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Introduction	  	  	  The	  task	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  answer	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  challenges	  in	  modern	  political	  philosophy:	  the	  question	  of	  under	  what	  conditions	  a	  modern	  government	  can	  attain	  genuine	  moral	  authority	  over	  its	  citizens.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  governments	  claim	  moral	  authority	  because	  they	  claim	  that	  they	  can	  issue	  laws	  that	  citizens	  may	  be	  punished	  for	  disobeying.	  	  Punishment,	  however,	  involves	  harsh	  treatment	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  persons	  generally	  have	  standing	  moral	  rights	  against,	  like	  being	  imprisoned.	  	  These	  rights	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  permissibly	  punishing	  people	  for	  acting	  in	  ways	  you	  disagree	  with,	  yet	  that	  is	  exactly	  what	  the	  government	  claims	  to	  be	  able	  to	  do.	  	  Governments	  claim	  that	  laws	  somehow	  change	  the	  moral	  standing	  of	  citizens	  such	  that	  they	  no	  longer	  have	  a	  right	  against	  being	  punished	  for	  acting	  in	  ways	  that	  entail	  breaking	  the	  law.	  	  	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  seems	  quite	  clear	  that	  many	  actual	  modern	  governments	  lack	  the	  moral	  standing	  to	  issue	  morally	  binding	  commands.	  	  It	  strains	  credulity	  to	  claim	  that	  a	  brutal	  dictator	  like	  Kim	  Jong-­‐Un	  has	  the	  moral	  permission	  to	  punish	  North	  Koreans	  for	  dissenting	  political	  speech,	  for	  example.	  	  There	  are	  bad	  laws	  and	  bad	  regimes.	  	  A	  good	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  provides	  one	  important	  and	  intuitive	  way	  of	  distinguishing	  governments	  that	  actually	  morally	  bind	  their	  citizens	  from	  governments	  that	  do	  not.	  	  	  	   Although	  understanding	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  government	  has	  political	  authority	  are	  clear,	  it	  is	  common	  in	  philosophy	  today	  to	  endorse	  philosophical	  anarchism,	  the	  position	  that	  no	  actual	  government	  has	  or	  can	  plausibly	  attain	  genuine	  moral	  authority.	  While	  anarchists	  generally	  admit	  that	  there	  are	  often	  moral	  reasons	  to	  do	  as	  the	  law	  says,	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especially	  under	  reasonably	  just	  regimes,	  they	  deny	  that	  any	  government	  has	  the	  power	  to	  issue	  laws	  that	  bind	  citizens’	  and	  ipso	  facto	  change	  their	  moral	  standing	  with	  respect	  to	  particular	  acts.	  	  	  	   While	  philosophical	  anarchism	  is	  in	  some	  respects	  counterintuitive,	  it	  is	  also	  theoretically	  robust.	  	  When	  political	  thought	  moved	  away	  from	  the	  divine	  right	  of	  kings	  and	  began	  focusing	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  individual	  citizens	  and	  how	  those	  rights	  constrain	  rulers,	  political	  authority	  became	  a	  much	  more	  difficult	  issue.	  	  Since	  then	  the	  problem	  of	  political	  authority	  has	  most	  often	  been	  approached	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  consent.	  Consent	  is	  the	  most	  obvious	  way	  that	  an	  impermissible	  act	  can	  be	  made	  permissible,	  and	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  if	  a	  government	  could	  secure	  actual	  consent	  from	  its	  citizens,	  then	  punishment	  wouldn’t	  wrong	  them.	  	  However,	  anarchists	  have	  persuasively	  argued	  that	  no	  actual	  government	  has	  secured	  such	  consent	  and	  that	  the	  extant	  attempts	  to	  establish	  governmental	  authority	  by	  appealing	  to	  consent	  in	  its	  non-­‐actual	  forms,	  for	  example	  tacit	  consent	  or	  hypothetical	  consent,	  are	  flawed.	  	  	  	   The	  goal	  of	  the	  dissertation,	  then,	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  idea	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  to	  propose	  and	  defend	  a	  novel	  account	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  new	  account	  shows	  that	  some	  modern	  governments,	  particularly	  liberal	  democracies,	  have	  genuine	  moral	  authority	  over	  most	  of	  their	  citizens.	  	  This	  authority	  contributes	  to	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  those	  governments	  govern	  permissibly.	  	  However,	  my	  account	  differs	  from	  traditional	  accounts	  of	  political	  authority,	  and	  those	  differences	  matter	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  citizens	  and	  the	  law.	  In	  the	  end	  we	  can	  respect	  many	  of	  the	  intuitions	  motivating	  philosophical	  anarchism,	  and	  many	  of	  its	  arguments,	  without	  embracing	  the	  counterintuitive	  position	  that	  no	  government	  has	  the	  power	  to	  issue	  morally	  binding	  laws.	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   In	  the	  end	  a	  plausible	  and	  informative	  picture	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  citizens	  and	  the	  law	  emerges.	  	  All	  citizens	  have	  a	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  to	  establish,	  maintain,	  and	  support	  the	  institutions	  that	  constitute	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  in	  a	  way	  that	  meets	  the	  demands	  of	  justice.	  	  In	  order	  to	  set	  up	  and	  maintain	  these	  institutions	  over	  time	  while	  meeting	  the	  demands	  of	  justice,	  the	  government	  must	  coordinate	  action	  on	  a	  mass	  scale	  by	  establishing	  a	  system	  of	  punishment	  that	  doesn’t	  wrong	  its	  citizens.	  	  The	  government	  has	  expertise	  relative	  to	  almost	  all	  their	  citizens	  about	  how	  to	  establish	  and	  support	  these	  institutions,	  meaning	  the	  citizen	  is	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  contribute	  to	  just	  institutions	  by	  following	  the	  law	  than	  if	  she	  tried	  to	  establish	  and	  support	  institutions	  based	  on	  her	  own	  judgment.	  	  Due	  to	  this,	  when	  the	  government	  issues	  commands,	  citizens’	  evidence	  about	  how	  to	  best	  discharge	  their	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice,	  and	  so	  how	  not	  to	  wrong	  their	  co-­‐citizens,	  decisively	  changes.	  	  This	  change	  makes	  them	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  acting	  otherwise,	  and	  so	  is	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  a	  system	  of	  permissible	  punishment.	  When	  the	  government	  has	  sufficiently	  widespread	  expertise	  about	  setting	  up	  and	  maintaining	  the	  basic	  institutions	  of	  society	  in	  a	  way	  that	  treats	  all	  citizens	  fairly,	  laws	  morally	  bind	  citizens	  and	  their	  actions	  may	  be	  coercively	  coordinated	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  our	  shared	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice.	  The	  five	  chapters	  that	  follow	  this	  introduction	  make	  the	  argument	  for	  this	  picture.	  It	  begins	  with	  a	  detailed	  characterization	  of	  authority	  and	  claims	  that	  authority	  must	  be	  understood	  more	  broadly	  than	  is	  generally	  assumed	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  political	  authority.	  	  This	  broader	  notion	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  that	  what	  is	  required	  for	  the	  sort	  of	  authority	  governments	  claim	  is	  evidential	  authority,	  rather	  than	  traditional	  authority.	  	  A	  close	  look	  at	  the	  nature	  of	  evidence	  leads	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  commands	  bind	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subjects,	  and	  so	  in	  what	  sense	  citizens	  are	  morally	  bound	  to	  do	  as	  the	  law	  dictates.	  	  The	  main	  condition	  on	  evidential	  authority	  is	  epistemic	  expertise,	  so	  we	  enter	  the	  social	  epistemology	  literature	  and	  explore	  the	  idea	  that	  governments	  could	  plausibly	  achieve	  the	  relevant	  expertise	  due	  to	  their	  institutional	  nature.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  discussion	  I	  add	  four	  additional	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  evidential	  authority,	  each	  responding	  to	  concerns	  over	  when	  it	  is	  reasonable	  for	  citizens	  to	  defer	  to	  authorities.	  	  Finally,	  I	  argue	  that	  some	  modern	  governments	  plausibly	  meet	  these	  conditions	  and	  so	  have	  genuine	  evidential	  authority	  over	  most	  of	  their	  citizens	  in	  most	  domains,	  denying	  philosophical	  anarchism.	  	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  introduction	  more	  fully	  details	  this	  argument.	  	  1.	  Authority	  and	  Anarchism	  The	  main	  task	  of	  the	  first	  chapter	  is	  to	  characterize	  the	  concept	  of	  authority.	  	  The	  starting	  point	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  command:	  authorities	  issue	  commands,	  speech	  acts	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  bind	  subjects	  by	  giving	  them	  a	  preemptive	  and	  content-­‐independent	  reason.	  	  Preemptive	  reasons	  are	  contrasted	  with	  merely	  additive	  reasons,	  and	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  preemptive	  reasons	  replace	  (or	  preempt)	  some	  of	  the	  subjects’	  other	  reasons	  rather	  than	  merely	  being	  added	  to	  the	  overall	  balance	  of	  subjects’	  reasons.	  	  Content-­‐independent	  reasons	  are	  reasons	  that	  have	  force	  due	  to	  their	  provenance	  rather	  than	  to	  their	  content;	  when	  a	  mother	  commands	  her	  child	  to	  go	  to	  her	  room,	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  child	  to	  obey	  is	  that	  the	  mother	  has	  the	  appropriate	  standing,	  not	  that	  the	  content	  of	  the	  command	  was	  in	  some	  sense	  correct.	  	  Had	  a	  stranger	  issued	  the	  same	  directive	  to	  the	  child,	  the	  child	  wouldn’t	  be	  bound	  because	  the	  provenance	  of	  the	  command	  was	  wrong	  even	  though	  the	  content	  of	  the	  command	  was	  the	  same.	  	  This	  characterization	  of	  authority	  traces	  through	  Thomas	  Hobbes	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and	  Jeremy	  Bentham	  to	  the	  twentieth	  century	  and	  the	  philosophies	  of	  H.	  L.	  A.	  Hart	  and	  Joseph	  Raz.	  These	  theories	  have	  in	  common	  a	  rationalist	  approach	  to	  authority,	  characterizing	  authority	  by	  the	  sort	  of	  reasons	  commands	  constitute	  for	  subjects.	  	   The	  most	  important	  argument	  of	  chapter	  one	  focuses	  on	  the	  moral	  standing	  the	  authority	  has	  to	  issue	  commands.	  	  The	  traditional	  notion	  of	  authority	  is	  of	  authority	  as	  the	  right	  to	  command.	  	  Here	  ‘right’	  refers	  to	  a	  Hohfeldian	  advantages.	  	  When	  one	  agent	  has	  a	  right	  against	  another,	  the	  other	  has	  a	  correlative	  duty.	  	  Thus	  if	  authority	  is	  the	  right	  to	  command,	  subjects	  have	  a	  correlative	  duty	  to	  obey.	  	  This	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  very	  intuitive	  and	  plausible	  concept	  of	  authority.	  	  If	  citizens	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law,	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  can	  be	  punished	  for	  breaking	  the	  law	  makes	  intuitive	  sense.	  	  However,	  the	  traditional	  notion	  of	  authority	  is	  too	  narrow.	  	   The	  idea	  of	  authority	  as	  the	  right	  to	  command	  cannot	  capture	  some	  paradigmatic	  exercises	  of	  authority.	  We	  have	  to	  expand	  our	  understanding	  of	  authority	  past	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  right	  to	  command	  and	  focus	  on	  a	  different	  Hohfeldian	  advantage,	  namely	  on	  a	  power.	  	  When	  one	  agent	  has	  a	  power	  over	  another,	  then	  she	  can	  alter	  the	  other’s	  normative	  standing	  at	  her	  discretion.	  	  This	  modified	  understanding	  of	  authority	  shows	  that	  agents	  can	  have	  authority	  that	  effects	  change	  in	  the	  standing	  of	  subjects	  without	  changing	  what	  they	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  do.	  	  Thus	  we	  see	  the	  possibility	  of	  authority	  that	  isn’t	  traditional	  authority,	  and	  the	  possibility	  that	  non-­‐traditional	  authority	  could	  be	  attained	  even	  though	  traditional	  authority	  cannot,	  as	  the	  anarchists	  have	  shown.	  	   Finally,	  I	  outline	  Raz’s	  service	  conception	  of	  authority.	  	  The	  service	  conception	  details	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  genuine	  authority	  and	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  new	  account.	  	  The	  main	  condition	  on	  genuine	  authority	  for	  Raz	  is	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis,	  which	  says	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that	  one	  agent	  has	  authority	  over	  another	  when	  the	  subject	  would	  likely	  better	  conform	  to	  her	  reasons	  if	  she	  tried	  to	  follow	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  authority	  than	  if	  she	  tried	  to	  follow	  her	  own	  judgment.	  	  Thus	  authority	  is	  in	  service	  to	  the	  subject,	  only	  binding	  her	  because	  she	  will	  better	  conform	  to	  her	  own	  preexisting	  reasons.	  	  2.	  Evidential	  Modern	  Political	  Authority	  With	  the	  concept	  of	  authority	  clarified	  and	  a	  conception	  of	  authority	  on	  offer,	  I	  then	  turn	  to	  narrowing	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  dissertation	  to	  modern	  political	  authority	  in	  particular.	  	  Modern	  political	  authority	  is	  characterized	  in	  six	  ways	  that	  distinguish	  it	  from	  authority	  in	  general	  and	  that	  show	  why	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  especially	  difficult	  to	  attain.	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  problem	  of	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  this:	  how	  could	  one	  agent	  have	  the	  power	  to	  command	  millions	  or	  even	  billions	  of	  incredibly	  diverse	  individuals,	  over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  entire	  lives,	  about	  the	  most	  important	  domains	  of	  their	  lives,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  punishment	  for	  disobedience	  is	  morally	  permissible,	  yet	  without	  their	  consent.	  	  If	  attaining	  genuine	  moral	  authority	  over	  even	  one	  other	  person	  in	  any	  condition	  is	  difficult,	  as	  it	  seems	  to	  be,	  then	  attaining	  modern	  political	  authority	  seems	  supremely	  difficult.	  	   The	  focus	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  punishable	  authority,	  or	  authority	  that	  issues	  commands	  subjects	  can	  be	  permissibly	  punished	  for	  disobeying.	  	  This	  is	  the	  defining	  and	  most	  morally	  worrying	  feature	  of	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  The	  question	  is	  what	  kind	  of	  authority	  is	  punishable	  authority.	  	  At	  first	  glance,	  traditional	  authority	  looks	  exactly	  right	  because	  it	  creates	  duties,	  so	  subjects	  act	  wrongly	  if	  they	  disobey.	  	  This	  isn’t	  right	  though,	  as	  I	  show	  with	  a	  series	  of	  thought	  experiments.	  	  To	  fully	  understand	  moral	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment,	  we	  have	  to	  distinguish	  between	  wrongdoing	  and	  culpability.	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Someone	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  only	  if	  they	  are	  culpable,	  yet	  agents	  can	  be	  culpable	  without	  acting	  wrongly	  and	  can	  be	  nonculpable	  despite	  acting	  wrongly.	  	  Culpability	  is	  grounded	  in	  subjective	  wrongdoing	  rather	  than	  objective	  wrongdoing:	  an	  agent	  is	  culpable	  if	  she	  acts	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  be	  objectively	  wrong	  if	  her	  beliefs	  or	  evidence	  were	  true,	  rather	  than	  if	  she	  acts	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  objectively	  wrong.	  	   Thus	  governments	  require	  the	  power	  to	  change	  citizens’	  subjective	  duties	  if	  they	  are	  to	  permissibly	  punish	  citizens	  for	  breaking	  the	  law.	  	  While	  traditional	  accounts	  can	  capture	  this	  change	  without	  much	  difficulty,	  our	  broadened	  understanding	  of	  authority	  as	  a	  power	  instead	  of	  a	  right	  shows	  that	  governments	  could	  have	  authority	  that	  changes	  subjective	  duties	  without	  changing	  objective	  duties.	  	  In	  this	  case	  they	  have	  evidential	  rather	  than	  traditional	  authority.	  	  In	  some	  situations,	  when	  subjects’	  evidence	  changes	  so	  does	  what	  they	  are	  prima	  facie	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  doing,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  their	  objective	  duties	  have	  changed.	  	  This	  is	  important	  because	  it	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  political	  authority	  that	  anarchists	  haven’t	  addressed	  and	  that	  modern	  governments	  can	  perhaps	  attain.	  	   There	  is	  a	  worry	  with	  this	  thought	  from	  the	  outset,	  however.	  	  Changing	  evidence	  merely	  changes	  subjective	  duties,	  but	  authority	  must	  change	  subjects’	  objective	  standing.	  Further,	  it	  must	  change	  objective	  standing	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  subjects’	  actions	  can	  be	  coordinated	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  political	  aims.	  	  It	  appears	  that	  changes	  in	  epistemic	  reasons	  cannot	  accomplish	  this	  task.	  	  However,	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  evidence	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  answers	  this	  worry.	  I	  can	  coordinate	  action	  and	  make	  a	  decisive	  difference	  in	  subjects’	  objective	  moral	  standing	  by	  making	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individuals’	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment.	  Evidential	  authority	  really	  is	  practical	  authority.	  	  3.	  How	  Authorities	  Bind	  Traditional	  authority	  runs	  into	  a	  dilemma	  when	  considering	  nonconsensual	  authorities	  that	  issue	  mistaken	  commands.	  	  Authorities	  are	  agents	  and	  all	  agents	  are	  fallible,	  so	  all	  actual	  authorities	  will	  sometimes	  issue	  mistaken	  commands.	  	  However,	  it	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  that	  mistaken	  commands	  necessarily	  fail	  to	  bind.	  	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  authority	  would	  be	  an	  empty	  and	  useless	  idea,	  for	  subjects	  would	  simply	  have	  reason	  to	  do	  as	  their	  preexisting	  reasons	  entail	  and	  whether	  an	  authority	  commanded	  the	  subject	  to	  act	  in	  some	  way	  is	  irrelevant.	  	  Further,	  the	  fact	  that	  commands	  give	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  entails	  that	  some	  mistaken	  commands	  bind,	  for	  whether	  a	  command	  is	  mistaken	  is	  an	  issue	  of	  content.	  	  The	  problem	  for	  traditional	  authority	  is	  that	  mistaken	  commands	  are	  supposed	  to	  entail	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  do	  as	  commanded,	  but	  the	  preexisting	  reasons	  also	  entail	  a	  duty	  to	  do	  not	  as	  commanded	  (given	  that	  the	  command	  is	  mistaken).	  	  This	  contradicts	  the	  plausible	  principle	  of	  “ought	  implies	  can”.	  	   The	  most	  obvious	  response	  to	  this	  dilemma	  is	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  authority’s	  command	  somehow	  removes	  the	  countervailing	  reasons.	  	  Thus	  Raz	  claims	  that	  countervailing	  reasons	  are	  excluded,	  which	  is	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  second-­‐order	  defeat.	  	  Excluded	  reasons,	  regardless	  of	  their	  weight,	  can	  no	  longer	  function	  as	  reasons	  for	  the	  subject.	  	  However,	  getting	  clear	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  exclusion	  is	  difficult.	  	  Raz	  endorses	  a	  motivational	  interpretation	  of	  exclusion,	  but	  this	  interpretation	  should	  be	  rejected	  because	  it	  requires	  an	  implausible	  understanding	  of	  our	  motives	  and	  because	  it	  is	  dissonant	  with	  out	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commonsense	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  obey	  an	  authority.	  	  Instead	  we	  should	  understand	  exclusion	  under	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation.	  	  The	  justificatory	  interpretation	  shows	  that	  consensual	  authority	  excludes	  by	  canceling	  the	  force	  of	  certain	  reasons,	  while	  nonconsensual,	  evidential	  authority	  excludes	  by	  undercutting	  the	  force	  of	  certain	  reasons.	  	  Undercutting	  defeat	  is	  a	  function	  of	  reliability,	  which	  coheres	  well	  with	  our	  understanding	  of	  evidence,	  Raz’s	  examples	  of	  exclusion,	  and	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis.	  	  	  	   This	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  first	  condition	  on	  authority,	  which	  is	  an	  analog	  to	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis.	  	  I	  call	  it	  the	  expertise	  condition.	  	  Experts	  are	  individuals	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  less	  mistaken	  and	  likely	  to	  be	  mistaken	  less	  than	  the	  layperson	  because	  they	  have	  extensive	  training	  in	  a	  particular	  domain.	  	  It	  is	  especially	  important	  and	  relevant	  that	  they	  understand	  the	  second-­‐order	  justificatory	  structure	  of	  the	  domain,	  so	  they	  can	  modify	  their	  beliefs	  in	  light	  of	  new	  evidence,	  can	  apply	  their	  beleifs	  to	  new	  situations,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  reliability	  of	  their	  judgments	  trumps	  the	  reliability	  of	  non-­‐experts’	  judgments:	  when	  an	  expert	  issues	  a	  judgment,	  the	  rational	  response	  is	  to	  believe	  what	  the	  expert	  says	  precisely	  because	  she	  is	  an	  expert.	  	  4.	  From	  Expertise	  to	  Authority	  Chapter	  four	  details	  three	  further	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  First	  is	  the	  acceptance	  condition,	  which	  says	  that	  an	  authority	  must	  issue	  directives	  with	  practical	  intent,	  with	  the	  intention	  that	  the	  subject	  take	  the	  command	  to	  give	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  act	  on	  its	  basis	  in	  the	  practical	  context	  under	  consideration.	  	  This	  distinguishes	  authority	  from	  the	  mere	  issuance	  of	  expert	  judgments	  and	  bridges	  the	  gap	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from	  expert	  directives	  that	  give	  reason	  to	  believe	  to	  practical	  commands	  that	  give	  reason	  to	  act.	  	   However,	  this	  move	  makes	  it	  appear	  that	  in	  order	  to	  have	  moral	  authority	  you	  must	  also	  have	  moral	  expertise.	  	  This	  is	  because	  an	  expert	  about	  a	  non-­‐moral	  domain	  does	  not	  necessarily	  know	  when	  her	  expertise	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  subject’s	  reasons	  in	  a	  particular	  context	  and	  so	  when	  she	  should	  claim	  the	  subject	  has	  a	  reason	  to	  accept	  her	  judgment.	  	  But	  if	  moral	  expertise	  is	  required	  for	  moral	  authority,	  it	  looks	  very	  implausible	  that	  modern	  governments	  could	  have	  any	  form	  of	  moral	  authority.	  	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  concern	  is	  the	  precedence	  condition.	  	  Even	  non-­‐experts	  sometimes,	  even	  often,	  know	  when	  non-­‐moral	  expertise	  is	  relevant	  in	  a	  given	  moral	  context.	  	  While	  moral	  expertise	  is	  (perhaps)	  sufficient	  for	  this	  knowledge,	  it	  isn’t	  necessary.	  	  What’s	  required	  for	  moral	  authority	  grounded	  in	  non-­‐moral	  expertise	  is	  knowledge	  that	  the	  non-­‐moral	  expertise	  is	  precedent	  in	  a	  particular	  practical	  context,	  i.e.	  that	  acting	  on	  that	  domain	  is	  also	  acting	  all-­‐things-­‐considered.	  	   It	  might	  also	  appear	  that	  moral	  authority	  requires	  moral	  virtue.	  	  Authority	  is	  not	  about	  judgment	  but	  about	  issuing	  directives,	  and	  one	  way	  to	  fail	  to	  issue	  binding	  directives	  is	  to	  issue	  directives	  when	  one	  shouldn’t.	  	  This	  is	  something	  like	  the	  deficit	  we	  see	  in	  the	  old	  story	  of	  the	  boy	  who	  cried	  wolf.	  	  The	  problem	  here	  isn’t	  whether	  the	  purported	  authority	  is	  expert,	  but	  whether	  she	  exercises	  her	  authority	  by	  issuing	  directives	  in	  the	  appropriate	  manner.	  	  This	  returns	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  command	  is	  a	  communicative	  speech	  act	  that	  requires	  a	  particular	  relationship	  between	  two	  agents.	  	  This	  relationship	  must	  be	  one	  of	  trust,	  for	  otherwise	  deference	  to	  another	  is	  rationally	  mystifying.	  	  Trust	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  relying	  on	  the	  goodwill	  and	  competence	  of	  another	  by	  granting	  them	  discretionary	  powers	  over	  important	  interests.	  	  The	  more	  important	  the	  interests	  in	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question	  and	  the	  more	  powers	  you	  grant	  them,	  the	  more	  vulnerable	  you	  make	  yourself	  to	  them	  and	  the	  more	  trust	  is	  required.	  	  	  	   Finally,	  I	  address	  whether	  it	  is	  even	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  that	  governments	  could	  attain	  the	  levels	  of	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness	  required	  for	  political	  authority.	  	  Governments	  have	  extensive	  powers	  over	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  interests	  in	  citizens’	  lives,	  so	  require	  an	  extensive	  amount	  of	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness	  that	  they	  do	  not	  at	  first	  glance	  seem	  apt	  to	  attain.	  	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  problem	  lies	  in	  the	  institutional	  nature	  of	  modern	  governments.	  	  Institutions	  are	  able	  to	  aggregate	  the	  expertise	  of	  many	  individuals	  in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  expert	  judgments.	  The	  expertise	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  is	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	  institutions	  rather	  than	  of	  particular	  individuals	  in	  the	  government.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  trustworthiness:	  institutions	  are	  able	  to	  incorporate	  explicit,	  public	  rules	  that	  ground	  goodwill	  in	  a	  way	  that	  individuals	  cannot.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  institutions	  necessarily	  do	  this,	  just	  that	  well-­‐constructed	  institutions	  can	  raise	  the	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness	  of	  the	  government	  to	  levels	  much	  higher	  than	  we	  would	  expect	  when	  considering	  the	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness	  of	  the	  individuals	  that	  make	  up	  modern	  governments.	  	  5.	  Towards	  Evidential	  Governmentalism	  In	  the	  final	  chapter	  I	  apply	  the	  theory’s	  five	  conditions	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Western	  democracies	  and	  argue	  that	  they	  plausibly	  have	  genuine	  evidential	  authority	  over	  most	  of	  their	  citizens	  in	  most	  domains.	  	  This	  is	  sufficient	  authority	  to	  achieve	  governments’	  ends	  and	  denies	  philosophical	  anarchism.	  	  First,	  expertise.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  some	  modern	  governments	  are	  expert	  about	  the	  demands	  of	  justice,	  understood	  in	  a	  Rawlsian	  vein,	  over	  most	  of	  their	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citizens.	  	  This	  is	  not	  the	  claim	  that	  modern	  governments	  are	  absolute	  or	  universal	  experts	  about	  justice,	  but	  merely	  that	  they	  are	  expert	  relative	  to	  most	  of	  the	  population.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  because	  justice	  requires	  contextual	  expertise,	  as	  the	  demands	  of	  justice	  vary	  from	  context	  to	  context.	  	  While	  some	  citizens	  may	  be	  experts	  about	  justice	  in	  the	  abstract,	  they	  likely	  lack	  the	  contextual	  expertise	  that	  is	  required	  to	  make	  all	  but	  the	  most	  basic	  demands	  of	  justice	  determinate	  in	  a	  particular	  context.	  	   Further,	  once	  we	  see	  that	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  requires	  mere	  equal	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment,	  not	  universal	  obedience	  to	  the	  law,	  we	  see	  another	  way	  traditional	  theories	  have	  gone	  wrong.	  	  Simmons	  rightly	  objects	  to	  Rawls	  that	  having	  a	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  justice	  to	  be	  achieved;	  an	  individual	  act	  of	  law-­‐breaking	  has	  no	  significant	  effect.	  	  But	  universal	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  is	  a	  different	  matter,	  for	  without	  that	  the	  law	  is	  arbitrary	  and	  can’t	  support	  and	  maintain	  just	  societal	  institutions.	  	  	  	   Governments	  clearly	  claim	  practical	  authority,	  so	  the	  acceptance	  condition	  is	  met.	  	  It	  is	  also	  intuitively	  clear	  that	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  is	  important	  enough	  to	  meet	  the	  deference	  condition.	  	  And	  the	  governments’	  expertise,	  both	  in	  justice	  and	  in	  non-­‐moral	  domains,	  is	  clearly	  relevant	  to	  individual	  citizens’	  duty	  to	  create,	  uphold,	  and	  maintain	  just	  societal	  institutions,	  meeting	  the	  precedence	  condition.	  	   The	  remaining	  condition	  is	  the	  trustworthiness	  condition.	  	  I	  address	  this	  condition,	  and	  bolster	  the	  case	  for	  the	  relative,	  contextual	  expertise	  of	  modern	  governments,	  by	  looking	  at	  democracy.	  	  Democratic	  institutions	  are	  important	  firstly	  because	  they	  guarantee	  (in	  some	  ways,	  although	  certainly	  not	  all)	  that	  citizens’	  interests	  are	  accounted	  for	  in	  the	  judgments	  of	  the	  government.	  	  Poor	  enough	  decisions	  will	  result	  in	  politicians	  not	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being	  reelected	  and	  so	  changes	  in	  how	  the	  government	  functions.	  	  This	  contributes	  greatly	  to	  the	  goodwill	  component	  of	  trustworthiness.	  	  	  Democratic	  institutions	  also	  contribute	  to	  the	  competence	  and	  ultimately	  the	  expertise	  of	  modern	  governments.	  	  This	  is	  because	  feedback	  mechanisms	  like	  elections	  constrain	  the	  judgments	  of	  governments	  in	  ways	  that	  enhance	  competence.	  	  Further,	  there	  is	  recent	  social	  science	  evidence	  that	  under	  the	  right	  conditions,	  cognitive	  diversity	  is	  more	  important	  for	  the	  competency	  of	  group	  decisions	  than	  individuals’	  levels	  of	  competence.	  	  Finally,	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  political	  questions	  are	  morally	  indeterminate	  means	  that	  we	  can	  make	  decisions	  on	  procedural	  rather	  than	  substantive	  grounds.	  These	  reflections	  show	  why	  my	  view	  that	  the	  government	  requires	  expertise	  to	  have	  genuine	  moral	  authority	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  experts	  should	  rule.	  Some	  modern	  governments	  are	  trustworthy	  experts	  about	  meeting	  the	  demands	  of	  justice	  with	  respect	  to	  most	  of	  their	  citizens	  in	  most	  domains,	  giving	  them	  genuine	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  While	  this	  entails	  that	  philosophical	  anarchism	  is	  false,	  the	  account	  presented	  here	  respects	  the	  anarchist’s	  motivations	  while	  allowing	  for	  a	  nuanced,	  plausible,	  and	  intuitive	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  citizens	  and	  the	  governments	  that	  largely	  structure	  our	  lives	  in	  modern	  societies.	  	  In	  the	  end	  we	  better	  understand	  the	  conditions	  for	  justified	  governance,	  and	  so	  as	  citizens	  have	  stronger	  and	  clearer	  grounds	  for	  holding	  governments	  accountable	  to	  our	  interests	  and	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  justice.	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1	  –	  Authority	  and	  Anarchism	  	  One	  of	  the	  central	  questions	  of	  political	  philosophy	  is	  whether	  governments	  have	  moral	  authority	  over	  their	  citizens.	  	  If	  the	  government	  has	  moral	  authority,	  then	  its	  commands	  constitute	  changes	  in	  citizens	  moral	  standing:	  simply	  because	  the	  government	  has	  made	  some	  act	  illegal	  changes	  citizens’	  moral	  relations	  to	  that	  act.	  	  Philosophical	  anarchists	  deny	  that	  any	  actual	  government	  has	  genuine	  (or	  de	  jure	  or	  justified)	  moral	  authority,	  in	  part	  because	  the	  idea	  that	  governments	  as	  we	  know	  them	  can	  simply	  create	  moral	  duties	  ex	  
nihilo	  seems	  preposterous.1	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  philosophical	  anarchists,	  governmentalists	  claim	  at	  least	  some	  actual	  governments	  have	  genuine	  moral	  authority,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  intuitively	  plausible	  idea	  that	  government	  and	  the	  issuance	  of	  morally	  binding	  laws	  is	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  achieving	  great	  moral	  goods,	  such	  as	  justice.	  The	  debate	  between	  philosophical	  anarchists	  and	  governmentalists	  has	  a	  long	  history,	  with	  entrenched	  arguments	  on	  both	  sides.	  	  This	  debate,	  however,	  has	  been	  myopic.	  	  It	  focuses	  entirely	  on	  one	  kind	  of	  moral	  authority,	  what	  I	  call	  traditional	  authority.	  	  My	  sense	  of	  the	  literature	  and	  theorists’	  general	  attitudes	  is	  that	  philosophical	  anarchists	  have	  won	  the	  debate	  over	  traditional	  authority,	  so	  anarchism	  has	  become	  the	  default	  position	  on	  the	  question	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  I	  basically	  agree	  with	  this	  trend.	  	  The	  anarchists	  have	  established,	  to	  my	  mind,	  that	  governments	  don’t	  have	  (and	  realistically	  can’t	  attain)	  traditional	  authority.	  Traditional	  governmentalism,	  the	  view	  that	  governments	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See,	  e.g.,	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  “The	  Anarchist	  Position:	  A	  Reply	  to	  Klosko	  and	  Senor”,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  
Affairs	  16	  (1987):	  pp.	  269-­‐70.	  	  I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  the	  standard	  understanding	  of	  philosophical	  anarchism,	  but	  others	  define	  it	  in	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  ways,	  including	  views	  about	  political	  legitimacy,	  sovereignty,	  and	  other	  governmental	  attributes.	  	  I	  will	  use	  it	  simply	  as	  the	  position	  that	  denies	  any	  actual	  government	  has	  genuine	  moral	  authority.	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traditional	  authority,	  is	  false.	  Philosophical	  anarchism	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  the	  default	  position	  once	  we	  get	  past	  the	  myopic	  focus	  on	  traditional	  authority.	  	  Once	  we	  see	  that	  there	  are	  types	  of	  moral	  authority	  other	  than	  traditional	  authority,	  we	  see	  that	  governments	  could	  have	  moral	  authority	  despite	  lacking	  traditional	  authority.	  	  In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  argue	  for	  a	  version	  of	  governmentalism	  that	  attempts	  to	  capture	  this	  middle	  ground.	  	  I	  call	  it	  evidential	  
governmentalism.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  more	  fully	  articulate	  the	  anarchist	  and	  governmentalist	  positions,	  clarify	  the	  concept	  of	  authority,	  and	  begin	  to	  defend	  the	  myopia	  charge.	  	  
1.	  Anarchism	  and	  Governmentalism	  Philosophical	  anarchism,	  as	  I	  have	  said,	  is	  the	  position	  that	  no	  government	  has	  genuine	  moral	  authority.	  	  It	  is	  contrasted	  with	  political	  anarchism,	  which	  goes	  beyond	  the	  claim	  that	  governments	  lack	  moral	  authority	  to	  some	  practical	  conclusions	  about	  how	  citizens	  should	  relate	  to	  the	  government.	  	  The	  political	  anarchist	  thinks	  the	  government	  is	  unnecessary,	  should	  be	  resisted,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  overthrown.	  	  Philosophical	  anarchists	  are	  often	  not	  political	  anarchists	  because	  they	  believe	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  do	  as	  the	  government	  says	  and	  keep	  the	  government	  in	  place	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  government	  lacks	  moral	  authority.2	  	  Political	  anarchism	  looks	  especially	  implausible	  if	  philosophical	  anarchism	  is	  false,	  so	  if	  I	  can	  establish	  a	  version	  of	  governmentalism	  and	  deny	  philosophical	  anarchism,	  political	  anarchism	  will	  fall	  as	  well.	  	  As	  such	  my	  focus	  will	  be	  exclusively	  on	  philosophical	  anarchism,	  and	  I	  will	  use	  ‘anarchism’	  to	  mean	  philosophical	  anarchism.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Although	  there	  are	  some	  reasons	  to	  doubt	  that	  philosophical	  anarchism	  without	  political	  anarchism	  isn’t	  possible.	  	  For	  example,	  see	  Christopher	  Heath	  Wellman	  and	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  Is	  There	  a	  Duty	  to	  Obey	  the	  Law?	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  UP,	  2005):	  pp.	  26-­‐29.	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   Philosophical	  anarchism	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  conceptual	  philosophical	  anarchism	  and	  empirical	  philosophical	  anarchism.3	  	  Conceptual	  anarchists	  argue	  that	  governments	  lack	  moral	  authority	  because	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  moral	  authority	  is	  conceptually	  incoherent.	  	  Conceptual	  anarchists	  are	  a	  rarity,	  and	  to	  my	  mind	  have	  been	  plausibly	  and	  convincingly	  answered.4	  	  The	  more	  common	  position	  is	  empirical	  anarchism,	  according	  to	  which	  governments	  lack	  moral	  authority	  because	  no	  actual	  government	  meets	  the	  conditions	  for	  such	  authority.	  	  According	  to	  the	  empirical	  anarchist,	  there	  are	  possible	  worlds	  where	  a	  government	  could	  meet	  the	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  moral	  authority	  (like	  an	  imaginary	  world	  where	  governments	  were	  able	  to	  secure	  actual	  universal	  consent).	  The	  problem	  is	  that,	  as	  the	  world	  is,	  no	  government	  does	  meet	  those	  conditions.	  	   Within	  empirical	  philosophical	  anarchism	  we	  can	  make	  further	  distinctions.	  	  According	  to	  the	  empirical	  anarchist,	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  government	  has	  genuine	  authority	  is	  a	  contingent	  fact.	  	  If	  empirical	  circumstances	  changed	  sufficiently,	  an	  empirical	  anarchist	  would	  be	  a	  governmentalist.	  	  The	  question,	  then,	  is	  how	  close	  actual	  governments	  are	  to	  meeting	  the	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  authority.	  	  	  At	  one	  limit	  we	  might	  think	  actual	  governments	  are	  extremely	  close	  to	  meeting	  those	  conditions,	  so	  a	  few	  tweaks	  would	  change	  us	  from	  anarchists	  to	  governmentalists.	  	  At	  the	  other	  limit	  we	  might	  think	  actual	  governments	  are	  extremely	  far	  away	  from	  meeting	  those	  conditions,	  so	  far	  away	  that	  nothing	  that	  looks	  like	  a	  government	  as	  we	  conceive	  of	  them	  could	  plausibly	  meet	  the	  conditions.	  	  Our	  anarchism	  would	  then	  be	  much	  less	  contingent,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  we	  might	  think	  no	  government	  could	  have	  moral	  authority	  in	  any	  plausibly-­‐realizable	  state	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  Simmons,	  “The	  Anarchist	  Position”,	  pp.	  269-­‐70	  for	  this	  contrast.	  4	  The	  only	  two	  I	  know	  of	  are	  Robert	  Paul	  Wolff,	  In	  Defense	  of	  Anarchism	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  1970)	  and	  Heidi	  M.	  Hurd,	  “Challenging	  Authority”,	  The	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  100	  (1991):	  pp.	  1611-­‐77.	  	  See	  Simmons,	  “The	  Anarchist	  Position”,	  n.	  2	  for	  a	  refutation	  of	  Wolff.	  	  I	  address	  Hurd’s	  similar	  argument	  in	  Appendix	  A.	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world.	  	   This	  more	  robust,	  less	  contingent	  empirical	  anarchism	  describes	  the	  position	  of	  most	  anarchists,	  including	  empirical	  anarchism’s	  exemplar,	  A.	  John	  Simmons.	  	  Simmons	  rejects	  conceptual	  anarchism	  because	  he	  thinks	  that	  universal	  actual	  consent	  could	  ground	  a	  government’s	  genuine	  moral	  authority.	  	  Universal	  actual	  consent,	  though,	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  genuine	  political	  authority	  on	  Simmons’	  account.	  	  While	  we	  can	  imagine	  a	  possible	  world	  where	  something	  like	  a	  modern	  government	  was	  able	  to	  secure	  universal	  actual	  consent,	  no	  actual	  government	  has	  done	  this.	  	  Further,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  no	  actual	  government	  could	  do	  this.	  	  The	  logistics	  are	  a	  nightmare,	  there	  is	  the	  ever-­‐present	  possibility	  of	  contrarians	  who	  would	  not	  consent	  simply	  because	  everyone	  else	  has,	  and	  many	  people	  in	  the	  world	  today	  are	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  give	  morally	  binding	  consent.	  	  So	  for	  Simmons,	  the	  possible	  world	  where	  a	  government	  has	  genuine	  authority	  is	  very	  far	  away	  from	  the	  actual	  world	  and	  any	  plausibly-­‐realizable	  government	  must	  lack	  moral	  authority.	  	  Simmons’	  more	  robust	  empirical	  anarchism	  can	  be	  put	  thusly:	  all	  actual	  governments	  lack	  genuine	  moral	  authority	  and	  in	  no	  forseeable,	  plausibly-­‐realizable	  near	  future	  would	  any	  government	  be	  able	  to	  attain	  it.	  	  This	  is	  the	  most	  common,	  well-­‐defended,	  and	  plausible	  version	  of	  anarchism.	  	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  the	  most	  practically	  relevant	  version	  of	  anarchism,	  as	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  sort	  of	  government	  that	  could	  plausibly	  affect	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  people	  in	  the	  world	  today.	  It	  will	  be	  my	  main	  focus	  for	  these	  reasons.	  	  	  	   In	  contrast	  to	  anarchism	  as	  I’ve	  defined	  it	  is	  governmentalism.	  	  Most	  minimally,	  governmentalism	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  at	  least	  one	  government	  has	  moral	  authority	  over	  at	  least	  one	  citizen	  in	  at	  least	  one	  domain.	  	  The	  term	  ‘governmentalism’	  is	  my	  own,	  but	  this	  position	  has	  various	  names	  in	  the	  literature,	  including	  ‘statism’.	  	  I	  think	  government	  is	  best	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thought	  of	  as	  the	  group	  of	  individuals	  filling	  roles	  in	  a	  political	  institution	  while	  the	  state	  is	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  political	  institution.5	  	  Drawing	  the	  distinction	  in	  this	  way	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  preferable	  to	  think	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  governments	  rather	  than	  the	  authority	  of	  states,	  and	  so	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  using	  ‘governmentalism’	  rather	  than	  ‘statism’.	  	  First,	  authority	  rests	  with	  agents,	  not	  with	  institutions.	  	  We	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  obeying	  an	  individual	  who	  fills	  an	  institutional	  role	  because	  they	  fill	  that	  institutional	  role,	  but	  the	  idea	  of	  obeying	  an	  institution	  as	  such	  is	  at	  least	  more	  mysterious.	  	   Second,	  states	  are	  only	  one	  kind	  of	  political	  institution,	  especially	  if	  we	  take	  ‘state’	  to	  refer	  to	  something	  like	  modern	  nation-­‐states.	  	  There	  are	  other	  forms	  of	  political	  organization	  that	  establish	  non-­‐state	  political	  institutions,	  for	  example	  global	  institutions.	  	  If	  we	  frame	  the	  discussion	  of	  political	  authority	  in	  terms	  of	  state	  authority,	  we	  risk	  ignoring	  the	  possibility	  that	  non-­‐state	  governments	  could	  have	  genuine	  political	  authority.	  	  As	  I	  am	  a	  political	  cosmopolitan	  and	  believe	  that	  justice	  in	  our	  modern	  world	  demands	  some	  non-­‐state	  political	  institutions,	  I	  especially	  want	  to	  highlight	  the	  possibility	  of	  genuine	  non-­‐state	  political	  authority.	  	  	  	   Third,	  using	  the	  term	  ‘statism’	  threatens	  to	  burden	  our	  discussion	  of	  political	  authority	  with	  expectations	  that	  are	  particular	  to	  state	  authority.	  	  A	  good	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  claim	  modern	  nation-­‐states	  paradigmatically,	  and	  perhaps	  conceptually,	  make	  to	  
perfectly	  general	  authority.	  	  That	  is,	  they	  claim	  authority	  over	  all	  individuals	  within	  their	  territory	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  all	  domains	  over	  those	  individuals.	  	  If	  we	  use	  the	  term	  ‘statism’,	  then,	  it	  looks	  reasonable	  to	  demand	  that	  a	  good	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  We	  could	  also	  think	  of	  the	  government	  as	  the	  collective	  agent	  that	  emerges	  from	  individuals	  acting	  in	  institutional	  roles.	  	  I	  am	  sympathetic	  to	  this	  construction	  but	  don’t	  wish	  to	  get	  into	  the	  complicated	  and	  controversial	  issues	  surrounding	  collective	  agency.	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able	  to	  justify	  authority	  that	  is	  perfectly	  general.	  	  But	  almost	  everyone	  in	  this	  debate	  doesn’t	  think	  political	  authority	  as	  such	  must	  be	  perfectly	  general	  with	  respect	  to	  individuals	  or	  domains.	  	  We	  shouldn’t	  expect	  an	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  to	  give	  criteria	  for	  the	  precise	  sort	  of	  authority	  that	  actual	  modern	  nation-­‐states	  claim.	  	  Instead,	  as	  I	  explain	  below,	  there	  are	  certain	  features	  of	  modern	  states	  that	  a	  good	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  must	  capture	  but	  there	  are	  others	  that	  can	  be	  discarded,	  like	  perfect	  generality.	  	  So	  instead	  of	  ‘statism’,	  I’ll	  use	  ‘governmentalism’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  position	  that	  governments	  have	  genuine	  authority.	  	   Governmentalists	  must	  be	  precise	  about	  what	  sort	  of	  moral	  authority	  they	  think	  actual	  governments	  have	  or	  can	  plausibly	  attain.	  	  The	  minimalist	  governmentalist	  position	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  actual	  government	  that	  has	  genuine	  moral	  authority	  over	  only	  one	  individual	  in	  only	  one	  domain.	  	  While	  this	  position	  is	  a	  conceptual	  possibility,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  know	  nobody	  takes	  it.	  	  On	  the	  other	  extreme,	  the	  maximalist	  governmentalist	  position	  claims	  that	  all	  actual	  governments	  have	  perfectly	  general	  authority	  of	  the	  sort	  they	  claim.	  	  As	  with	  the	  minimalist	  position,	  this	  is	  unusual,	  especially	  in	  philosophy.	  	  Its	  basis	  would	  presumably	  have	  to	  be	  something	  like	  the	  claim	  that	  effective	  power	  is	  sufficient	  for	  genuine	  moral	  authority.	  	  As	  a	  view	  about	  moral	  authority	  this	  would	  be	  bizarre,	  licensing	  the	  idea	  that	  even	  the	  world’s	  worst	  dictators	  have	  moral	  authority	  over	  the	  people	  they	  oppress.	  The	  most	  common	  governmentalist	  position	  lies	  between	  the	  maximalist	  and	  minimalist	  versions.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  governments	  of	  some	  Western	  democracies,	  paradigmatically	  the	  Scandinavian	  countries	  but	  including	  others,	  have	  moral	  authority	  of	  a	  sort	  that	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  authority	  they	  actually	  claim.	  	  Many	  nations	  in	  the	  world,	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probably	  due	  to	  injustice	  on	  their	  part,	  lack	  any	  moral	  authority	  over	  their	  subjects.	  	   The	  evidential	  governmentalism	  I’ll	  argue	  for	  in	  this	  dissertation	  a	  version	  of	  this	  common,	  middle	  position.	  My	  view	  will	  also	  endorse	  the	  claim	  that	  many	  governments	  entirely	  lack	  moral	  authority	  over	  their	  subjects.	  	  But	  those	  governments	  that	  do	  have	  genuine	  authority	  will	  have	  it	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  on	  my	  account	  than	  on	  standard	  governmentalist	  approaches.	  	  Following	  Joseph	  Raz,	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  authority	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  a	  three-­‐part	  relation	  between	  the	  authority,	  a	  subject,	  and	  a	  domain.6	  	  A	  has	  authority	  over	  S	  in	  D.	  	  It	  is	  only	  as	  summary	  of	  individual	  authority	  relations	  that	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  perfectly	  general	  authority,	  authority	  over	  all	  individuals	  (in	  a	  territory,	  paradigmatically)	  with	  respect	  to	  all	  domains.	  	  An	  authority’s	  jurisdiction	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  domains	  and	  individuals	  she	  has	  authority	  over.	  On	  this	  radically	  individualized,	  piecemeal	  approach	  to	  authority,	  a	  government	  could	  have	  moral	  authority	  over	  S1	  only	  with	  respect	  to	  domains	  D1,	  D2,	  D5,	  and	  D7	  while	  simultaneously	  having	  moral	  authority	  over	  another	  S2	  only	  with	  respect	  to	  domains	  D1,	  D3,	  and	  D6.	  	  This	  is	  nothing	  like	  perfectly	  general	  authority	  and	  my	  approach	  will	  not	  completely	  endorse	  the	  kind	  of	  sweeping	  authority	  the	  standard	  governmentalist	  often	  claims	  to	  capture.	  Scandinavian	  governments	  will	  have	  authority	  over	  more	  citizens	  and	  more	  domains	  than	  other	  governments,	  even	  others	  that	  have	  some	  genuine	  moral	  authority	  over	  some	  citizens	  and	  some	  domains,	  like	  the	  American	  government.	  	  That	  said,	  the	  more	  restricted	  the	  government’s	  authority,	  the	  less	  plausible	  governmentalism	  looks.	  	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  its	  ends,	  the	  government	  must	  coordinate	  action	  between	  most	  of	  its	  citizens	  and	  so	  must	  have	  authority	  over	  most	  of	  its	  citizens.	  	  So	  the	  interesting	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Joseph	  Raz,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  1986).	  [MF]	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controversial	  governmentalist	  claim	  is	  not	  simply	  that	  some	  modern	  governments	  have	  some	  kind	  of	  moral	  authority,	  but	  that	  they	  have	  sufficient	  moral	  authority	  to	  actually	  achieve	  their	  aims.	  While	  my	  approach	  will	  ground	  evaluations	  of	  actual	  governments	  similar	  to	  other	  approaches,	  I	  will	  argue	  genuine	  political	  authority	  is	  of	  a	  different	  nature	  than	  governmentalists	  have	  generally	  assumed,	  and	  so	  the	  conditions	  for	  attaining	  genuine	  political	  authority	  quite	  different.	  	  Even	  under	  the	  new	  conditions,	  though,	  we	  will	  see	  that	  some	  modern	  governments	  can	  have	  sufficiently	  broad	  authority	  to	  achieve	  their	  aims.	  	  This	  new	  picture	  of	  authority	  also	  changes,	  and	  I	  hope	  clarifies,	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  appropriate	  relationship	  between	  citizens	  and	  the	  law.	  	  
2.	  Commands	  as	  Speech	  Acts	  The	  disagreement	  between	  the	  anarchist	  and	  the	  governmentalist	  hinges	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  authority.	  	  In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  governments	  have	  authority,	  and	  over	  which	  individuals	  and	  which	  domains,	  we	  need	  an	  account	  of	  authority.	  	  This	  section	  begins	  to	  present	  such	  an	  account,	  although	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  build	  and	  modify	  the	  account	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  the	  dissertation.	  	  The	  traditional	  understanding	  of	  authority	  claims	  that	  authority	  is	  the	  right	  to	  command.7	  	  Eventually	  I	  argue	  that	  “the	  right	  to	  command”	  is	  too	  narrow	  an	  understanding	  of	  authority,	  but	  this	  characterization	  is	  an	  intuitive	  and	  sufficient	  starting	  point.	  	  Let’s	  begin	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  command.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For	  example,	  see	  Robert	  Paul	  Wolff,	  “The	  Conflict	  Between	  Authority	  and	  Autonomy”,	  in	  ed.	  Joseph	  Raz,	  
Authority	  (New	  York:	  NYU	  Press,	  1990):	  p.	  20;	  G.E.M.	  Anscombe,	  “On	  the	  Source	  of	  the	  Authority	  of	  the	  State”,	  in	  ed.	  Raz,	  p.	  144;	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.23,	  and	  see	  n.1	  on	  that	  page	  for	  further	  instances	  of	  this	  view.	  
	   22	  
First	  and	  foremost,	  commands	  are	  speech	  acts.8	  	  A	  paradigmatic	  example	  is	  a	  mother	  exercising	  her	  parental	  authority	  and	  commanding	  her	  child,	  “Go	  to	  your	  room!”.	  	  What	  makes	  this	  speech	  act	  a	  command?	  	  In	  its	  most	  everyday	  usage,	  a	  command	  is	  simply	  any	  speech	  act	  that	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  an	  imperative.	  	  But	  in	  the	  context	  of	  authority,	  ‘command’	  is	  generally	  a	  technical	  term.	  	  The	  best	  way	  to	  understand	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  everyday	  and	  technical	  senses	  of	  “command”	  is	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  Austin’s	  theory	  of	  speech	  acts.9	  	  	  Austin	  distinguishes	  between	  three	  different	  aspects	  of	  a	  speech	  act:	  the	  locutionary	  aspect,	  the	  illocutionary	  aspect,	  and	  the	  perlocutionary	  aspect.	  	  Imagine	  a	  child	  coming	  indoors	  on	  a	  cold	  day	  and	  her	  mother	  asking	  the	  question	  “Is	  the	  door	  shut?”.	  	  The	  locutionary	  aspect	  of	  this	  utterance	  is	  interrogative.	  	  It	  can	  be	  answered	  in	  the	  affirmative	  or	  negative,	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  door	  is	  shut.	  	  But	  often	  when	  parents	  ask	  questions	  of	  their	  children,	  they	  mean	  to	  do	  more	  than	  simply	  ask	  a	  question.	  	  This	  extra	  element	  is	  the	  illocutionary	  aspect	  of	  the	  utterance.	  	  When	  the	  mother	  asks	  whether	  the	  door	  is	  shut,	  she’s	  really	  also	  requesting	  that	  the	  child	  shut	  the	  door	  if	  it’s	  not	  shut.	  	  The	  request	  is	  illocutionary;	  it’s	  not	  reflected	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  utterance	  but	  is	  still	  intended	  to	  convey	  the	  mother’s	  request	  that	  the	  door	  be	  shut.	  	  The	  utterance	  “Please	  shut	  the	  door”	  is	  a	  request	  in	  both	  its	  locutionary	  and	  illocutionary	  aspects.	  	  Finally,	  the	  perlocutionary	  aspect	  of	  an	  utterance	  depends	  on	  how	  the	  listener	  responds	  to	  the	  utterance.	  	  If	  the	  illocutionary	  request	  of	  “Is	  the	  door	  shut?”	  is	  successfully	  conveyed	  to	  the	  child,	  she	  shuts	  the	  door.	  	  Shutting	  the	  door	  was	  the	  perlocutionary	  response	  to	  the	  illocutionary	  request	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	  H.	  L.	  A.	  Hart,	  “Commands	  and	  Authoritative	  Reasons”,	  in	  Essays	  on	  Bentham	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1982):	  pp.	  243-­‐268.	  	  Hart	  traces	  the	  focus	  on	  commands	  as	  speech	  acts	  to	  Bentham,	  ultimately	  arguing	  that	  Bentham’s	  philosophy	  of	  language	  was	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  nature	  of	  command.	  9	  J.	  L.	  Austin,	  How	  to	  Do	  Things	  with	  Words	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  1955).	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the	  interrogative	  locution	  of	  “Is	  the	  door	  shut?”.	  The	  everyday	  usage	  of	  ‘command’	  focuses	  on	  the	  locutionary	  aspect	  of	  utterances.	  	  Here	  ‘command’	  simply	  refers	  to	  any	  speech	  act	  with	  the	  locutionary	  aspect	  of	  an	  imperative	  or	  demand.	  	  Commands	  would	  thus	  include	  utterances	  that	  aren’t	  intended	  to	  bind,	  as	  when	  requests	  (the	  illocution)	  are	  put	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  imperative	  (the	  locution).	  	  Imagine	  requesting	  a	  beer	  from	  the	  fridge	  with	  the	  locution	  “Grab	  me	  a	  beer!”.	  	  This	  locution	  is	  imperatival	  but	  the	  illocution	  need	  not	  be.	  	  In	  certain	  contexts,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  close	  friendship,	  it	  can	  be	  understood	  that	  you	  only	  intend	  to	  request	  the	  beer	  with	  this	  imperatival	  locution,	  not	  to	  command	  your	  friend.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  technical	  sense	  of	  ‘command’	  focuses	  on	  the	  illocutionary	  aspect.	  	  Commands	  are	  utterances	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  bind	  their	  subjects;	  they	  are	  utterances	  with	  a	  particular	  illocutionary	  aspect.	  	  We	  all	  know	  that	  commands	  can	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  locutions	  that	  aren’t	  imperatives,	  as	  when	  a	  superior	  officer	  “suggests”	  that	  a	  subordinate	  act	  in	  some	  way.	  	  This	  suggestion	  is	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  command	  and	  is	  intended	  to	  bind	  the	  subordinate;	  the	  utterance	  is	  a	  suggestion	  in	  its	  locutionary	  aspect	  but	  a	  command	  in	  its	  illocutionary	  aspect.	  	  This	  utterance	  is	  a	  command	  in	  the	  technical	  sense	  but	  not	  in	  the	  everyday	  sense.	  	  When	  concerned	  with	  authority,	  we	  don’t	  really	  care	  what	  the	  locutionary	  aspect	  of	  any	  given	  command	  is,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  clearly	  conveyed	  to	  the	  listener	  that	  the	  illocutionary	  aspect	  is	  that	  of	  command.	  	  So	  when	  I	  use	  ‘command’,	  I’ll	  be	  referring	  to	  utterances	  that	  are	  imperatives	  in	  their	  illocutionary	  aspect	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  expressed	  as	  imperatives	  in	  their	  locutionary	  aspect.	  	  	  Focusing	  on	  speech	  acts	  with	  a	  particular	  illocutionary	  intent	  shows	  that	  authority	  must	  be	  intentional,	  performative,	  and	  discretionary.	  	  First,	  authority	  is	  intentional.	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Commands	  are	  illocutionary	  so	  require	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  commander	  to	  bind	  the	  subject.	  	  We	  know	  that	  people	  with	  authority	  can	  use	  imperatival	  locutions	  without	  commanding	  simply	  because	  they	  don’t	  intend	  to	  bind.	  	  Imagine	  that	  your	  partner	  is	  the	  police	  chief	  in	  your	  town.	  	  She	  has	  legal	  authority	  over	  you	  and	  can	  issue	  commands	  that	  legally	  bind	  you.	  	  In	  one	  situation,	  say	  at	  a	  crime	  scene,	  she	  says	  “Stop!”	  and	  so	  legally	  binds	  you	  to	  stop:	  you	  would	  be	  acting	  illegally	  and	  subject	  to	  sanctions	  if	  you	  didn’t	  stop.	  	  But	  in	  other	  circumstances,	  say	  in	  the	  privacy	  of	  your	  shared	  home,	  when	  she	  says	  “Stop!”	  she	  doesn’t	  intend	  to	  bind	  you	  with	  her	  legal	  authority.	  	  The	  speech	  act	  is	  still	  intended	  to	  give	  you	  a	  reason	  to	  stop,	  but	  it	  isn’t	  intended	  to	  legally	  bind	  you	  to	  stop.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  she	  uses	  an	  imperatival	  locution	  and	  in	  both	  cases	  she	  has	  genuine	  legal	  authority	  over	  you	  to	  issue	  these	  sorts	  of	  commands.	  	  The	  only	  difference	  is	  in	  her	  intention,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  because	  of	  her	  intention	  to	  bind	  you	  that	  you	  are	  bound.	  	  Importantly,	  this	  means	  subjects	  cannot	  be	  bound	  unintentionally.	  	  If	  your	  partner	  is	  in	  the	  next	  room	  and	  commands	  her	  deputy	  to	  “Stop!”,	  you	  aren’t	  bound	  merely	  by	  hearing	  a	  command:	  it	  wasn’t	  directed	  at	  you	  and	  wasn’t	  intended	  to	  bind	  you,	  so	  can’t	  be	  a	  command	  that	  binds	  you.	  Second,	  authority	  is	  performative:	  it	  must	  be	  exercised	  in	  order	  to	  bind	  subjects.	  	  Illocution	  must	  be	  conveyed	  by	  locution,	  so	  without	  the	  actual	  speech	  act,	  there	  is	  no	  command.	  (Note	  that	  speech	  acts	  should	  be	  understood	  broadly:	  an	  authority	  can	  issue	  written	  commands.)	  	  The	  fact	  that	  authority	  is	  performative	  may	  seem	  too	  obvious	  to	  be	  worth	  stating,	  but	  it	  conceals	  an	  important	  point.	  	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  command,	  and	  so	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  be	  a	  genuine	  authority,	  the	  authority	  must	  be	  able	  to	  convey	  meaning	  to	  the	  subject:	  command	  is	  an	  act	  of	  communication.	  	  She	  must	  be	  able	  to	  indicate	  which	  judgments	  are	  commands	  intended	  to	  bind	  the	  subject,	  and	  which	  other	  of	  her	  actions	  are	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not	  intended	  as	  commands.	  	  This	  puts	  performative	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  authority.	  	  A	  person	  who	  otherwise	  fulfilled	  the	  conditions	  for	  authority	  but	  could	  not	  convey	  her	  intentions	  to	  her	  subjects	  cannot	  be	  an	  authority.	  	  These	  performative	  conditions	  are	  often	  overlooked	  but	  are	  an	  important	  part	  of	  authority	  and	  will	  be	  important	  in	  my	  account.	  	  I	  discuss	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  point	  more	  fully	  in	  later	  chapters.	  Third,	  authority	  is	  discretionary:	  subjects	  are	  bound	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  authority.	  	  This	  follows	  from	  the	  performative	  nature	  of	  commands.	  	  The	  performance	  of	  the	  command	  is	  done	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  commander.	  	  I	  don’t	  mean	  to	  imply	  that	  there	  are	  no	  standards	  for	  when	  a	  commander	  should	  command.	  	  Institutional	  authorities,	  for	  example	  military	  commanders,	  follow	  strict	  standards	  for	  how	  and	  when	  they	  command	  their	  subjects.	  	  Commands	  are	  still	  discretionary	  because	  the	  subject’s	  standing	  changes	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  commander.	  	  Returning	  to	  the	  mother	  exercising	  her	  parental	  authority,	  imagine	  that	  in	  one	  case	  it	  is	  7:59	  when	  the	  child	  is	  commanded	  to	  go	  to	  her	  room.	  	  At	  7:58,	  the	  child	  had	  the	  permission	  to	  continue	  playing,	  or	  to	  go	  to	  bed	  on	  her	  own,	  or	  to	  read,	  or	  whatever.	  	  At	  8:00,	  though,	  the	  command	  has	  changed	  her	  situation.	  	  She	  now	  only	  has	  the	  permission	  to	  go	  to	  bed	  and	  the	  permission	  to	  continue	  playing	  has	  been	  removed	  by	  the	  command.	  	  In	  the	  second	  case	  the	  only	  difference	  is	  that	  the	  command	  is	  issued	  at	  8:01.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  at	  8:00	  the	  child	  still	  had	  the	  permission	  to	  continue	  playing.	  	  These	  examples	  show	  that	  the	  standing	  of	  the	  subject	  is	  changed	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  authority.	  	  Whether	  continuing	  to	  play	  was	  permissible	  for	  the	  child	  at	  8:00	  depends	  entirely	  on	  the	  mother’s	  discretion	  about	  when	  to	  perform	  the	  utterance	  and	  thereby	  issue	  the	  command.	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  authority	  is	  discretionary	  has	  been	  characterized	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	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Raz,	  for	  example,	  characterizes	  authority	  as	  the	  power	  to	  bind	  subjects	  simply	  by	  expressing	  
an	  intention	  to	  do	  so.10	  	  The	  fact	  that	  subjects	  are	  bound	  simply	  by	  the	  authority’s	  expression	  of	  the	  intention	  means	  authority	  is	  discretionary:	  the	  expression	  changes	  subjects’	  standing	  just	  because	  it	  was	  expressed,	  and	  if	  it	  hadn’t	  been	  expressed,	  the	  subjects’	  standing	  wouldn’t	  have	  changed.	  	  An	  agent	  acting	  at	  her	  discretion	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  acting	  both	  intentionally	  and	  performatively.	  	  So	  I’ll	  characterize	  the	  commands	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority	  as	  binding	  subjects	  at	  the	  authority’s	  discretion,	  intending	  to	  simultaneously	  indicate	  that	  authority	  is	  intentional,	  performative,	  and	  discretionary.	  	  
3.	  Reasons	  If	  authority	  is	  the	  right	  to	  command	  and	  commands	  are	  speech	  acts	  with	  a	  specific	  illocutionary	  aspect,	  the	  next	  step	  towards	  understanding	  authority	  is	  understanding	  the	  intention	  that	  defines	  the	  illocution.	  	  When	  an	  authority	  issues	  an	  imperative	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  command	  her	  subjects,	  what	  exactly	  does	  that	  intention	  amount	  to?	  	  Following	  H.L.A.	  Hart	  and	  Joseph	  Raz,	  I’ll	  take	  a	  “rationalist”	  approach	  to	  authority,	  according	  to	  which	  authority	  is	  best	  understood	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  subject’s	  reasons.	  	  When	  an	  authority	  commands	  a	  subject,	  she	  intends	  her	  command	  to	  constitute	  a	  particular	  sort	  of	  reason	  for	  the	  subject.	  	  	  	   Before	  discussing	  the	  authority’s	  intention	  in	  more	  detail,	  we	  first	  need	  to	  be	  clear	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons,	  which	  will	  be	  a	  central	  focus	  of	  the	  entire	  dissertation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  See,	  e.g.,	  Joseph	  Raz,	  “The	  Problem	  of	  Authority:	  Revisiting	  the	  Service	  Conception”,	  Minnesota	  Law	  Review	  90	  (2006):	  p.	  1013.	  [RSC]	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Reasons	  are	  considerations	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  of.11	  	  A	  practical	  reason	  is	  a	  consideration	  in	  favor	  of	  acting	  in	  some	  way.	  	  If	  I	  am	  thirsty,	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  water	  in	  the	  glass	  in	  front	  of	  me	  is	  a	  practical	  reason	  for	  me	  to	  drink	  from	  that	  glass.	  Drinking	  water	  would	  help	  quench	  my	  thirst,	  so	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  water	  in	  the	  glass	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  drinking	  from	  the	  glass.	  	  If	  the	  glass	  contained	  poison,	  I	  would	  have	  no	  practical	  reason	  to	  take	  a	  drink	  from	  the	  glass	  because	  drinking	  poison	  would	  not	  quench	  my	  thirst.	  	  That	  there	  is	  water	  in	  the	  glass	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  drink	  from	  the	  glass;	  that	  there	  is	  poison	  in	  the	  glass	  is	  not	  a	  reason	  to	  drink	  from	  the	  glass	  (assuming	  I	  aim	  to	  quench	  my	  thirst).	  	  	  	   An	  epistemic	  reason,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  a	  consideration	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  some	  proposition.	  	  	  Epistemic	  reasons	  are	  also	  called	  evidence.	  	  If	  I	  have	  evidence	  of	  some	  proposition,	  I	  have	  considerations	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  that	  proposition.	  	  If	  Xi’s	  fingerprints	  are	  found	  on	  a	  knife	  that	  has	  been	  used	  to	  murder	  Josh,	  the	  fingerprints	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  the	  proposition	  that	  Xi	  murdered	  Josh.	  	  The	  fingerprints	  are	  evidence	  that	  Xi	  murdered	  Josh.	  	  Unlike	  practical	  reasons,	  evidence	  can	  be	  misleading.	  	  Perhaps	  Xi	  touched	  the	  knife	  while	  cutting	  some	  vegetables,	  but	  it	  was	  Helena	  that	  murdered	  Josh.	  	  In	  that	  case	  Xi’s	  fingerprints	  are	  still	  evidence	  that	  she	  murdered	  Josh,	  they	  are	  just	  misleading	  evidence.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  reasons	  to	  believe	  can	  be	  misleading	  in	  ways	  that	  reasons	  to	  act	  cannot.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  glass	  in	  front	  of	  me	  is	  filled	  with	  colorless,	  odorless	  poison	  that	  is	  indistinguishable	  from	  water.	  	  I	  have	  strong	  evidence	  that	  the	  glass	  is	  filled	  with	  water,	  so	  have	  good	  epistemic	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  glass	  is	  filled	  with	  water	  and	  good	  epistemic	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  if	  I	  drink	  from	  the	  glass	  my	  thirst	  will	  be	  quenched.	  	  But	  because	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  I	  believe	  this	  is	  the	  best	  and	  fullest	  characterization	  possible,	  following	  many	  others	  who	  hold	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  reason	  is	  basic	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  can’t	  be	  usefully	  defined	  in	  other	  terms.	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glass	  is	  filled	  with	  poison,	  I	  do	  not	  have	  a	  practical	  reason	  to	  drink	  from	  the	  glass.	  	  I	  have	  a	  misleading	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  I	  have	  a	  practical	  reason	  to	  drink	  from	  the	  glass,	  so	  I	  have	  a	  merely	  apparent	  practical	  reason.	  Some	  theorists	  believe	  that	  practical	  reasons	  can	  be	  misleading	  in	  precisely	  the	  way	  epistemic	  reasons	  can.	  	  Another	  way	  of	  putting	  this	  is	  that	  these	  theorists	  and	  I	  disagree	  over	  whether	  practical	  reasons	  are	  veridical.	  	  I	  can’t	  hope	  to	  solve	  the	  debate	  between	  these	  camps	  here.	  	  Instead,	  what	  I’ll	  do	  is	  explain	  the	  contrasting	  positions	  and	  motivate	  why	  I	  take	  the	  veridical	  stance:	  this	  is	  intended	  as	  a	  frame	  for	  my	  project	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  full	  discussion,	  giving	  knockdown	  arguments	  against	  opposing	  positions.	  	  	  Raz	  is	  a	  prominent	  example	  of	  someone	  who	  disagrees	  with	  the	  veridicality	  of	  practical	  reasons.	  	  He	  considers	  a	  case	  where	  an	  undetectable	  meteorite	  is	  about	  to	  crash	  into	  my	  town,	  resulting	  in	  my	  death.12	  	  Because	  the	  meteor	  is	  undetectable	  (not	  only	  to	  me,	  but	  to	  astronomers	  and	  everyone	  else	  as	  well),	  Raz	  claims	  I	  have	  no	  practical	  reason	  to	  leave	  my	  town.	  	  Raz	  and	  I	  agree	  that	  I	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  I	  should	  leave	  my	  town	  because	  reasons	  to	  believe	  aren’t	  veridical.	  	  But	  it	  seems	  bizarre	  to	  me	  to	  claim	  that	  I	  have	  no	  practical	  reason	  to	  leave.	  	  This	  is	  like	  saying	  I	  have	  no	  reason	  not	  to	  drink	  the	  poison	  if	  the	  poison	  is	  undetectable.	  	  Of	  course	  I	  have	  a	  reason:	  if	  I	  don’t	  leave	  or	  if	  I	  drink	  the	  poison,	  I’ll	  die!	  	  Survival	  counts	  heavily	  in	  favor	  of	  leaving.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  I	  don’t	  know	  about	  the	  meteor	  is	  unfortunate,	  but	  it’s	  still	  a	  reason	  to	  leave.	  	  	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  that	  it	  seems	  coherent	  and	  also	  sensible	  to	  me	  to	  hold	  that	  practical	  reasons	  are	  veridical	  is	  the	  role	  of	  third	  parties.	  	  Imagine	  that	  I	  have	  an	  omniscient	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Joseph	  Raz,	  From	  Normativity	  to	  Responsibility	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  2011):	  pp.	  34-­‐5.	  [FNR]	  I’m	  modifying	  the	  example	  slightly:	  the	  meteorite	  is	  not	  undetectable	  in	  his	  case,	  but	  its	  movements	  are	  entirely	  random,	  so	  its	  path	  is	  undetectable.	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advisor	  whom	  I	  can	  reach	  by	  phone.	  	  As	  a	  practical	  advisor,	  her	  role	  is	  to	  give	  advice	  about	  what	  I	  should	  do,	  so	  she	  should	  base	  her	  advice	  on	  my	  reasons.	  	  If	  she	  is	  half	  the	  world	  away	  and	  advising	  me	  about	  where	  I	  should	  eat	  lunch	  today	  (all	  on	  my	  lonesome),	  it	  would	  be	  bad	  advice	  to	  tell	  me	  that	  I	  shouldn’t	  get	  seafood	  because	  she	  is	  allergic	  to	  seafood.	  	  It’s	  only	  my	  allergy	  to	  seafood	  that	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  me	  not	  to	  have	  seafood.	  	  So	  she	  can	  only	  base	  her	  advice	  on	  my	  reasons.	  	  Returning	  to	  the	  meteor,	  if	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  can’t	  know	  about	  the	  meteor	  means	  I	  have	  no	  practical	  reason	  not	  to	  leave	  my	  town,	  then	  she	  can’t	  advise	  me	  to	  leave	  the	  town	  even	  though	  she	  knows	  about	  the	  meteor.	  	  This	  is	  clearly	  mistaken:	  she	  should	  tell	  me	  about	  the	  meteor	  and	  advise	  me	  to	  leave.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  way	  we	  choose	  our	  advisors	  is	  generally	  based	  on	  whether	  they	  might	  know	  more	  about	  our	  practical	  reasons	  than	  we	  do.	  	  Claiming	  that	  whether	  I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  leave	  the	  town	  depends	  on	  whether	  I	  know	  about	  the	  meteor	  denies	  this.13	  One	  worry	  about	  the	  veridical	  understanding	  of	  practical	  reasons	  stems	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  if	  I	  fail	  to	  conform	  to	  a	  reason	  I	  have,	  I	  am	  in	  some	  sense	  criticizable.	  	  For	  example,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Raz	  addresses	  something	  like	  this	  objection,	  and	  his	  reply	  could	  be	  modified	  to	  this	  case	  to	  claim	  that	  having	  an	  advisor	  means	  I	  do	  have	  a	  practical	  reason	  to	  leave	  the	  town.	  	  While	  I	  still	  do	  not	  know	  that	  the	  meteor	  is	  coming,	  I	  can	  know	  because	  I	  have	  an	  available,	  omniscient	  friend	  who	  does	  know	  (or	  can	  easily	  find	  out).	  	  Again,	  this	  strikes	  me	  as	  odd.	  	  Why	  should	  whether	  I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  leave	  my	  town	  depend	  on	  somebody	  else’s	  epistemic	  context?	  Here	  Raz’s	  account	  is	  left	  intentionally	  underspecified.	  	  What	  he	  argues	  is	  that	  practical	  reasons	  are	  best	  understood	  as	  part	  of	  a	  “normative/explanatory	  nexus”.	  	  The	  nexus	  includes	  two	  “filters”	  on	  reasons:	  a	  possibility	  filter	  and	  an	  epistemic	  filter.	  	  The	  possibility	  filter	  functions	  similarly	  to	  the	  “ought-­‐implies-­‐can”	  principle:	  if	  something	  is	  impossible	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  do,	  in	  some	  important	  sense	  of	  possibility,	  then	  it	  can’t	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  agent	  ought	  to	  do	  that.	  	  The	  possibility	  filter	  is	  essentially	  a	  “reasons-­‐imply-­‐can”	  principle:	  even	  if	  I	  could	  save	  a	  million	  lives	  by	  flying	  around	  the	  world	  like	  Superman,	  I	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  fly	  around	  the	  world	  like	  Superman	  because	  I	  can’t.	  	  The	  epistemic	  filter	  does	  the	  same	  work,	  but	  the	  impossibility	  is	  epistemic:	  if	  an	  agent	  can’t	  know	  about	  some	  fact,	  that	  fact	  can’t	  provide	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  agent.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  I	  can’t	  know	  about	  the	  meteorite	  means	  its	  impending	  impact	  gives	  me	  no	  reason	  to	  leave	  my	  town.	  	  But	  Raz	  admits	  that	  the	  sense	  of	  possibility	  in	  the	  epistemic	  filter	  is	  unclear.	  	  He	  wants	  to	  separate	  cases	  like	  the	  meteorite,	  where	  there	  is	  absolutely	  no	  plausible	  way	  I	  could	  know	  that	  the	  meteorite	  is	  about	  to	  hit	  my	  town,	  from	  cases	  of	  “superficial	  epistemic	  incapacity”	  (FNR,	  p.	  126.)	  He	  thinks	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  epistemic	  incapacity	  sometimes	  affects	  whether	  we	  have	  practical	  reasons,	  but	  it	  is	  equally	  clear	  that	  epistemic	  incapacity	  sometimes	  doesn’t	  affect	  whether	  we	  have	  practical	  reasons.	  	  So	  he	  attempts	  to	  capture	  both	  points	  while	  leaving	  the	  dividing	  line	  between	  them	  vague.	  	  I	  don’t	  have	  the	  space	  to	  get	  into	  the	  details	  of	  this	  interesting	  account.	  	  As	  noted,	  at	  this	  point	  I’m	  simply	  trying	  to	  elucidate	  the	  veridical	  position	  and	  give	  some	  reason	  why	  I	  prefer	  it	  without	  pretending	  to	  have	  decided	  the	  issues.	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perhaps	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  failed	  to	  conform	  to	  my	  practical	  reason	  to	  leave	  my	  town	  means	  that	  I	  am	  irrational.	  	  After	  all,	  irrationality	  is	  centrally	  concerned	  with	  responsiveness	  to	  reasons.	  	  If	  the	  charge	  of	  irrationality	  is	  based	  in	  my	  conformity	  to	  my	  practical	  reasons	  and	  I	  have	  a	  practical	  reason	  to	  leave	  my	  town,	  then	  I	  am	  irrational	  for	  failing	  to	  leave	  even	  though	  the	  meteor	  was	  completely	  undetectable.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  charge	  of	  irrationality	  is	  misplaced	  in	  this	  case.	  	  But	  that’s	  not	  because	  I	  lack	  a	  practical	  reason	  to	  leave	  my	  town.	  	  It’s	  because	  the	  charge	  of	  irrationality	  is	  not	  based	  in	  conformity	  to	  practical	  reasons	  but	  conformity	  to	  epistemic	  reasons.	  	  If	  I	  saw	  the	  meteor	  heading	  towards	  my	  town	  and	  failed	  to	  leave,	  that	  would	  be	  irrational.	  	  There	  is	  much	  more	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  choice	  between	  veridical	  and	  non-­‐veridical	  accounts	  of	  practical	  reasons,	  and	  I	  don’t	  expect	  that	  opponents	  will	  be	  convinced	  by	  this	  discussion.	  	  But	  from	  here	  on	  I	  will	  assume	  that	  practical	  reasons	  are	  veridical	  (but	  that	  epistemic	  reasons	  are	  not).	  I’ll	  distinguish	  among	  reasons	  by	  grouping	  them	  into	  domains.	  	  Morality,	  prudence,	  basketball,	  physics,	  and	  anthropology	  are	  examples	  of	  domains	  of	  reasons.	  	  A	  classic	  moral	  reason	  is	  whether	  some	  act	  inflicts	  unnecessary	  pain	  on	  an	  innocent.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  an	  act	  inflicts	  unnecessary	  pain	  on	  an	  innocent	  is	  a	  moral	  consideration	  in	  favor	  of	  not	  performing	  that	  act.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  act	  would	  be	  very	  harmful	  to	  me	  is	  a	  prudential	  consideration	  in	  favor	  of	  me	  not	  performing	  that	  act.	  	  The	  domains	  of	  prudence	  and	  morality	  are	  at	  least	  in	  part	  defined	  by	  their	  aims.	  	  Prudence,	  for	  example,	  aims	  at	  maximizing	  personal	  welfare	  (or	  something	  of	  the	  sort).	  	  That	  an	  act	  would	  be	  harmful	  to	  me	  is	  a	  prudential	  reason	  not	  to	  perform	  that	  act	  because	  harm	  does	  not	  serve	  the	  aim	  of	  personal	  welfare.	  	  Basketball	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  practice-­‐based	  domain.	  	  Basketball	  is	  a	  social	  practice	  with	  a	  set	  of	  defined	  aims	  (winning	  games,	  by	  scoring	  the	  most	  points,	  or	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winning	  tournaments,	  by	  winning	  games)	  and	  rules.	  	  If	  I	  have	  the	  ball	  and	  am	  undefended	  under	  the	  basket,	  I	  have	  good	  basketball	  reason	  to	  shoot	  the	  ball:	  shooting	  the	  ball	  serves	  the	  aim	  of	  winning	  the	  game.	  	  If	  I	  am	  a	  professional	  basketball	  player	  and	  my	  salary	  depends	  on	  my	  performance,	  I	  have	  both	  a	  basketball	  reason	  and	  a	  prudential	  reason	  to	  shoot	  the	  ball.	  	  	  	   Distinguishing	  reasons	  in	  this	  way	  is	  useful	  but	  quite	  complex.	  	  Some	  domains	  overlap,	  as	  prudence	  does	  with	  both	  basketball	  and	  morality	  (the	  fact	  that	  an	  act	  would	  harm	  me	  is	  both	  a	  prudential	  and	  a	  moral	  reason	  not	  to	  perform	  it,	  although	  that	  reason	  may	  not	  tip	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  in	  either	  domain).	  	  Further,	  as	  practical	  agents	  we	  try	  to	  act	  on	  our	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  balance	  of	  reasons.	  	  This	  means	  that	  we	  have	  to	  balance	  reasons	  from	  different	  domains	  against	  each	  other.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  relatively	  common	  understanding	  of	  morality	  holds	  that	  moral	  reasons	  are	  lexically	  ordered	  with	  respect	  to	  reasons	  from	  all	  other	  domains.	  	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  if	  the	  balance	  of	  moral	  reasons	  favored	  one	  option,	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  what	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  from	  any	  other	  domain	  favors.	  	  Your	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  balance	  of	  reasons	  is	  to	  do	  what	  the	  balance	  of	  moral	  reasons	  favors	  because	  moral	  reasons	  tip	  the	  scales	  in	  the	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  balancing.	  	  Most	  domains,	  perhaps	  all,	  aren’t	  lexically	  ordered	  and	  so	  balancing	  them	  against	  one	  another	  is	  not	  easy.	  	  Determining	  what	  act	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  balance	  of	  reasons	  will	  often	  be	  massively	  complicated,	  requiring	  one	  to	  balance	  reasons	  from	  different	  domains	  (and	  reasons	  that	  count	  differently	  in	  different	  domains).	  	  The	  complex	  nature	  of	  grouping	  reasons	  by	  domain	  is	  unavoidable.	  	  It	  simply	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  world	  is	  very	  complex	  so	  acting	  well	  in	  the	  world	  is	  no	  easy	  affair.	  	   Attempting	  to	  come	  to	  an	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  balance	  of	  reasons	  is	  difficult	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because	  we	  often,	  perhaps	  always,	  have	  reasons	  that	  conflict.	  	  Practical	  reasons	  conflict	  when	  they	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  doing	  conflicting	  actions,	  e.g.	  when	  performing	  one	  act	  entails	  not	  performing	  another,	  while	  epistemic	  reasons	  conflict	  when	  they	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  conflicting	  propositions.	  	  When	  reasons	  come	  into	  conflict,	  one	  can	  defeat	  another	  (or	  a	  group	  of	  reasons	  can	  defeat	  another	  group).	  	  There	  are	  different	  kinds	  of	  defeat.	  	  The	  most	  common	  and	  obvious	  kind	  of	  defeat	  is	  usually	  put	  in	  terms	  of	  outweighing,	  although	  the	  metaphor	  of	  force	  is	  also	  used.	  	  Let’s	  say	  you’re	  considering	  going	  to	  the	  gym.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  you	  will	  get	  exercise	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  going	  to	  the	  gym,	  while	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  will	  be	  sore	  afterward	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  not	  going	  to	  the	  gym.	  	  Most	  days,	  the	  exercise	  is	  a	  greater	  gain	  than	  the	  soreness	  is	  a	  loss,	  so	  exercise	  outweighs	  soreness	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  favors	  going	  to	  the	  gym.	  	  	  	   Crucially,	  when	  a	  reason	  is	  outweighed,	  it	  still	  retains	  its	  force.	  	  The	  soreness	  is	  still	  bad,	  and	  that	  badness	  remains	  even	  though,	  on	  balance,	  it’s	  better	  to	  accept	  the	  soreness	  in	  order	  to	  also	  get	  the	  benefits	  of	  going	  to	  the	  gym.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  soreness	  is	  merely	  outweighed,	  though,	  means	  I	  have	  reason	  to	  take	  action	  to	  mitigate	  my	  soreness	  even	  when	  I	  ultimately	  decide	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym,	  for	  example	  by	  stretching	  beforehand.	  	  This	  idea	  is	  perhaps	  clearest	  in	  the	  moral	  case.	  	  If	  I	  have	  made	  a	  promise	  to	  meet	  my	  friend	  for	  lunch	  but	  on	  the	  way	  I	  encounter	  a	  drowning	  child	  that	  I	  can	  easily	  rescue,	  the	  reasons	  I	  have	  to	  save	  the	  child	  outweigh	  the	  reasons	  I	  have	  to	  keep	  my	  promise	  and	  meet	  my	  friend.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  reason	  is	  merely	  outweighed	  means	  I	  have	  reasons	  to	  compensate	  for	  my	  failure	  to	  keep	  my	  promise;	  for	  example,	  I	  should	  apologize	  and	  perhaps	  set	  up	  another	  time	  for	  lunch	  (although	  the	  fact	  that	  my	  promise	  was	  defeated	  means	  I	  did	  nothing	  wrong	  by	  breaking	  it).	  	  In	  cases	  of	  outweighing	  there	  is	  a	  “remainder”,	  because	  the	  outweighed	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reasons	  are	  still	  reasons	  with	  force	  that	  must	  be	  accounted	  for.	  	   Another	  kind	  of	  defeat	  is	  canceling.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  outweighing,	  when	  a	  reason	  is	  canceled	  there	  is	  no	  remainder.	  	  Perhaps	  I	  need	  to	  get	  to	  the	  airport	  as	  fast	  as	  possible.	  	  Of	  my	  current	  options,	  taking	  the	  metro	  will	  be	  quickest,	  so	  I	  have	  reason	  to	  take	  the	  metro.	  	  However,	  just	  as	  I	  am	  about	  to	  embark,	  my	  friend	  tells	  me	  she	  can	  drive	  me	  to	  the	  airport,	  and	  this	  would	  be	  significantly	  faster	  than	  taking	  the	  metro.	  	  I	  now	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  take	  the	  metro;	  the	  reason	  I	  had	  was	  canceled	  by	  the	  possibility	  of	  getting	  a	  ride.	  	  There	  is	  no	  remainder	  and	  I	  should	  feel	  no	  regret	  about	  not	  taking	  the	  metro.	  	  But	  I	  would	  still	  have	  reason	  to	  take	  the	  metro	  if	  the	  car	  weren’t	  an	  option.	  	  	  	   This	  fact	  contrasts	  canceling	  with	  undercutting.	  	  A	  reason	  is	  undercut	  when	  the	  prima	  facie	  connection	  between	  the	  fact	  and	  what	  it	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  is	  severed.	  	  Here’s	  an	  example	  modified	  from	  a	  classic	  case	  in	  the	  epistemology	  literature.	  	  I	  am	  looking	  at	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  barn:	  wooden,	  painted	  red,	  large,	  tin	  roof,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  My	  perceptions	  give	  me	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  I	  am	  looking	  at	  a	  barn.	  	  But	  I	  find	  out	  that	  I	  am	  in	  a	  county	  where	  most	  of	  the	  barn-­‐looking	  buildings	  are	  actually	  clever	  movie	  set	  mock-­‐ups.	  	  This	  fact	  undercuts	  the	  normally	  reliable	  connection	  between	  my	  perceptions	  and	  what	  is	  the	  case.	  	  Breaking	  this	  connection	  undercuts	  any	  reason	  I	  may	  have	  had	  to	  believe	  this	  is	  a	  barn.	  	  A	  canceled	  reason	  can	  be	  rehabilitated	  by	  changing	  other	  reasons;	  for	  example	  if	  my	  friend	  rescinds	  her	  offer	  to	  drive	  me	  to	  the	  airport,	  I	  now	  have	  reason	  to	  take	  the	  metro	  again.	  	  But	  an	  undercut	  reason	  loses	  its	  status	  as	  a	  reason	  more	  permanently	  because	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  fact,	  like	  my	  perception	  of	  barn-­‐like	  characteristics,	  and	  what	  it	  counts	  in	  favor	  of,	  like	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  barn	  there,	  is	  severed.	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4.	  Commands	  as	  Content-­‐Independent	  Reasons	  With	  this	  understanding	  of	  reasons	  we	  can	  more	  fully	  characterize	  authority.	  	  Following	  the	  rationalist	  approach,	  authorities	  are	  distinguished	  by	  the	  kind	  of	  reasons	  their	  commands	  constitute	  for	  their	  subjects.	  	  In	  this	  way	  we	  can	  distinguish	  both	  authority	  from	  other	  kinds	  of	  speech	  acts	  and	  types	  of	  authority	  from	  each	  other.	  	  	  	   At	  the	  end	  of	  section	  two,	  we	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  commands	  were	  speech	  acts	  with	  a	  particular	  illocutionary	  aspect.	  	  The	  authority	  intends	  her	  command	  to	  be	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  reason	  for	  subjects,	  namely	  a	  content-­‐independent	  and	  preemptive	  reason.	  Both	  features	  contrast	  authority	  with	  related	  but	  distinct	  speech	  acts,	  and	  neither	  is	  a	  particularly	  worrying	  feature	  of	  a	  reason	  in	  general.	  	  In	  combination,	  though,	  they	  make	  clear	  what	  is	  distinctive	  about	  authority	  and	  why	  genuine	  authority	  is	  difficult	  to	  attain.	  I	  address	  content-­‐independence	  in	  this	  section	  and	  preemption	  in	  the	  next.	  In	  general,	  an	  utterance	  has	  two	  important	  features	  that	  affect	  what	  kind	  of	  reason	  it	  constitutes.	  	  These	  are	  the	  utterance’s	  content	  and	  provenance.	  	  Commands	  are	  interesting	  because	  they	  constitute	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  for	  subjects.	  	  Raz	  and	  Hart	  develop	  the	  idea	  of	  content-­‐independence	  from	  Hobbes’	  characterization	  of	  command.	  	  Hobbes	  says,	  “COMMAND	  is,	  where	  a	  man	  saith,	  Doe	  this,	  or	  Doe	  not	  this,	  without	  expecting	  any	  other	  reason	  than	  the	  Will	  of	  him	  that	  sayes	  it.”14	  	  According	  to	  Hobbes,	  the	  commander	  can	  command	  opposites	  (do	  this	  or	  do	  not	  this)	  but	  bind	  the	  subject	  in	  either	  case.	  A	  first	  pass	  at	  the	  idea	  of	  content-­‐independence	  is	  that	  an	  authority’s	  command	  binds	  regardless	  of	  content.	  	  The	  content	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  whether	  the	  subject	  has	  a	  reason	  to	  do	  as	  commanded.	  To	  understand	  content-­‐independence	  a	  useful	  comparison	  is	  threats.	  	  Imagine	  you	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Thomas	  Hobbes,	  ed.	  Richard	  Tuck,	  Leviathan	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  UP,	  1991),	  Chapter	  25,	  p.	  176.	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are	  kidnapped	  and	  threatened	  with	  your	  death	  and	  the	  death	  of	  your	  family	  unless	  you…	  well,	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  what	  demands	  are	  made	  on	  you,	  and	  that’s	  the	  whole	  point.	  	  The	  reason	  to	  comply	  is	  the	  same	  and	  has	  the	  same	  strength	  regardless	  of	  whether	  your	  kidnapper	  demands	  money,	  or	  information,	  or	  an	  act.	  	  The	  reason	  to	  do	  as	  you	  are	  threatened	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  demand.	  	  	  If	  the	  content	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  whether	  the	  command	  constitutes	  a	  reason	  for	  subjects,	  then	  the	  reason	  must	  come	  from	  the	  command’s	  provenance	  instead.	  As	  Hobbes	  says,	  the	  reason	  to	  act	  as	  commanded	  is	  not	  whether	  you	  are	  commanded	  to	  do	  a	  particular	  thing	  but	  because	  of	  “the	  Will	  of	  him	  that	  sayes	  it”.	  	  Authorities	  claim	  they	  should	  be	  obeyed	  because	  they	  issued	  the	  command.	  	  Imagine	  a	  parent	  orders	  her	  child	  to	  go	  to	  her	  room.	  	  If	  the	  child	  asks	  why,	  a	  sufficient	  response	  would	  be	  “Because	  I	  told	  you	  to!”.	  	  Appealing	  to	  the	  provenance	  of	  the	  command	  as	  the	  reason	  to	  obey	  is	  constitutive	  of	  authority.	  	  If	  the	  parent	  had	  responded,	  “Because	  if	  you	  don’t,	  you’re	  grounded!”	  or	  “Because	  if	  you	  do,	  I’ll	  pay	  you.”,	  she	  wouldn’t	  be	  appealing	  to	  her	  authority.	  	  In	  the	  first	  case	  the	  reason	  to	  obey	  is	  the	  threat	  and	  in	  the	  second	  case	  the	  reason	  to	  obey	  is	  the	  benefits	  the	  child	  will	  gain	  from	  obeying.15	  	  	  Had	  a	  stranger	  issued	  an	  identical	  order	  for	  the	  child	  to	  go	  to	  her	  room,	  the	  child	  would	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  obey	  because	  the	  stranger	  is	  not	  the	  right	  sort	  of	  person	  to	  issue	  binding	  commands	  to	  the	  child:	  the	  command’s	  provenance	  is	  wrong.	  	  Imagine	  you	  are	  walking	  down	  the	  sidewalk	  and	  an	  approaching	  stranger	  says	  “I	  command	  you	  not	  to	  walk	  there!”.	  	  You	  may	  respond,	  paradigmatically,	  “And	  just	  who	  do	  you	  think	  you	  are?”.	  	  This	  is	  a	  good	  response	  because	  you	  are	  challenging	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  stranger:	  you	  are	  questioning	  whether	  the	  stranger	  is	  the	  sort	  of	  person	  who	  can	  bind	  you	  with	  commands,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The	  threat	  may	  be	  an	  indirect	  reference	  to	  authority,	  if	  the	  claim	  assumes	  that	  the	  grounding	  is	  justified	  because	  the	  child	  disobeyed	  a	  command	  from	  a	  genuine	  authority.	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i.e.	  you	  are	  questioning	  the	  command’s	  provenance.	  	  	  So	  the	  reason	  constituted	  by	  a	  command	  is	  provenance-­‐dependent.	  	  To	  say	  the	  reason	  is	  provenance-­‐dependent	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  altering	  certain	  characteristics	  of	  the	  provenance	  of	  the	  command	  can	  alter	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  reason,	  or	  even	  whether	  there	  is	  such	  a	  reason	  at	  all.	  	  Provenance-­‐dependence	  is	  not	  a	  unique	  feature	  to	  authority,	  and	  in	  fact	  is	  ubiquitous.	  	  If	  I	  ask	  a	  financial	  advisor	  and	  my	  twelve-­‐year	  old	  which	  stocks	  to	  invest	  in,	  I	  ought	  to	  weight	  the	  advisor’s	  answer	  much	  more	  heavily	  than	  my	  child’s.	  	  The	  financial	  provenance	  of	  one	  judgment	  is	  much	  better	  than	  the	  other.	  	  While	  provenance-­‐dependence	  is	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  reasons,	  what’s	  uncommon	  is	  
complete	  provenance-­‐dependence.	  	  This	  is	  equivalent	  to	  content-­‐independence	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  provenance	  and	  content	  are	  the	  only	  relevant	  features	  of	  utterances.	  If	  content	  is	  ruled	  out	  as	  a	  source	  of	  the	  reason	  to	  obey,	  then	  the	  only	  remaining	  source	  is	  provenance.	  	  As	  Richard	  Friedman	  puts	  it,	  What	  is	  therefore	  essential	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  authoritative	  command	  is	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  person	  who	  prescribes	  and	  what	  he	  prescribes,	   so	   that	   the	   content	   of	   the	   prescription	   becomes	   irrelevant,	   and	  the	  person	  becomes	  the	  fact	  that	  endows	  the	  prescription	  with	  its	  distinctive	  appeal.16	  	  This	  is	  odd.	  	  Normally	  the	  reasons	  that	  justify	  my	  act	  are	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  act.	  	  I	  go	  to	  the	  fridge	  because	  the	  food	  is	  there,	  I	  do	  pushups	  because	  of	  the	  health	  benefits,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  There	  is	  a	  direct	  connection	  between	  the	  reason	  (health	  benefits)	  and	  the	  act	  (pushups).	  	  But	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  sever	  this	  direct	  connection.	  	  If	  I	  do	  pushups	  because	  my	  superior	  officer	  commanded	  me	  to,	  it’s	  not	  because	  of	  anything	  about	  pushups.	  	  I	  could	  have	  been	  commanded	  to	  do	  sit-­‐ups,	  or	  to	  stop	  doing	  pushups	  I	  was	  already	  doing,	  and	  I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Richard	  B.	  Friedman,	  “On	  the	  Concept	  of	  Authority	  in	  Political	  Philosophy”,	  in	  ed.	  Raz,	  Authority,	  p.	  66.	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would	  have	  the	  same	  reason	  to	  act.	  	  When	  acting	  because	  of	  a	  command,	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  reason	  the	  subject	  is	  acting	  and	  the	  act	  itself	  is	  thus	  indirect.17	  	  	  There	  is	  one	  important	  qualification	  and	  one	  important	  implication	  of	  this	  discussion.	  	  The	  qualification	  is	  that	  the	  first	  pass	  at	  content-­‐independence	  was	  stated	  too	  strongly.	  	  The	  first	  pass	  was	  that	  the	  content	  of	  a	  command	  is	  completely	  irrelevant	  for	  whether	  the	  command	  constitutes	  a	  reason	  for	  subjects.	  	  But	  the	  content	  of	  a	  command	  is	  not	  completely	  irrelevant.	  	  The	  most	  obvious	  exception	  is	  cases	  where	  subjects	  are	  commanded	  to	  do	  something	  clearly	  unjust.	  	  If	  my	  military	  commander	  directs	  me	  to	  commit	  genocide,	  that	  doesn’t	  mean	  I	  must	  commit	  genocide	  in	  order	  to	  conform	  to	  my	  reasons.	  	  Instead	  I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  commander	  lacks	  authority	  over	  me	  in	  this	  domain.	  	  Egregious	  errors	  undermine	  authority.	  	  	  This	  is	  analogous	  to	  limitations	  on	  two	  other	  content-­‐independent	  speech	  acts.	  	  The	  first	  is	  threats,	  mentioned	  above.	  	  There	  I	  said	  that	  if	  you	  are	  threatened	  with	  the	  death	  of	  your	  family	  unless	  you	  act	  in	  some	  way,	  you	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  act	  in	  the	  way	  directed	  no	  matter	  what	  that	  act	  is:	  paying	  a	  ransom,	  stealing	  work	  product,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  But	  this	  isn’t	  quite	  right	  because	  at	  some	  point,	  the	  threatened	  act	  can	  be	  so	  egregious	  that	  you	  shouldn’t	  do	  it	  even	  though	  your	  family	  will	  die	  if	  you	  don’t.	  	  If	  the	  threat	  is	  that	  your	  family	  dies	  unless	  you	  set	  off	  a	  nuclear	  weapon	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  the	  content	  of	  the	  threat	  matters	  to	  whether	  you	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  comply.	  	  	  The	  other	  relevant	  comparison	  is	  to	  promises.	  	  Promises	  give	  promisers	  content-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ibid.	  See	  also	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  35.	  	  He	  also	  calls	  the	  command	  “extraneous”	  to	  the	  act.	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independent	  reasons	  to	  do	  as	  promised.18	  	  If	  I	  promise	  to	  meet	  you	  at	  Myrtle’s	  for	  lunch	  tomorrow,	  I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  go	  to	  Myrtle’s.	  	  Had	  I	  promised	  to	  meet	  you	  at	  Joe’s	  instead,	  I	  would	  have	  an	  identical	  reason	  to	  go	  to	  Joe’s.	  	  The	  reason	  is	  the	  promise,	  not	  the	  particular	  content.	  	  But	  there	  are	  some	  things	  I	  can’t	  promise	  to	  do,	  and	  even	  if	  I	  make	  a	  “promise”	  to	  do	  them,	  that	  “promise”	  doesn’t	  give	  me	  a	  reason	  to	  act.	  	  Murder	  is	  an	  example:	  I	  can’t	  promise	  to	  murder	  someone	  and	  then	  claim	  my	  killing	  was	  justified	  because	  I	  made	  a	  promise.	  	  The	  promise	  doesn’t	  bind	  me	  because	  of	  its	  content,	  even	  though	  in	  general	  the	  reason	  to	  do	  as	  you	  promised	  is	  content-­‐independent.	  The	  idea	  that	  commands,	  promises,	  and	  threats	  constitute	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  except	  in	  some	  cases	  smacks	  of	  incoherence	  and	  perhaps	  looks	  ad	  hoc.	  	  Why	  does	  content	  matter	  in	  some	  cases	  but	  not	  others?	  	  And	  if	  content	  is	  sometimes	  relevant,	  why	  does	  it	  make	  sense	  to	  call	  these	  content-­‐independent	  reasons?	  	  Threats	  are	  a	  degenerate	  case	  that	  I’m	  going	  to	  put	  aside.	  	  In	  the	  cases	  of	  promising	  and	  commanding	  we	  have	  a	  good	  explanation	  for	  this	  seeming	  incoherence.	  	  If	  I	  say	  something	  like	  “I	  promise	  to	  murder	  Joe”,	  I	  have	  made	  a	  failed	  attempt	  at	  promising.	  	  It’s	  not	  that	  I	  promised	  to	  murder	  Joe	  and	  then	  my	  promise	  was	  somehow	  defeated	  by	  the	  content	  of	  the	  promise.	  	  The	  thing	  I	  tried	  to	  promise	  to	  do	  I	  simply	  cannot	  promise	  to	  do.	  	  The	  content	  of	  the	  utterance	  meant	  it	  couldn’t	  be	  a	  promise.	  	  	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  commands.	  	  When	  clearly	  unjust	  commands	  are	  issued,	  it’s	  not	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  bound	  by	  the	  command	  and	  then	  the	  content	  defeats	  the	  command.	  	  It’s	  that	  the	  commander	  never	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  command	  that	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  She’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Many	  make	  this	  comparison	  between	  commands	  and	  promises,	  including	  Hobbes,	  Hart,	  Raz,	  and	  John	  Rawls,	  “Two	  Concepts	  of	  Rules”,	  The	  Philospohical	  Review	  64	  (1955):	  pp.	  13ff.	  	  Hurd	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  examples	  of	  someone	  who	  denies	  that	  promises	  constitute	  content-­‐independent	  reasons.	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issuing	  a	  command	  that	  falls	  outside	  her	  domain	  of	  authority,	  so	  it	  doesn’t	  bind.	  	  It’s	  like	  your	  boss	  trying	  to	  command	  you	  how	  to	  raise	  your	  kids.	  	  Her	  authority	  doesn’t	  extend	  to	  your	  parenting,	  so	  when	  she	  issues	  “commands”	  about	  your	  parenting,	  you	  aren’t	  bound.	  	  Of	  course	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  determine	  when	  an	  authority	  is	  issuing	  commands	  outside	  her	  domain.	  	  It’s	  pretty	  clear	  in	  the	  boss	  case	  because	  parenting	  and	  occupation	  are	  rather	  distinct	  domains.	  	  It’s	  less	  clear	  in	  a	  case	  like	  a	  military	  commander	  ordering	  genocide	  because	  military	  commanders	  generally	  have	  authority	  in	  domains	  like	  killing.	  	  (Specifying	  the	  precise	  boundaries	  of	  an	  authority’s	  domain	  is	  thus	  a	  very	  important	  task.)	  Content-­‐independence	  is	  best	  specified	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  content	  of	  a	  directive	  that	  falls	  within	  the	  authority’s	  domain	  is	  irrelevant.	  	  When	  the	  directive	  falls	  outside	  the	  authority’s	  domain,	  the	  content	  can	  be	  a	  good	  indicator	  that	  the	  directive	  doesn’t	  bind.	  	  But	  the	  reason	  it	  doesn’t	  bind	  is	  because	  it	  fell	  outside	  the	  authority’s	  domain,	  not	  that	  the	  content	  was	  so	  mistaken	  (as	  determined	  by	  comparison	  with	  reasons	  within	  the	  authority’s	  domain)	  that	  it	  was	  defeated	  by	  other	  reasons.	  Importantly,	  content-­‐independence	  entails	  that	  some	  mistaken	  commands	  bind.	  I’ll	  clarify	  the	  idea	  of	  mistaken	  commands	  below,	  but	  the	  essential	  point	  is	  that	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  in	  a	  particular	  domain	  will	  favor	  some	  act	  independently	  of	  the	  command.	  	  When	  an	  authority’s	  directives	  demand	  that	  subjects	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  contrary	  to	  how	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  in	  that	  domain	  would	  otherwise	  dictate,	  the	  command	  is	  mistaken.	  	  Mistakes,	  then,	  are	  an	  issue	  of	  content:	  whether	  the	  content	  matches	  to	  the	  preexisting	  balance	  of	  reasons	  in	  the	  domain.	  	  But	  if	  the	  reason	  to	  obey	  is	  content-­‐independent,	  then	  whether	  a	  command	  is	  mistaken	  can’t	  affect	  whether	  the	  command	  constitutes	  a	  reason	  for	  subjects.	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If	  mistaken	  commands	  didn’t	  bind,	  then	  authority	  wouldn’t	  give	  content-­‐independent	  reasons.	  	  Instead,	  every	  time	  their	  directives	  were	  mistaken	  they	  would	  fail	  to	  bind.	  	  In	  the	  end	  this	  simply	  entails	  that	  authority	  never	  changes	  people’s	  reasons:	  either	  the	  directive	  is	  accurate	  and	  tells	  them	  what	  their	  reasons	  entail	  anyway,	  or	  the	  directive	  is	  mistaken	  so	  doesn’t	  bind.	  	  But	  changing	  reasons	  is	  exactly	  what	  authority	  does.	  	  As	  Raz	  bluntly	  puts	  it,	  “there	  is	  no	  point	  in	  having	  authorities	  unless	  their	  determinations	  are	  binding	  even	  if	  mistaken”.19	  	  If	  authority’s	  commands	  only	  bound	  subjects	  when	  they	  were	  correct	  or	  just,	  then	  authority	  becomes	  epiphenomenal.	  	  	  Another	  way	  of	  putting	  this	  is	  that	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistaken	  but	  binding	  commands,	  authority	  is	  just	  advice.	  	  But	  there	  are	  clear	  cases	  where	  authority	  is	  more	  than	  advice,	  like	  when	  you	  consent	  to	  obey	  another	  person,	  and	  our	  practices	  of	  authority	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  different	  in	  kind	  than	  advice.	  	  Content-­‐independence	  is	  a	  necessary	  and	  defining	  feature	  of	  authority.	  	  But	  it	  is	  only	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  commands	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority	  also	  constitute	  preemptive	  reasons	  for	  subjects	  that	  content-­‐independence	  becomes	  worrying.	  	  
5.	  Commands	  as	  Preemptive	  Reasons	  The	  commands	  of	  genuine	  authorities	  constitute	  preemptive	  reasons	  for	  their	  subjects.	  	  Preemption	  allows	  us	  to	  capture	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  subjects	  are	  bound	  by	  commands.	  (In	  chapter	  three	  I	  discuss	  this	  in	  considerable	  detail.)	  	  When	  a	  practical	  command	  is	  issued,	  it	  claims	  to	  be	  a	  reason	  to	  act	  in	  some	  way.	  	  But	  in	  many	  cases	  there	  are	  obvious	  and	  weighty	  reasons	  to	  act	  contrary	  to	  the	  command.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  when	  the	  command	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  47.	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mistaken,	  as	  defined	  above.	  	  When	  a	  mistaken	  command	  is	  issued,	  it	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  doing	  as	  commanded.	  	  But	  if	  there	  are	  reasons	  from	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  authority	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  not	  doing	  as	  commanded,	  why	  can’t	  subjects	  simply	  ignore	  the	  command	  and	  conform	  to	  the	  other	  reasons?	  	  	  	   There	  are	  two	  worrying	  implications	  if	  we	  can’t	  answer	  this	  question.	  	  First,	  if	  subjects	  can	  simply	  disregard	  mistaken	  commands	  and	  do	  as	  the	  reasons	  otherwise	  indicate,	  authority	  is	  again	  rendered	  useless.	  	  It’s	  the	  same	  problem	  as	  the	  case	  where	  the	  commands	  of	  an	  authority	  are	  not	  content-­‐independent.	  	  In	  this	  case	  mistaken	  commands	  are	  still	  commands	  but	  they	  are	  simply	  overridden	  by	  the	  other,	  countervailing	  reasons.	  	  Second,	  if	  subjects	  can	  conform	  better	  to	  their	  reasons	  by	  disobeying	  an	  authority,	  it	  looks	  irrational	  to	  obey	  authorities.	  	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  central	  problems	  theories	  of	  authority	  have	  to	  grapple	  with.20	  	  Preemption	  explains	  how	  subjects	  are	  decisively	  bound	  by	  commands,	  so	  ultimately	  explains	  how	  subjects	  are	  rational	  to	  obey	  authorities.	  To	  understand	  preemption,	  a	  useful	  comparison	  is	  with	  an	  arbitrator.21	  	  When	  conflicting	  parties	  submit	  their	  problem	  to	  an	  arbitrator,	  they	  agree	  to	  follow	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  arbitrator	  even	  if	  she	  rules	  against	  them.	  	  They	  may	  think	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  is	  in	  their	  favor,	  for	  example	  justifying	  recompense.	  	  But	  when	  the	  arbitrator	  issues	  her	  judgment,	  the	  parties’	  personal	  judgments	  about	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  and	  the	  final	  decision	  have	  to	  be	  put	  aside.	  	  Her	  judgment	  is	  decisive	  because	  it	  tilts	  the	  parties’	  balance	  of	  reasons	  inexorably	  in	  its	  own	  favor:	  in	  order	  to	  act	  on	  their	  reasons,	  they	  now	  must	  put	  aside	  their	  own	  judgment	  and	  act	  as	  the	  arbitrator	  decided.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  For	  the	  most	  trenchant	  expressions	  of	  this	  concern,	  see	  Wolff	  and	  Hurd,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  discussed	  by	  Raz,	  Friedman,	  and	  many	  others.	  21	  Cf.	  Raz,	  MF,	  pp.	  41-­‐2.	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Arbitrators	  and	  authorities	  contrast	  in	  this	  respect	  with	  advice.22	  	  When	  you	  get	  advice,	  it	  is	  merely	  one	  part	  of	  the	  overall	  balance	  of	  reasons.	  	  You	  may	  decide	  to	  accept	  the	  advice	  or	  reject	  it,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  decisive.	  	  Your	  balance	  of	  reasons	  may	  still	  favor	  going	  against	  the	  advice.	  	  Arbitrators	  and	  authorities	  claim	  to	  do	  much	  more.	  	  Once	  their	  judgment	  is	  made,	  you	  cannot	  simply	  factor	  it	  into	  your	  judgment	  of	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  and	  proceed	  as	  usual.	  	  	  Arbitrators’	  judgments	  and	  the	  commands	  of	  genuine	  authorities	  are	  decisive	  because	  they	  are	  preemptive.	  	  As	  Raz	  says,	  “the	  fact	  that	  an	  authority	  requires	  performance	  of	  an	  action	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  its	  performance	  which	  is	  not	  to	  be	  added	  to	  all	  other	  relevant	  reasons	  when	  assessing	  what	  to	  do.	  	  It	  should	  exclude	  and	  take	  the	  place	  of	  some	  of	  them.”23	  	  Preemptive	  reasons	  are	  decisive	  because	  they	  defeat	  countervailing	  reasons	  in	  a	  way	  
merely	  additive	  reasons,	  like	  that	  given	  by	  advice,	  do	  not.	  	  Above	  I	  noted	  that	  conflicting	  reasons	  are	  subject	  to	  three	  kinds	  of	  defeat:	  outweighing,	  canceling,	  and	  undercutting.	  But	  in	  what	  way	  do	  the	  preemptive	  reasons	  given	  by	  authorities’	  commands	  defeat	  countervailing	  reasons?	  	  This	  is	  a	  surprisingly	  thorny	  question	  to	  answer.	  	  Here	  I’m	  going	  to	  sketch	  a	  preliminary	  answer	  that	  is	  to	  my	  mind	  largely	  correct,	  but	  will	  considerably	  refine	  the	  answer	  in	  chapter	  three.	  On	  Raz’s	  account,	  following	  Hart,	  the	  commands	  of	  genuine	  authorities	  constitute	  a	  two-­‐part	  reason,	  variously	  called	  a	  preemptive,	  peremptory,	  or	  protected	  reason.24	  	  A	  preemptive	  reason	  consists	  in	  two	  reasons:	  a	  simple	  first-­‐order	  reason	  that	  counts	  in	  favor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Hobbes	  was	  perhaps	  the	  first	  to	  contrast	  command	  with	  advice,	  a	  theme	  picked	  up	  by	  Hart	  and	  Raz,	  among	  others.	  23	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  46.	  My	  emphasis.	  Raz	  calls	  this	  the	  preemption	  thesis.	  24	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  preemptive	  reason	  is	  central	  to	  Raz’s	  account	  of	  authority,	  but	  also	  to	  his	  account	  of	  rules	  and	  norms	  in	  general.	  	  See	  Practical	  Reasons	  and	  Norms	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  UP,	  1975)	  [PRN]	  and	  The	  
Authority	  of	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  1979):	  p.	  27.	  [AL]	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of	  doing	  as	  commanded	  and	  a	  second-­‐order	  reason.	  	  The	  force	  of	  the	  first-­‐order	  reason	  is	  something	  akin	  to	  a	  request.	  	  The	  more	  important	  part	  of	  preemptive	  reasons	  is	  the	  second-­‐order	  part,	  what	  Raz	  calls	  an	  exclusionary	  reason.	  Exclusion	  is	  Raz’s	  novel	  notion	  of	  second-­‐order	  defeat.	  When	  reasons	  conflict	  in	  the	  first-­‐order,	  they	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  normal	  kinds	  of	  defeat.	  	  Sometimes,	  though,	  we	  have	  reasons	  to	  treat	  our	  reasons	  in	  certain	  ways:	  second-­‐order	  reasons.	  	  Exclusionary	  reasons	  are	  considerations	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  not	  acting	  on	  other	  reasons.	  	  Importantly,	  exclusion	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  defeat	  are	  distinct.	  	  At	  the	  first-­‐order	  level,	  some	  reason	  could	  be	  hugely	  weighty	  yet	  still	  be	  excluded	  by	  a	  second-­‐order	  reason.	  	  The	  weight	  doesn’t	  affect	  whether	  it	  is	  excluded.	  	  Raz	  argues	  that	  the	  commands	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority	  exclude	  countervailing	  reasons	  and	  this	  explains	  why	  preemptive	  reasons	  are	  decisive.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  practical	  authority,	  a	  command	  gives	  an	  exclusionary	  reason	  not	  to	  act	  on	  reasons	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  acting	  in	  any	  way	  other	  than	  as	  commanded.	  	  Reasons	  that	  would	  support	  acting	  in	  any	  other	  way	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  subject’s	  practical	  deliberation.25	  	  To	  illustrate	  this,	  imagine	  an	  authority	  has	  just	  commanded	  you	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym	  (perhaps	  you	  promised	  to	  obey	  your	  partner’s	  gym-­‐directives	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  take	  the	  control	  out	  of	  your	  akratic	  hands).	  	  You	  already	  had	  some	  preexisting	  reasons	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym,	  most	  obviously	  the	  health	  benefits.	  	  You	  also	  had	  some	  preexisting	  reasons	  not	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym,	  like	  the	  pain	  in	  your	  knee	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  get	  some	  lunch.	  	  	  Now	  the	  authority	  commands	  you	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym,	  and	  you	  have	  a	  new	  reason	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym:	  you	  were	  commanded	  to.	  	  The	  command	  also	  constitutes	  a	  second-­‐order	  reason	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Here	  I	  characterize	  Raz’s	  most	  recent	  position	  with	  respect	  to	  exclusionary	  reasons;	  in	  earlier	  writing	  like	  PRN	  he	  claimed	  all	  reasons	  other	  than	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  command,	  not	  only	  the	  countervailing	  reasons,	  are	  excluded.	  This	  nuance	  is	  discussed	  in	  Appendix	  A.	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to	  exclude	  any	  reason	  that	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  not	  going	  to	  they	  gym.	  	  Before	  you	  may	  have	  judged	  that	  avoiding	  more	  pain	  in	  your	  knee	  and	  getting	  lunch	  would	  outweigh	  going	  to	  the	  gym,	  and	  so	  not	  gone	  to	  the	  gym.	  	  But	  the	  pain	  in	  your	  knee	  and	  getting	  lunch	  are	  ruled	  out	  as	  reasons	  for	  you	  to	  act	  by	  the	  exclusionary	  reason.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  this	  is	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  balance	  of	  your	  reasons,	  you	  must	  go	  to	  the	  gym.	  	  This	  is	  the	  only	  act	  that	  has	  any	  support	  from	  reasons;	  the	  reasons	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  not	  going	  to	  the	  gym	  have	  been	  excluded.	  	  	  A	  common	  misunderstanding	  of	  authority	  follows	  from	  misunderstanding	  preemption.	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  assume	  that	  preemptive	  reasons	  must	  be	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  or	  absolutely	  decisive;	  after	  all,	  countervailing	  reasons	  have	  been	  excluded.	  	  Another	  way	  of	  putting	  this	  is	  that	  it	  is	  attempting	  to	  assume	  that	  preemptive	  reasons	  must	  be	  undefeatable.	  	  If	  the	  commands	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority	  are	  absolutely	  decisive,	  disobeying	  such	  commands	  is	  necessarily	  wrong.	  	  You	  would	  have	  to	  obey	  come	  hell	  or	  high	  water.	  	  	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  we	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  rejecting	  the	  notion	  of	  authority	  altogether.	  	  So	  to	  forestall	  this	  misunderstanding	  and	  accompanying	  objections,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  very	  precise	  about	  what	  preemption	  entails.	  Authorities’	  commands	  are	  not	  absolutely	  decisive	  because	  they	  only	  preempt	  certain	  reasons.	  	  Preemption	  is	  constrained	  by	  three	  factors:	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdiction,	  the	  available	  preexisting	  reasons,	  and	  the	  moment	  of	  performance.26	  	  First,	  jurisdiction.	  Above	  I	  defined	  an	  authority’s	  jurisdiction	  as	  the	  domain	  or	  domains	  it	  has	  authority	  over	  as	  well	  as	  the	  agent	  or	  agents	  it	  has	  authority	  over.	  Your	  boss’	  jurisdiction	  is	  a	  single	  domain	  and	  over	  multiple	  individuals.	  	  She	  has	  occupational	  authority	  over	  you	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Cf.	  Raz,	  MF,	  pp.	  46,	  62.	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other	  employees;	  she	  lacks	  authority	  over	  any	  employee	  with	  respect	  to	  non-­‐occupational	  domains	  and	  she	  lacks	  authority	  over	  any	  non-­‐employee	  with	  respect	  to	  all	  domains.	  	  If	  she	  tries	  to	  issue	  commands	  that	  fall	  outside	  this	  jurisdiction	  in	  either	  respect,	  her	  directives	  fail	  to	  preempt	  and	  so	  can	  be	  defeated.	  	  So	  if	  she	  tries	  to	  issue	  a	  command	  to	  you	  about	  how	  you	  raise	  your	  children,	  this	  directive	  does	  not	  decisively	  change	  the	  balance	  of	  your	  parenting	  reasons	  because	  her	  authority	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  parenting	  domain.	  	  Similarly,	  if	  she	  tries	  to	  command	  any	  non-­‐employee,	  the	  balance	  of	  their	  reasons	  does	  not	  decisively	  change	  because	  her	  authority	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  them	  and	  doesn’t	  preempt	  any	  of	  their	  reasons.	  	  In	  later	  chapters	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  systematically	  issuing	  commands	  outside	  jurisdiction	  is	  a	  defeater	  on	  authority.	  	  Further,	  even	  when	  her	  commands	  fall	  within	  her	  domain,	  they	  are	  only	  preemptive	  in	  that	  domain.	  	  If	  she	  orders	  you	  to	  work	  this	  weekend,	  the	  balance	  of	  your	  occupational	  reasons	  decisively	  changes	  such	  that	  you	  should	  now	  work	  this	  weekend.	  	  But	  if	  your	  partner	  becomes	  seriously	  sick	  and	  is	  rushed	  to	  the	  hospital,	  your	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  balance	  of	  reasons	  decisively	  favors	  leaving	  work	  and	  going	  to	  the	  hospital.	  	  Your	  boss’s	  command	  was	  still	  preemptive	  within	  the	  occupational	  domain,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  preemptive	  outside	  the	  domain	  of	  her	  jurisdiction.	  	  Your	  boss’s	  occupational	  authority	  can’t	  exclude	  reasons	  in	  other	  domains.	  Second,	  authorities’	  commands	  only	  constitute	  preemptive	  reasons	  with	  respect	  to	  those	  reasons	  within	  their	  domain	  that	  are	  accessible	  to	  them	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  command.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  exclusion	  clarifies	  this	  constraint.	  	  When	  an	  authority	  issues	  a	  command,	  it	  excludes	  countervailing	  reasons	  within	  her	  jurisdiction.	  	  But	  it	  doesn’t	  exclude	  all	  possible	  countervailing	  reasons	  within	  her	  jurisdiction,	  it	  only	  excludes	  the	  ones	  that	  she	  has	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available	  to	  her.	  	  Again,	  there	  is	  an	  illuminating	  parallel	  with	  arbitrators.	  	  Imagine	  that	  you	  and	  an	  ex-­‐partner	  submit	  to	  arbitration	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  parental	  rights.	  	  You	  know	  that	  your	  ex-­‐partner	  is	  an	  addict	  who	  often	  ignores	  the	  welfare	  of	  your	  child	  in	  favor	  of	  feeding	  the	  addiction.	  	  Your	  ex	  successfully	  conceals	  the	  addiction	  from	  the	  arbitrator,	  who	  issues	  a	  judgment	  rewarding	  your	  ex	  full	  custody.	  	  This	  judgment	  doesn’t	  decisively	  bind	  you	  because	  in	  this	  case	  you	  know	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  from	  within	  the	  relevant	  domain	  that	  was	  unavailable	  to	  the	  arbitrator.	  	  Now,	  the	  judgment	  may	  still	  give	  you	  instrumental	  reasons	  to	  hand	  over	  custody,	  or	  reasons	  to	  reexamine	  your	  own	  parental	  fitness,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  arbitrator	  didn’t	  know	  about	  the	  debilitating	  addiction	  means	  that	  the	  arbitrator’s	  judgment	  isn’t	  decisive	  for	  you.	  	  Of	  course	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  judge	  when	  the	  arbitrator	  actually	  lacked	  certain	  information	  as	  opposed	  to	  when	  you	  merely	  hope	  she	  lacked	  certain	  information	  because	  she	  ruled	  against	  you.	  	  Again,	  though,	  this	  pragmatic	  difficulty	  is	  no	  barrier	  to	  the	  conceptual	  point	  that	  if	  certain	  reasons	  from	  within	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdictional	  domain	  are	  unavailable	  to	  her,	  then	  her	  directives	  might	  not	  decisively	  change	  the	  balance	  of	  your	  reasons,	  even	  in	  that	  domain.	  Third,	  authority’s	  commands	  only	  constitute	  preemptive	  reasons	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  command.	  	  New	  reasons	  from	  the	  very	  same	  domain	  as	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdiction	  can	  render	  the	  authority’s	  command	  inert.	  	  If	  we	  just	  modify	  the	  arbitration	  example,	  imagine	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	  arbitration	  your	  ex	  is	  not	  an	  addict,	  but	  in	  the	  months	  afterwards	  develops	  an	  addiction	  that	  puts	  your	  child	  at	  imminent	  risk	  of	  severe	  harm.	  	  The	  addiction	  was	  unforeseeable,	  but	  once	  it	  arises	  it	  overrides	  the	  arbitrator’s	  directive.	  	  Again,	  practical	  matters	  are	  more	  complicated:	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  might	  be	  (unjustifiably)	  punished	  if	  you	  don’t	  conform	  to	  the	  arbitrator’s	  judgment	  gives	  you	  a	  reason	  to	  follow	  it	  even	  though	  it	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doesn’t	  bind	  you	  anymore,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  best	  response	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  bindingness	  is	  to	  ask	  the	  arbitrator	  to	  decide	  anew	  rather	  than	  just	  taking	  your	  child	  back.	  	  But	  if	  your	  ex’s	  addiction	  is	  putting	  your	  child	  in	  imminent	  risk	  of	  severe	  harm,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  your	  only	  option	  is	  to	  take	  your	  child.	  	  These	  pragmatic	  points	  don’t	  undermine	  the	  fact	  that	  new	  reasons	  can	  arise	  even	  from	  within	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdiction.	  As	  a	  technical	  matter	  this	  is	  simply	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  second	  constraint	  on	  preemption,	  but	  it’s	  an	  important	  and	  noteworthy	  extension.	  	  Many	  reasons	  that	  arise	  after	  the	  command	  are	  unlikely	  to	  have	  been	  available	  to	  the	  authority	  at	  the	  time	  of	  command,	  although	  certainly	  not	  all	  of	  them.	  	  In	  sum:	  the	  commands	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority	  constitute	  preemptive	  reasons	  within	  their	  jurisdictional	  domain	  for	  subjects.	  	  The	  preemptive	  effect	  of	  the	  command	  excludes	  some	  reasons	  from	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  within	  that	  domain	  and	  so	  changes	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  for	  subjects	  in	  a	  non-­‐additive	  way.	  	  Only	  those	  reasons	  that	  fall	  within	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdictional	  domain	  and	  are	  available	  to	  her	  at	  the	  time	  of	  command	  are	  preempted.	  	  Reasons	  that	  aren’t	  preempted	  are	  still	  part	  of	  subjects’	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  balance	  of	  reasons,	  so	  sometimes	  (or	  even	  often!)	  the	  subject	  won’t	  be	  required	  to	  obey	  the	  authority’s	  command	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  conform	  to	  her	  reasons	  all-­‐things-­‐considered.	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  subject	  sometimes	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  obey	  the	  authority’s	  command	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  the	  authority	  wasn’t	  genuine	  or	  that	  the	  command	  failed	  to	  bind.	  	  It	  did	  bind	  and	  so	  did	  have	  a	  preemptive	  effect	  on	  the	  subject’s	  balance	  of	  reasons,	  it’s	  just	  that	  the	  effect	  was	  constrained.	  	  We	  tend	  to	  think	  of	  authority	  in	  its	  most	  extreme	  forms,	  like	  god	  exercising	  divine	  moral	  authority	  over	  people	  that	  binds	  absolutely.	  	  If	  authority	  must	  be	  absolute	  in	  this	  way,	  then	  the	  fact	  that	  subjects	  often	  disobey	  yet	  still	  act	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  their	  reasons	  makes	  it	  appear	  that	  the	  command	  didn’t	  bind.	  	  But	  once	  we	  see	  that	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preemption	  is	  constrained,	  the	  pragmatic	  disconnect	  between	  our	  practices	  of	  obeying	  authorities	  of	  various	  kinds	  and	  the	  theoretical	  picture	  of	  authority	  as	  preemptive	  is	  not	  worrying.	  	  	  
6.	  Authority	  Changes	  Standing	  Up	  to	  this	  point	  I	  have	  been	  intentionally	  coy	  about	  one	  of	  the	  central	  aspects	  of	  authority.	  	  So	  far,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  authorities	  issue	  commands,	  discretionary	  speech	  acts	  that	  constitute	  preemptive,	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  for	  subjects.	  	  But	  what	  does	  a	  preemptive,	  content-­‐independent	  reason	  do?	  	  In	  what	  way	  should	  we	  characterize	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  commands	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority	  on	  a	  subject’s	  balance	  of	  reasons?	  	  	  Our	  starting	  point	  was	  traditional	  authority,	  understood	  as	  the	  right	  to	  command	  that	  creates	  a	  new	  duty	  for	  subjects.	  	  According	  to	  this	  account	  what	  preemptive,	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  do	  is	  create	  duties;	  subjects	  are	  bound	  because	  they	  have	  a	  new	  duty.	  	  The	  thought	  is	  that	  when	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  decisively	  favors	  some	  act,	  I	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  perform	  that	  act.	  	  Thus,	  preemptive	  reasons	  create	  duties:	  they	  exclude	  all	  countervailing	  reasons	  and	  add	  a	  new	  reason	  in	  favor	  of	  doing	  as	  commanded.	  	  Exclusion	  rigs	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  in	  favor	  of	  doing	  as	  commanded,	  so	  a	  command	  tilts	  the	  balance	  and	  creates	  a	  duty	  to	  do	  as	  commanded.	  	  This	  understanding	  of	  authority,	  however,	  is	  too	  narrow.	  There	  is	  an	  alternative,	  and	  very	  sensible,	  way	  to	  think	  of	  authority.	  	  Authority	  is	  not	  a	  right.	  	  Authority	  is	  a	  power.	  27	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  This	  point	  is	  indebted	  to	  Arthur	  Isak	  Applbaum,	  “Legitimacy	  without	  the	  Duty	  to	  Obey”,	  Philosophy	  and	  
Public	  Affairs	  38	  (2010):	  pp.	  215-­‐239.	  	  See	  also	  David	  Copp,	  “The	  Idea	  of	  Political	  Legitimacy”,	  Philosophy	  and	  
Public	  Affairs	  28	  (1999):	  pp.	  3-­‐45.	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The	  contrast	  between	  right	  and	  power	  is	  found	  in	  Wesley	  Hohfeld’s	  framework.28	  	  Hohfeld	  looked	  at	  the	  way	  ‘right’	  was	  variously	  used	  in	  legal	  contexts	  and	  distinguished	  four	  correlated	  pairs	  of	  legal	  advantage	  and	  disadvantage,	  the	  sum	  of	  which	  comprises	  a	  person’s	  legal	  standing.	  	  We	  can	  take	  the	  notion	  of	  legal	  advantage	  and	  disadvantage	  and	  apply	  it	  to	  morality	  and	  other	  normative	  domains.29	  	  For	  example,	  a	  person’s	  moral	  standing	  is	  a	  complete	  description	  of	  her	  moral	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	  	   The	  first,	  paradigmatic	  pair	  of	  advantage	  and	  disadvantage	  is	  claim-­‐right/duty.	  	  If	  A	  has	  a	  claim-­‐right	  against	  B,	  then	  B	  has	  a	  correlative	  duty	  to	  A.	  	  A’s	  advantage	  is	  the	  claim-­‐right,	  B’s	  disadvantage	  the	  duty.	  	  The	  second	  correlated	  pair	  is	  vulnerability/liberty:	  if	  A	  has	  a	  liberty	  with	  respect	  to	  B,	  B	  is	  correlatively	  vulnerable	  to	  A.30	  	  To	  see	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  pairs,	  imagine	  there	  is	  an	  apple	  between	  us.	  	  If	  I	  bought	  the	  apple,	  I	  have	  a	  claim-­‐right	  to	  it	  as	  my	  property,	  so	  you	  have	  a	  correlative	  duty	  not	  to	  take	  it	  and	  wrong	  me	  if	  you	  do.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  apple	  fell	  off	  a	  nearby,	  unowned	  apple	  tree	  then	  I	  merely	  have	  a	  liberty	  with	  respect	  to	  it,	  so	  am	  vulnerable	  to	  your	  taking	  it	  and	  you	  do	  not	  wrong	  me	  if	  you	  do.	  	  You	  also	  have	  a	  liberty	  to	  the	  unowned	  apple	  so	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  my	  taking	  it	  and	  I	  do	  not	  wrong	  you	  if	  I	  do.	  Traditional	  authority	  is	  the	  claim-­‐right	  to	  command.	  	  Because	  it	  is	  a	  claim-­‐right,	  it	  entails	  a	  correlative	  duty.	  	  Authorities	  have	  the	  right	  to	  command	  subjects,	  so	  subjects	  have	  a	  correlative	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  command.	  	  The	  connection	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  authority	  and	  how	  subjects	  are	  bound	  is	  direct	  and	  intuitive.	  	  But	  this	  notion	  of	  authority	  cannot	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Wesley	  Newcomb	  Hohfeld,	  Fundamental	  Legal	  Conceptions	  as	  Applied	  to	  Judicial	  Reasoning	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  UP,	  1919).	  29	  See	  Applbaum,	  “Legitimacy	  without	  the	  Duty	  to	  Obey”,	  pp.	  220ff.	  30	  The	  terminology	  for	  this	  pair	  varies.	  	  “Vulnerability”	  is	  my	  own	  amendment	  to	  Hohfeld’s	  scheme.	  	  Hohfeld	  uses	  “no-­‐claim”	  or	  “no-­‐right”.	  	  What	  I	  call	  “liberty”	  is	  also	  sometimes	  called	  “permission”,	  “privilege”	  and	  “justification-­‐right”.	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capture	  some	  paradigmatic	  exercises	  of	  authority.	  Consider	  a	  police	  officer	  exercising	  her	  legal	  authority	  over	  you.	  	  Legal	  authority	  is	  a	  form	  of	  practical	  authority,	  changing	  the	  legal	  reasons	  you	  have	  to	  act	  in	  some	  way.	  	  When	  a	  police	  officer	  commands	  you	  to	  stop,	  you	  gain	  a	  legal	  duty	  to	  stop	  and	  so	  act	  illegally	  if	  you	  fail	  to	  conform	  to	  that	  reason	  and	  don’t	  stop.	  	  From	  the	  legal	  perspective,	  the	  command	  of	  a	  police	  officer	  to	  stop	  is	  a	  preemptive	  reason,	  excluding	  other	  legal	  reasons.	  	  This	  is	  clearly	  an	  exercise	  of	  authority,	  imposing	  a	  legal	  duty.	  	  	  But	  then	  the	  officer	  tells	  you	  that	  you	  may	  continue.	  	  This	  utterance	  cancels	  your	  legal	  duty	  to	  stop.	  	  You	  are	  now	  at	  legal	  liberty	  to	  continue,	  but	  you	  are	  also	  at	  legal	  liberty	  to	  remain	  stopped	  (assuming	  the	  officer	  didn’t	  also	  command	  you	  to	  go	  on).	  	  When	  the	  officer	  tells	  you	  that	  you	  may	  continue,	  she	  is	  exercising	  her	  legal	  authority	  over	  you,	  but	  she	  can’t	  be	  exercising	  traditional	  authority.	  Her	  utterance	  doesn’t	  give	  you	  new	  legal	  duties	  and	  you	  don’t	  have	  any	  new	  legal	  reason	  to	  do	  or	  not	  do	  anything.	  	  Instead,	  you	  lose	  your	  legal	  reason	  to	  stop	  and	  you	  gain	  legal	  liberty.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  don’t	  gain	  a	  new	  legal	  duty,	  her	  utterance	  was	  a	  content-­‐independent	  and	  preemptive	  legal	  reason	  for	  you.	  	  Imagine	  that	  she	  commanded	  you	  to	  stop	  because	  of	  a	  chemical	  spill	  and	  it	  was	  too	  dangerous	  for	  you	  to	  continue.	  	  She’s	  following	  regulations	  and	  knows	  that	  a	  certain	  risk	  of	  exposure	  means	  she	  should	  cordon	  off	  civilians,	  while	  a	  risk	  of	  exposure	  lower	  than	  that	  threshold	  means	  she	  shouldn’t	  impede	  traffic	  and	  should	  allow	  people	  through.	  	  In	  this	  case	  she	  misjudges	  the	  risk	  of	  exposure	  and	  thinks	  that	  it	  has	  gone	  below	  the	  threshold	  such	  that	  she	  should	  allow	  people	  to	  continue	  on.	  	  If	  her	  utterance	  was	  a	  content-­‐dependent	  legal	  reason	  for	  you,	  then	  you	  would	  still	  have	  a	  legal	  duty	  to	  stop.	  	  After	  all,	  she	  was	  mistaken	  about	  how	  dangerous	  it	  is.	  	  But	  if	  you	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continue	  on	  after	  being	  given	  mistaken	  permission,	  you	  do	  not	  act	  illegally.	  	  This	  is	  because	  your	  legal	  duty	  to	  stop	  was	  canceled	  by	  the	  content-­‐independent	  reason	  given	  by	  the	  later	  utterance.	  	  Her	  utterance	  also	  gives	  you	  a	  preemptive	  reason	  because	  it	  excluded	  other	  legal	  reasons	  you	  may	  have	  had	  to	  stop.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  canceled	  your	  earlier	  duty.	  	  This	  is	  like	  a	  police	  officer	  in	  an	  intersection	  waving	  you	  through	  a	  red	  light.	  	  You	  had	  a	  legal	  reason	  to	  stop,	  but	  the	  police	  officer’s	  command	  excluded	  that	  reason	  and	  gave	  you	  a	  liberty	  to	  go	  through	  the	  red.	  	  My	  point	  is	  this:	  the	  only	  way	  to	  accurately	  capture	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  police	  officer’s	  second	  utterance	  had	  on	  you	  is	  to	  see	  that	  this	  utterance	  also	  gave	  you	  a	  content-­‐independent	  and	  preemptive	  reason.	  	  Her	  latter	  duty-­‐canceling,	  liberty-­‐making	  utterance	  of	  the	  police	  officer	  was	  as	  much	  an	  exercise	  of	  her	  authority	  as	  her	  former	  duty-­‐making,	  liberty-­‐canceling	  utterance.	  	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  authority	  as	  only	  duty-­‐making	  must	  be	  mistaken.	  	  Otherwise	  the	  latter	  utterance	  would	  not	  have	  been	  an	  exercise	  of	  the	  officer’s	  legal	  authority.	  	  This	  ignores	  both	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  utterance	  superficially	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  exercise	  of	  authority	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  utterance	  constituted	  a	  content-­‐independent,	  preemptive	  reason	  for	  you.	  Authority	  must,	  conceptually,	  give	  a	  content-­‐independent	  and	  preemptive	  reason	  that	  changes	  your	  standing,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  what	  part	  of	  your	  standing	  is	  decisively	  changed.	  	  Above	  I	  defined	  an	  agent’s	  normative	  standing	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  her	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  within	  that	  normative	  domain,	  so	  your	  legal	  standing	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  your	  legal	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  the	  complete	  specification	  of	  your	  legal	  duties,	  legal	  rights,	  legal	  vulnerabilities,	  and	  legal	  liberties	  at	  a	  particular	  time	  (as	  well	  as	  your	  second-­‐order	  legal	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages,	  which	  I	  discuss	  shortly).	  So	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authority	  can	  be	  duty-­‐making	  as	  the	  traditional	  account	  claims,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  duty-­‐canceling,	  liberty-­‐making,	  vulnerability-­‐making,	  vulnerability-­‐canceling,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  A	  has	  authority	  over	  B	  in	  domain	  D	  iff	  A’s	  directives	  constitute	  a	  preemptive,	  content-­‐independent	  D-­‐reason	  for	  B	  and	  so	  necessarily	  change	  B’s	  D-­‐standing.	  	  	  One	  way	  to	  be	  misled	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  authority	  can	  be	  exercised	  by	  changing	  parts	  of	  standing	  without	  changing	  duties	  is	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  commands	  of	  an	  authority	  must	  be	  preemptive	  reasons	  (which	  is	  true)	  and	  that	  preemptive	  reasons	  must	  be	  duty-­‐making	  (which	  isn’t).	  	  To	  see	  why	  this	  tempting	  thought	  is	  false,	  consider	  that	  if	  the	  apple	  really	  is	  unowned	  then	  that	  fact	  is	  a	  preemptive	  reason	  that	  entails	  both	  of	  us	  lack	  a	  duty	  not	  to	  take	  it.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  facts	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  ownership	  are	  decisively	  liberty-­‐making	  and	  vulnerability-­‐making:	  the	  fact	  that	  neither	  of	  us	  owns	  it	  means	  both	  of	  us	  are	  at	  liberty	  to	  take	  it	  and	  both	  of	  us	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  it	  being	  taken	  by	  the	  other.	  	  These	  reasons	  are	  decisive	  because	  they	  create	  the	  liberty	  regardless	  of	  other	  facts;	  even	  if	  I	  have	  more	  reason	  to	  take	  the	  apple	  than	  you	  do,	  for	  example	  if	  apples	  are	  my	  favorite	  food	  and	  your	  least	  favorite	  food,	  I	  do	  not	  thereby	  gain	  a	  moral	  right	  to	  the	  apple.	  	  You	  are	  still	  at	  liberty	  to	  take	  it	  and	  do	  not	  wrong	  me	  if	  you	  do	  because	  the	  facts	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  ownership	  are	  decisive	  liberty-­‐making	  reasons.	  	  	  	  	  This	  characterization	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  authority	  is	  a	  power,	  not	  a	  right.	  	  Power	  is	  a	  second-­‐order	  advantage.	  	  It’s	  second-­‐order	  because	  it	  references	  first-­‐order	  advantages,	  and	  in	  particular	  a	  power	  allows	  one	  agent	  to	  change	  another’s	  first-­‐order	  standing.	  	  Like	  at	  the	  first	  level,	  Hohfeld	  identifies	  two	  second-­‐order	  connected	  pairs	  of	  advantage	  and	  disadvantage.	  	  They	  are	  power/liability	  and	  immunity/disability.	  	  	  If	  A	  has	  a	  power	  over	  B,	  B	  is	  liable	  to	  A.	  	  If	  I	  let	  you	  borrow	  my	  book,	  I	  have	  the	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power	  to	  give	  you	  a	  new	  duty	  to	  return	  the	  book	  to	  me.	  	  I	  may	  not	  have	  specified	  a	  time,	  but	  if	  I	  say	  “I	  need	  the	  book	  back	  by	  tomorrow”	  you	  have	  a	  new	  duty	  to	  return	  it	  to	  me	  by	  tomorrow.	  	  You	  were	  liable	  to	  a	  change	  in	  your	  first-­‐order	  normative	  standing,	  a	  new	  duty.	  	  	  My	  power	  can	  also	  change	  your	  powers,	  as	  when	  a	  sheriff	  exercises	  her	  legal	  power	  to	  deputize	  someone	  and	  grant	  them	  various	  legal	  powers.	  	  The	  other	  second-­‐order	  pair	  is	  immunity/disability.	  	  If	  A	  is	  immune	  to	  B,	  B	  has	  a	  disability	  to	  A.	  	  You	  and	  I	  are	  legally	  immune	  to	  having	  our	  innocence	  or	  guilt	  for	  a	  crime	  determined	  by	  each	  other,	  and	  we	  are	  similarly	  disabled	  against	  each	  other	  in	  that	  respect	  (assuming	  one	  of	  us	  is	  not	  on	  a	  jury	  or	  a	  judge).	  	  	  The	  police	  officer	  exercises	  authority	  over	  you,	  but	  with	  this	  schema	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  she	  is	  exercising	  a	  power	  over	  you,	  not	  exercising	  her	  rights.	  	  When	  she	  issued	  her	  command	  to	  stop,	  you	  gained	  a	  new	  legal	  duty.	  	  When	  she	  said	  you	  could	  continue,	  you	  lost	  a	  duty	  and	  gained	  a	  liberty.	  	  This	  is	  precisely	  what	  having	  a	  normative	  power	  over	  another	  agent	  allows.31	  	  If	  authority	  is	  a	  right,	  it	  can	  only	  create	  new	  (correlative)	  duties	  and	  can’t	  create	  new	  liberties.	  	  To	  capture	  the	  officer’s	  legal	  authority,	  we	  must	  conceive	  of	  authority	  as	  a	  power.	  Instead	  of	  thinking	  of	  authority	  as	  the	  right	  to	  command,	  it	  is	  more	  apt	  to	  consider	  it	  the	  power	  to	  bind.	  With	  the	  concept	  of	  authority	  as	  a	  normative	  power	  in	  hand,	  new	  possibilities	  have	  opened.	  	  In	  particular,	  if	  authority	  is	  a	  power	  then	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  authorities	  to	  change	  subjects’	  standing	  in	  ways	  other	  than	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  duties.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  this	  possibility	  is	  important	  because	  authority	  that	  creates	  new	  duties	  is	  unnecessary	  for	  political	  authority.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Note	  that	  Raz	  also	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘normative	  power’	  but	  means	  something	  quite	  different	  than	  I	  do;	  he’s	  referring	  to	  a	  more	  general	  idea	  than	  a	  Hohfeldian	  advantage.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  MF,	  p.	  24.	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7.	  The	  Service	  Conception	  of	  Authority	  To	  this	  point	  I	  have	  been	  discussing	  the	  concept	  of	  authority	  and	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  traditional	  authority	  is	  too	  narrow.	  	  Instead	  of	  simply	  creating	  duties,	  authority	  is	  a	  normative	  power	  that	  can	  change	  any	  component	  of	  subjects’	  first-­‐order	  normative	  standing.	  	  At	  her	  discretion,	  an	  authority	  can	  issue	  a	  directive	  that	  constitutes	  a	  preemptive,	  content-­‐independent	  reason	  that	  binds	  subjects	  by	  changing	  their	  standing.	  	  With	  this	  concept	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  conception	  of	  genuine	  authority.32	  	  Here	  we	  are	  not	  concerned	  with	  what	  authority	  is,	  but	  with	  how	  an	  agent	  can	  attain	  genuine	  authority.	  	  In	  short,	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  the	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  authority.	  If	  our	  concept	  of	  authority	  is	  accurate,	  then	  the	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  authority	  will	  be	  the	  same	  as	  the	  conditions	  on	  one	  agent’s	  discretionary	  utterances	  constituting	  preemptive	  and	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  for	  another	  agent	  in	  a	  particular	  domain.	  	  One	  way	  for	  utterances	  to	  do	  this	  is	  via	  consent.	  	  I	  can	  consent	  to	  treat	  your	  utterances	  as	  preemptive	  and	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  and	  thereby	  make	  you	  an	  authority	  over	  me.	  But	  often	  in	  discussions	  of	  authority	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  whether	  one	  person	  could	  have	  authority	  over	  another	  without	  their	  consent,	  especially	  with	  respect	  to	  political	  authority.	  	  I’ll	  explain	  these	  ideas	  more	  fully	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  For	  now	  the	  important	  idea	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  single	  set	  of	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  authority.	  	  Consent	  is	  one	  way	  to	  get	  genuine	  authority,	  but	  there	  are	  others,	  and	  these	  others	  will	  be	  quite	  different.	  The	  most	  widely	  accepted	  and	  influential	  conception	  of	  authority	  is	  Joseph	  Raz’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  John	  Rawls,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice,	  Revised	  Edition	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  UP,	  1999):	  p.	  5.	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service	  conception.33	  	  I’ve	  already	  followed	  Raz’s	  approach	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  particularly	  in	  describing	  the	  commands	  of	  authority	  as	  constituting	  preemptive	  and	  content-­‐independent	  reasons.	  	  In	  general	  I	  think	  the	  service	  conception	  is	  basically	  correct,	  even	  once	  we	  have	  expanded	  our	  concept	  of	  authority	  to	  include	  any	  change	  in	  standing	  rather	  than	  just	  focusing	  on	  duties.	  	  In	  following	  chapters	  I’ll	  offer	  some	  arguments	  against	  details	  of	  Raz’s	  view	  and	  so	  will	  modify	  the	  service	  conception.	  	  	  	   The	  service	  conception	  is	  motivated	  in	  large	  part	  by	  the	  rationality	  challenge	  to	  authority.	  	  In	  connection	  with	  preemption,	  I	  noted	  that	  subjects	  look	  irrational	  if	  they	  obey	  commands,	  especially	  mistaken	  commands,	  because	  they	  are	  not	  conforming	  to	  their	  reasons.	  	  It	  is	  only	  because	  reasons	  for	  acting	  in	  ways	  not	  commanded	  are	  preempted	  that	  subjects	  could	  be	  acting	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  their	  reasons	  by	  obeying	  an	  authority.	  	  The	  first	  important	  condition	  on	  genuine	  authority	  comes	  from	  a	  similar	  line	  of	  thought.	  	   Above	  I	  briefly	  argued	  that	  good	  advice	  must	  be	  based	  on	  reasons	  that	  already	  apply	  to	  a	  subject.	  	  If	  my	  lunch	  advisor	  tells	  me	  not	  to	  get	  seafood	  because	  she	  is	  allergic	  to	  seafood,	  this	  is	  bad	  advice	  because	  it	  takes	  her	  reasons	  to	  be	  my	  reasons.	  	  I	  am	  not	  allergic,	  so	  I	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  avoid	  seafood.	  	  In	  order	  to	  explain	  how	  obeying	  an	  authority	  could	  be	  rational,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  genuine	  authority	  is	  the	  same	  way.	  	  If	  an	  authority	  were	  commanding	  based	  on	  her	  reasons	  for	  action	  rather	  than	  on	  yours,	  her	  commands	  give	  you	  no	  reason	  to	  obey.	  	  Instead,	  binding	  commands	  must	  be	  based	  in	  your	  reasons.	  	  Raz	  calls	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Raz’s	  theory	  is	  explicated	  over	  many	  years,	  books,	  and	  articles.	  	  I	  will	  mainly	  be	  working	  from	  MF,	  and	  I	  have	  already	  cited	  AL,	  PRN,	  RSC,	  and	  FNR.	  	  To	  complete	  the	  picture,	  I	  will	  also	  use	  “Facing	  Up:	  A	  Reply”,	  
Southern	  California	  Law	  Review	  62	  (1988):	  pp.	  1153-­‐1235	  [FU]	  and	  Between	  Authority	  and	  Interpretation:	  On	  
the	  Theory	  of	  Law	  and	  Practical	  Reason	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  2010)	  [BAI].	  	  For	  a	  recent,	  concise	  overview	  of	  Raz’s	  theory	  and	  criticisms	  thereof,	  see	  Kenneth	  Ehrenberg,	  “Joseph	  Raz’s	  Theory	  of	  Authority”,	  Philosophy	  
Compass	  6	  (2011):	  pp.	  884-­‐94	  and	  “Critical	  Reception	  of	  Raz’s	  Theory	  of	  Authority”,	  Philosophy	  Compass	  6	  (2011):	  pp.	  777-­‐785.	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these	  dependent	  reasons,	  I’ll	  call	  them	  preexisting	  reasons.34	  	  Preexisting	  reasons	  are	  reasons	  the	  subject	  already	  had	  before	  a	  command.	  	  Like	  good	  advice,	  authority	  must	  be	  based	  on	  the	  preexisting	  reasons.35	  	  	  	   Advice	  and	  authority	  are	  distinct,	  however.	  	  Advice	  gives	  content-­‐dependent	  reasons	  to	  do	  as	  advised	  while	  authority	  gives	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  to	  do	  as	  commanded.	  	  Advice	  must	  be	  based	  on	  preexisting	  reasons,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  accept	  it,	  the	  advice	  must	  actually,	  accurately	  reflect	  those	  preexisting	  reasons.36	  	  You	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  accept	  bad	  advice	  (except	  instrumentally,	  for	  example	  in	  order	  to	  appease	  your	  advisor).	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  commands	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority	  constitute	  content-­‐independent	  reasons,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  means	  that	  sometimes	  commands	  will	  bind	  subjects	  even	  when	  they	  fail	  to	  accurately	  reflect	  the	  preexisting	  reasons.	  	  If	  authority	  were	  like	  advice	  and	  had	  to	  accurately	  reflect	  them,	  authority	  would	  again	  be	  rendered	  useless.	  	  This	  is	  another	  version	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  some	  mistaken	  commands	  must	  bind.	  	   Although	  some	  mistaken	  commands	  bind,	  an	  ideal	  authority	  would	  never	  issue	  mistaken	  commands.	  	  If	  there	  were	  such	  an	  infallible	  authority,	  it’s	  clear	  why	  it	  would	  be	  rational	  to	  obey	  her	  commands.	  	  If	  her	  commands	  always	  accurately	  reflect	  your	  preexisting	  reasons,	  and	  you	  know	  that	  you	  are	  fallible	  but	  she	  is	  not,	  then	  you	  can	  always	  conform	  better	  to	  your	  reasons	  by	  obeying	  the	  authority	  than	  by	  following	  your	  own	  judgment	  about	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons.	  	  Actual	  authorities	  aren’t	  infallible	  though.	  	  When	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Because	  of	  this,	  Raz	  calls	  this	  condition	  on	  authority	  “the	  dependence	  thesis”,	  MF,	  p.	  47.	  35	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  a	  subject’s	  preexisting	  reasons	  are	  not	  necessarily	  self-­‐interested	  reasons.	  	  When	  a	  military	  commander	  issues	  an	  order	  that	  puts	  her	  soldiers	  in	  harm’s	  way,	  it	  doesn’t	  mean	  she’s	  making	  her	  decisions	  on	  the	  wrong	  reasons.	  	  Instead,	  we	  understand	  that	  the	  soldiers	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  risk	  their	  lives	  in	  pursuit	  of	  winning	  the	  conflict.	  36	  As	  a	  pragmatic	  issue,	  it	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  tell	  the	  difference	  between	  good	  advice	  and	  advice	  issued	  by	  a	  good	  advisor.	  	  In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  advice	  is	  good	  in	  its	  content,	  you	  would	  need	  to	  already	  know	  what	  your	  reasons	  are	  and	  the	  advice	  would	  be	  redundant.	  	  But	  this	  pragmatic	  difficulty	  does	  not	  mean	  you	  should	  accept	  bad	  advice.	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can	  it	  be	  rational	  to	  obey	  a	  fallible	  person	  who	  will	  sometimes	  issue	  mistaken	  directives?	  The	  answer	  is	  quite	  intuitive:	  when	  obeying	  that	  person	  tends	  to	  help	  you	  better	  conform	  to	  your	  preexisting	  reasons.	  	  While	  your	  judgment	  might	  be	  better	  in	  individual	  instances,	  on	  the	  whole	  you	  will	  conform	  better	  in	  the	  long	  run	  if	  you	  obey	  than	  if	  you	  follow	  your	  own	  judgment.	  	  This	  idea	  is	  captured	  in	  Raz’s	  main	  condition	  on	  genuine	  authority,	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis:	  	  [T]he	   normal	   way	   to	   establish	   that	   a	   person	   has	   authority	   over	   another	  person	   involves	   showing	   that	   the	   alleged	   subject	   is	   likely	   better	   to	   comply	  with	   reasons	   which	   apply	   to	   him	   (other	   than	   the	   alleged	   authoritative	  directives)	   if	   he	   accepts	   the	   directives	   of	   the	   alleged	   authority	   as	  authoritatively	   binding	   and	   tries	   to	   follow	   them,	   rather	   than	   by	   trying	   to	  follow	  the	  reasons	  which	  apply	  to	  him	  directly.37	  	  The	  main	  question:	  why	  does	  fulfilling	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  mean	  that	  A’s	  directives	  constitute	  preemptive	  and	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  for	  B?	  	  First,	  the	  reason	  is	  content-­‐independent	  because	  it	  is	  about	  the	  tendency	  of	  the	  authority’s	  directives.	  	  The	  important	  point	  is	  that	  an	  agent	  has	  authority	  when	  “the	  alleged	  subject	  is	  likely	  better	  to	  comply”.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  following	  this	  particular	  command	  will	  actually,	  necessarily	  lead	  the	  subject	  to	  act	  better.	  	  Again,	  this	  would	  render	  authority	  redundant	  and	  it	  wouldn’t	  explain	  how	  authority’s	  commands	  give	  content-­‐independent	  reasons.	  	  Instead,	  it’s	  a	  tendency	  to	  better	  compliance,	  based	  on	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  authority’s	  judgment	  in	  that	  domain.	  	  	  	   Due	  to	  this,	  Raz	  terms	  his	  account	  the	  service	  conception	  of	  authority:	  authority	  exists	  and	  is	  justified	  just	  because	  it	  is	  in	  service	  of	  the	  subject,	  helping	  her	  conform	  better	  to	  her	  preexisting	  reasons.	  	  A	  somewhat	  flippant	  summary	  of	  the	  idea	  behind	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  is	  this:	  if	  agents	  aim	  to	  maximize	  conformity	  with	  their	  reasons,	  the	  only	  condition	  under	  which	  obeying	  an	  authority	  could	  be	  rational	  is	  when	  obedience	  would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  53.	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increase	  conformity.	  	  	  	   When	  an	  agent	  fulfills	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis,	  the	  subjects’	  preexisting	  reasons	  are	  preempted.	  	  For	  now	  I’m	  going	  to	  gesture	  at	  an	  explanation	  of	  this	  fact.	  	  In	  chapter	  three	  I	  provide	  an	  in-­‐depth	  examination	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  preemption,	  and	  there	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  fuller	  account	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  preemption	  and	  the	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  authority.	  	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  my	  preexisting	  reasons	  are	  preempted	  because	  the	  authority	  bases	  her	  decisions	  on	  those	  reasons	  and	  her	  judgment	  about	  those	  reasons	  is	  likely	  better	  than	  mine.	  	  Like	  advice,	  genuine	  authority	  aims	  at	  serving	  subjects	  in	  a	  domain	  by	  issuing	  directives	  based	  on	  subjects’	  preexisting	  reasons	  in	  that	  domain.	  	  By	  virtue	  of	  representing	  a	  likely	  better	  balance	  of	  preexisting	  reasons,	  the	  command	  excludes	  those	  reasons.	  	  This	  sketch	  raises	  a	  variety	  of	  questions	  that	  I	  take	  up	  in	  in	  further	  chapters.	  	  	  	   The	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  is	  importantly	  qualified	  by	  the	  independence	  condition:	  “that	  the	  matters	  regarding	  which	  [the	  normal	  justification	  thesis]	  is	  met	  are	  such	  that	  with	  respect	  to	  them	  it	  is	  better	  to	  conform	  to	  reason	  than	  to	  decide	  for	  oneself,	  unaided	  by	  authority.”38	  	  Calling	  this	  the	  “independence”	  condition	  is	  a	  bit	  confusing	  because,	  if	  it	  is	  met,	  then	  subjects	  do	  not	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  act	  “independently”,	  i.e.	  on	  their	  own	  judgment.	  	  Instead,	  I’m	  going	  to	  call	  it	  the	  deference	  condition,	  on	  the	  thought	  that	  if	  it	  is	  fulfilled,	  then	  the	  subject	  might	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  defer	  in	  this	  situation.	  	  	  An	  example	  that	  fails	  the	  deference	  condition,	  so	  does	  not	  entail	  the	  authority	  of	  A	  over	  B	  although	  A	  fulfills	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  with	  respect	  to	  B,	  is	  the	  process	  of	  responsibilization	  of	  children.	  	  In	  order	  to	  teach	  children	  how	  to	  make	  decisions	  on	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  See	  Raz,	  RSC,	  p.	  1014;	  MF,	  p.	  69.	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own,	  parents	  often	  give	  their	  children	  discretion	  over	  decisions	  that	  the	  parents	  could	  make	  better.	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  child	  making	  the	  decisions	  herself	  is	  more	  important	  than	  securing	  better	  outcomes	  by	  letting	  the	  parent	  make	  the	  reliably	  better	  decisions:	  the	  child	  has	  reasons	  not	  to	  defer.	  	  Similarly,	  in	  many	  areas	  of	  an	  individual’s	  life	  it	  is	  more	  important	  that	  she	  choose	  for	  herself,	  exercising	  control	  over	  her	  own	  life	  and	  acting	  as	  the	  agent	  of	  her	  own	  decisions,	  than	  it	  is	  to	  secure	  better	  outcomes.	  	  Note	  that	  the	  deference	  condition	  merely	  captures	  contexts	  in	  which	  subjects	  do	  not	  have	  decisive	  reasons	  not	  to	  defer;	  whether	  a	  subject	  should	  actually	  defer	  also	  depends	  on	  whether	  the	  other	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  authority	  are	  met.	  The	  main	  attraction	  of	  the	  service	  conception	  is	  its	  explanation	  of	  how	  obeying	  an	  authority	  can	  be	  rational.	  	  The	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  shows	  how	  the	  commands	  of	  an	  authority	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  preexisting	  reasons	  that	  already	  apply	  to	  the	  subject.	  	  It	  is	  only	  because	  of	  this	  connection	  that	  obedience	  is	  sometimes	  justified.	  	  Without	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  obeying	  the	  authority	  is	  necessarily	  irrational,	  ignoring	  the	  reasons	  that	  apply	  to	  a	  subject	  and	  acting	  for	  the	  indirect	  reason	  of	  the	  command.	  	  But	  on	  Raz’s	  account,	  the	  command	  itself	  must	  be	  based	  on	  the	  preexisting	  reasons	  that	  apply	  to	  the	  subject,	  so	  deference	  to	  the	  command	  is	  less	  mystifying.	  	  If	  rationality	  generally	  requires	  one	  to	  maximize	  conformity	  with	  reason,	  then	  deferring	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  deference	  serves	  conformity	  can	  be	  rational.	  	  At	  this	  point	  we	  have	  clarified	  both	  the	  concept	  of	  authority	  and	  a	  plausible	  and	  widely	  accepted	  conception	  of	  authority.	  	  A	  has	  the	  power	  of	  authority	  over	  B	  in	  domain	  D	  iff	  A’s	  directives	  constitute	  preemptive,	  content-­‐independent	  D-­‐reasons	  for	  B,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  some	  part	  of	  B’s	  D-­‐standing	  is	  changed.	  	  On	  the	  service	  conception,	  then,	  A’s	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directives	  constitute	  preemptive,	  content-­‐independent	  D-­‐reasons	  when	  following	  A’s	  directives	  likely	  helps	  B	  better	  conform	  to	  her	  preexisting	  D-­‐reasons.	  	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  extended	  discussion	  of	  authority	  is	  to	  help	  us	  clarify	  the	  debate	  between	  the	  philosophical	  anarchist	  and	  the	  governmentalist.	  	  Next	  in	  chapter	  two	  I	  apply	  our	  new	  understanding	  of	  authority	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  political	  authority.	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2	  –	  Evidential	  Modern	  Political	  Authority	  	  From	  the	  arguments	  in	  chapter	  one,	  we	  now	  understand	  authority	  as	  the	  discretionary	  power	  to	  issue	  directives	  that	  constitute	  preemptive,	  content-­‐independent	  reasons	  for	  others,	  resulting	  in	  a	  change	  in	  their	  standing	  in	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdictional	  domain.	  	  When	  A	  has	  authority	  over	  B,	  A	  has	  the	  power	  to	  bind	  B	  at	  her	  discretion.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  apply	  this	  understanding	  of	  authority	  to	  the	  question	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  Political	  authority	  is	  differentiated	  from	  other	  kinds	  of	  authority	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  the	  combination	  of	  which	  means	  political	  authority	  is	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  attain.	  	  That	  said,	  the	  broadened	  notion	  of	  authority	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  that	  there	  are	  different	  kinds	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  The	  standard	  debate	  between	  anarchists	  and	  governmentalists	  has	  focused	  too	  narrowly	  on	  traditional	  authority,	  the	  right	  to	  command	  that	  creates	  duties.	  	  It	  is	  implausible	  that	  governments	  have	  traditional	  political	  authority,	  but	  plausible	  that	  they	  have	  another	  kind,	  what	  I	  call	  evidential	  political	  authority.	  	   	  
1.	  Political	  Authority	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  notion	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  attempt	  to	  adjudicate	  the	  debate	  between	  anarchists	  and	  governmentalists	  in	  a	  new	  way,	  rather	  than	  to	  present	  an	  account	  of	  authority	  generally.	  	  The	  authority	  that	  governments	  claim	  has	  some	  necessary	  and	  distinguishing	  features	  that	  put	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  political	  authority	  beyond	  the	  conditions	  for	  authority	  in	  general.	  	  	  	   Governments,	  as	  I	  defined	  them	  in	  chapter	  one,	  are	  the	  individuals	  filling	  institutional	  roles	  in	  a	  political	  institution,	  one	  prominent	  example	  of	  which	  is	  the	  nation-­‐
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state.	  	  For	  our	  purposes,	  there	  are	  three	  characteristics	  of	  political	  authority	  that	  distinguish	  it	  and	  call	  out	  for	  justification.	  	  The	  first	  two	  are	  intuitive	  and	  will	  be	  relevant	  later	  in	  the	  dissertation.	  	  The	  third	  requires	  more	  explanation	  and	  is	  one	  of	  the	  foci	  of	  this	  chapter.	  First,	  political	  authority	  is	  diachronic.	  	  We	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  synchronic	  authority,	  authority	  in	  only	  one	  instance.	  	  When	  I	  promise	  to	  obey	  your	  directives	  about	  where	  to	  go	  to	  lunch,	  I	  make	  you	  an	  authority	  over	  only	  one	  domain	  and	  for	  only	  one	  act:	  where	  I	  go	  to	  lunch	  today.	  	  You	  are	  a	  synchronic	  authority	  over	  me.	  	  But	  this	  pushes	  the	  notion	  of	  authority	  to	  its	  limit;	  our	  normal	  understanding	  of	  authority	  is	  diachronic.	  	  This	  is	  why	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  likelihood	  of	  following	  an	  authority’s	  commands	  helping	  you	  conform	  better	  to	  your	  reasons	  over	  the	  long	  run.	  	  Governments	  claim	  a	  particularly	  diachronically	  robust	  form	  of	  authority	  because	  they	  claim	  authority	  over	  the	  entire	  course	  of	  subjects’	  lives.	  	  Laws	  function	  as	  standing	  orders.1	  Of	  course,	  we	  shouldn’t	  close	  off	  the	  possibility	  that	  nobody	  can	  have	  authority	  that	  lasts	  that	  long.	  	  Perhaps	  governments’	  claim	  to	  authority	  over	  individuals’	  entire	  lives	  is	  simply	  mistaken.	  	  But	  there	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  any	  principled	  reason	  why	  this	  should	  be	  so.	  	  Further,	  governments	  couldn’t	  accomplish	  the	  aims	  they	  are	  required	  for,	  like	  securing	  justice,	  establishing	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  so	  forth,	  without	  diachronic	  influence	  of	  some	  sort.	  	  Governments	  also	  claim	  diachronic	  authority	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  claim	  to	  bind	  subjects	  with	  commands	  that	  were	  issued	  before	  those	  subjects	  were	  born.	  	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  there	  are	  laws	  hundreds	  of	  years	  old	  that	  people	  are	  still	  punished	  for	  breaking.	  	  If	  genuine,	  this	  kind	  of	  far-­‐reaching	  authority	  is	  quite	  astonishing.	  	  We	  need	  very	  good	  reasons	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  H.L.A.	  Hart,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  1961):	  p.	  23.	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expect	  that	  one	  agent	  could	  have	  this	  sort	  of	  power	  over	  others.	  	  The	  robustly	  diachronic	  nature	  of	  political	  authority	  calls	  out	  for	  special	  justification.	  	   Second,	  political	  authority	  is	  held	  over	  more	  than	  one	  individual.	  	  In	  chapter	  one	  I	  defined	  authority	  as	  a	  three-­‐part	  relation	  between	  two	  agents	  and	  a	  domain.	  	  It	  is	  only	  by	  way	  of	  summary	  that	  we	  speak	  of	  one	  agent	  having	  authority	  over	  more	  than	  one	  person,	  or	  over	  more	  than	  one	  domain.	  	  Political	  authority	  is	  concerned	  with	  solving	  social	  issues,	  issues	  that	  arise	  in	  the	  context	  of	  multiple	  individuals	  interacting.	  	  In	  order	  to	  solve	  those	  issues,	  it	  must	  have	  authority	  over	  multiple	  individuals.	  	  It	  also	  necessarily	  requires	  authority	  over	  multiple	  domains.	  	  Here	  I’m	  simply	  noting	  that	  if	  authority	  over	  one	  person	  is	  difficult	  to	  attain,	  authority	  over	  many	  others	  should	  be	  that	  much	  more	  difficult.	  	  It	  is	  another	  feature	  of	  political	  authority	  in	  particular	  that	  requires	  extra	  justification.	  	   Finally,	  and	  most	  importantly	  for	  both	  the	  justification	  of	  political	  authority	  and	  for	  our	  purposes	  in	  this	  chapter,	  political	  authority	  is	  morally	  punishable	  authority.	  	  Political	  authority	  is	  a	  form	  of	  moral	  and	  so	  practical	  authority:	  it	  changes	  subjects’	  moral	  reasons	  for	  action.	  	  To	  see	  that	  political	  authority	  is	  a	  species	  of	  moral	  authority,	  consider:	  if	  you	  are	  standing	  in	  your	  kitchen	  one	  morning,	  drinking	  coffee,	  and	  suddenly	  armed	  men	  burst	  into	  your	  home,	  handcuff	  you,	  and	  physically	  carry	  you	  into	  a	  small,	  locked	  room	  where	  you	  are	  held	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  your	  life,	  you	  normally	  have	  a	  (justified)	  moral	  complaint.	  	  You	  have	  the	  right	  to	  resist	  being	  taken	  away	  and	  the	  right	  to	  escape	  when	  you	  are	  held.	  	  When	  it’s	  not	  the	  government	  taking	  these	  actions	  we	  call	  them	  assault	  and	  kidnapping,	  recognize	  their	  impermissibility,	  and	  punish	  people	  for	  them.	  But	  when	  the	  government	  does	  this	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  law,	  they	  say	  you	  have	  no	  moral	  complaint.	  	  They	  claim	  you	  have	  no	  moral	  complaint	  because	  they	  issued	  a	  law	  that	  changed	  your	  moral	  standing,	  which	  you	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then	  broke.	  	  Further,	  they	  claim	  that	  you	  have	  no	  moral	  right	  to	  resist	  their	  punishments,	  and	  will	  punish	  you	  further	  if	  you	  do.	  	  This	  is	  striking	  and	  clearly	  distinguishes	  the	  attempted	  exercise	  of	  authority	  from	  the	  raw	  exercise	  of	  power;	  not	  even	  the	  boldest	  of	  criminals	  would	  claim	  that	  you	  act	  morally	  wrongly	  if	  you	  resist	  them	  (stupidly,	  maybe,	  or	  imprudently,	  but	  not	  wrongly).	  	  	  The	  government’s	  authority	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  explaining	  why	  citizens	  aren’t	  wronged	  by	  punishment	  (if	  they	  aren’t).	  	  The	  government	  only	  claims	  the	  permission	  to	  punish	  you	  if	  you	  disobey	  their	  genuine	  commands,	  e.g.	  if	  you	  break	  the	  law.	  	  Disobeying	  the	  government	  must	  be	  a	  morally	  punishable	  violation,	  then,	  and	  any	  good	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  must	  explain	  this.	  	  If	  disobeying	  some	  authority	  is	  a	  morally	  punishable	  violation,	  it	  is	  punishable	  authority.	  Whether	  the	  government	  has	  punishable	  authority	  is	  an	  important	  question	  but	  it	  is	  also	  importantly	  distinct	  from	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  particular	  person	  is	  wronged	  by	  a	  particular	  act	  of	  punishment.	  	  Just	  because	  I’ve	  done	  something	  punishable	  in	  principle	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  a	  particular	  act	  of	  punishment	  is	  justified.	  	  Punishment	  must	  be	  inflicted	  on	  someone	  who	  has	  committed	  a	  punishable	  violation	  in	  order	  to	  be	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  permissible	  but	  other	  conditions	  must	  be	  met	  as	  well.	  For	  example,	  punishment	  must	  be	  proportionate	  in	  order	  not	  to	  wrong	  the	  punishee.	  	  If	  I	  steal	  your	  phone,	  I	  have	  done	  something	  punishable.	  	  But	  if	  I	  am	  killed	  as	  punishment	  for	  this	  theft,	  I	  am	  wronged	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  was	  punished	  for	  a	  punishable	  violation	  precisely	  because	  death	  is	  a	  disproportionate	  punishment	  for	  minor	  theft.	  	  If	  some	  government	  has	  a	  legal	  system	  with	  wildly	  disproportionate	  penalties,	  then	  even	  if	  they	  had	  punishable	  authority,	  actual	  acts	  of	  punishment	  by	  that	  government	  would	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be	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  impermissible.	  	  While	  their	  citizens	  would	  be	  punishable	  in	  principle	  for	  breaking	  the	  law,	  all	  the	  actual	  punishments	  inflicted	  by	  the	  state	  would	  wrong	  the	  punishee	  because	  they	  violate	  the	  proportionality	  constraint.	  	  So	  when	  concerned	  with	  punishable	  authority,	  we	  are	  simply	  inquiring	  whether	  disobeying	  a	  command	  of	  this	  authority	  is	  a	  punishable	  violation	  in	  principle.	  	  The	  further	  questions	  that	  must	  be	  answered	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  government	  has	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  permission	  to	  punish	  its	  citizens	  for	  breaking	  the	  law	  fall	  under	  political	  legitimacy	  as	  I	  conceive	  it.2	  Political	  legitimacy	  is	  about	  whether	  the	  government	  has	  the	  right	  to	  rule.	  	  I	  think	  genuine	  political	  authority	  is	  a	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  condition	  on	  political	  legitimacy.	  	  The	  right	  to	  rule	  requires	  authority	  but	  also	  much	  more,	  including	  things	  like	  a	  fair	  and	  proportionate	  institution	  of	  punishment.	  	  When	  distinguished	  in	  this	  way,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  authority	  and	  legitimacy	  are	  distinct	  ideas.	  	  Justifying	  the	  power	  to	  bind	  others	  requires	  very	  different	  considerations	  than	  justifying	  the	  right	  to	  rule.3	  	  	  
	  
2.	  Modern	  Political	  Authority	  In	  addition	  to	  focusing	  only	  on	  political	  authority,	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  only	  one	  species	  of	  political	  authority,	  which	  I	  call	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  modern	  political	  authority	  because	  I	  want	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  whether	  anything	  like	  a	  modern	  government	  could	  have	  anything	  like	  the	  authority	  they	  claim	  to	  have.	  	  This	  is	  not	  due	  to	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  As	  with	  many	  concepts	  in	  such	  a	  long-­‐standing	  debate,	  “political	  authority”	  and	  “political	  legitimacy”	  get	  used	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  oft-­‐conflicting	  senses.	  	  I	  am	  simply	  stipulating	  that	  political	  authority	  is	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  government	  has	  the	  power	  to	  change	  our	  moral	  standing	  by	  issuing	  commands.	  	  Political	  legitimacy,	  to	  my	  mind,	  includes	  much	  more,	  such	  as	  the	  permission	  to	  set	  up	  a	  coercive	  legal	  system.	  	  I	  am	  not	  interested	  in	  terminological	  debates,	  but	  have	  reasons	  to	  think	  this	  is	  a	  sensible	  and	  useful	  way	  to	  draw	  the	  distinction.	  3	  Cf.	  Bas	  van	  der	  Vossen,	  “On	  Legitimacy	  and	  Authority”,	  Res	  Publica	  14	  (2008):	  pp.	  299-­‐302.	  
	   66	  
inherent	  conservatism,	  assuming	  that	  governments	  do	  have	  the	  power	  they	  claim	  and	  then	  trying	  to	  give	  a	  justification.	  	  The	  space	  for	  critique	  and	  improvement	  of	  actual	  governments	  remains.	  	  Indeed,	  my	  conclusion	  will	  be	  that	  almost	  all	  actual	  governments	  do	  not	  have	  the	  sort	  of	  sweeping	  authority	  they	  claim.	  	  	  Instead,	  my	  motivation	  is	  pragmatic:	  if	  there	  is	  any	  genuine	  political	  authority	  in	  the	  world	  today,	  it	  has	  to	  look	  something	  like	  the	  authority	  actual	  modern	  governments	  claim.	  	  My	  interest	  in	  authority	  flows	  from	  my	  interest	  in	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  individuals,	  and	  so	  focusing	  on	  the	  only	  kind	  of	  (political)	  authority	  that	  affects	  actual	  individuals	  makes	  sense.	  	  The	  focus	  on	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  also	  shared	  with	  the	  most	  common	  form	  of	  philosophical	  anarchism,	  which	  makes	  an	  empirical	  claim	  about	  the	  sort	  of	  authority	  actual	  governments	  claim	  or	  could	  plausibly	  claim	  given	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  world.	  	  	  Although	  my	  account	  will	  not	  justify	  the	  precise	  sort	  of	  political	  authority	  that	  modern	  governments	  claim,	  there	  may	  be	  genuine	  political	  authority	  that	  is	  significantly	  similar.	  	  It	  might	  be	  true,	  for	  example,	  that	  some	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  some	  governments	  bind	  most	  of	  the	  people	  in	  a	  territory	  most	  of	  the	  time.	  	  Even	  though	  this	  isn’t	  the	  sort	  of	  perfectly	  general	  authority	  modern	  governments	  claim,	  it	  would	  be	  an	  important	  kind	  of	  authority	  to	  justify.	  	  Some	  problems	  can	  only	  be	  solved	  by	  large-­‐scale	  coordinated	  efforts,	  and	  binding	  people	  such	  that	  they	  can	  be	  punished	  if	  they	  don’t	  participate	  is	  necessary	  to	  coordinate.	  	  If	  those	  people	  couldn’t	  be	  so	  bound,	  those	  problems	  would	  probably	  go	  unsolved.4	  	  Any	  optimism	  on	  this	  front	  depends	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  something	  like	  genuine	  modern	  political	  authority.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Philosophical	  anarchists	  often	  argue	  that	  private	  institutions	  can	  solve	  these	  problems,	  rendering	  the	  government	  unnecessary	  for	  the	  ends	  governmentalists	  generally	  appeal	  to.	  	  For	  a	  recent	  argument	  to	  this	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As	  with	  political	  authority,	  there	  are	  three	  features	  of	  modern	  political	  authority	  to	  highlight.	  	  Again,	  the	  first	  two	  are	  straightforward	  and	  will	  be	  relevant	  later	  in	  the	  dissertation.	  	  The	  third	  feature	  is	  most	  important	  and	  distinctive,	  and	  will	  be	  important	  throughout	  this	  chapter.	  	  The	  three	  relevant	  features	  that	  characterize	  modern	  political	  authority	  are	  scale,	  scope	  of	  jurisdiction,	  and	  lack	  of	  consent.	  First,	  modern	  governments	  claim	  to	  have	  authority	  over	  millions	  and	  even	  billions	  of	  people.	  Above	  I	  said	  political	  authority	  is	  over	  more	  than	  one	  individual	  and	  that	  having	  authority	  over	  multiple	  people	  is	  harder	  to	  achieve.	  	  My	  point	  about	  modern	  political	  authorities	  here	  is	  twofold.	  	  Simply	  given	  the	  number	  of	  people	  in	  modern	  political	  units,	  the	  worry	  about	  having	  authority	  over	  multiple	  people	  is	  exacerbated.	  	  As	  importantly,	  these	  people	  are	  incredibly	  and	  increasingly	  diverse.	  	  This	  trend	  cannot	  be	  realistically	  reversed,	  even	  if	  it	  were	  desirable	  to	  reverse	  it	  (which	  it	  isn’t).	  	  Modern	  political	  authority	  is	  addressed	  to	  pluralistic	  groups	  that	  disagree	  about	  many	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  facets	  of	  life,	  and	  a	  good	  account	  needs	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  fact	  of	  reasonable	  pluralism.5	  We	  could	  imagine	  authorities	  that	  were	  political	  in	  some	  sense	  but	  didn’t	  have	  this	  problem	  with	  scale	  and	  pluralism.	  	  If	  a	  village	  elects	  a	  leader	  and	  sets	  up	  some	  laws,	  the	  leader	  may	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  authority	  that	  can	  bind	  a	  village	  but	  couldn’t	  bind	  millions.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  authority	  depends	  in	  part	  on	  trust,	  as	  I	  argue	  in	  chapter	  four,	  then	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  village	  leader	  could	  establish	  extensive	  interpersonal	  trust	  with	  each	  member	  of	  the	  village	  while	  a	  leader	  of	  a	  modern	  government	  cannot	  do	  the	  same	  with	  each	  member	  of	  her	  state	  leads	  to	  some	  differences	  in	  their	  authority.	  	  This	  is	  one	  way	  in	  which	  my	  account	  does	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  effect,	  see	  Michael	  Huemer,	  The	  Problem	  of	  Political	  Authority:	  An	  Examination	  of	  the	  Right	  to	  Coerce	  and	  the	  
Duty	  to	  Obey	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2013).	  5	  John	  Rawls,	  Political	  Liberalism	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  UP,	  1993).	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attempt	  to	  capture	  all	  kinds	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  genuine	  political	  authority	  that	  could	  bind	  the	  sort	  of	  massive	  political	  groups	  we	  find	  in	  the	  modern	  world.	  Second,	  modern	  governments	  claim	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  most	  important	  domains	  in	  our	  lives,	  for	  example	  personal	  safety.	  	  Some	  jurisdictional	  claims	  of	  current	  governments	  will	  not	  be	  realized	  on	  my	  account,	  for	  example	  the	  claim	  to	  necessarily	  bind	  everyone	  within	  a	  territory.	  	  But	  any	  good	  account	  of	  modern	  political	  authority	  must	  explain	  how	  modern	  political	  agents	  can	  have	  authority	  over	  the	  domains	  of	  our	  lives	  we	  care	  most	  about.	  	  Modern	  governments	  also	  claim	  jurisdiction	  over	  particularly	  modern	  issues.	  	  For	  example,	  some	  modern	  governments’	  claim	  to	  authority	  over	  the	  domain	  of	  collective	  self-­‐defense	  includes	  jurisdiction	  over	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  No	  government	  in	  history	  has	  had	  authority	  over	  a	  capability	  that	  had	  the	  realistic	  possibility	  of	  ending	  all	  higher	  forms	  of	  life	  on	  Earth,	  as	  the	  US	  and	  Russia	  did	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  Authority	  over	  the	  standard	  capacity	  to	  wage	  war	  is	  one	  thing,	  but	  threatening	  all	  life	  on	  Earth	  is	  another.	  	  These	  are	  further	  respects	  in	  which	  political	  authority	  must	  be	  moral	  authority,	  but	  they	  also	  show	  that	  it	  must	  be	  moral	  authority	  of	  a	  particularly	  important	  type,	  as	  it	  addresses	  moral	  issues	  that	  are	  exceptionally	  weighty.	  Third	  and	  most	  importantly,	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  nonconsensual.	  	  Discussions	  of	  philosophical	  anarchism	  and	  governmentalism	  have	  historically	  focused	  in	  large	  part	  on	  the	  role	  of	  consent.	  	  This	  is	  understandable	  and	  laudable;	  one	  easy	  way	  to	  get	  authority	  over	  another	  is	  for	  them	  to	  consent	  to	  be	  your	  subject.	  	  Consent	  is	  the	  gold	  standard	  for	  permissibility:	  it	  distinguishes	  boxing	  from	  assault	  and	  borrowing	  from	  theft.	  	  Consent	  can	  make	  permissible	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  grievously	  wrong.	  	  If	  we	  are	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worried	  about	  taxes	  as	  a	  form	  of	  institutionalized	  theft	  (or	  slavery!),	  a	  successful	  appeal	  to	  consent	  would	  be	  very	  helpful	  indeed.	  	  	  I’ll	  first	  explain	  how	  consent	  can	  ground	  authority	  in	  terms	  of	  my	  promise	  to	  go	  to	  lunch	  wherever	  you	  command.	  	  On	  a	  normal	  day	  where	  I	  have	  made	  no	  promises	  about	  my	  lunch	  venue,	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  reasons	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  choosing	  a	  particular	  venue.	  	  I	  have	  a	  right	  to	  choose	  the	  closest	  venue,	  or	  the	  fastest	  venue,	  or	  the	  tastiest	  venue,	  or	  the	  venue	  where	  my	  friends	  generally	  eat,	  or	  the	  venue	  with	  the	  best	  combination	  of	  these	  traits.	  	  Distance,	  speed,	  tastiness,	  and	  companionship	  are	  all	  good	  reasons	  for	  me	  to	  decide	  between	  lunch	  venues.	  	  If	  you	  asked	  me	  why	  I	  was	  lunching	  where	  I	  was,	  I	  could	  cite	  any	  of	  these	  reasons	  as	  a	  good	  explanation.	  	  But	  when	  I	  make	  my	  promise,	  they	  no	  longer	  justify	  my	  action.	  	  	  If	  you	  command	  me	  to	  go	  to	  Myrtle’s	  and	  I	  decide	  to	  go	  to	  Joe’s,	  I	  cannot	  cite	  Joe’s	  tastier	  food	  as	  justification	  for	  failing	  to	  go	  to	  Myrtle’s	  (even	  if	  it’s	  an	  accurate	  description	  of	  my	  motivation	  for	  going	  to	  Joe’s	  and	  so	  a	  good	  explanatory	  reason).	  	  This	  is	  precisely	  the	  sort	  of	  reason	  that	  promising	  is	  supposed	  to	  rule	  out,	  and	  if	  promising	  didn’t	  rule	  out	  such	  minor	  reasons	  of	  taste	  it	  would	  be	  essentially	  useless.	  	  Ceteris	  paribus,	  on	  the	  day	  I’ve	  promised	  the	  only	  reason	  that	  justifies	  my	  choice	  of	  lunch	  venue	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  promised	  to	  go	  wherever	  you	  chose	  and	  you	  chose	  Myrtle’s.	  	  	  Applying	  this	  framework	  to	  taxes:	  without	  consent,	  I	  have	  the	  right	  to	  use	  my	  income	  as	  I	  choose	  without	  your	  interference.	  	  You	  can’t	  force	  me	  to	  save,	  or	  force	  me	  to	  buy	  good	  scotch,	  or	  anything	  else.	  	  You	  have	  a	  duty	  not	  to	  interfere	  with	  my	  decisions	  about	  my	  own	  resources.	  	  But	  if	  I	  consent	  to	  give	  you	  20%	  of	  my	  income	  every	  year,	  then	  I	  am	  not	  at	  liberty	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  spend	  that	  20%.	  	  By	  consenting	  I	  have	  waived	  my	  right	  to	  spend	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it	  how	  I	  choose	  and	  now	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  give	  it	  to	  you,	  acting	  wrongly	  if	  I	  don’t.	  	  The	  only	  way	  I	  can	  conform	  to	  the	  balance	  of	  my	  reasons	  with	  that	  20%	  is	  to	  give	  it	  to	  you.	  If	  I	  promise	  to	  give	  you	  whatever	  percentage	  of	  my	  income	  you	  demand,	  you	  are	  a	  traditional	  authority	  over	  me	  with	  respect	  to	  my	  income	  because	  you	  can	  change	  my	  duty	  by	  issuing	  commands	  that	  change	  how	  much	  I	  owe	  you.	  	  This	  is	  essentially	  the	  government’s	  claim	  about	  their	  authority	  with	  respect	  to	  taxes.	  But	  as	  anarchists	  have	  shown,	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  nonconsensual,	  so	  consent	  cannot	  explain	  how	  taxation	  (or	  any	  other	  coercive	  act)	  by	  modern	  governments	  is	  permissible.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  universal	  actual	  consent	  is	  lacking	  in	  all	  modern	  governments,	  and	  plausibly	  always	  will	  be	  lacking.	  	  As	  Christopher	  H.	  Wellman	  has	  written,	  “only	  wishful	  thinking	  supports	  the	  belief	  that	  existing	  states	  have	  garnered	  the	  morally	  valid	  consent	  of	  all	  of	  their	  citizens.”6	  	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  governmentalists	  have	  appealed	  to	  consent	  in	  other	  forms,	  from	  Locke’s	  tacit	  consent	  to	  Rawls’	  hypothetical	  consent.	  	  Simmons	  argues,	  very	  convincingly	  I	  think,	  that	  none	  of	  these	  appeals	  work,	  largely	  because	  none	  of	  them	  can	  capture	  the	  power	  of	  actual	  consent	  to	  transform	  the	  impermissible	  into	  the	  permissible.	  	  Without	  consent,	  however,	  the	  idea	  that	  modern	  governments	  have	  traditional	  authority	  looks	  mysterious,	  as	  Simmons	  concludes.7	  	  	  As	  with	  empirical	  philosophical	  anarchists	  like	  Simmons,	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  deny	  the	  possibility	  of	  genuine	  traditional	  political	  authority.	  	  We	  can	  imagine	  a	  small	  community	  forming	  with	  universal	  actual	  consent	  and	  thereby	  creating	  a	  government	  with	  traditional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Christopher	  H.	  Wellman,	  “Liberalism,	  Samaritanism,	  and	  Political	  Legitimacy”,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  25	  (1996):	  212.	  7	  There	  are	  of	  course	  other	  accounts	  of	  traditional	  authority	  that	  do	  not	  appeal	  to	  consent,	  for	  example	  those	  based	  in	  principles	  of	  fairness	  or	  a	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice.	  	  Anarchists	  also	  have	  a	  series	  of	  arguments	  against	  these	  positions,	  but	  I	  won’t	  go	  into	  them	  here	  because	  my	  only	  point	  is	  that	  modern	  political	  authority	  cannot	  plausibly	  be	  explained	  by	  an	  appeal	  to	  consent.	  	  In	  chapter	  five	  I	  appeal	  to	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  and	  defend	  that	  appeal	  against	  objections.	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authority	  over	  them.	  	  But	  since	  I	  am	  worried	  about	  governments	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  we	  see	  in	  the	  world	  today,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  genuine	  nonconsensual	  political	  authority	  can	  be	  secured.	  	  In	  sum,	  then,	  an	  account	  of	  modern	  political	  authority	  must	  explain	  how	  an	  agent	  (individual	  or	  corporate)	  can	  have	  the	  power	  to	  issue	  morally	  punishable	  commands	  that	  bind	  large,	  diverse	  groups,	  without	  their	  consent,	  yet	  over	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  facets	  of	  their	  lives.	  	  Highlighting	  these	  conditions	  shows	  how	  odd	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  and	  how	  it	  especially	  calls	  out	  for	  justification.	  	  	  	  
3.	  The	  Grounds	  of	  Punishment	  My	  main	  focus	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  punishable	  authority.	  	  For	  authority	  to	  be	  punishable,	  it	  must	  be	  morally	  permissible	  in	  principle	  to	  punish	  a	  subject	  for	  disobeying	  the	  authority.	  	  At	  a	  minimum	  this	  entails	  that	  the	  subject	  must	  lack	  a	  right	  against	  being	  punished	  for	  disobedience.	  	  If	  she	  did	  have	  such	  a	  right,	  others	  would	  have	  a	  correlative	  duty	  not	  to	  punish	  her.	  	  Punishing	  her	  would	  thus	  violate	  her	  right	  against	  punishment	  and	  wrong	  her.	  	  With	  the	  Hohfeldian	  framework	  from	  chapter	  one,	  we	  see	  that	  right	  and	  vulnerability	  are	  opposites,	  so	  lacking	  a	  right	  against	  punishment	  entails	  that	  the	  subject	  must	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment.	  	  The	  commands	  of	  a	  punishable	  authority	  must	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  subjects	  gain	  a	  moral	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  for	  disobeying.8	  	  Another	  way	  I’ll	  put	  this	  is	  that	  modern	  political	  authority	  must	  be	  vulnerability-­‐to-­‐punishment-­‐making	  authority.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Given	  this,	  it	  looks	  natural	  to	  claim	  that	  authority	  is	  the	  liberty	  to	  command.	  	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  view	  of	  Robert	  Ladenson,	  “In	  Defense	  of	  a	  Hobbesian	  Conception	  of	  Law”,	  in	  ed.	  Raz,	  Authority:	  32-­‐55.	  	  Ladenson	  claims	  authority	  is	  a	  justification-­‐right	  (another	  term	  for	  liberty),	  so	  is	  similar	  in	  some	  respects	  to	  my	  account.	  	  But	  Ladenson’s	  explanation	  of	  authority	  is	  much	  different,	  appealing	  to	  a	  Rawlsian	  hypothetical	  consent	  model,	  and	  is	  Hobbesian	  in	  that	  it	  basically	  says	  whatever	  government	  happens	  to	  be	  in	  power	  will	  have	  authority	  because	  everyone	  would	  recognize	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  state	  from	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance.	  	  I	  don’t	  think	  either	  the	  substance	  of	  or	  the	  rationale	  behind	  this	  view	  are	  correct.	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It	  is	  intuitive	  to	  think	  that	  traditional	  authority	  is	  exactly	  the	  sort	  of	  authority	  that	  one	  is	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  disobeying.	  	  After	  all,	  traditional	  authority	  creates	  duties	  so	  disobeying	  a	  traditional	  authority	  is	  wrong.	  	  If	  we	  consider	  the	  most	  obvious	  cases	  of	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment,	  it	  looks	  like	  what	  we’re	  punishing	  is	  wrongdoing,	  i.e.	  acting	  impermissibly	  and	  not	  doing	  one’s	  duty.	  	  The	  Menendez	  brothers	  are	  in	  jail	  right	  now	  for	  brutally	  murdering	  their	  parents.	  	  They	  are	  clearly	  vulnerable	  to	  such	  punishment	  (punishing	  doesn’t	  wrong	  them)	  and	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  direct	  connection	  between	  their	  wrongdoing	  and	  their	  vulnerability.	  	  In	  murdering	  their	  parents	  they	  violated	  their	  parents’	  rights	  to	  life,	  wronged	  their	  parents,	  and	  failed	  to	  do	  their	  duty.	  	  In	  sum,	  they	  acted	  (egregiously)	  wrongly	  and	  it	  appears	  that	  this	  is	  what	  makes	  them	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment.	  	  But	  it	  turns	  out	  this	  very	  intuitive	  line	  of	  thought	  is	  mistaken.	  Wrongdoing	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  disobeying	  the	  commands	  of	  a	  traditional	  authority	  entails	  is	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  sufficient	  to	  be	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment.	  	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  Dr.	  Mary	  in	  the	  parallel	  cases	  of	  Benevolent	  Mary	  and	  Murderous	  Mary.	  	  Dr.	  Mary	  has	  a	  patient	  with	  a	  severe	  but	  not	  life-­‐threatening	  dermatological	  condition.9	  	  She	  has	  two	  treatment	  options:	  drug	  C,	  which	  will	  cure	  her	  patient,	  and	  drug	  K,	  which	  will	  kill	  her	  patient.	  	  Unfortunately	  someone	  has	  undetectably	  switched	  the	  labels	  on	  the	  vials	  containing	  the	  drugs,	  so	  C	  is	  labeled	  as	  K	  and	  K	  as	  C.	  	  Mary	  has	  a	  clear	  duty	  to	  give	  C	  and	  cure	  her	  patient,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  clear	  duty	  not	  to	  give	  K	  and	  needlessly	  kill	  her	  patient;	  the	  patient,	  in	  turn,	  has	  a	  right	  not	  to	  be	  unnecessarily	  killed	  by	  Mary	  as	  well	  as	  a	  (perhaps	  weaker)	  right	  to	  be	  cured.	  	  In	  the	  first	  version,	  Benevolent	  Mary	  gives	  the	  patient	  what	  she	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Taken	  in	  spirit	  from	  Frank	  Jackson,	  “Decision-­‐theoretic	  Consequentialism	  and	  the	  Nearest	  and	  Dearest	  Objection”,	  Ethics	  101	  (1991):	  pp.	  461-­‐82.	  	  Also	  see	  Raz,	  FNR,	  pp.	  120-­‐6.	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believes	  is	  C	  because	  she	  intends	  to	  cure	  her	  patient	  so	  selected	  the	  vial	  labeled	  C.	  	  But	  in	  fact	  this	  vial	  contains	  K	  so	  her	  patient	  dies.	  	  	  Benevolent	  Mary	  acted	  wrongly:	  she	  needlessly	  killed	  an	  innocent	  and	  she	  failed	  to	  cure	  her	  patient	  when	  she	  had	  the	  means	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Killing	  the	  patient	  is	  inflicting	  an	  unjustified	  harm	  on	  an	  innocent	  and	  violates	  the	  patient’s	  right	  to	  life,	  so	  he	  was	  wronged.	  	  But	  Benevolent	  Mary	  is	  clearly	  not	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  giving	  K.10	  	  (For	  now	  I’m	  simply	  going	  to	  appeal	  to	  intuition	  to	  establish	  this	  claim,	  as	  it	  seems	  significantly	  implausible	  to	  deny.	  	  Below	  I’ll	  sketch	  a	  theory	  of	  punishment	  that	  explains	  the	  intuition.)	  Were	  we	  to	  punish	  her,	  for	  example	  by	  imprisoning	  her,	  she	  would	  have	  a	  justified	  moral	  complaint	  against	  us.	  	  In	  Hohfeldian	  terms,	  this	  is	  just	  what	  it	  means	  to	  say	  that	  she	  is	  not	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment,	  i.e.	  she	  has	  a	  claim-­‐right	  against	  punishment,	  so	  we	  have	  a	  correlative	  duty	  not	  to	  punish	  her	  and	  wrong	  her	  if	  we	  do.	  	  The	  case	  of	  Benevolent	  Mary	  shows	  that	  not	  doing	  one’s	  duty	  is	  insufficient	  for	  moral	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  In	  the	  second	  version,	  Murderous	  Mary	  hates	  her	  patient,	  so	  takes	  the	  vial	  labeled	  K	  and	  gives	  her	  patient	  a	  drug	  she	  believes	  will	  kill.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  label	  switch,	  however,	  her	  patient	  is	  cured	  and	  not	  killed.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  Murderous	  Mary	  is	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  and	  is	  not	  wronged	  if	  we	  punish	  her.	  	  But	  we	  can’t	  claim	  that	  she	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  not	  doing	  her	  duty	  and	  acting	  wrongly	  because	  she	  did	  her	  duty:	  her	  patient	  had	  no	  rights	  violated,	  was	  not	  wronged,	  and	  in	  fact	  has	  been	  cured	  of	  his	  disease.	  	  Instead	  Murderous	  Mary	  is	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  attempted	  murder,	  an	  act	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  In	  case	  this	  seems	  to	  quick	  to	  you,	  note	  that	  we	  can	  easily	  stipulate	  all	  the	  conditions	  that	  make	  it	  clear	  she’s	  not	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment:	  vials	  are	  generally	  accurately	  labeled	  in	  her	  experience,	  she	  has	  no	  reason	  to	  suspect	  she’s	  not	  giving	  the	  cure,	  she	  has	  not	  reason	  to	  suspect	  the	  labels	  have	  been	  tampered	  with,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  As	  will	  become	  clear	  below,	  these	  conditions	  implicitly	  rely	  on	  the	  view	  that	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  is	  a	  function	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  one’s	  beliefs	  and	  evidence.	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worthy	  of	  punishment	  even	  when	  nobody’s	  rights	  are	  violated	  and	  the	  agent	  happened	  to	  do	  what	  she	  should	  have	  done	  anyway.	  (This	  is	  comparable	  to	  a	  case	  where	  we	  punish	  someone	  for	  planning	  a	  murder,	  even	  though	  any	  of	  the	  individual	  components	  of	  the	  planning	  would	  be	  permissible	  without	  the	  intent	  to	  murder,	  like	  buying	  a	  weapon,	  watching	  a	  person	  in	  public,	  and	  so	  forth.)	  	  The	  case	  of	  Murderous	  Mary	  shows	  that	  not	  doing	  one’s	  duty	  is	  unnecessary	  for	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  cases	  that	  underwrites	  our	  opposing	  judgments	  of	  moral	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  is	  not	  the	  difference	  in	  outcome,	  or	  in	  rights	  violated,	  or	  whether	  Mary	  did	  her	  duty.	  	  Instead	  the	  relevant	  difference	  is	  what	  each	  Mary	  believed	  she	  was	  doing	  in	  light	  of	  her	  evidence.	  	  Benevolent	  Mary	  reasonably	  believed	  she	  was	  curing	  her	  patient	  when	  she	  gave	  K	  while	  Murderous	  Mary	  reasonably	  believed	  she	  was	  murdering	  her	  patient	  when	  she	  gave	  C.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  outcome	  was	  the	  opposite	  of	  what	  they	  intended	  is	  irrelevant;	  Benevolent	  Mary	  and	  her	  patient	  were	  unlucky	  that	  the	  labels	  were	  switched	  while	  Murderous	  Mary	  and	  her	  patient	  were	  lucky.	  	  A	  similar	  way	  of	  putting	  this	  is	  that	  Benevolent	  Mary	  accidentally	  killed	  her	  patient	  while	  Murderous	  Mary	  accidentally	  cured	  her	  patient.	  	  Pointing	  out	  that	  the	  results	  were	  a	  matter	  of	  luck	  or	  accident	  also	  hints	  at	  an	  explanation	  why	  wrongdoing	  is	  not	  relevant	  for	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment:	  we	  only	  think	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  punish	  people	  for	  things	  that	  are	  within	  their	  control,	  and	  so	  things	  they	  are	  responsible	  for.	  	  We	  don’t	  punish	  people	  for	  bad	  luck	  or	  accidents.	  Punishing	  Benevolent	  Mary	  for	  her	  bad	  luck	  is	  pointless	  and	  not	  punishing	  Murderous	  Mary	  for	  her	  good	  luck	  is	  foolish.	  	  But	  if	  wrongdoing	  is	  not	  the	  ground	  of	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment,	  what	  is?	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4.	  Objective	  and	  Subjective	  On	  the	  traditional	  account	  of	  authority,	  authority	  is	  duty-­‐making.	  	  But	  traditional	  authority	  doesn’t	  just	  create	  duties,	  it	  creates	  objective	  duties.	  	  It	  is	  common	  in	  normative	  ethics	  to	  distinguish	  between	  objective	  and	  subjective	  duties.11	  	  Objective	  duties	  are	  entailed	  by	  a	  decisive	  balance	  of	  objective	  reasons,	  which	  in	  turn	  are	  constituted	  by	  the	  relevant	  facts.	  	  Subjective	  duties	  are	  entailed	  by	  the	  balance	  of	  subjective	  reasons,	  which	  are	  constituted	  by	  something	  other	  than	  the	  facts,	  most	  commonly	  the	  agent’s	  beliefs.	  	  (When	  I	  use	  ‘duty’,	  ‘right’,	  ‘wrongdoing’	  and	  so	  on	  without	  qualifier	  I	  will	  always	  mean	  the	  objective	  type.	  	  If	  I	  mean	  anything	  else,	  I’ll	  use	  a	  qualifier	  such	  as	  “subjective”.)	  A	  perspicuous	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  distinction	  is	  that	  objective	  reasons	  are	  not	  relativized	  to	  agents’	  epistemic	  standing	  while	  subjective	  reasons	  are	  so	  relativized.	  	  Your	  subjective	  reasons	  are	  what	  your	  objective	  reasons	  would	  be	  if	  your	  epistemic	  context	  was	  accurately	  reflective	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  world.	  	  If	  you	  are	  perfectly	  omniscient,	  your	  subjective	  reasons	  and	  objective	  reasons	  are	  always	  identical.	  	  As	  an	  illustration	  I’ll	  apply	  this	  distinction	  to	  the	  apple	  cases	  from	  chapter	  one.	  	  If	  I	  bought	  the	  apple,	  I	  have	  an	  objective	  claim-­‐right	  to	  it	  and	  you	  have	  an	  objective	  duty	  not	  to	  take	  it	  from	  me.	  	  My	  right	  and	  your	  duty	  are	  objective	  because	  they	  hold	  regardless	  of	  whether	  we	  happen	  to	  believe	  they	  hold	  (they	  hold	  independent	  of	  our	  epistemic	  context,	  of	  which	  beliefs	  are	  an	  important	  part).	  	  If	  you	  happen	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  apple	  is	  unowned	  and	  take	  it	  from	  me,	  my	  objective	  right	  to	  the	  apple	  is	  violated	  and	  you	  objectively	  wrong	  me.	  	  You	  stole	  the	  apple	  from	  me	  regardless	  of	  whether	  you	  believed	  you	  were	  stealing	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See,	  for	  example,	  Henry	  Sidgwick,	  The	  Methods	  of	  Ethics	  (London:	  MacMillan,	  1874);	  Derek	  Parfit,	  On	  What	  
Matters	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  2011);	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  2011).	  	  Note	  that	  in	  this	  context	  objectivity	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  moral	  realism.	  
	   76	  
and	  I	  have	  a	  justified	  moral	  complaint	  against	  you.	  	  	  But	  your	  subjective	  duties	  are	  set	  by	  your	  epistemic	  context.	  	  If	  you	  reasonably	  believe	  that	  the	  apple	  is	  unowned,	  then	  you	  lack	  a	  subjective	  duty	  not	  to	  take	  it	  and	  don’t	  do	  anything	  subjectively	  wrong	  if	  you	  take	  it.	  	  If	  your	  belief	  was	  true	  and	  the	  apple	  really	  was	  unowned,	  you	  would	  have	  an	  objective	  liberty	  to	  take	  the	  apple.	  	  Your	  subjective	  duty	  is	  determined	  by	  facts	  about	  your	  epistemic	  context	  rather	  than	  facts	  about	  my	  ownership	  of	  the	  apple:	  it	  is	  entailed	  by	  the	  balance	  of	  subjective	  reasons	  rather	  than	  the	  balance	  of	  objective	  reasons.	  	  	   The	  commands	  of	  an	  objective	  authority,	  then,	  constitute	  objective	  reasons	  for	  subjects.	  	  The	  commands	  of	  a	  subjective	  authority	  constitute	  subjective	  reasons	  for	  subjects.	  	  It’s	  important	  that	  just	  because	  something	  constitutes	  a	  decisive	  objective	  reason	  doesn’t	  mean	  it’s	  necessarily	  creates	  an	  objective	  duty,	  as	  I	  argued	  in	  chapter	  one.	  Recall	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  apple	  is	  unowned	  is	  a	  decisive	  objective	  reason	  that	  entails	  that	  everyone	  has	  an	  objective	  liberty	  to	  the	  apple.	  	  This	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  objective	  authority	  that	  is	  not	  traditional	  authority,	  i.e.	  not	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  authority.	  	  	   The	  Mary	  cases	  established	  that	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  reasons	  and	  objective	  vulnerability-­‐to-­‐punishment-­‐making	  reasons	  are	  different.	  	  The	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  reasons	  are	  the	  facts	  about	  the	  badness	  of	  death,	  the	  moral	  innocence	  of	  the	  patient,	  the	  needlessness	  of	  the	  patient’s	  death,	  the	  doctor’s	  options,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  The	  balance	  of	  these	  reasons	  entails	  that	  Dr.	  Mary	  had	  an	  objective	  duty	  to	  give	  C	  and	  cure	  her	  patient	  as	  well	  as	  an	  objective	  duty	  not	  to	  give	  K	  and	  not	  needlessly	  kill	  her	  patient.	  	  Benevolent	  Mary	  failed	  to	  conform	  to	  these	  reasons	  because	  she	  accidentally	  gave	  K,	  so	  acted	  objectively	  impermissibly	  and	  wronged	  her	  patient.	  	  Murderous	  Mary	  conformed	  to	  the	  objective	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reasons	  because	  she	  accidentally	  gave	  C,	  so	  didn’t	  act	  objectively	  wrongly.	  	  But	  it	  was	  also	  clear	  that	  Benevolent	  Mary	  was	  not	  objectively	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  while	  Murderous	  Mary	  was	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment.	  	  For	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  the	  standard	  of	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  cannot	  be	  whether	  the	  agent	  conformed	  to	  her	  objective	  reasons.	  	  If	  it	  were,	  our	  judgments	  of	  objective	  wrongdoing	  and	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  would	  be	  identical	  and	  we	  would	  have	  to	  hold	  that	  Benevolent	  Mary	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  accidentally	  killing	  while	  Murderous	  Mary	  is	  not	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  attempted	  murder.	  	  This	  would	  be	  bizarre.	  	  	  	   Instead	  of	  objective	  moral	  wrongdoing,	  objective	  moral	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  is	  based	  on	  subjective	  moral	  wrongdoing:	  whether	  the	  agent	  conformed	  to	  her	  subjective	  reasons	  and	  did	  her	  subjective	  duty.	  	  Applying	  this	  thought	  to	  the	  Mary	  cases	  gives	  exactly	  the	  results	  we	  want.	  	  Mary	  has	  an	  objective	  duty	  to	  give	  C	  and	  not	  to	  give	  K	  due	  to	  the	  relevant	  facts.	  	  But	  because	  the	  labels	  were	  switched	  and	  Mary	  reasonably	  believes	  that	  C	  is	  K	  and	  K	  is	  C,	  Mary	  has	  a	  subjective	  duty	  to	  give	  the	  drug	  labeled	  as	  C	  and	  a	  subjective	  duty	  not	  to	  give	  the	  drug	  labeled	  as	  K.	  	  If	  her	  belief	  that	  the	  drug	  labeled	  as	  C	  is	  C	  were	  true,	  she	  would	  have	  an	  objective	  duty	  to	  give	  the	  drug	  labeled	  as	  C.	  	  Benevolent	  Mary	  does	  her	  subjective	  duty	  by	  giving	  the	  drug	  labeled	  as	  C,	  which	  unbeknownst	  to	  her	  and	  unfortunately	  is	  K.	  	  Murderous	  Mary,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  fails	  to	  do	  her	  subjective	  duty	  by	  giving	  the	  drug	  labeled	  as	  K,	  i.e.	  C.	  	  Our	  judgments	  of	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  track	  which	  agent	  did	  her	  subjective	  duty,	  not	  which	  agent	  did	  her	  objective	  duty.	  	  People	  are	  only	  objectively	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  subjective	  moral	  wrongdoing.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  a	  person	  does	  their	  subjective	  duty	  grounds	  blameworthiness	  or	  
	   78	  
culpability.12	  	  Murderous	  Mary	  is	  blameworthy	  or	  culpable	  for	  her	  act	  while	  Benevolent	  Mary	  is	  not.	  	  Benevolent	  Mary	  committed	  a	  blameless	  wrongdoing.	  	  With	  this	  connection	  between	  subjective	  wrongdoing,	  culpability,	  and	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment,	  we	  can	  supplement	  our	  intuitive	  evaluation	  of	  the	  Mary	  cases	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  punishment.	  	  Following	  Larry	  Alexander	  and	  others,	  I	  think	  punishment	  aims	  to	  reduce	  unjust	  harms	  with	  a	  normative	  intervention,	  by	  giving	  agents’	  practical	  reasons	  not	  to	  perform	  acts	  that	  risk	  harm.13	  	  Because	  punishment	  aims	  at	  changing	  people’s	  decisions,	  punishment	  is	  only	  appropriate	  in	  response	  to	  acts	  that	  the	  agent	  chose	  for	  herself	  and	  was	  under	  control	  of,	  i.e.	  those	  she	  is	  culpable	  for.	  	  Permissible	  punishment	  requires	  mens	  rea,	  a	  guilty	  mind.	  Punishing	  Benevolent	  Mary	  makes	  no	  sense	  because	  her	  decision-­‐making	  process	  was	  good	  even	  though	  the	  results	  were	  bad.	  	  She	  was	  not	  culpable	  for	  her	  patient’s	  death	  precisely	  because	  it	  was	  a	  result	  of	  factors	  outside	  of	  her	  control.	  Telling	  her	  that	  she	  has	  reasons	  not	  to	  kill	  her	  patient	  would	  not	  have	  changed	  the	  outcome	  because	  she	  didn’t	  try	  to	  kill	  her	  patient.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  punishing	  Murderous	  Mary	  makes	  sense	  because	  she	  made	  a	  bad	  choice	  in	  light	  of	  her	  evidence,	  intending	  to	  unjustly	  harm	  her	  patient,	  even	  though	  the	  results	  were	  good.	  	  If	  you	  pointed	  a	  gun	  at	  Murderous	  Mary	  and	  threatened	  to	  shoot	  her	  if	  she	  kills	  her	  patient,	  her	  decision-­‐making	  changes	  and	  she	  likely	  would	  no	  longer	  try	  to	  kill.	  	  This	  is	  the	  sort	  of	  effect	  we	  want	  punishment	  (and	  the	  threat	  thereof)	  to	  have.14	  	  So	  it’s	  not	  simply	  that	  our	  intuitions	  about	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  punishment	  don’t	  align	  with	  objective	  wrongdoing	  in	  the	  Mary	  cases.	  	  If	  punishment	  aims	  to	  reduce	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  This	  is	  a	  relatively	  common	  thought.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Parfit,	  On	  What	  Matters,	  Vol.	  1,	  pp.150-­‐58	  for	  similar	  points.	  13	  Larry	  Alexander,	  Kim	  Kessler	  Ferzan	  and	  Stephen	  J.	  Morse,	  Crime	  and	  Culpability:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Criminal	  Law	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  UP,	  2009).	  This	  doesn’t	  entail	  an	  endorsement	  of	  deterrence	  theories	  of	  punishment;	  while	  the	  aim	  of	  punishment	  is	  reduction	  of	  harm,	  the	  justification	  needn’t	  be.	  14	  Compare	  Warren	  Quinn,	  “The	  Right	  to	  Threaten	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Punish”,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  14	  (1985):	  pp.	  327-­‐373.	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harm	  by	  giving	  agents	  reasons	  that	  effect	  their	  decision-­‐making,	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  punish	  someone	  whose	  decision-­‐making	  was	  flawless	  but	  whose	  results	  were	  bad	  because	  of	  circumstances	  outside	  her	  control,	  like	  Benevolent	  Mary.	  One	  possible	  oddity	  in	  this	  discussion	  is	  that	  when	  we	  accuse	  someone	  of	  acting	  wrongly,	  we	  generally	  mean	  it	  with	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  approbation.	  	  If	  someone	  acts	  objectively	  wrongly	  but	  subjectively	  permissibly,	  then	  she	  has	  committed	  a	  blameless	  or	  nonculpable	  wrongdoing.	  	  In	  this	  case	  approbation	  is	  inappropriate	  precisely	  because	  the	  agent	  is	  blameless.	  	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  is	  sometimes	  thought	  that	  we	  should	  only	  use	  “wrong”	  and	  its	  cognates	  in	  the	  subjective	  sense.15	  	  I	  understand	  this	  impulse	  and	  am	  sympathetic	  to	  it	  but	  we	  shouldn’t	  jettison	  the	  notion	  of	  objective	  wrongdoing	  for	  several	  reasons.	  	  	  First,	  objective	  duties	  are	  what	  subjective	  duties	  aim	  at:	  conforming	  to	  the	  objective	  reasons	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  action	  for	  the	  rational	  agent.	  	  It	  is	  what	  our	  beliefs	  and	  evidence	  are	  about,	  and	  when	  we	  discover	  that	  our	  beliefs	  are	  false	  or	  our	  evidence	  is	  misleading	  we	  modify	  our	  beliefs	  because	  we	  aim	  to	  conform	  with	  the	  objective	  reasons,	  not	  just	  what	  we	  believe	  our	  objective	  reasons	  to	  be.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  relevant	  when	  I	  am	  evaluating	  my	  actions	  ex	  post	  facto	  and	  realize	  what	  my	  objective	  duty	  was.	  	  If	  I	  did	  my	  subjective	  duty	  but	  failed	  to	  do	  my	  objective	  duty	  I	  may	  appropriately	  be	  regretful,	  and	  one	  way	  to	  express	  this	  regret	  is	  to	  be	  watchful	  for	  similar	  circumstances	  in	  the	  future	  so	  that	  I	  can	  do	  my	  objective	  duty	  then.	  	  (I	  shouldn’t	  feel	  guilty,	  though,	  because	  I	  did	  my	  subjective	  duty	  so	  am	  not	  culpable	  or	  blameworthy.)	  	  Even	  though	  I	  acted	  blamelessly	  there	  is	  room	  for	  improvement	  and	  as	  a	  conscientious	  and	  responsible	  person	  I	  should	  be	  looking	  for	  areas	  of	  moral	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  For	  a	  nuanced	  discussion	  of	  different	  ways	  ‘wrong’	  is	  used	  see	  Parfit,	  On	  What	  Matters,	  Vol.	  1,	  pp.	  164-­‐74.	  
	   80	  
improvement.	  	  Second,	  all	  I	  have	  claimed	  so	  far	  is	  that	  objective	  wrongdoing	  is	  irrelevant	  for	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  	  But	  punishment	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  we	  treat	  agents	  based	  on	  their	  actions.	  	  Objective	  wrongdoing	  is	  the	  main	  ground	  of	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  defensive	  harm.16	  	  This	  thought	  is	  common	  in	  the	  self-­‐defense	  literature.	  	  Imagine	  I	  try	  to	  kill	  you	  because	  a	  madman	  has	  kidnapped	  my	  family	  and	  threatens	  to	  kill	  them	  unless	  I	  kill	  you.	  	  My	  attempt	  to	  kill	  you	  is	  objectively	  unjustified:	  you	  are	  morally	  innocent	  and	  have	  a	  right	  to	  life	  that	  I	  violate	  if	  I	  kill	  you.	  	  I	  wrong	  you	  and	  you	  have	  a	  justified	  moral	  complaint	  against	  me.	  	  But	  the	  madman	  has	  coerced	  me	  by	  threatening	  the	  death	  of	  my	  entire	  family	  and	  this	  coercion	  is	  a	  paradigmatic	  excuse,	  rendering	  me	  nonculpable	  for	  killing	  you.	  	  I	  commit	  a	  blameless	  wrongdoing.	  	  I	  shouldn’t	  be	  punished	  for	  killing	  you	  because	  of	  my	  excuse	  (it’s	  the	  madman	  who	  should	  be	  punished).	  	  But	  you	  do	  not	  wrong	  me	  if	  you	  shoot	  me	  in	  defense.	  	  I	  am	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  because	  I	  am	  objectively	  wrong	  to	  kill	  you	  although	  I	  am	  not	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  because	  my	  wrongdoing	  is	  excused.	  	  	  The	  reason	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  is	  grounded	  in	  objective	  wrongdoing	  is	  that	  defensive	  harm	  is	  only	  justified	  when	  it	  stands	  a	  reasonable	  chance	  of	  succeeding	  in	  reducing	  an	  ongoing	  or	  imminent	  unjustified	  harm.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  police	  may	  shoot	  someone	  who	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  unjustifiably	  killing,	  but	  if	  he	  has	  just	  killed,	  is	  unarmed,	  clearly	  surrenders,	  and	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  threat	  to	  anyone,	  they	  may	  not	  shoot	  him	  in	  defense	  (there’s	  nothing	  to	  defend).	  	  Now	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  he	  is	  culpable	  and	  so	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War.	  	  McMahan	  uses	  ‘liability’	  as	  I	  use	  ‘vulnerability’,	  but	  to	  my	  mind	  this	  is	  confusing	  because	  Hohfeld	  uses	  ‘liability’	  as	  the	  term	  for	  one	  of	  the	  second-­‐order	  disadvantages	  (which	  I	  haven’t	  discussed	  here).	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vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  the	  killing.	  	  Similar	  thoughts	  are	  common	  in	  just	  war	  theory	  and	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  (the	  very	  great	  defensive	  harm	  of)	  war	  is	  justified.	  	  Because	  defensive	  and	  punitive	  harm	  have	  different	  aims,	  though,	  they	  are	  justified	  by	  appealing	  to	  different	  reasons.	  	  Objective	  wrongdoing	  grounds	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  but	  it	  is	  subjective	  wrongdoing	  that	  grounds	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  The	  most	  important	  point	  to	  draw	  from	  this	  section	  is	  that	  there	  are	  differences	  between	  what	  makes	  an	  act	  wrong	  and	  what	  makes	  an	  act	  punishable.	  	  I’ve	  been	  putting	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  objective	  and	  subjective.	  	  I	  use	  these	  terms	  because	  they	  seem	  most	  natural	  to	  me	  and	  because	  they	  track	  the	  distinction	  between	  veridical	  practical	  reasons	  and	  non-­‐veridical	  epistemic	  reasons.	  	  But	  you	  needn’t	  agree	  with	  me	  that	  practical	  reasons	  are	  veridical	  or	  that	  what	  makes	  an	  act	  wrong	  is	  not	  doing	  one’s	  objective	  duty.	  	  The	  insight	  that	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  what	  makes	  an	  act	  wrong	  and	  what	  makes	  an	  act	  punishable,	  regardless	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  difference,	  forces	  a	  wedge	  between	  traditional	  authority	  and	  what	  is	  required	  for	  modern	  political	  authority.17	  	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  explore	  this	  gap	  and	  argue	  that	  it	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  overlooked	  kind	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  
5.	  Subjective	  Authority,	  Beliefs,	  and	  Evidence	  Modern	  political	  authority	  is	  punishable	  authority,	  so	  it	  must	  be	  able	  to	  change	  what	  people	  are	  objectively	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  doing.	  	  Someone	  is	  objectively	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  only	  if	  they	  are	  culpable.	  	  In	  turn,	  someone	  is	  culpable	  only	  if	  they	  don’t	  do	  their	  subjective	  duty.	  	  For	  the	  government	  to	  issue	  commands	  that	  change	  what	  people	  may	  be	  punished	  for	  doing,	  then,	  it	  must	  change	  what	  they	  have	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  For	  example,	  another	  possibility	  is	  that	  what	  makes	  an	  act	  wrong	  and	  what	  makes	  an	  act	  punishable	  are	  grounded	  in	  different	  types	  of	  subjective	  reasons	  rather	  than	  in	  objective	  and	  subjective	  reasons.	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subjective	  duty	  to	  do.	  	  If	  the	  government	  issued	  a	  command	  that	  changed	  people’s	  objective	  duties	  but	  didn’t	  change	  their	  subjective	  duties,	  then	  if	  they	  disobeyed	  they	  would	  be	  acting	  wrongly	  but	  not	  culpably.	  	  This	  entails	  that	  they	  can’t	  be	  permissibly	  punished.	  	  Further,	  we	  know	  that	  sometimes	  people	  can	  be	  punished	  for	  acting	  in	  ways	  that	  aren’t	  objectively	  wrong,	  like	  Murderous	  Mary.	  	  So	  authority	  that	  changes	  objective	  duties	  isn’t	  sufficient	  for	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  	  	   The	  question	  that	  confronts	  us,	  then,	  is	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  change	  subjective	  duties.	  	  As	  I	  have	  been	  using	  the	  idea,	  an	  agent	  has	  a	  subjective	  duty	  to	  act	  in	  some	  way	  if	  she	  would	  have	  an	  objective	  duty	  to	  act	  in	  that	  way	  if	  her	  epistemic	  context	  was	  accurate.	  	  So	  Benevolent	  Mary’s	  subjective	  duty	  is	  to	  give	  the	  drug	  that	  is	  labeled	  as	  C	  but	  contains	  K	  because	  if	  her	  belief	  that	  the	  drug	  labeled	  as	  C	  is	  C	  were	  true,	  she	  would	  have	  an	  objective	  duty	  to	  give	  the	  drug	  labeled	  as	  C.	  	  Subjective	  duties	  are	  relativized	  to	  a	  particular	  agent’s	  epistemic	  context.	  	  Changing	  subjective	  duties	  thus	  requires	  changing	  epistemic	  context.	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  what	  changes	  in	  epistemic	  context	  entail	  a	  change	  in	  moral	  culpability.	  	  	  There	  are	  two	  types	  of	  facts	  about	  an	  agent’s	  epistemic	  context	  that	  are	  relevant	  for	  moral	  culpability:	  what	  an	  agent	  actually	  believes	  and	  what	  she	  should	  believe	  in	  light	  of	  her	  evidence.	  	  What	  an	  agent	  believes	  is	  obviously	  often	  relevant	  to	  culpability.	  	  If	  I	  aim	  a	  gun	  at	  you	  sincerely	  believing	  that	  it	  will	  fire	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  has	  been	  rendered	  inoperable,	  I	  am	  culpable	  for	  pulling	  the	  trigger	  even	  though	  I	  don’t	  harm	  you	  and	  don’t	  even	  have	  a	  chance	  of	  harming	  you.	  	  I	  believed	  I	  was	  going	  to	  unjustifiably	  kill	  you	  and	  that	  makes	  me	  culpable.	  One	  way	  to	  characterize	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  I	  failed	  to	  do	  my	  rational	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duty.18	  	  An	  agent	  has	  a	  rational	  duty	  to	  act	  in	  some	  way	  just	  in	  case	  she	  would	  have	  an	  objective	  duty	  to	  act	  in	  that	  way	  if	  her	  actual	  beliefs	  were	  true.	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  mode	  of	  moral	  evaluation:	  it	  says	  something	  about	  my	  character	  when	  I	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  I	  sincerely	  believe	  is	  wrong.	  	  	  To	  see	  that	  evidence	  is	  often	  relevant	  to	  culpability,	  consider	  another	  pair	  of	  cases	  with	  Dr.	  Mary.	  The	  facts	  about	  the	  patient	  and	  the	  doctor’s	  options	  remain	  the	  same	  as	  the	  above,	  so	  the	  objective	  duties	  remain	  the	  same.	  	  This	  time	  the	  labels	  are	  accurate,	  but	  Mary’s	  evidence	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  K	  and	  C	  is	  different.	  	  In	  the	  first	  case	  Data	  Mary	  has	  very	  strong	  (although	  misleading)	  evidence	  that	  K	  will	  cure	  and	  C	  will	  kill:	  many	  reputable	  studies	  have	  been	  published	  with	  this	  result,	  which	  she	  knows	  because	  she	  regularly	  attends	  seminars	  updating	  her	  pharmaceutical	  knowledge,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  Just	  like	  Benevolent	  Mary,	  Data	  Mary	  sincerely	  believes	  that	  K	  will	  cure	  her	  patient,	  so	  has	  a	  rational	  duty	  to	  give	  K.	  	  Her	  evidence	  is	  very	  strong,	  so	  she	  also	  has	  an	  evidential	  duty	  to	  give	  K:	  if	  her	  evidence	  were	  accurate,	  she	  would	  have	  an	  objective	  duty	  to	  give	  K.	  	  When	  she	  gives	  K	  and	  her	  patient	  dies,	  she	  is	  not	  culpable	  just	  like	  Benevolent	  Mary.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  their	  evidence	  to	  give	  K	  was	  strong,	  there	  were	  no	  defeaters	  of	  the	  evidence,	  and	  they	  followed	  their	  evidence,	  as	  responsible	  agents	  should.	  In	  the	  second	  case	  Anecdote	  Mary	  has	  anecdotal	  evidence	  that	  K	  will	  cure	  and	  C	  will	  kill	  (and	  no	  contraindicators).	  	  She	  sincerely	  believes	  this	  anecdote	  so	  her	  rational	  duty	  is	  to	  give	  K,	  just	  like	  Data	  Mary.	  	  Anecdote	  Mary	  is	  not	  under	  any	  particularly	  strong	  time	  constraint	  and	  she	  has	  a	  pharmaceutical	  guide	  in	  her	  pocket	  that	  clearly	  indicates	  K	  will	  kill	  and	  C	  will	  cure.	  	  Anecdote	  Mary	  doesn’t	  consult	  her	  guide,	  so	  gives	  K	  and	  her	  patient	  dies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Here	  I’m	  drawing	  on	  Parfit’s	  distinction	  between	  fact-­‐relative,	  evidence-­‐relative,	  and	  belief-­‐relative	  duties.	  	  See	  e.g.	  On	  What	  Matters,	  Vol.	  1,	  pp.	  34,	  37	  and	  150-­‐8.	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Anecdote	  Mary	  should	  be	  evaluated	  identically	  to	  Data	  Mary	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  objective	  reasons	  as	  well	  as	  their	  beliefs,	  both	  of	  which	  were	  held	  constant	  between	  the	  cases.	  	  Data	  Mary	  and	  Anecdote	  Mary	  acted	  wrongly	  by	  unnecessarily	  killing	  their	  patients	  but	  both	  did	  their	  rational	  duty	  by	  taking	  the	  action	  they	  sincerely	  believed	  would	  save	  the	  patient.	  	  Intuitively,	  though,	  Anecdote	  Mary	  seems	  culpable	  in	  a	  way	  Data	  Mary	  is	  not.	  	  	  The	  difference	  of	  course	  lies	  in	  their	  evidence.	  	  Anecdote	  Mary’s	  evidence	  was	  quite	  weak,	  she	  knew	  the	  action	  she	  was	  taking	  was	  morally	  weighty,	  and	  she	  knew	  that	  she	  could	  easily	  improve	  her	  evidence	  if	  she	  simply	  checked	  the	  book	  in	  her	  pocket.	  	  She	  should	  have	  checked	  before	  she	  gave	  K	  and	  not	  doing	  so	  indicates	  a	  moral	  failing.	  	  Anecdote	  Mary	  is	  culpable	  and	  blameworthy	  for	  killing	  her	  patient	  in	  a	  way	  Data	  Mary	  is	  not:	  Anecdote	  Mary	  was	  negligent.	  	  Although	  Anecdote	  Mary	  believed	  she	  should	  give	  K,	  her	  evidence	  that	  supported	  that	  belief	  was	  weak	  and	  she	  had	  evidence	  that	  K	  will	  kill,	  so	  we	  can	  say	  she	  did	  her	  rational	  duty	  but	  didn’t	  do	  her	  evidential	  duty.	  	  (Note	  that	  while	  Anecdote	  Mary	  is	  culpable	  to	  some	  degree	  due	  to	  her	  negligence,	  this	  doesn’t	  mean	  she’s	  as	  culpable	  as	  Murderous	  Mary.	  	  Attempted	  murder	  is	  generally	  more	  culpable	  than	  negligent	  homicide.)	  	  We	  morally	  evaluate	  agents	  based	  on	  their	  evidence	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  objective	  reasons	  and	  their	  beliefs.	  	  	  Changing	  subjects’	  subjective	  duties	  requires	  changing	  subjects’	  epistemic	  context,	  so	  requires	  changing	  either	  beliefs	  or	  evidence.	  We	  are	  concerned	  with	  subjective	  moral	  duties,	  so	  are	  concerned	  with	  changing	  subjects’	  beliefs	  or	  evidence	  about	  their	  objective	  moral	  standing.	  	  Once	  we	  see	  this,	  we	  see	  that	  accounts	  of	  traditional	  political	  authority	  actually	  have	  a	  straightforward	  explanation	  for	  why	  subjects	  are	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  disobeying	  the	  governments’	  commands.	  	  Consider	  a	  subject	  deliberating	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about	  what	  to	  do,	  searching	  for	  evidence	  of	  her	  objective	  duties.	  	  She	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  traditional	  authority,	  whose	  commands	  change	  her	  objective	  standing.	  	  As	  stressed	  in	  chapter	  one,	  authority	  must	  be	  exercised	  by	  a	  performance,	  paradigmatically	  an	  utterance.	  	  This	  performance	  is	  directed	  at	  the	  subject.	  	  So	  as	  the	  subject	  is	  deliberating	  about	  what	  to	  do,	  the	  authority	  enters	  and	  commands	  her	  to	  act	  in	  some	  way.	  	  The	  command	  constitutes	  a	  change	  in	  her	  objective	  duty,	  but	  it	  also	  constitutes	  evidence	  of	  her	  subjective	  duty.	  	  Under	  standard	  conditions,	  the	  utterance	  of	  a	  traditional	  authority	  is	  good	  evidence	  that	  one’s	  objective	  duty	  has	  changed	  (under	  nonstandard	  conditions,	  this	  needn’t	  be	  the	  case,	  as	  if	  the	  authority	  is	  being	  coerced,	  or	  if	  it	  is	  understood	  that	  she	  is	  joking	  around	  and	  doesn’t	  intend	  to	  bind,	  and	  so	  forth).	  	  	  Accounts	  of	  traditional	  political	  authority	  can	  exploit	  this	  close	  connection	  between	  the	  utterances	  of	  an	  authority	  and	  subjects’	  evidence	  of	  their	  objective	  standing.	  	  Raz,	  for	  example,	  includes	  a	  publicity	  condition	  on	  genuine	  political	  authority,	  requiring	  that	  governments	  make	  their	  commands	  public	  in	  order	  to	  bind	  subjects.	  It	  doesn’t	  appear	  that	  Raz	  was	  motivated	  to	  include	  the	  publicity	  condition	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  change	  in	  subjects’	  subjective	  standing,	  but	  it	  does	  have	  that	  effect.	  	  For	  some,	  the	  public	  command	  changes	  their	  belief.	  	  Generally	  this	  change	  occurs	  because	  they	  actually	  receive	  the	  command,	  e.g.	  they	  read	  the	  posting	  or	  hear	  the	  utterance,	  and	  because	  they	  believe	  the	  authority	  is	  genuine	  and	  binds	  them.	  	  If	  they	  didn’t	  believe	  the	  authority	  was	  genuine,	  then	  the	  issuance	  of	  a	  new	  command	  would	  not	  change	  their	  beliefs	  about	  their	  objective	  duties	  because	  they	  don’t	  believe	  that	  their	  objective	  duties	  can	  change	  by	  that	  agent’s	  commands.	  	  If	  governments	  must	  change	  subjects’	  actual	  beliefs,	  many	  people	  wouldn’t	  be	  culpable	  for	  disobeying	  the	  law:	  all	  those	  who	  were	  ignorant	  of	  the	  command	  and	  all	  those	  who	  didn’t	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believe	  the	  government	  actually	  had	  authority.	  	  If	  this	  were	  true,	  it	  would	  essentially	  vitiate	  governments’	  claim	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  general	  authority,	  and	  the	  government	  doesn’t	  take	  ignorance	  of	  the	  law	  to	  be	  an	  excuse	  that	  removes	  culpability	  and	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  Luckily,	  though,	  subjects’	  epistemic	  context	  can	  change	  even	  if	  their	  actual	  beliefs	  don’t	  change	  because	  subjects’	  evidence	  can	  change	  without	  their	  beliefs	  changing.	  	  Public	  commands	  that	  change	  objective	  duties	  plausibly	  change	  subjects’	  evidence,	  even	  those	  subjects	  that	  were	  ignorant	  of	  the	  command	  or	  those	  that	  don’t	  believe	  the	  government	  has	  authority.	  	  When	  ignorant	  or	  mistakenly-­‐anarchist	  subjects	  disobey	  the	  law,	  governments	  can	  claim	  to	  hold	  them	  responsible	  because	  the	  subjects’	  evidence	  entailed	  that	  they	  ought	  to	  do	  as	  the	  government	  commanded.	  	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  these	  subjects	  are	  like	  Anecdote	  Mary,	  having	  good	  evidence	  not	  to	  do	  as	  they	  did	  but	  ignoring	  that	  evidence	  and	  so	  acting	  negligently.	  So	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  citizens’	  subjective	  duties	  must	  change	  in	  order	  to	  be	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  disobeying	  governments’	  commands	  doesn’t	  undermine	  accounts	  of	  traditional	  political	  authority	  in	  any	  serious	  way.	  	  Governments	  have	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  authority	  and	  then	  they	  simply	  manipulate	  subjects’	  beliefs	  and	  evidence	  about	  their	  objective	  duties	  through	  normal	  means,	  like	  uttering	  a	  command	  or	  posting	  a	  law,	  and	  this	  changes	  what	  people	  are	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  doing.	  	  Simply	  pointing	  out	  that	  what	  makes	  an	  act	  wrong	  and	  what	  makes	  it	  punishable	  are	  different	  doesn’t	  show	  that	  accounts	  of	  traditional	  political	  authority	  are	  mistaken.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I’ll	  argue	  against	  traditional	  authority.	  	  My	  point	  here	  is	  different.	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  one	  way	  to	  change	  subjects’	  subjective	  duties	  is	  to	  change	  their	  objective	  duties	  in	  a	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public	  way	  such	  that	  subjects’	  evidence	  of	  their	  objective	  duties	  also	  changes.	  	  The	  standard	  debate	  between	  anarchists	  and	  governmentalists	  has	  been	  myopic	  because	  it	  ignores	  the	  possibility	  that	  subjects’	  evidence	  of	  their	  objective	  duties	  could	  change	  without	  changing	  their	  objective	  duties.	  Changes	  in	  subjective	  duties	  are	  sufficient	  for	  changes	  in	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  	  Consider	  Murderous	  Mary	  again.	  	  Mary	  has	  a	  subjective	  duty	  not	  to	  give	  the	  drug	  labeled	  as	  K:	  she	  both	  believes	  and	  has	  strong	  evidence	  that	  the	  drug	  labeled	  as	  K	  will	  unjustifiably	  kill	  the	  patient.	  	  When	  she	  gives	  the	  drug	  labeled	  as	  K,	  she	  is	  objectively	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  even	  though	  she	  ultimately	  cures	  her	  patient	  and	  conforms	  to	  her	  objective	  reasons.	  	  Now	  imagine	  that	  a	  hospital	  official	  comes	  in	  and	  tells	  Mary	  that	  someone	  has	  been	  switching	  labels,	  so	  the	  official	  switches	  the	  labels	  back	  such	  that	  they	  now	  accurately	  reflect	  the	  vials’	  contents.	  	  Mary	  sees	  this	  switch	  and	  believes	  the	  official,	  so	  her	  subjective	  duty	  has	  changed.	  	  She	  is	  now	  culpable	  and	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  if	  gives	  K,	  whereas	  before	  she	  was	  culpable	  and	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  if	  she	  gave	  C.	  	  The	  point	  is	  that	  her	  change	  in	  evidence	  was	  sufficient	  to	  change	  what	  she	  is	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  doing.	  	  Mary’s	  objective	  duty	  never	  changed:	  it	  remains	  the	  case	  that	  C	  would	  cure	  her	  patient	  and	  K	  would	  unjustifiably	  kill	  her	  patient,	  and	  those	  facts	  set	  her	  objective	  duty.	  	  Changes	  in	  epistemic	  context	  can	  change	  what	  people	  are	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  doing	  even	  when	  objective	  duties	  don’t	  change.	  On	  traditional	  authority	  accounts,	  subjective	  duties	  are	  changed	  by	  changing	  objective	  duties	  and	  then	  manipulating	  subjects’	  epistemic	  context	  to	  co-­‐vary	  with	  the	  changes	  in	  objective	  duties.	  	  The	  authority	  does	  not	  change	  subjective	  duties	  directly;	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instead	  it	  changes	  subjective	  standing	  indirectly	  by	  changing	  objective	  duties	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  change	  in	  epistemic	  context.	  	  Now	  we	  see,	  though,	  that	  objective	  duties	  needn’t	  change	  for	  a	  subject’s	  subjective	  duties	  to	  change.	  	  This	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  that	  governments	  could	  change	  only	  subjects’	  evidence	  of	  their	  objective	  duties	  without	  changing	  the	  objective	  duties	  themselves.	  	  My	  proposal,	  then,	  is	  this:	  modern	  governments	  lack	  traditional	  (objective	  duty-­‐making)	  authority,	  as	  philosophical	  anarchists	  have	  claimed.	  	  But	  governments	  don’t	  need	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  authority	  in	  order	  to	  have	  punishable	  authority.	  	  Another,	  overlooked	  option	  is	  that	  governments	  have	  subjective	  duty-­‐making	  authority:	  their	  commands	  constitute	  content-­‐independent	  and	  preemptive	  subjective	  reasons	  for	  subjects,	  which	  entail	  a	  change	  in	  subjective	  standing.	  	  On	  this	  account,	  governments	  change	  subjective	  duties	  directly	  and	  without	  changing	  objective	  duties.	  	  When	  governments	  issue	  commands,	  the	  commands	  change	  what	  subjects	  are	  objectively	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  doing	  even	  though	  they	  don’t	  change	  what	  subjects	  are	  objectively	  morally	  wrong	  to	  do.	  	  	  Before	  fleshing	  out	  this	  thought,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  subjective	  duty-­‐making	  authority	  is	  not	  identical	  to	  objective	  vulnerability-­‐to-­‐punishment-­‐making	  authority.	  	  I	  can	  only	  be	  permissibly	  punished	  if	  I	  am	  culpable,	  and	  I	  am	  culpable	  only	  if	  I	  fail	  to	  do	  my	  subjective	  duty.	  	  But	  these	  clams	  are	  ‘only	  if’,	  not	  ‘if	  and	  only	  if’.	  	  There	  are	  conditions	  under	  which	  I	  fail	  to	  do	  my	  subjective	  duty	  but	  am	  not	  culpable,	  as	  when	  I	  have	  an	  excuse	  like	  coercion.	  	  The	  claim,	  instead,	  is	  that	  what	  I	  am	  prima	  facie	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  doing	  changes	  when	  my	  subjective	  duty	  changes.	  	  There	  are	  various	  defeaters	  between	  failing	  to	  do	  my	  subjective	  duty	  and	  being	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	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punishment,	  so	  the	  change	  is	  prima	  facie.	  	  My	  claim	  is	  not	  that	  any	  subjective	  duty-­‐making	  authority	  also	  has	  objective	  vulnerability-­‐to-­‐punishment-­‐making	  authority,	  but	  the	  reverse:	  if	  governments	  have	  objective	  vulnerability-­‐to-­‐punishment-­‐making	  authority,	  they	  must	  have	  subjective	  duty-­‐making	  authority	  as	  well.	  	  I	  recognize	  that	  this	  proposal	  immediately	  raises	  a	  horde	  of	  questions.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  governments	  only	  have	  subjective	  authority	  is	  quite	  counterintuitive	  in	  some	  respects.	  	  I	  answer	  these	  questions,	  I	  hope,	  over	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  dissertation	  as	  I	  elucidate	  the	  particulars	  of	  this	  proposal	  and	  answer	  some	  of	  the	  most	  common	  objections	  to	  it.	  	  The	  first	  question	  to	  address	  before	  these	  questions	  can	  be	  fully	  answered,	  or	  even	  fully	  asked,	  is,	  what	  kind	  of	  subjective	  duty-­‐making	  authority	  could	  governments	  have?	  There	  are	  two	  possibilities,	  given	  the	  two	  relevant	  features	  of	  subjects’	  epistemic	  context,	  beliefs	  and	  evidence.	  	  What	  an	  agent	  believes	  entails	  her	  rational	  duties;	  the	  power	  to	  change	  rational	  duties	  at	  an	  agent’s	  discretion	  would	  thus	  be	  rational	  authority.	  	  An	  agent’s	  evidence	  entails	  her	  evidential	  duties;	  the	  power	  to	  change	  evidential	  duties	  at	  an	  agent’s	  discretion	  would	  thus	  be	  evidential	  authority.	  	  While	  these	  are	  both	  possibilities	  in	  some	  sense,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  can	  tell	  the	  idea	  of	  rational	  authority	  is	  incoherent.19	  	  	  	  Imagine	  a	  “rational	  authority”	  issued	  a	  command	  to	  a	  subject:	  believe	  p!	  	  Rational	  authorities	  would	  necessarily	  change	  subjects’	  rational	  standing.	  	  But	  rational	  standing	  as	  defined	  is	  entailed	  by	  the	  agent’s	  actual,	  current	  beliefs,	  i.e.	  what	  she	  would	  be	  required	  to	  do	  if	  her	  beliefs	  were	  true.	  	  Given	  this,	  if	  a	  command	  fails	  to	  change	  what	  the	  agent	  actually	  believes,	  her	  rational	  duties	  won’t	  be	  affected.	  	  Whether	  the	  subject	  actually	  believes	  p	  as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Compare	  Raz,	  RSC,	  p.	  1034.	  	  As	  Raz	  argues,	  relying	  on	  a	  fine	  distinction	  between	  having	  authority	  over	  someone	  and	  being	  an	  authority,	  this	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  nobody	  is	  a	  rational	  authority	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  know	  better	  what	  rationality	  requires.	  	  It’s	  just	  that	  nobody	  has	  the	  power	  to	  change	  rational	  standing	  at	  their	  discretion.	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result	  of	  a	  command	  is	  an	  open	  question.	  	  If	  she	  doesn’t	  take	  the	  authority	  to	  have	  authority,	  she	  might	  not	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  If	  she	  is	  simply	  distracted	  and	  forgets	  whether	  the	  authority	  said	  to	  believe	  p	  or	  not	  p,	  she	  might	  not	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  If	  she	  cannot	  bring	  herself	  to	  give	  up	  her	  belief	  that	  not	  p,	  she	  might	  not	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  If	  a	  person’s	  command	  doesn’t	  constitute	  a	  decisive	  reason	  in	  some	  domain,	  though,	  she	  doesn’t	  have	  authority	  in	  that	  domain.20	  	  Rational	  reasons	  are	  just	  actual	  beliefs	  and	  one	  person’s	  commands	  cannot	  
constitute	  a	  change	  another	  agent’s	  beliefs	  (even	  if	  they	  sometimes	  do	  effect	  such	  a	  change).	  	  A	  normative	  power	  can’t	  constitute	  changes	  in	  descriptive	  facts,	  like	  the	  subject’s	  actual	  current	  beliefs,	  and	  so	  can’t	  constitute	  changes	  in	  rational	  standing:	  there	  is	  no	  rational	  authority.21	  	  Beliefs	  and	  evidence	  are	  the	  most	  relevant	  epistemic	  categories	  for	  morally	  evaluating	  agents	  relative	  to	  their	  epistemic	  standing.	  	  The	  agent’s	  actual	  beliefs	  are	  relevant	  because	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  they	  are	  all	  she	  has	  to	  work	  from	  at	  the	  time	  of	  action	  and	  the	  agent’s	  evidence	  is	  relevant	  because	  there	  are	  sometimes	  beliefs	  an	  agent	  should	  have	  but	  does	  not	  because	  of	  negligence.	  	  Given	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  The	  only	  thing	  that	  necessarily	  changes	  beliefs	  would	  be	  a	  physical	  power,	  like	  if	  I	  brainwashed	  you	  into	  believing	  p.	  	  But	  brainwashing	  changes	  your	  normative	  standing	  in	  the	  same	  way	  my	  drowning	  in	  a	  shallow	  pond	  in	  your	  path	  changes	  your	  normative	  standing.	  	  Both	  change	  the	  descriptive	  facts	  first,	  entailing	  changes	  in	  the	  normative	  facts.	  	  Brainwashing	  changes	  your	  beliefs	  and	  this	  changes	  your	  rational	  standing,	  and	  my	  drowning	  in	  your	  path	  changes	  the	  objective	  reasons	  and	  so	  changes	  your	  duties.	  	  In	  neither	  case	  do	  I	  exercise	  any	  kind	  of	  authority	  over	  you	  because	  I	  don’t	  change	  your	  normative	  standing	  directly,	  at	  my	  discretion	  and	  simply	  by	  expressing	  an	  intention	  to.	  	  My	  directives	  don’t	  constitute	  decisive	  reasons	  within	  the	  domain.	  	  Instead	  what	  I	  am	  doing	  is	  exercising	  a	  physical	  power,	  at	  my	  discretion	  pressing	  a	  button	  on	  the	  machine	  that	  brainwashes	  you.	  	  The	  effects	  on	  normative	  standing	  are	  outside	  my	  control.	  21	  It	  is	  only	  true	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  rational	  authority	  is	  incoherent	  on	  this	  narrow	  sense	  of	  “rational”,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  widely	  used	  and	  important	  sense	  because	  it	  captures	  minimal	  practical	  consistency.	  	  If	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  rational	  authority	  in	  this	  sense,	  it	  means	  that	  no	  agent	  can	  command	  another	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  her	  necessarily	  open	  to	  rational	  criticism	  for	  failing	  to	  conform.	  Of	  course,	  we	  normally	  expect	  adult	  humans	  to	  believe	  propositions	  that	  have	  been	  made	  obvious,	  in	  part	  because	  we	  recognize	  that	  what	  we	  believe	  is	  not	  under	  our	  direct	  voluntary	  control.	  	  So	  often,	  or	  even	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  an	  authority’s	  commands	  will	  change	  what	  others	  believe	  and	  so	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  her	  rational	  standing,	  it’s	  just	  not	  a	  direct	  effect.	  	  It’s	  not	  rational	  authority,	  but	  epistemic	  authority,	  the	  power	  to	  issue	  directives	  that	  constitute	  content-­‐independent	  and	  preemptive	  reasons	  to	  believe,	  exercised	  over	  subjects	  that	  are	  well-­‐functioning	  rational	  agents	  and	  so	  most	  of	  the	  time	  believe	  what	  they	  should.	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rational	  authority,	  and	  absent	  any	  alternatives,	  if	  governments	  have	  subjective	  authority,	  it	  must	  be	  evidential	  authority.	  	  	  	  
6.	  Evidential	  Political	  Authority	  	  An	  appeal	  to	  evidential	  authority	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  modern	  governments	  bind	  their	  citizens	  is	  only	  interesting	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  distinct	  from	  both	  the	  philosophical	  anarchist	  and	  the	  traditional	  governmentalist.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  deny	  traditional	  governmentalism	  by	  arguing	  that	  governments	  lack	  traditional	  authority.	  	  In	  order	  to	  deny	  philosophical	  anarchism,	  two	  claims	  must	  be	  established.	  	  First,	  that	  evidential	  authority	  is	  a	  coherent	  and	  possible	  form	  of	  political	  authority	  and,	  second,	  that	  modern	  governments	  actually	  have	  or	  can	  plausibly	  attain	  genuine	  evidential	  political	  authority.	  	  If	  the	  first	  can’t	  be	  established,	  then	  we	  should	  be	  conceptual	  evidential	  anarchists,	  just	  as	  Wolff	  is	  a	  conceptual	  anarchist	  about	  traditional	  authority.	  	  If	  the	  second	  can’t	  be	  established,	  then	  we	  should	  be	  empirical	  evidential	  anarchists,	  just	  as	  Simmons	  is	  about	  traditional	  authority.	  	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  and	  the	  next,	  I	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  evidential	  political	  authority	  is	  a	  coherent	  idea.	  	  The	  final	  chapters	  go	  on	  to	  elucidate	  the	  conditions	  on	  such	  authority	  and	  then	  apply	  the	  theory	  to	  modern	  governments.	  	   The	  main	  challenge	  to	  the	  conceptual	  coherence	  of	  evidential	  political	  authority	  arises	  once	  we	  see	  what	  evidential	  authority	  requires.22	  	  When	  A	  has	  evidential	  authority	  over	  B	  in	  domain	  D,	  A’s	  commands	  constitute	  decisive	  evidence	  of	  B’s	  objective	  D-­‐standing.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  For	  views	  that	  also	  attempt	  to	  ground	  political	  authority	  in	  epistemic	  factors,	  see	  Donald	  H.	  Regan,	  “Authority	  and	  Value”,	  Southern	  California	  Law	  Review	  62	  (1989):	  995-­‐1096	  and	  Hurd,	  “Challenging	  Authority”.	  	  This	  section	  clearly	  separates	  Hurd’s	  view	  from	  mine;	  while	  both	  of	  us	  appeal	  to	  expertise	  and	  epistemic	  authority,	  Hurd	  thinks	  practical	  authority	  is	  a	  conceptually	  incoherent	  idea,	  whereas	  I	  only	  think	  the	  appeal	  to	  expertise	  works	  because	  in	  some	  contexts	  expertise	  grounds	  a	  kind	  of	  practical	  authority.	  	  Regan’s	  appeal	  to	  indicators	  is	  more	  similar	  to	  my	  view,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  make	  the	  connection	  to	  culpability	  or	  punishment	  and	  so	  does	  not	  adequately	  situate	  indicator	  reasons.	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The	  commands	  of	  an	  evidential	  political	  authority,	  then,	  constitute	  decisive	  evidence	  for	  subjects	  of	  their	  objective	  political	  standing.	  	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  there	  is	  some	  subset	  of	  moral	  issues	  that	  are	  the	  proper	  concern	  of	  the	  government.	  	  Call	  this	  subset	  the	  political	  domain.	  	  The	  political	  domain	  is	  a	  moral	  domain	  but	  does	  not	  encompass	  all	  of	  morality:	  for	  example,	  whether	  one	  should	  tell	  a	  white	  lie	  is	  a	  moral	  question	  but	  not	  a	  political	  question.	  	  There	  are	  some	  moral	  questions	  that	  the	  government	  has	  no	  business	  addressing.23	  	  The	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  evidential	  political	  authority	  include	  (but	  aren’t	  exhausted	  by)	  those	  characteristics	  that	  entail	  that	  an	  agent’s	  directives	  constitute	  decisive	  evidence	  about	  another	  agent’s	  objective	  moral	  standing	  within	  political	  domains.	  From	  the	  epistemology	  literature,	  we	  already	  have	  a	  good	  idea	  of	  what	  sort	  of	  agent	  can	  issue	  commands	  that	  constitute	  decisive	  evidence	  for	  others:	  epistemic	  authorities	  or	  experts.24	  	  The	  classic	  example	  is	  the	  scientist,	  an	  expert	  about	  some	  descriptive	  domain	  who	  can	  tell	  you	  what	  to	  believe	  in	  that	  domain,	  e.g.	  a	  physicist	  can	  tell	  you	  what	  you	  should	  believe	  about	  the	  physical	  makeup	  of	  objects.	  	  Notably,	  the	  testimony	  of	  experts	  changes	  your	  evidence	  in	  a	  radically	  different	  way	  than	  the	  testimony	  of	  non-­‐experts.	  	  Non-­‐expert	  testimony	  gives	  you	  some	  reason	  to	  believe,	  but	  you	  should	  balance	  that	  reason	  with	  your	  other	  evidence.	  	  It’s	  like	  advice.	  Expert	  testimony,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  constitutes	  decisive	  evidence	  that	  preempts	  all	  your	  evidence	  that	  contradicts	  their	  judgment	  (within	  the	  domain	  of	  their	  expertise).	  	  You	  should	  believe	  what	  the	  expert	  says	  even	  when	  it	  flies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  all	  the	  evidence	  you	  have,	  even	  very	  strong	  evidence.	  	  	  Consider	  that	  to	  my	  untrained	  judgment	  the	  table	  in	  front	  of	  me	  is	  a	  solid	  object	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  This	  is	  captured	  by	  the	  deference	  condition.	  24	  See	  e.g.	  John	  Hardwig,	  “Epistemic	  Dependence,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  82	  (1985):	  pp.	  335-­‐49,	  “The	  Role	  of	  Trust	  in	  Knowledge”,	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  88	  (1991):	  pp.	  693-­‐708,	  and	  Alvin	  I.	  Goldman,	  “Experts,	  Which	  Ones	  Should	  You	  Trust?,”	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research	  63	  (2001):	  pp.	  85-­‐110.	  
	   93	  
with	  no	  space	  between	  its	  parts.	  	  I	  have	  many	  years	  of	  experience	  with	  many	  different	  tables	  that	  give	  me	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  my	  belief	  that	  this	  table	  is	  solid.	  	  Now,	  a	  colleague	  of	  mine	  whom	  I	  know	  to	  be	  an	  expert	  on	  physics	  tells	  me	  that	  the	  table	  is	  mostly	  space	  between	  particles	  and	  that	  my	  folk	  judgment	  about	  the	  table	  is	  radically	  mistaken.	  	  Her	  judgment	  on	  that	  issue	  is	  informed	  by	  a	  colossal	  amount	  of	  underlying	  theory	  and	  belief	  about	  the	  relation	  between	  experiments,	  evidence,	  and	  theory	  confirmation.	  	  Most	  of	  these	  facts	  cannot	  be	  related	  to	  me	  in	  a	  way	  that	  I	  can	  understand	  and	  use	  to	  balance	  the	  evidence	  on	  my	  own	  without	  extensive	  training	  and	  experience.	  	  Thus	  when	  the	  expert	  offers	  a	  judgment	  about	  an	  issue	  within	  her	  domain	  of	  expertise,	  I	  must	  defer	  and	  take	  her	  on	  her	  word.	  	  Whatever	  evidence	  I	  had	  to	  the	  contrary	  is	  overridden,	  and	  in	  this	  case	  it	  looks	  like	  I	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  reliable	  evidence	  from	  my	  experiences	  of	  the	  table,	  and	  many	  other	  tables	  and	  solid	  objects	  like	  it.	  	  My	  evidence	  is	  changed	  decisively	  by	  her	  expression	  of	  her	  judgment	  despite	  my	  considerable	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary	  and	  the	  significant	  counter-­‐intuitiveness	  of	  her	  judgment	  to	  me.	  	  Her	  judgment	  preempted	  my	  countervailing	  evidence	  and	  her	  expertise	  gave	  me	  a	  content-­‐independent	  reason	  to	  accept	  her	  judgment.	  This	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  precisely	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  experts	  are	  epistemic	  authorities.	  	  It	  would	  be	  quite	  odd	  if	  their	  directives	  didn’t	  affect	  subjects	  in	  a	  way	  very	  similar	  to	  how	  I’ve	  been	  describing	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  directives	  of	  practical	  authorities.25	  	  So	  the	  essence	  of	  my	  proposal	  is	  that	  expertise	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  on	  genuine	  evidential	  political	  authority,	  indeed	  the	  main	  necessary	  condition.	  	  If	  governments’	  judgments	  are	  not	  expert,	  then	  they	  cannot	  have	  genuine	  evidential	  political	  authority.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  
extremely	  important	  that	  I	  am	  not	  claiming	  that	  expertise	  is	  sufficient	  for	  genuine	  evidential	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Compare	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  53,	  where	  he	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  practical	  and	  epistemic	  authorities	  “share	  the	  same	  basic	  structure”.	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political	  authority.	  	  In	  later	  chapters	  I’ll	  argue	  for	  the	  further	  conditions.	  	  For	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  focus	  merely	  on	  the	  expertise	  condition,	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  expertise	  can	  ground	  practical	  authority	  under	  any	  conditions	  is	  extremely	  contentious.	  Experts	  change	  evidence,	  but	  evidence	  can	  be	  misleading	  and	  experts	  can	  be	  mistaken.	  	  Reasons	  to	  believe	  and	  reasons	  to	  act	  are	  very	  different.	  	  Consider	  a	  case	  from	  the	  ethics	  literature,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  drink	  from	  the	  glass	  in	  front	  of	  me	  filled	  with	  a	  clear	  liquid.26	  	  Because	  I	  think	  reasons	  for	  action	  have	  force	  regardless	  of	  epistemic	  context,	  I	  think	  you	  only	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  drink	  if	  that	  liquid	  will	  actually	  serve	  the	  end	  you	  are	  trying	  to	  achieve,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  you	  believe	  it	  will.	  	  If	  the	  liquid	  is	  gin	  and	  you	  have	  a	  desire	  for	  some	  gin,	  you	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  drink	  it.	  	  If	  the	  liquid	  is	  petrol,	  you	  don’t	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  drink	  it	  because	  it	  isn’t	  gin	  and	  won’t	  fulfill	  your	  desire	  for	  gin.	  	  In	  chapter	  one	  I	  characterized	  this	  idea	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  practical	  reasons	  are	  veridical.	  Evidence	  or	  reasons	  to	  believe,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  not	  veridical.	  	  I	  can	  have	  completely	  decisive	  reason	  to	  believe	  something	  that	  is	  false.	  	  If	  a	  chemist	  tests	  the	  liquid	  in	  my	  glass	  and	  tells	  me	  it’s	  gin,	  I	  have	  decisive	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  it’s	  gin.	  	  But	  if	  it’s	  actually	  petrol	  and	  the	  expert	  was	  mistaken,	  the	  expert’s	  judgment	  doesn’t	  change	  whether	  I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  drink	  because	  whether	  I	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  drink	  is	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  what’s	  actually	  in	  the	  glass	  and	  is	  independent	  of	  what	  I	  believe	  to	  be	  in	  the	  glass.	  	  In	  terms	  from	  above,	  while	  I	  still	  have	  objective	  reason	  not	  to	  drink	  from	  the	  glass,	  my	  subjective	  reasons	  have	  changed	  because	  my	  evidence	  has	  decisively	  changed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  expert’s	  testimony.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Bernard	  Williams,	  “Internal	  and	  External	  Reasons”,	  in	  Moral	  Luck	  (Cambridge	  UP,	  1980).	  	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  embroil	  myself	  in	  the	  motivational	  internalism/externalism	  debate,	  but	  if	  one	  is	  an	  objectivist	  in	  the	  sense	  I’ve	  defined	  it	  one	  is	  committed	  to	  motivational	  externalism	  about	  practical	  reasons.	  	  As	  I’ve	  stated,	  however,	  one	  needn’t	  be	  an	  objectivist	  to	  endorse	  my	  account	  of	  political	  authority.	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   This	  introduces	  a	  problem	  for	  my	  account	  because	  if	  modern	  governments	  only	  have	  evidential	  authority,	  it	  looks	  like	  they	  are	  only	  changing	  my	  evidence	  and	  my	  reasons	  to	  believe	  but	  can’t	  affect	  my	  reason	  to	  act.	  	  They	  are	  like	  the	  chemist:	  their	  judgment	  is	  decisive	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  evidence,	  but	  they	  cannot	  change	  the	  underlying	  reason	  to	  act	  that	  their	  judgment	  is	  evidence	  of.	  	  If	  they	  are	  mistaken	  and	  we	  follow	  their	  judgment,	  we	  will	  fail	  to	  conform	  to	  our	  objective	  practical	  reasons:	  we	  drink	  some	  petrol	  and	  fail	  to	  fulfill	  our	  desire	  for	  gin	  or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  moral	  reasons	  we	  act	  wrongly.	  	  Raz	  considered	  views	  like	  evidential	  authority	  under	  the	  broader	  heading	  of	  “recognitional	  authority”	  and	  raised	  a	  series	  of	  related	  concerns	  for	  them.27	  	  They	  all	  focus	  on	  this	  worry	  that	  giving	  subjects	  reasons	  to	  believe	  cannot	  ground	  practical	  authority	  because	  practical	  authority	  must	  give	  its	  subjects	  reasons	  to	  act.	  	  Political	  authority	  is	  a	  type	  of	  practical	  authority,	  so	  expertise	  cannot	  ground	  political	  authority.	  	  	   Raz’s	  argument	  rests	  on	  his	  claim	  that	  authority	  must	  make	  a	  “difference	  to	  what	  its	  subjects	  ought	  to	  do”.	  28	  	  What	  Raz	  means	  by	  this	  is	  that	  authority	  must	  be	  duty-­‐making.	  	  But	  given	  arguments	  from	  chapter	  one,	  I	  think	  a	  broader	  characterization	  is	  in	  order:	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  difference,	  authority	  must	  change	  subjects’	  objective	  standing.	  	  Traditional	  authority	  is	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  authority	  and	  changes	  its	  subjects’	  standing	  by	  imposing	  new	  objective	  duties.	  	  Evidential	  political	  authority	  is	  subjective	  duty-­‐making	  and	  so	  objective	  vulnerability-­‐to-­‐punishment-­‐making:	  it	  changes	  subjective	  standing	  by	  changing	  subjective	  duties	  and	  changes	  objective	  standing	  by	  changing	  objective	  vulnerability.	  	  I	  admit	  that	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  authority	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  the	  ideal	  form	  of	  practical	  authority.	  After	  all,	  evidential	  authority	  is	  trying	  to	  identify	  what	  a	  traditional	  authority	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  28-­‐31.	  28	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  48.	  Original	  emphasis.	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simply	  creates	  by	  an	  expression	  of	  her	  will.	  	  But	  the	  fact	  that	  evidential	  political	  authority	  is	  not	  ideal	  does	  not	  mean	  it	  is	  not	  practical	  authority.	  	  	  Putting	  the	  difference	  authority	  needs	  to	  make	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  need	  to	  give	  a	  “reason	  to	  act”	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  infelicitous	  because	  it	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  reason	  has	  to	  be	  in	  favor	  of	  performing	  some	  act.	  	  But	  practical	  reasons	  also	  determine	  which	  acts	  are	  merely	  permissible	  for	  us,	  without	  necessarily	  determining	  that	  one	  particular	  act	  must	  be	  performed	  instead	  of	  others.	  	  Let’s	  return	  to	  an	  example	  I	  used	  in	  chapter	  one,	  the	  police	  officer	  exercising	  her	  legal	  authority	  over	  you.	  	  She	  tells	  you	  to	  stop	  and	  later	  tells	  you	  that	  you	  may	  continue.	  	  The	  former	  command	  creates	  a	  duty	  for	  you,	  but	  the	  latter	  command	  doesn’t	  give	  you	  new	  legal	  duties	  and	  you	  don’t	  have	  any	  new	  legal	  reason	  to	  do	  or	  not	  do	  anything.	  	  Instead,	  you	  lose	  your	  legal	  reason	  to	  stop	  and	  you	  gain	  legal	  liberty.	  The	  officer’s	  second	  exercise	  of	  authority	  made	  a	  decisive	  difference	  to	  your	  objective	  legal	  standing.	  	  But	  this	  change	  was	  the	  introduction	  of	  objective	  legal	  liberties,	  not	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  objective	  duty.	  	  Only	  the	  broader	  notion	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  difference	  authority	  must	  make	  can	  capture	  this.	  	  So	  authority	  must	  change	  standing	  but	  can	  change	  any	  component	  of	  standing	  without	  needing	  to	  be	  duty-­‐making.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  that	  authority	  in	  a	  practical	  domain	  must	  change	  subjects’	  objective	  standing	  in	  that	  domain.	  	  Changing	  subjective	  standing	  is	  just	  changing	  reasons	  to	  believe,	  so	  subjective	  authority	  in	  a	  practical	  domain	  still	  merely	  changes	  what	  reasons	  you	  have	  to	  believe	  certain	  propositions	  about	  that	  practical	  domain.	  	  This	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  authority	  that	  truly	  makes	  no	  difference	  to	  our	  practical	  reasons.	  	  All	  experts	  are	  subjective	  duty-­‐making	  authorities.	  	  As	  I	  noted	  above,	  expertise	  is	  not	  the	  only	  necessary	  condition	  on	  evidential	  political	  authority.	  It	  is	  only	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under	  certain	  conditions	  that	  not	  doing	  one’s	  subjective	  duty	  makes	  one	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment,	  so	  it	  is	  only	  under	  certain	  conditions	  that	  experts	  can	  have	  evidential	  political	  authority.	  	  Under	  those	  conditions,	  their	  directives	  change	  both	  your	  subjective	  duties	  and	  your	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  	  Because	  any	  change	  in	  your	  objective	  standing	  in	  a	  practical	  domain	  entails	  a	  change	  in	  your	  practical	  reasons,	  authority	  that	  changes	  your	  objective	  vulnerabilities	  is	  as	  much	  practical	  authority	  as	  authority	  that	  changes	  your	  objective	  duties.	  	  	  	   Raz	  is	  also	  worried	  that	  if	  there	  can’t	  be	  decisive	  practical	  reasons	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  particular	  act,	  as	  a	  duty	  creates,	  then	  governments	  cannot	  coordinate	  action.	  	  Coordinating	  action	  is	  a	  main	  task	  of	  modern	  governments	  and	  without	  such	  an	  ability	  they	  would	  look	  very	  different	  than	  we	  conceive	  of	  them.	  	  The	  paradigmatic	  case	  of	  “pure”	  coordination,	  where	  there	  are	  no	  moral	  reasons	  to	  favor	  either	  side	  so	  some	  method	  is	  required	  to	  get	  people	  acting	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  is	  which	  side	  of	  the	  road	  to	  drive	  on.	  	  It	  is	  permissible	  to	  drive	  on	  the	  right,	  as	  in	  America,	  or	  on	  the	  left,	  as	  in	  Britain,	  but	  it	  is	  impermissible	  for	  each	  person	  in	  large	  societies	  with	  ubiquitous	  driving	  to	  be	  at	  liberty	  to	  choose	  which	  side	  to	  drive	  on	  for	  themselves.	  	  This	  would	  lead	  to	  chaos	  and	  driving	  would	  be	  extremely	  risky.	  	  This	  is	  a	  pure	  coordination	  problem	  because	  while	  there	  is	  decisive	  moral	  reason	  for	  everyone	  to	  drive	  on	  the	  same	  side,	  there	  is	  no	  decisive	  moral	  reason	  for	  everyone	  to	  drive	  on	  a	  particular	  side.	  	  We	  need	  a	  convention	  people	  will	  follow	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  if	  the	  convention	  is	  to	  drive	  on	  the	  right	  side	  or	  to	  drive	  on	  the	  left	  side.	  	   If	  the	  government’s	  political	  authority	  doesn’t	  extend	  to	  actually	  creating	  objective	  duties,	  however,	  then	  how	  can	  they	  create	  a	  convention?	  	  If	  the	  government’s	  commands	  can’t	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  everyone	  has	  decisive	  reason	  to	  drive	  on	  one	  side,	  then	  it	  will	  be	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permissible	  for	  people	  to	  drive	  on	  either	  side.29	  	  But	  it	  seems	  very	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  changing	  everyone’s	  vulnerabilities	  such	  that	  everyone	  is	  objectively	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  (like	  a	  $100	  fine)	  for	  driving	  on	  the	  left	  while	  everyone	  was	  at	  objective	  liberty	  to	  drive	  on	  the	  right	  can	  effectively	  create	  a	  convention.	  	  If	  you	  have	  a	  permission	  to	  do	  A	  or	  B	  and	  no	  significant	  reason	  to	  choose	  one	  or	  the	  other,	  introducing	  a	  significant	  cost	  to	  A	  but	  not	  B	  means	  you	  will	  choose	  A	  almost	  all	  the	  time.	  	  This	  is	  sufficient	  to	  achieve	  the	  kind	  of	  conventions	  necessary	  for	  modern	  governments.	  	   It	  may	  seem	  that	  this	  change	  in	  practical	  reasons	  is	  essentially	  the	  same	  as	  a	  highway	  robber	  pointing	  a	  gun	  at	  you	  and	  threatening	  you	  unless	  you	  act	  how	  he	  chooses.	  	  But	  impermissible	  threats	  and	  threats	  of	  punishment	  that	  one	  is	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  have	  very	  different	  effects	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  of	  an	  agent	  trying	  to	  act	  in	  perfect	  conformity	  with	  her	  practical	  reasons.	  	  If	  I	  am	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment,	  I	  have	  no	  right	  against	  it	  and	  so	  lose	  the	  right	  to	  resist.	  	  It	  is	  essentially	  a	  cost	  I	  have	  to	  accept	  if	  I	  choose	  the	  punishable	  action.	  	  But	  I	  do	  have	  the	  moral	  liberty	  to	  resist	  unjustified	  threats,	  creating	  different	  options	  for	  me	  and	  introducing	  a	  different	  balance	  of	  reasons.	  	  I	  can	  defend	  myself	  from	  unjustified	  threats,	  have	  a	  justified	  demand	  for	  compensation	  if	  such	  threats	  are	  carried	  out,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  Making	  someone	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  gives	  them	  a	  practical	  reason	  importantly	  different	  from	  the	  reasons	  given	  by	  unjustified	  threats.	  The	  idea	  of	  changing	  vulnerabilities	  to	  make	  conventions	  without	  changing	  duties	  means	  that	  it’s	  not	  the	  case	  that	  you	  necessarily	  act	  wrongly	  in	  every	  case	  of	  driving	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  It’s	  actually	  not	  clear	  that	  traditional	  authority	  on	  the	  service	  conception	  fares	  any	  better	  here.	  	  This	  is	  a	  case	  of	  pure	  coordination,	  so	  ex	  hypothesi	  there	  are	  no	  reasons	  favoring	  either	  choice.	  	  But	  if	  there	  are	  no	  preexisting	  reasons	  for	  subject	  to	  choose	  a	  side,	  nobody	  will	  fulfill	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  choice	  because	  there	  can	  be	  no	  claim	  that	  following	  someone	  else’s	  judgment	  could	  help	  a	  citizen	  conform	  better	  to	  her	  (nonexistent)	  preexisting	  reasons.	  	  It	  looks	  like	  Raz’s	  argument	  depends	  on	  the	  de	  facto	  authority	  of	  the	  government	  to	  solve	  coordination	  problems.	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left	  in	  America	  (assuming	  the	  American	  government	  has	  genuine	  authority	  in	  this	  domain).	  	  This	  seems	  true	  to	  me	  anyway,	  but	  whether	  driving	  on	  the	  left	  is	  objectively	  wrong	  is	  also	  both	  unnecessary	  and	  insufficient	  for	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  for	  driving	  on	  the	  left,	  as	  explained	  above.	  	  So	  objective	  moral	  vulnerability-­‐to-­‐punishment-­‐making	  authority	  is	  practical	  authority	  and	  sufficient	  to	  give	  reasons	  for	  action	  that	  can	  create	  conventions	  on	  a	  large	  scale.	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3	  -­‐	  How	  Authorities	  Bind	  	  	  Evidential	  governmentalism	  claims	  that	  modern	  governments	  lack	  traditional	  political	  authority	  but	  have	  evidential	  political	  authority.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  give	  a	  novel	  argument	  against	  traditional	  modern	  political	  authority,	  and	  in	  the	  process	  more	  fully	  characterize	  evidential	  authority.	  	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  the	  decisive	  effect	  the	  commands	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority	  have	  on	  subjects’	  reasons,	  which	  I	  sketched	  but	  did	  not	  fully	  explain	  in	  chapter	  one.	  	  The	  sketch	  I	  gave	  followed	  Hart	  and	  Raz	  by	  explaining	  decisiveness	  in	  terms	  of	  preemptive,	  exclusionary	  reasons.	  	  While	  this	  sketch	  is	  essentially	  correct,	  I	  argue	  that	  exclusionary	  reasons	  have	  been	  misunderstood	  in	  some	  important	  respects.	  	  A	  better	  characterization	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons	  shows	  that	  they	  cannot	  ground	  traditional	  modern	  political	  authority,	  but	  can	  ground	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  
1.	  A	  Dilemma	  for	  Traditional	  Modern	  Political	  Authority	  In	  this	  section	  I	  make	  a	  novel	  argument	  that	  modern	  governments	  lack	  traditional	  authority.	  	  In	  making	  this	  argument	  I	  proceed	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  modern	  authority	  must	  be	  nonconsensual	  authority,	  as	  I	  argued	  in	  chapter	  two.	  	  Instead	  of	  arguing	  that	  particular	  attempts	  to	  ground	  traditional	  modern	  political	  authority	  fail,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  nonconsensual	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  authority	  is	  incoherent.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  accounts	  of	  traditional	  modern	  political	  authority	  cannot	  plausibly	  explain	  the	  effect	  of	  mistaken	  commands	  on	  subjects.	  	  	  Consider	  Subject	  Mary,	  with	  the	  same	  patient	  and	  the	  same	  options	  as	  in	  the	  Mary	  cases	  from	  the	  last	  chapter.	  	  This	  means	  Subject	  Mary’s	  objective	  duty	  is	  to	  give	  C	  and	  not	  to	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give	  K,	  but	  in	  this	  case	  the	  vials	  are	  correctly	  labeled,	  so	  her	  evidential	  duty	  matches	  her	  objective	  duty.	  	  However,	  before	  she	  can	  give	  C	  an	  agent	  with	  genuine	  authority	  over	  Subject	  Mary	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  pharmaceuticals	  enters	  and	  commands	  Subject	  Mary	  to	  give	  K.	  	  If	  the	  authority	  has	  traditional	  authority,	  the	  command	  constitutes	  a	  preemptive	  and	  content-­‐independent	  objective	  reason	  for	  Subject	  Mary	  that	  entails	  an	  objective	  duty	  to	  give	  K.	  	  Given	  the	  details	  of	  the	  case,	  this	  is	  a	  mistaken	  command:	  it	  commands	  Mary	  to	  do	  something	  other	  than	  what	  her	  preexisting	  objective	  reasons	  entail.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  now	  apparent.	  	  Subject	  Mary	  has	  an	  objective	  duty	  to	  give	  C,	  entailed	  by	  the	  preexisting	  facts	  that	  C	  will	  cure	  her	  patient	  and	  K	  will	  kill	  her	  patient.	  	  But,	  according	  to	  accounts	  of	  traditional	  authority,	  Subject	  Mary	  also	  has	  an	  objective	  duty	  not	  to	  give	  C	  and	  to	  give	  K	  instead,	  entailed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  genuine	  traditional	  authority	  commanded	  her	  to	  give	  K.	  	  Subject	  Mary	  cannot	  have	  a	  duty	  both	  to	  give	  K	  and	  not	  to	  give	  K	  because	  of	  the	  “ought	  implies	  can”	  principle.	  	  Her	  duties	  are	  logical	  opposites	  such	  that	  performing	  one	  simply	  entails	  failing	  to	  perform	  the	  other:	  to	  give	  K	  entails	  not-­‐not	  giving	  K,	  and	  not	  to	  give	  K	  entails	  not-­‐giving	  K.	  	  The	  sense	  of	  possibility	  in	  the	  “ought	  implies	  can”	  principle	  I	  am	  appealing	  to	  in	  this	  case	  is	  very	  robust	  (and	  so	  very	  plausible):	  given	  the	  law	  of	  the	  excluded	  middle,	  it	  is	  logically	  impossible	  for	  Subject	  Mary	  both	  to	  give	  K	  and	  not	  give	  K,	  and	  so	  it	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  that	  Subject	  Mary	  ought	  both	  to	  give	  K	  and	  not	  give	  K.1	  	  	  Before	  examining	  possible	  responses	  to	  this	  problem,	  first	  I	  want	  to	  note	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  on	  the	  evidential	  account	  because	  there	  is	  no	  conflict	  between	  evidential	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  One	  way	  to	  avoid	  this	  problem	  would	  be	  to	  deny	  “ought	  implies	  can”,	  as	  Raz	  does,	  FU,	  p.	  1174.	  	  I	  will	  consider	  other	  responses	  because	  this	  seems	  implausible	  to	  me,	  in	  part	  because	  as	  I	  argued	  above	  the	  sense	  of	  possibility	  I	  am	  appealing	  to	  is	  very	  strong	  and	  so	  intuitively	  a	  plausible	  constraint	  on	  whether	  agents	  have	  a	  reason	  to	  act.	  	  But	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  argument	  only	  applies	  to	  someone	  who	  wishes	  to	  defend	  the	  traditional	  authority	  of	  the	  government	  while	  also	  maintaining	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “can”.	  	  Also	  note	  that	  maintaining	  that	  Subject	  Mary	  has	  both	  duties	  raises	  its	  own	  problems.	  	  The	  subject	  must	  fail	  in	  one	  of	  her	  duties	  and	  so	  necessarily	  acts	  wrongly,	  introducing	  a	  tragic	  dilemma.	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objective	  duties.	  	  What	  you	  ought	  to	  do	  objectively	  and	  what	  you	  are	  culpable	  for	  as	  determined	  by	  your	  evidential	  duty	  are	  two	  different	  things,	  as	  the	  Benevolent	  and	  Murderous	  Mary	  cases	  illustrated.	  	  Raz	  is	  worried	  that	  this	  is	  still	  a	  problematic	  conflict	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  subject	  must	  decide	  between	  her	  evidential	  duty	  and	  her	  objective	  duty	  but	  that	  there	  isn’t	  a	  way	  for	  her	  to	  choose	  between	  them.2	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  issue.	  	  I	  never	  denied	  that	  evidential	  duties	  are	  subservient	  to	  objective	  duties.	  	  Indeed,	  Mary’s	  evidence	  is	  evidence	  about	  her	  objective	  reasons.	  	  The	  practical	  conflict	  cannot	  arise	  if	  Mary	  is	  aware	  that	  not	  giving	  K	  is	  her	  objective	  duty.	  	  If	  she	  knows	  that	  her	  objective	  duty	  is	  not	  to	  give	  K,	  she	  cannot	  have	  a	  conflicting	  evidential	  duty:	  her	  evidential	  duty	  is	  also	  not	  to	  give	  K.	  	  Her	  knowledge	  requires	  evidence	  and	  that	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  the	  she	  should	  not	  give	  K.	  	  If	  she	  doesn’t	  know	  this,	  then	  she	  acts	  wrongly	  but	  nonculpably	  if	  she	  gives	  K.	  	  Given	  Mary’s	  epistemic	  context,	  she	  should	  follow	  her	  evidence	  and	  give	  K.	  	  But	  if	  we	  were	  advising	  her,	  we	  would	  tell	  her	  not	  to	  give	  K.	  	  These	  claims	  don’t	  contradict	  each	  other.	  	  There	  is	  no	  practical	  conflict	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  cannot	  guide	  her	  action	  or	  that	  she	  has	  no	  reason	  to	  choose	  one	  way	  of	  acting	  over	  another.	  Returning	  to	  traditional	  authority,	  to	  avoid	  the	  dilemma	  the	  defender	  must	  show	  that	  one	  of	  the	  duties	  isn’t	  present,	  either	  the	  preexisting	  duty	  not	  to	  give	  K	  or	  the	  command	  duty	  to	  give	  K.	  	  When	  comparing	  the	  duties,	  the	  most	  salient	  fact	  is	  that	  the	  authority’s	  command	  was	  mistaken,	  so	  it	  is	  intuitive	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  authority’s	  command	  failed	  to	  entail	  a	  duty	  for	  Subject	  Mary	  to	  give	  K.	  	  If	  one	  of	  the	  considerations	  has	  to	  give	  way,	  it	  should	  be	  the	  mistaken	  command	  and	  not	  the	  fact	  that	  giving	  K	  will	  needlessly	  kill	  Subject	  Mary’s	  patient.	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  a	  command	  does	  nothing	  to	  change	  the	  medical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Raz,	  FNR,	  p.	  127.	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and	  biological	  facts,	  and	  those	  are	  the	  facts	  that	  should	  determine	  what	  Subject	  Mary	  ought	  to	  do.3	  	  This	  is	  all	  quite	  plausible,	  but	  we	  need	  to	  know	  why	  the	  authority’s	  command	  failed	  to	  entail	  a	  duty	  in	  this	  case.	  	  After	  all,	  the	  case	  stipulated	  that	  the	  authority	  was	  genuine	  and	  imposing	  a	  new	  duty	  is	  precisely	  what	  traditional	  authority	  does.	  The	  obvious	  thought	  is	  that	  the	  authority’s	  command	  failed	  to	  bind	  Subject	  Mary	  just	  because	  it	  was	  mistaken.	  	  If	  the	  authority	  had	  accurately	  determined	  what	  Subject	  Mary	  ought	  to	  do	  and	  had	  commanded	  her	  to	  do	  that,	  Subject	  Mary	  would	  be	  bound.	  	  But	  given	  the	  mistake,	  she	  has	  no	  duty	  to	  obey.	  	  As	  initially	  compelling	  as	  this	  thought	  may	  be,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  good	  response.	  	  Recall	  Raz’s	  statement	  that	  “there	  is	  no	  point	  in	  having	  authorities	  unless	  their	  determinations	  are	  binding	  even	  if	  mistaken”.4	  	  As	  emphasized	  in	  chapter	  one,	  if	  authorities	  only	  bind	  subjects	  when	  their	  commands	  are	  not	  mistaken,	  authority	  is	  empty	  and	  useless.	  	  The	  command	  of	  the	  authority	  adds	  nothing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Subject	  Mary	  should	  do	  what	  the	  objective	  reasons	  entail	  she	  ought	  to	  do,	  and	  if	  the	  command	  is	  mistaken	  she	  should	  just	  ignore	  it	  anyway.	  	  Authority	  isn’t	  preemptive	  and	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  actually	  bind.5	  	  	  Mistaken	  yet	  binding	  commands	  are	  made	  possible	  in	  part	  because	  of	  content-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This	  assumes	  objectivism	  about	  wrongness	  because	  the	  wrongmakers	  are	  not	  relativized	  to	  the	  agent’s	  epistemic	  context.	  	  The	  dilemma	  dissolves	  entirely	  if	  one	  is	  some	  an	  evidentialist	  about	  wrongness.	  	  In	  that	  case	  the	  wrongmakers	  can	  be	  changed	  by	  a	  change	  in	  evidence:	  evidential	  authority	  would	  just	  be	  traditional	  authority.	  	  	  4	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  47.	  	  5	  This	  is	  the	  same	  problem	  faced	  by	  the	  claim	  that	  while	  the	  command	  was	  genuine	  and	  gave	  Subject	  Mary	  a	  duty,	  it	  did	  not	  give	  her	  an	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  duty.	  	  The	  commands	  of	  authorities,	  even	  genuine	  ones,	  only	  entail	  prima	  facie	  duties,	  and	  thus	  can	  sometimes	  be	  overridden.	  	  Any	  account	  of	  authority	  recognizes	  this	  fact,	  and	  appealing	  to	  it	  seems	  to	  solve	  our	  problem	  by	  claiming	  that	  the	  command	  did	  bind,	  prima	  facie,	  but	  was	  overridden	  by	  other	  concerns.	  	  Thus	  only	  the	  duty	  entailed	  by	  the	  preexisting	  facts	  actually	  (all-­‐things-­‐considered)	  binds	  Subject	  Mary	  and	  there	  is	  no	  problem	  with	  conflicting	  (all-­‐things-­‐considered)	  duties.	  	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  a	  plausible	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  I	  have	  been	  pressing	  it	  would	  need	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  all	  mistaken	  commands	  are	  overridden	  in	  the	  manner	  just	  described.	  	  If	  the	  duties	  entailed	  by	  some	  mistaken	  commands	  are	  not	  overridden	  then	  they	  will	  conflict	  with	  the	  preexisting	  duty	  and	  the	  problem	  arises	  again.	  	  If	  all	  the	  mistakes	  are	  overridden,	  though,	  authority	  is	  rendered	  empty	  again.	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independence:	  the	  reason	  to	  obey	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  the	  agent	  (her	  authority)	  rather	  than	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  command	  (its	  accuracy).	  	  This	  contrasts	  authority	  with	  advice,	  where	  you	  should	  follow	  advice	  because	  it	  is	  good	  advice	  rather	  than	  because	  of	  who	  is	  advising	  you	  (although	  because	  of	  epistemic	  limitations,	  this	  distinction	  is	  often	  useless	  in	  practice).6	  	  Whether	  the	  command	  is	  mistaken	  is	  an	  issue	  of	  content,	  but	  commands	  bind	  independently	  of	  content.	  This	  is	  why	  you	  could	  command	  me	  to	  lunch	  at	  either	  Myrtle’s	  or	  Joe’s:	  the	  content	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  whether	  it	  binds,	  and	  if	  you	  command	  me	  to	  go	  to	  Myrtle’s	  I	  am	  bound	  to	  go	  to	  Myrtle’s	  even	  if	  the	  balance	  of	  other	  reasons	  clearly	  favors	  Joe’s,	  e.g.	  even	  if	  Joe’s	  was	  closer,	  tastier,	  faster,	  cheaper,	  and	  where	  my	  friends	  eat.	  	  Content-­‐independence	  is	  a	  necessary	  and	  defining	  feature	  the	  reasons	  the	  commands	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority	  give	  its	  subjects.7	  	  Content-­‐independence	  cannot	  be	  jettisoned	  and	  it	  entails	  that	  some	  mistaken	  commands	  must	  bind.	  	   The	  defender	  of	  traditional	  political	  authority	  cannot	  plausibly	  claim	  that	  the	  authority’s	  command	  did	  not	  entail	  an	  objective	  duty	  for	  Subject	  Mary.	  	  Perhaps,	  though,	  the	  authority’s	  command	  really	  does	  change	  the	  situation	  such	  that	  the	  preexisting	  facts	  no	  longer	  entail	  an	  objective	  duty	  not	  to	  give	  K.	  	  Here	  I	  agree	  that	  the	  fact	  of	  a	  command	  from	  an	  authority	  adds	  a	  new	  reason	  for	  the	  subject	  to	  act	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  	  But	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  this	  could	  eliminate	  the	  preexisting	  reasons.	  	  Sure,	  Subject	  Mary	  has	  a	  new	  reason	  to	  give	  K.	  	  But	  she	  still	  has	  decisive	  reason	  not	  to:	  the	  fact	  that	  giving	  K	  will	  needlessly	  kill	  the	  patient	  and	  violate	  his	  right	  to	  life.	  	  Both	  needless	  killing	  and	  violating	  rights	  are	  paradigmatic	  objective	  duty-­‐makers.	  	  And	  she	  still	  has	  decisive	  reason	  to	  give	  C:	  the	  fact	  that	  giving	  C	  will	  cure	  her	  patient.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  the	  command	  does	  not,	  and	  could	  not,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  52-­‐4.	  7	  See	  Hart,	  “Commands	  and	  Authoritative	  Legal	  Reasons”,	  and	  Raz,	  MF,	  especially	  pp.	  35-­‐7	  and	  46-­‐8.	  
	   105	  
change	  these	  descriptive	  facts,	  and	  they	  still	  comprise	  reasons	  to	  act	  in	  certain	  ways.	  	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  nothing	  could	  change	  the	  situation	  such	  that	  Subject	  Mary	  doesn’t	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  give	  C.	  	  Throw	  in	  a	  standard	  extreme	  consequentialist	  hypothetical	  (A	  terrorist	  threatens	  to	  blow	  up	  a	  nuclear	  device	  in	  a	  large	  city	  unless	  Mary	  gives	  K!!!)	  and	  the	  facts	  can	  change	  such	  that	  your	  duties	  change.	  	  But	  whatever	  change	  in	  the	  facts	  there	  is	  in	  Subject	  Mary’s	  case,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  the	  moral	  reason	  not	  to	  kill	  her	  patient	  could	  be	  overridden	  merely	  by	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  command.	  	  The	  reason	  given	  by	  the	  fact	  of	  command	  is	  not	  sufficiently	  weighty	  to	  override	  this	  kind	  of	  reason,	  where	  a	  life	  and	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  a	  person	  are	  at	  stake.	  	  	  This	  is	  only	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  modern	  governments,	  exercising	  nonconsensual	  control	  over	  morally	  weighty	  domains,	  have	  traditional	  authority.	  	  If	  the	  government	  has	  authority	  over	  a	  domain	  that	  is	  essentially	  trivial,	  as	  when	  I	  promise	  to	  obey	  your	  commands	  about	  my	  lunch	  venue,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  the	  command	  could	  override	  those	  reasons.	  	  But	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  concerned	  with	  some	  extremely	  morally	  weighty	  domains	  that	  affect	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  people:	  establishing	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  collective	  defense,	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  market,	  the	  control	  of	  powerful	  destructive	  capacities,	  and	  so	  on.	  Consent	  can	  explain	  how	  weighty	  moral	  reasons	  lose	  their	  force.	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  case:	  A	  has	  consensual	  sex	  with	  B	  and	  then	  is	  punished	  by	  his	  government	  for	  violating	  B’s	  “family’s	  honor”.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  A	  has	  an	  objective	  moral	  right	  against	  being	  punished	  for	  this	  reason	  and	  that	  the	  government	  wrongs	  A.	  	  Without	  consent,	  it	  is	  wildly	  implausible	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  defending	  honor	  is	  a	  legal	  justification	  could	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  the	  government	  doesn’t	  morally	  wrong	  A	  when	  punishing	  him.	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Defending	  honor	  is	  not	  a	  moral	  justification,	  particularly	  not	  when	  the	  so-­‐called	  violation	  of	  honor	  is	  consensual.	  	  	  But	  imagine	  that	  the	  government	  has	  secured	  universal	  actual	  consent	  from	  its	  citizens.	  	  A	  consented	  to	  waive	  his	  moral	  rights	  against	  the	  government	  punishing	  him	  as	  it	  sees	  fit;	  that	  is,	  he	  accepts	  that	  he	  is	  objectively	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  if	  he	  is	  legally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment.	  	  Since	  the	  government	  considers	  violating	  honor	  a	  legally	  punishable	  offense,	  A	  accepts	  that	  having	  sex	  with	  B	  makes	  him	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment.	  	  It’s	  as	  if	  A	  has	  said,	  “If	  I	  have	  sex	  with	  B,	  I	  have	  no	  moral	  complaint	  against	  the	  government	  punishing	  me”,	  just	  like	  a	  boxer	  says,	  “If	  I	  enter	  the	  boxing	  ring,	  I	  have	  no	  moral	  complaint	  against	  my	  opponent	  if	  she	  punches	  me”.	  	  Modern	  political	  authority	  is	  nonconsensual,	  however,	  so	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  cannot	  explain	  how	  it	  could	  be	  the	  case	  that	  A	  is	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  by	  any	  actual	  government,	  nor	  could	  it	  explain	  how	  the	  patient	  would	  not	  be	  wronged	  by	  Mary	  unnecessarily	  killing	  him.	  	  	  The	  idea	  that	  a	  person’s	  directive	  cannot	  override	  weighty	  reasons	  without	  consent	  is	  obviously	  true	  where	  the	  purported	  command	  comes	  from	  a	  non-­‐authority.	  	  If	  Subject	  Mary	  is	  about	  to	  give	  C	  and	  is	  interrupted	  by	  a	  hapless	  bystander	  who	  orders	  her	  to	  give	  K	  instead,	  Mary	  should	  simply	  ignore	  the	  order.	  	  While	  requests	  by	  bystanders	  may	  indeed	  give	  some	  (very	  weak)	  reason	  to	  comply,	  this	  reason	  is	  clearly	  overridden	  by	  the	  reasons	  given	  by	  the	  life	  and	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  patient.	  	  But,	  the	  defender	  may	  say,	  the	  authority	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  bystander.	  	  There	  is	  something	  special	  about	  the	  authority	  that	  makes	  her	  authority	  genuine,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  characteristic	  that	  we	  should	  appeal	  to	  when	  explaining	  how	  reasons	  given	  by	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  command	  can	  defeat	  other,	  even	  significantly	  weighty,	  reasons.	  	  In	  particular,	  I	  have	  so	  far	  ignored	  the	  fact	  that	  authorities’	  commands	  constitute	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preemptive	  reasons	  for	  subjects.	  	  If	  we	  are	  concerned	  only	  with	  the	  weight	  of	  reasons	  then	  this	  problem	  looks	  intractable.	  	  But	  preemptive	  reasons	  as	  I	  characterized	  them	  affect	  a	  subject’s	  balance	  of	  reasons	  in	  a	  non-­‐additive	  way,	  not	  merely	  as	  another	  reason	  to	  be	  weighed	  in	  the	  balance.	  	  	  Raz’s	  service	  conception	  tells	  just	  such	  a	  story:	  the	  directives	  of	  someone	  who	  fulfills	  the	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  authority	  constitute	  preemptive	  reasons	  for	  subjects	  because	  they	  help	  subjects	  better	  conform	  to	  their	  reasons.	  Because	  following	  the	  commands	  will	  help	  the	  subject	  better	  conform	  in	  general,	  Raz	  claims	  that	  the	  command	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority	  is	  preemptive	  in	  that	  it	  constitutes	  an	  exclusionary	  reason.	  So	  perhaps	  the	  reasons	  Subject	  Mary	  had	  to	  not	  give	  K	  are	  excluded.	  	  This	  would	  explain	  how	  the	  reasons	  not	  to	  give	  K	  do	  not	  entail	  a	  duty	  for	  Subject	  Mary	  and	  thus	  how	  Subject	  Mary	  can	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  give	  K	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  command	  to	  give	  K	  was	  mistaken.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  this	  move	  actually	  gets	  accounts	  of	  traditional	  modern	  political	  authority	  out	  of	  the	  dilemma,	  we	  need	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons.	  	  While	  they	  are	  central	  to	  Raz’s	  account,	  they	  have	  been	  challenged	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  fronts.	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  address	  some	  of	  these	  challenges,	  sometimes	  defending	  Raz’s	  account	  and	  sometimes	  admitting	  the	  force	  of	  the	  criticism	  and	  modifying	  Raz’s	  account.	  	  In	  the	  end	  we	  will	  see	  that	  exclusion	  can’t	  explain	  traditional	  modern	  political	  authority	  but	  fits	  well	  with	  an	  account	  of	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  
2.	  Excluded	  in	  What	  Sense?	  Exclusion	  is	  a	  special	  mechanism	  by	  which	  some	  reasons	  are	  ruled	  out	  of	  the	  subject’s	  deliberation,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  because	  of	  this	  special	  mechanism	  that	  we	  understand	  how	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authorities	  affect	  subjects	  in	  the	  required	  manner.	  	  It	  turns	  out,	  however,	  that	  making	  the	  notion	  of	  exclusion	  precise	  is	  quite	  difficult.	  (Some	  have	  even	  claimed	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons	  is	  conceptually	  incoherent,	  a	  charge	  I	  address	  in	  Appendix	  A.)	  	  Raz’s	  clearest	  comments	  come	  in	  response	  to	  Matthew	  Moore,	  who	  proposes	  three	  different	  interpretations	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons.8	  	   The	  question	  that	  needs	  answering	  is	  what	  exactly	  is	  excluded	  and	  how.	  	  Moore’s	  three	  interpretations	  of	  exclusion	  are	  the	  decision-­‐procedure	  interpretation,	  the	  motivational	  interpretation,	  and	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation.9	  	  On	  the	  decision-­‐procedure	  interpretation,	  exclusionary	  reasons	  exclude	  certain	  decision-­‐procedures	  from	  the	  subject’s	  deliberations.	  	  On	  the	  motivational	  interpretation,	  exclusionary	  reasons	  exclude	  the	  agent	  from	  being	  motivated	  by	  certain	  reasons.	  	  And	  on	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation,	  exclusionary	  reasons	  exclude	  the	  justificatory	  force	  of	  certain	  reasons,	  making	  them	  no	  longer	  “count	  in	  favor	  of”	  some	  act.	  	  Moore	  claims	  that	  these	  interpretations	  form	  a	  trilemma	  for	  Raz	  because	  none	  works.	  	  In	  his	  response	  to	  Moore,	  Raz	  explicitly	  rejects	  the	  decision-­‐procedure	  and	  justificatory	  interpretations	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  motivational	  interpretation.	  	   To	  preview,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  argue	  that	  only	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  can	  answer	  the	  dilemma	  I	  proposed	  in	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  Raz	  and	  Moore	  both	  reject	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation,	  but	  that	  is	  because	  they	  are	  considering	  it	  in	  the	  context	  of	  traditional	  authority	  rather	  than	  evidential	  authority.	  	  The	  justificatory	  interpretation	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons	  given	  by	  the	  commands	  of	  an	  evidential	  authority	  is	  not	  only	  coherent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Raz,	  FU,	  pp.	  1156ff.	  9	  Michael	  S.	  Moore,	  “Authority,	  Law,	  and	  Razian	  Reasons”,	  Southern	  California	  Law	  Review	  62	  (1988):	  pp.	  854ff.	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but	  illuminating.	  	  That	  said,	  we	  shouldn’t	  adjudicate	  among	  the	  interpretations	  merely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  can	  answer	  the	  dilemma.	  	  Instead,	  there	  are	  good,	  independent	  reasons	  to	  reject	  both	  the	  decision-­‐making	  and	  motivational	  interpretations	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons.	  	  I’ll	  explain	  why	  these	  two	  interpretations	  should	  be	  rejected	  before	  turning	  to	  the	  more	  controversial	  justificatory	  interpretation.	  	   The	  first	  possibility	  is	  the	  decision-­‐procedure	  interpretation,	  according	  to	  which	  excluded	  reasons	  are	  excluded	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  	  When	  going	  through	  her	  practical	  deliberations,	  the	  subject	  cannot	  consider	  these	  reasons	  because	  they	  are	  excluded.	  	  But	  it	  is	  only	  this	  role	  in	  deliberation	  that	  the	  exclusion	  affects,	  and	  otherwise	  they	  act	  as	  reasons	  normally	  would.	  	  Hart	  seems	  to	  have	  embraced	  this	  interpretation,10	  but	  Raz	  explicitly	  rejects	  it	  because	  he	  does	  not	  think	  authority	  affects	  subject’s	  deliberation	  or	  what	  they	  can	  properly	  deliberate	  about.11	  	  When	  given	  a	  command,	  a	  subject	  merely	  has	  to	  act.	  	  If	  she	  wishes	  to	  deliberate	  about	  what	  she	  otherwise	  would	  have	  done,	  for	  example,	  she	  is	  free	  to.	  Moore	  adds	  a	  complaint	  to	  the	  decision-­‐procedure	  interpretation,	  claiming	  that	  it	  would	  make	  exclusionary	  reasons	  merely	  first-­‐order	  reasons	  to	  act	  on	  certain	  decision	  procedures,	  rather	  than	  about	  the	  reasons	  themselves.	  	  Taken	  together,	  these	  objections	  rule	  out	  the	  decision-­‐making	  interpretation	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons.	  	   The	  motivational	  interpretation	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons	  is	  Raz’s	  preferred	  understanding,	  and	  the	  idea	  is	  simply	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  disallowed	  from	  acting	  on	  certain,	  excluded	  motivations.	  	  It	  is	  a	  claim	  about	  what	  the	  agent’s	  actual	  psychological	  states	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  For	  example,	  in	  “Commands	  and	  Authoritative	  Legal	  Reasons”,	  he	  says	  commands	  are	  intended	  to	  take	  the	  place	  of	  “any	  deliberation	  or	  reasoning”	  of	  the	  subject’s	  own,	  p.	  253.	  11	  Raz,	  PRN,	  p.	  48	  and	  MF,	  p.	  39.	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should	  be	  at	  the	  time	  of	  action.	  	  This	  interpretation,	  however,	  has	  several	  difficulties.	  	  The	  first	  comes	  from	  Moore,	  who	  notes	  that	  people	  cannot	  simply	  choose	  which	  reasons	  motivate	  them.	  	  This	  is	  an	  analogue	  to	  doxastic	  involuntarism,	  which	  notes	  that	  people	  cannot	  simply	  choose	  what	  beliefs	  to	  have.	  	  Even	  if	  I	  offer	  you	  a	  million	  dollars	  to	  believe	  there	  is	  a	  giraffe	  in	  the	  room	  with	  you	  right	  now,	  you	  cannot	  just	  start	  to	  believe	  that.	  	  Similarly,	  one	  cannot	  simply	  flip	  a	  mental	  switch	  and	  find	  some	  reasons	  compelling	  and	  others	  not.	  	  If	  people	  cannot	  choose	  what	  reasons	  motivate	  them,	  however,	  then	  it	  cannot	  be	  claimed	  that	  people	  ought	  to	  be	  motivated	  by	  certain	  reasons	  over	  others	  (on	  pain	  of	  running	  into	  “ought	  implies	  can”).	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  Raz	  rejects	  “ought	  implies	  can”	  so	  can	  avoid	  this	  issue,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  significant	  worry	  for	  the	  overall	  plausibility	  of	  this	  interpretation.	  	   Beyond	  the	  impossibility	  of	  simply	  choosing	  what	  reasons	  are	  motivating,	  our	  motives	  are	  also	  more	  complicated	  and	  more	  obscure	  than	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  requires.	  	  On	  the	  motivational	  interpretation,	  the	  judgments	  of	  an	  authority	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  an	  agent	  is	  no	  longer	  allowed	  to	  act	  for	  those	  reasons.	  	  But	  most	  of	  the	  time	  our	  actions	  are	  taken	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  motives:	  I	  drove	  to	  work	  today	  because	  I	  was	  in	  a	  hurry,	  and	  because	  it	  was	  easier,	  and	  because	  I	  enjoy	  driving	  my	  car,	  and	  because	  I	  need	  to	  run	  errands	  after	  work,	  and	  because	  it	  is	  a	  habit	  of	  mine,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  All	  these	  reasons	  played	  a	  part	  in	  my	  actual	  psychology	  as	  I	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  drive.	  	  If	  an	  authority	  had	  ruled	  out	  one	  of	  those	  motives	  but	  not	  others,	  would	  I	  have	  been	  disobeying	  the	  command	  by	  acting	  as	  I	  did,	  multiply	  motivated?	  	  What	  if	  it	  only	  played	  a	  small	  part,	  but	  other	  motives	  would	  have	  been	  decisive	  in	  its	  absence?	  	  Not	  only	  do	  we	  often	  act	  for	  mixed,	  multiple	  motives,	  these	  motives	  are	  often	  obscure	  to	  us.	  	  This	  is	  clear	  both	  by	  introspection	  and	  in	  the	  social	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psychology	  literature.12	  	  Just	  thinking	  about	  the	  mundane	  acts	  I	  took	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  day	  today,	  it	  is	  unclear	  to	  me	  what	  motives	  actually	  moved	  me,	  let	  alone	  what	  portion	  of	  my	  motivation	  for	  a	  particular	  act	  is	  ascribable	  to	  a	  particular	  motive.	  	  	  	   For	  a	  command	  that	  excluded	  certain	  motivations	  to	  be	  effective,	  however,	  it	  seems	  that	  I	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  readily	  and	  accurately	  determine	  what	  I	  am	  motivated	  by	  and	  to	  what	  degree.	  	  Otherwise	  I	  have	  no	  idea	  whether	  I	  am	  obeying	  or	  not,	  and	  no	  idea	  what	  I	  can	  do	  to	  change	  so	  that	  I	  do	  obey.	  	  Thus	  commanding	  people	  to	  alter	  their	  motives	  seems	  difficult	  and	  very	  rarely	  effective,	  if	  not	  impossible.	  	  	  	   The	  other	  problem	  with	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  is	  that	  it	  just	  doesn’t	  square	  with	  our	  understanding	  of	  authority,	  especially	  political	  authority.	  	  The	  odd	  part	  of	  this	  criticism	  is	  that	  it	  seems	  firmly	  grounded	  in	  Raz’s	  own	  understanding	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  Hart	  claimed	  that	  authority	  changed	  how	  people	  ought	  to	  deliberate,	  not	  just	  how	  they	  ought	  to	  act.	  	  Raz	  distances	  himself	  from	  this	  claim,	  however:	  	  Surely	  what	  counts,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  person	  in	  authority,	  is	  not	  what	  the	  subject	  thinks	  but	  how	  he	  acts.	  	  I	  do	  all	  that	  the	  law	  requires	  of	  me	  if	  my	  actions	  comply	  with	  it.	  	  There	  is	  nothing	  wrong	  with	  my	  considering	  the	  merits	  of	   the	   law	  or	  of	  action	   in	  accord	  with	   it.	   	  Reflection	  on	   the	  merits	  of	  actions	   required	   by	   authorities	   is	   not	   automatically	   prohibited	   by	   any	  authoritative	   directive,	   though	   possibly	   it	   could	   be	   prohibited	   by	   a	   special	  directive	  to	  that	  effect.13	  	  Here	  Raz	  is	  saying	  that	  because	  authorities	  only	  care	  how	  we	  act,	  they	  shouldn’t	  care	  how	  we	  deliberate.	  	  But	  the	  same	  reasoning	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  authorities	  shouldn’t	  care	  about	  the	  content	  of	  our	  actual	  psychology	  when	  we	  act,	  i.e.	  it	  shouldn’t	  care	  about	  our	  motivations.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Richard	  E.	  Nisbett	  and	  Timothy	  D.	  Wilson,	  “Telling	  More	  Than	  We	  Can	  Know:	  Verbal	  Reports	  on	  Mental	  Processes”,	  Psychological	  Review	  84	  (1977):	  pp.	  231-­‐59.	  13	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  39.	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   Consider	  the	  case	  of	  the	  spiteful	  private.	  	  The	  private	  is	  at	  boot	  camp	  under	  a	  particularly	  nasty	  drill	  sergeant.	  	  The	  drill	  sergeant	  wants	  to	  see	  this	  private	  fail,	  so	  orders	  her	  to	  do	  one	  hundred	  pushups.	  	  The	  private	  realizes	  that	  the	  sergeant	  intends	  to	  humiliate	  her	  by	  giving	  her	  an	  order	  she	  cannot	  obey.	  	  Upon	  this	  realization,	  she	  girds	  herself	  to	  do	  the	  pushups	  because	  she	  knows	  that	  if	  she	  succeeds,	  she	  will	  frustrate	  the	  sergeant’s	  attempt	  to	  humiliate	  her.	  	  She	  does	  the	  pushups	  out	  of	  spite.	  	  If	  she	  didn’t	  think	  she	  could	  spite	  the	  drill	  sergeant,	  she	  wouldn’t	  do	  the	  pushups.	  	  When	  she	  finishes	  the	  pushups,	  has	  she	  obeyed?	  	  Clearly	  yes.	  	  If	  we	  embrace	  the	  motivational	  interpretation,	  though,	  we	  can’t	  say	  this.	  	  On	  this	  interpretation,	  the	  sergeant’s	  command	  constitutes	  an	  exclusionary	  reason	  that	  excludes	  reasons	  as	  motivations	  for	  the	  private,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  is	  motivationally	  excluded	  is	  spite.	  	  Her	  motivation	  was	  not	  the	  command	  itself,	  or	  any	  desire	  to	  obey,	  but	  precisely	  to	  spite	  the	  commander.	  	  Since	  spite	  was	  excluded	  by	  the	  command,	  though,	  she	  fails	  to	  conform	  to	  her	  reasons	  when	  she	  does	  the	  pushups	  and	  disobeys.	  	  The	  motivational	  interpretation	  gives	  counterintuitive	  results.	  	   This	  is	  even	  clearer	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  law.14	  	  I	  am	  planning	  to	  murder	  Jane,	  but	  ultimately	  decide	  not	  to.	  	  Consider	  three	  cases	  where	  I	  don’t	  murder	  Jane	  but	  am	  motivated	  by	  different	  reasons:	  because	  there	  is	  a	  law	  against	  murder,	  because	  I	  think	  murder	  is	  morally	  wrong,	  and	  because	  it	  would	  just	  be	  too	  inconvenient.	  	  If	  motivation	  matters	  to	  the	  law,	  then	  I	  have	  committed	  a	  violation	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  authority	  if	  I	  don’t	  murder	  Jane	  for	  any	  reason	  other	  than	  because	  there	  was	  a	  law	  against	  murder.	  	  But	  this	  seems	  preposterous	  especially	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  I	  don’t	  murder	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  See	  Larry	  Alexander,	  “Law	  and	  Exclusionary	  Reasons”,	  Philosophical	  Topics	  18	  (1990):	  p.	  15.	  Raz	  makes	  this	  point	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  law	  in	  one	  of	  the	  earlier	  writings:	  AL,	  p.	  30. 	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because	  I	  think	  murder	  is	  wrong.	  	  If	  anything	  this	  seems	  like	  the	  ideal	  motivation	  not	  to	  murder,	  and	  we	  would	  feel	  oddly	  about	  someone	  whose	  only	  reason	  not	  to	  murder	  was	  the	  law.	  	  It	  clearly	  should	  not	  matter	  to	  the	  law	  that	  I	  don’t	  murder	  because	  I	  think	  murder	  is	  wrong.	  	  	  	   This	  shows,	  I	  submit,	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  to	  an	  authority	  what	  subjects	  are	  motivated	  by	  and	  so	  shows	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  of	  exclusion	  to	  be	  incorrect.	  	  Note	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  authority	  is	  unconcerned	  with	  motivation	  is	  not	  absolute.	  	  It	  is	  a	  live	  option	  that	  an	  authority	  issues	  a	  command	  with	  specifically	  motivational	  content.	  	  This	  does	  not	  show	  that	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  is	  correct.	  	  The	  motivational	  interpretation	  claims	  that	  authorities	  are	  conceptually	  concerned	  with	  motivation;	  every	  command	  picks	  out	  motivations	  and	  there	  is	  no	  command	  from	  a	  genuine	  authority	  that	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  motivation.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  law	  doesn’t	  concern	  itself	  with	  motivation	  thus	  provides	  a	  counterexample	  to	  the	  motivational	  interpretation.	  This	  conclusion	  is	  easiest	  to	  accept	  when	  the	  motivation	  seems	  noble,	  but	  it	  should	  extend	  to	  cases	  where	  the	  motivation	  is	  wrong-­‐headed,	  like	  when	  I	  don’t	  murder	  Jane	  because	  it	  would	  be	  too	  inconvenient.	  	  In	  that	  case	  the	  authority	  still	  has	  no	  complaint:	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  why	  I	  didn’t	  murder	  Jane,	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  didn’t	  murder	  Jane	  means	  I	  successfully	  obeyed	  the	  command	  not	  to	  murder.	  	  If	  we	  ask	  “Did	  I	  break	  the	  law?”	  the	  answer	  is	  clearly	  “No.”	  	  	   Further,	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  the	  motivational	  claim	  fits	  into	  Raz’s	  picture	  of	  authority	  and	  reasons.	  	  Authority	  is	  supposed	  to	  change	  what	  subjects’	  duties	  are	  as	  determined	  by	  practical	  reasons,	  i.e.	  relevant	  facts.	  	  Authority	  ostensibly	  accomplishes	  this	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  commands	  entail	  exclusionary	  reasons.	  	  Exclusionary	  reasons	  are	  “second-­‐order	  reason[s]	  to	  refrain	  from	  acting	  for	  some	  reason”	  and	  “Let	  us	  say	  that	  a	  person	  φ-­‐s	  for	  the	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reason	  that	  p	  if,	  and	  only	  if,	  he	  φ-­‐s	  because	  he	  believes	  that	  p	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  him	  to	  φ.”15	  So	  the	  law	  against	  murder	  rules	  out	  not	  murdering	  because	  you	  believe	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  murdering	  is	  wrong	  is	  a	  reason	  for	  you	  not	  to	  murder.	  	  Surprisingly,	  this	  characterization	  makes	  it	  look	  like	  authority	  changes	  subjects’	  subjective	  reasons.	  	  An	  authority’s	  command	  constitutes	  an	  exclusionary	  reason	  not	  to	  act	  on	  some	  second	  reason,	  but	  what	  it	  means	  to	  act	  on	  a	  reason	  is	  to	  act	  because	  of	  your	  beliefs	  about	  your	  objective	  reasons.	  	  The	  exclusionary	  reason	  thus	  excludes	  certain	  beliefs	  about	  objective	  reasons	  from	  being	  the	  reason	  the	  agent	  acts,	  but	  this	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  some	  subjective	  reasons	  are	  excluded.	  	  	  	   Raz	  has	  a	  possible	  reply	  to	  these	  concerns.	  	  In	  earlier	  work	  he	  claims	  that	  what	  is	  excluded	  by	  the	  command	  of	  an	  authority	  is	  all	  the	  other	  reasons	  in	  the	  relevant	  domain.16	  	  So	  when	  I’m	  considering	  murdering	  Jane,	  not	  only	  can	  I	  not	  act	  on	  my	  hatred	  and	  kill	  her,	  I	  can’t	  act	  on	  my	  indifference	  and	  not	  kill	  her.	  	  The	  only	  motive	  available	  to	  me	  is	  to	  not	  kill	  her	  because	  the	  law	  said	  not	  to.	  	  And	  this	  is	  where	  the	  curiousness	  enters.	  	  But	  in	  later	  writing,	  Raz	  narrows	  the	  scope	  of	  exclusion.17	  	  It	  is	  only	  motives	  that	  would	  lead	  one	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  other	  than	  how	  commanded	  that	  are	  excluded.	  	  So	  I	  still	  can’t	  act	  on	  my	  hatred,	  because	  that	  would	  lead	  me	  to	  disobey	  the	  command,	  but	  I	  can	  act	  on	  my	  indifference	  or	  on	  my	  desire	  to	  do	  right	  because	  these	  motives	  would	  lead	  me	  to	  obey	  the	  command.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  spiteful	  private	  counts	  as	  obeying	  because	  acting	  on	  her	  spite	  leads	  her	  to	  do	  as	  commanded.	  	   This	  move	  gets	  Raz	  out	  of	  the	  worry	  that	  his	  account	  is	  dissonant	  with	  our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Raz,	  PRN,	  p.	  39,	  my	  emphasis.	  	  Raz’s	  view	  has	  undergone	  many	  modifications	  over	  the	  years,	  so	  I	  don’t	  take	  this	  understanding	  of	  exclusion	  from	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  texts	  as	  necessarily	  definitive,	  nor	  do	  I	  take	  my	  concern	  based	  on	  it	  to	  be	  at	  all	  decisive.	  16	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  59	  and	  PRN,	  p.	  192.	  17	  Raz,	  BAI,	  p.	  144-­‐5.	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understanding	  of	  authority.	  	  But	  it	  does	  not	  escape	  the	  worry	  about	  the	  resistance	  of	  our	  motives	  to	  introspection	  and	  control	  and,	  further,	  it	  is	  quite	  odd.18	  	  Notice	  that	  the	  motives	  really	  don’t	  matter	  at	  all	  any	  more.	  	  Saying	  you	  can’t	  act	  on	  any	  motive	  that	  would	  lead	  you	  to	  disobey	  is	  simply	  to	  say	  that	  you	  can’t	  disobey.	  	  It	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  your	  motives	  whatsoever.	  	  The	  talk	  of	  motives	  simply	  operationalizes	  the	  claim	  that	  you	  must	  do	  as	  commanded.	  	  If	  you	  are	  motivated	  to	  murder	  someone	  out	  of	  hatred,	  that	  motivation	  is	  excluded	  for	  you.	  	  But	  if	  you	  are	  motivated	  the	  next	  day	  not	  to	  murder	  someone	  because	  of	  your	  hatred,	  you	  can	  act	  on	  it.	  	  The	  motivation	  is	  irrelevant;	  the	  act	  is	  all	  that	  matters.	  	  This	  is	  how	  we	  understand	  authority	  and	  putting	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  motivation	  is	  unhelpful.	  	  	  	   A	  final	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  counterexamples	  I	  raised	  are	  really	  not	  counterexamples	  at	  all.	  	  The	  thought	  is	  that	  if	  motivations	  really	  are	  so	  difficult	  to	  discern,	  then	  as	  a	  practical	  matter	  no	  authority	  can	  hold	  subjects	  to	  a	  motivational	  standard.	  	  Acting	  with	  a	  specific	  motivation	  is	  still	  required	  for	  obedience,	  but	  our	  practices	  of	  discovering	  when	  subjects	  obey	  and	  holding	  them	  accountable	  are	  different	  because	  of	  our	  lack	  of	  epistemic	  access	  to	  motivations.	  	  One	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  this	  is	  to	  draw	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  criterion	  of	  obedience	  and	  the	  decision-­‐procedure	  for	  determining	  whether	  someone	  obeyed.	  	  The	  person	  who	  doesn’t	  murder	  out	  of	  indifference	  really	  does	  break	  the	  law	  because	  she	  doesn’t	  fulfill	  the	  criterion	  of	  obedience,	  there’s	  just	  a	  pragmatic	  barrier	  to	  using	  the	  criterion	  itself	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  she	  obeyed.	  	  We	  use	  a	  different	  decision-­‐procedure,	  namely	  just	  whether	  someone	  performed	  the	  act,	  because	  we	  need	  epistemic	  access	  to	  our	  evaluations.	  	  	  If	  the	  drill	  sergeant	  or	  the	  law	  had	  a	  way	  to	  discover	  people’s	  motivations,	  things	  would	  be	  different.	  	  So	  my	  counterexamples	  simply	  highlight	  pragmatic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  And	  as	  we	  see	  in	  Appendix	  A,	  this	  interpretation	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  exclusion	  runs	  into	  the	  problem	  of	  double-­‐counting.	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barriers	  and	  don’t	  count	  against	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  as	  such.	  	   Ultimately,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  attractive	  possibility.	  	  First,	  it	  is	  still	  very	  counterintuitive	  to	  think	  that	  someone	  who	  didn’t	  murder	  for	  reasons	  other	  than	  obedience	  to	  the	  law,	  for	  example	  the	  person	  who	  is	  simply	  motivated	  by	  their	  belief	  that	  murder	  is	  morally	  wrong,	  somehow	  disobeys	  the	  law.	  	  This	  is	  simply	  too	  restrictive.	  	  Second,	  it	  ignores	  the	  point	  that	  our	  motivations	  are	  resistant	  to	  introspection	  and	  direct	  intentional	  control	  and	  so	  the	  practice	  of	  holding	  us	  responsible	  for	  which	  motivation	  we	  act	  on	  is	  suspect.	  	  Third,	  it	  is	  at	  least	  worrying	  that	  the	  criterion	  for	  what	  counts	  as	  obedience	  and	  the	  methods	  for	  discovering	  obedience	  are	  so	  disconnected.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  may	  not	  be	  conclusively	  ruled	  out,	  but	  it	  is	  counterintuitive	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  	  Whether	  we	  should	  embrace	  this	  interpretation	  ultimately	  depends	  on	  whether	  there	  are	  better	  alternatives.	  	  In	  the	  next	  sections	  I	  consider	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  and	  argue	  that	  it	  works,	  giving	  further	  reason	  to	  reject	  the	  motivational	  interpretation.	  	   	  
3.	  Justificatory	  Force	  So	  much	  for	  the	  decision-­‐procedure	  and	  motivational	  interpretations.	  	  The	  only	  remaining	  possibility	  on	  Moore’s	  tripartite	  schema	  is	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation.	  	  I’m	  going	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  is	  correct.	  	  But	  this	  is	  difficult	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  reasons.	  	  First,	  both	  Moore	  and	  Raz	  reject	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation.	  	  Second,	  my	  main	  point	  will	  be	  that	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  looks	  exactly	  appropriate	  when	  we	  consider	  evidential	  authority.	  	  But	  as	  I	  have	  maintained	  throughout,	  I	  don’t	  think	  the	  idea	  of	  traditional	  authority	  is	  conceptually	  incoherent,	  especially	  due	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  genuine	  authority	  can	  be	  grounded	  in	  actual	  consent.	  	  If	  I	  argue	  that	  exclusion	  only	  makes	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sense	  in	  the	  evidentiary	  context,	  then	  I’m	  stuck	  with	  the	  mistaken	  view	  that	  traditional	  political	  authority	  is	  a	  conceptually	  incoherent	  idea.	  	  	  	   The	  justificatory	  interpretation	  claims	  that	  reasons	  are	  excluded	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  lose	  justificatory	  force.	  	  As	  Moore	  characterizes	  it,	  “On	  this	  interpretation,	  promises	  and	  authoritative	  rules	  actually	  change	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  right-­‐making	  characteristic	  of	  an	  action.”19	  	  The	  justificatory	  force	  in	  question	  is	  “right-­‐making”	  force.	  	  Given	  distinctions	  I	  made	  in	  chapter	  two,	  this	  should	  be	  interpreted	  as	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  force:	  the	  reasons	  no	  longer	  entail	  objective	  duties	  for	  subjects	  (I’ll	  continue	  to	  use	  Moore’s	  term	  ‘right-­‐making’	  as	  a	  convenient	  shorthand).	  	  As	  Moore	  goes	  on	  to	  say,	  “on	  this	  interpretation,	  some	  of	  the	  objective	  reasons	  of	  morality	  are	  excluded	  from	  doing	  their	  normal	  justificatory	  work	  whenever	  there	  is	  an	  exclusionary	  reason.”20	  	  The	  talk	  of	  justificatory	  force	  could	  be	  translated	  into	  the	  different	  analogies	  we	  use	  to	  characterize	  reasons:	  for	  example,	  reasons	  lose	  their	  weight	  so	  no	  longer	  count	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  when	  excluded.	  	  When	  reasons	  lose	  their	  justificatory	  force,	  they	  lose	  their	  character	  as	  reasons,	  for	  they	  no	  longer	  “count	  in	  favor	  of”	  anything.	  	  I’ll	  continue	  to	  use	  the	  language	  of	  justificatory	  force	  because	  it	  clearly	  connects	  to	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation,	  but	  this	  locution	  may	  be	  confusing	  at	  times.	  	  To	  stave	  off	  this	  possible	  confusion,	  it	  is	  best	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  when	  I	  talk	  about	  justificatory	  force,	  all	  I’m	  referring	  to	  is	  reasons	  as	  we	  normally	  conceive	  of	  them,	  counting	  in	  favor	  of	  certain	  acts	  or	  beliefs	  and	  thereby	  justifying	  them.	  	   At	  first	  glance,	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  is	  exactly	  what	  we	  need.	  	  After	  all,	  as	  Raz	  repeatedly	  emphasizes,	  authorities	  are	  supposed	  to	  change	  what	  the	  subject	  ought	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Moore,	  “Authority,	  Law,	  and	  Razian	  Reasons”,	  p.	  857.	  20	  Ibid.	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do.	  	  If	  they	  can	  change	  the	  justificatory	  force	  of	  reasons,	  then	  changing	  what	  subjects	  ought	  to	  do	  is	  simply	  entailed.	  	  Raz	  characterizes	  the	  exclusionary	  effect	  of	  an	  arbitrator’s	  decision	  thusly:	  “The	  point	  is	  that	  reasons	  that	  could	  have	  been	  relied	  upon	  to	  justify	  action	  before	  his	  decision	  cannot	  be	  relied	  upon	  once	  the	  decision	  is	  given.”21	  If	  reasons	  can’t	  be	  relied	  upon	  to	  justify	  action,	  they	  must	  have	  lost	  their	  justificatory	  force.	  	  	  	   To	  me,	  one	  helpful	  way	  to	  adjudicate	  among	  the	  interpretations	  is	  with	  the	  distinction	  between	  explanatory	  and	  justificatory	  reasons.	  	  When	  we	  ask	  an	  agent	  why	  she	  performed	  some	  act,	  we	  could	  be	  asking	  two	  different	  questions	  about	  reasons.	  	  We	  could	  be	  asking	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  her	  action,	  most	  commonly	  answered	  with	  a	  causal	  story.	  	  Or	  we	  could	  be	  asking	  for	  a	  justification	  of	  her	  action.	  	  These	  reasons	  often	  come	  apart.	  	  Imagine	  I	  bump	  into	  you	  on	  the	  street	  rather	  forcefully,	  causing	  you	  to	  drop	  your	  papers.	  	  When	  you	  ask	  me	  why	  I	  did	  that,	  I	  might	  explain	  that	  someone	  had	  just	  bumped	  into	  me	  and	  sent	  me	  stumbling	  into	  you.	  	  In	  that	  case	  I	  offer	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  was	  bumped	  as	  an	  explanatory	  reason,	  but	  I	  shouldn’t	  pretend	  it’s	  a	  justificatory	  reason.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  whether	  I	  hit	  you	  was	  out	  of	  my	  control	  excuses	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  caused	  you	  to	  drop	  your	  papers,	  rendering	  me	  nonculpable.	  	  But	  I	  wasn’t	  justified	  in	  bumping	  into	  you;	  I	  caused	  you	  an	  inconvenience	  with	  no	  benefits	  to	  anyone.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  I	  was	  bumped	  first	  is	  an	  explanatory	  but	  not	  a	  justificatory	  reason,	  and	  prima	  facie	  I	  should	  be	  willing	  to	  compensate	  by	  helping	  you	  pick	  your	  papers	  up.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  maybe	  I	  bump	  into	  you	  because	  there	  is	  a	  piano	  falling	  from	  above	  and	  I	  wanted	  to	  knock	  you	  out	  of	  harm’s	  way.	  	  In	  that	  case	  the	  explanation	  of	  my	  action	  is	  my	  desire	  to	  save	  you	  from	  harm	  and	  my	  justification	  for	  bumping	  you	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  if	  I	  didn’t,	  the	  piano	  would	  have	  fallen	  on	  you.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Raz,	  MF,	  p	  42.	  My	  emphasis.	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   Throughout	  the	  dissertation	  we	  have	  been	  concerned	  with	  justificatory	  reasons	  and	  not	  explanatory	  reasons.	  	  When	  a	  government	  issues	  a	  command,	  the	  interesting	  question	  is	  not	  whether	  the	  command	  explains	  my	  action	  but	  whether	  it	  justifies	  my	  action.	  We	  are	  concerned	  with	  de	  jure,	  not	  merely	  de	  facto,	  authority.	  More	  particularly	  still,	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  commands	  render	  disobedience	  unjustified	  in	  some	  sense.	  	  This	  is	  why	  we	  were	  concerned	  with	  whether	  commands	  entailed	  duties	  of	  obedience:	  duties,	  rights,	  and	  all	  the	  rest	  are	  relevant	  to	  whether	  actions	  are	  justified.	  	  A	  problem	  with	  the	  decision-­‐procedure	  and	  motivational	  interpretations	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons	  is	  that	  decision-­‐procedures	  and	  motivations	  are	  most	  commonly	  explanations	  of	  actions,	  not	  justifications.	  	  It	  looks	  like	  these	  interpretations	  are	  excluding	  certain	  reasons	  qua	  explanation	  instead	  of	  qua	  justification.	  	  	  	   On	  occasion	  the	  decision-­‐procedure	  I	  used	  or	  the	  motivation	  I	  acted	  on	  can	  be	  both	  my	  explanatory	  and	  justificatory	  reason.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  we	  are	  the	  ice	  cream	  shop	  and	  you	  ask	  why	  I	  chose	  chocolate	  rather	  than	  vanilla	  and	  I	  cite	  my	  preference	  for	  chocolate,	  my	  preference	  both	  explains	  and	  justifies	  my	  action.	  	  But	  as	  I	  argued	  above,	  commands	  are	  not	  conceptually	  concerned	  with	  motivations	  or	  decision-­‐procedures.	  	  Instead,	  practical	  authority	  claims	  to	  change	  what	  actions	  of	  mine	  are	  justified	  and	  then	  lets	  subjects	  take	  those	  actions	  in	  whatever	  way	  they	  choose,	  by	  whatever	  decision-­‐procedure	  and	  out	  of	  whatever	  motivation.	  	   If	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  is	  so	  promising,	  why	  do	  both	  Raz	  and	  Moore	  reject	  it?	  	  Raz	  basically	  defers	  to	  Moore’s	  criticisms	  of	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  since	  he	  endorses	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  instead.	  	  All	  he	  says	  is	  that	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  would	  render	  some	  of	  his	  common	  examples	  of	  exclusion	  mistaken.	  	  I	  think	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this	  is	  right	  but	  not	  an	  objection	  to	  the	  interpretation.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  because	  I	  think	  we	  can	  still	  make	  sense	  of	  Raz’s	  common	  examples	  once	  we	  concern	  ourselves	  with	  exclusion	  in	  the	  evidentiary	  context.	  	  I’ll	  explain	  this	  below,	  after	  I	  consider	  Moore’s	  objection.	  	   Moore’s	  objection	  to	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  is	  straightforwardly	  moral	  in	  nature	  and	  in	  fact	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  version	  of	  the	  dilemma	  for	  accounts	  of	  traditional	  political	  authority	  I	  presented	  above.	  	  This	  is	  very	  interesting	  given	  that	  we	  are	  examining	  exclusionary	  reasons	  in	  such	  detail	  precisely	  to	  see	  if	  exclusion	  provides	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  dilemma.	  	  Recall	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mistaken	  commands,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  authority	  “wins	  out”.	  	  In	  morally	  weighty	  domains,	  the	  reasons	  that	  entail	  a	  preexisting	  duty	  for	  subjects	  matter	  a	  great	  deal.	  	  In	  Mary’s	  case,	  what	  hinged	  on	  her	  decision	  was	  the	  life	  of	  her	  patient,	  so	  I	  objected	  that	  the	  mere	  force	  of	  the	  command	  couldn’t	  defeat	  the	  weighty	  reason	  given	  by	  the	  patient’s	  life.	  	  Commands	  can’t	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  a	  person’s	  life	  doesn’t	  matter	  any	  more.	  	  	  	   Moore	  makes	  a	  very	  similar	  complaint:	  “Morality	  never	  gives	  us	  reasons	  that	  exclude	  morally	  compelling	  considerations	  from	  counting	  to	  determine	  the	  rightness	  of	  keeping	  some	  promise	  or	  following	  some	  order.	  	  Morality	  never	  does	  this	  because	  nothing	  can	  be	  excluded	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  objective	  reasons	  of	  morality	  without	  leading	  to	  moral	  error.”22	  	  The	  “moral	  error”	  in	  Mary’s	  case	  would	  be	  unnecessarily	  killing	  her	  patient;	  morality	  (personified)	  doesn’t	  just	  ignore	  these	  sorts	  of	  goods.	  	  Nothing	  an	  authority	  could	  do	  could	  render	  someone’s	  life	  less	  valuable.	  	  Appropriating	  something	  Moore	  says	  against	  the	  decision-­‐procedure	  interpretation,	  “We	  do	  not	  have	  anything	  like	  this	  kind	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Moore,	  “Authority,	  Law,	  and	  Razian	  Reasons”,	  pp.	  872-­‐3.	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sovereignty	  over	  morality.”23	  	   In	  fact,	  this	  kind	  of	  intentional	  control	  over	  what	  constitutes	  objective	  moral	  reasons	  is	  so	  counterintuitive	  that	  we	  don’t	  think	  even	  god	  could	  have	  such	  control.	  	  In	  metaethics	  the	  most	  common	  argument	  against	  divine	  command	  theory	  is	  a	  dilemma,	  standardly	  posed	  as	  a	  version	  of	  the	  piety	  dilemma	  Socrates	  raised	  in	  Euthyphro.	  	  On	  the	  relevant	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma,	  we	  assume	  that	  god’s	  commands	  simply	  constitute	  right	  and	  wrong.	  The	  gory	  point	  of	  this	  horn	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  morality	  to	  be	  whimsical	  and	  arbitrary:	  god	  commanded	  people	  not	  to	  murder	  but	  just	  as	  easily	  could	  have	  commanded	  people	  to	  murder.	  	  Because	  god’s	  commands	  constitute	  right	  and	  wrong,	  murder	  would	  thus	  be	  required	  and	  not	  murdering	  would	  be	  wrong.	  	  But,	  goes	  the	  objection,	  morality	  just	  isn’t	  like	  
this.	  	  Murder	  simply	  cannot	  be	  required.	  	  Morality	  simply	  cannot	  be	  arbitrary.	  	  If	  authorities	  can	  issue	  commands	  that	  make	  unnecessary	  killing	  right,	  as	  in	  Subject	  Mary’s	  case,	  morality	  is	  objectionably	  whimsical	  and	  arbitrary.	  	  	  	   Given	  how	  close	  this	  criticism	  is	  to	  the	  objection	  I	  posed	  above	  for	  traditional	  authority,	  it	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  I	  think	  Moore	  is	  correct	  here.	  	  People’s	  lives	  don’t	  cease	  to	  count	  as	  moral	  reasons	  simply	  because	  somebody	  issued	  a	  command,	  even	  a	  genuine	  command.	  	  But	  as	  I	  argued	  above,	  I	  can’t	  take	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  too	  far	  because	  I	  want	  to	  claim	  that	  exclusionary	  reasons	  work	  in	  the	  evidential	  context.	  	  So	  to	  explain	  why	  Moore’s	  objection	  to	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  is	  correct	  in	  some	  sense	  but	  incorrect	  in	  some	  sense	  as	  well,	  we	  need	  to	  narrow	  our	  focus.	  	   Note	  that	  Moore	  specifically	  says	  that	  reasons	  like	  the	  life	  of	  another	  person	  can’t	  be	  excluded	  in	  the	  justificatory	  sense	  “because	  nothing	  can	  be	  excluded	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Moore,	  “Authority,	  Law,	  and	  Razian	  Reasons”,	  p.	  856.	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objective	  reasons	  of	  morality”.	  	  Moore	  is	  worried	  about	  justificatory	  force	  as	  objective	  right-­‐making	  or	  duty-­‐making	  force.	  	  But	  there	  is	  justificatory	  force	  that	  isn’t	  objective	  right-­‐	  or	  duty-­‐making.	  	  Of	  course	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  justificatory	  force	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  	  Further,	  there	  is	  justificatory	  force	  with	  respect	  to	  subjective	  reasons,	  and	  particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  evidence.	  	  Once	  we	  start	  making	  these	  distinctions	  we	  can	  see	  what	  has	  gone	  awry	  with	  Moore’s	  sweeping	  rejection	  of	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation.	  	  	  
4.	  The	  Justificatory	  Interpretation	  in	  Context	  Ultimately	  arguing	  that	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  of	  exclusion	  works	  in	  different	  contexts	  isn’t	  a	  criticism	  of	  Moore,	  as	  he	  is	  concerned	  with	  whether	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  Raz’s	  service	  conception.	  	  As	  far	  as	  that	  goes,	  Moore	  and	  I	  are	  in	  agreement:	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  commands	  of	  a	  nonconsensual	  authority	  exclude	  the	  justificatory	  force	  of	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  reasons	  is	  morally	  objectionable.	  	  My	  point	  is	  that	  we	  can’t	  extend	  this	  criticism	  to	  other	  contexts.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  commands	  exclude	  the	  justificatory	  force	  of	  other	  reasons	  is	  not	  objectionable	  in	  either	  the	  case	  of	  consensual	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  force	  or	  nonconsensual	  objective	  vulnerability-­‐to-­‐punishment-­‐making	  force.	  	   Consider	  first	  the	  case	  of	  consensual	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  force.	  	  I	  have	  agreed	  that	  universal	  actual	  consent	  can	  establish	  genuine	  traditional	  authority,	  i.e.	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  authority.	  	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  then	  consent	  must	  be	  able	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  of	  exclusion	  in	  the	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  context.	  	  Returning	  to	  the	  Subject	  Mary	  case,	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  of	  exclusion	  was	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that	  the	  very	  weighty	  reasons	  not	  to	  kill	  her	  innocent	  patient	  can’t	  just	  go	  away,	  especially	  not	  just	  because	  an	  authority	  came	  onto	  the	  scene.	  	  Morality	  isn’t	  like	  that.	  	  She	  has	  preexisting	  reason	  to	  give	  C	  and	  not	  give	  K,	  based	  on	  the	  relevant	  biological	  and	  moral	  facts.	  	  When	  the	  authority	  commands	  her	  to	  give	  K,	  it	  purports	  to	  exclude	  those	  preexisting,	  countervailing	  reasons.	  	  But	  reasons	  of	  that	  sort	  can’t	  lose	  their	  justificatory	  force	  just	  because	  someone	  says	  so.	  	   That’s	  almost	  right;	  those	  reasons	  can’t	  lose	  their	  justificatory	  force	  just	  because	  someone	  else	  says	  so.	  	  But	  they	  can	  lose	  their	  justificatory	  force	  just	  because	  the	  patient	  says	  so,	  i.e.	  because	  of	  consent.	  	  The	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  reasons	  are	  constituted	  about	  facts	  about	  the	  patient,	  the	  value	  of	  his	  life,	  his	  rights,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  The	  justificatory	  force	  of	  these	  reasons	  can	  be	  excluded	  by	  the	  authority’s	  command	  if	  the	  patient	  consented	  to	  let	  the	  authority	  have	  dominion	  over	  those	  aspects	  of	  his	  life	  in	  this	  instance.	  	   We	  need	  to	  be	  careful	  about	  what	  excluding	  justificatory	  force	  precisely	  entails.	  	  The	  claim	  is	  not	  that	  the	  authority’s	  command	  could	  make	  the	  patient’s	  unnecessary	  death	  
good.	  	  The	  unnecessary	  loss	  of	  the	  patient’s	  life	  is	  bad	  regardless	  of	  whether	  he	  consents.	  	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  this	  badness	  retains	  justificatory	  force;	  even	  if	  someone	  has	  consented	  to	  let	  you	  treat	  them	  in	  certain	  ways,	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  of	  those	  ways	  is	  bad	  still	  gives	  you	  a	  reason	  to	  choose	  other	  options.	  	  But	  when	  worried	  about	  authority’s	  effect	  on	  the	  justificatory	  reasons,	  we	  need	  to	  narrow	  our	  focus.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  concern	  is	  about	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  justificatory	  force.	  	  And	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  consent	  can	  affect	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  justificatory	  force	  because	  of	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  people	  can	  waive	  their	  own	  rights.	  	  	  	   The	  thought	  is	  this:	  Subject	  Mary	  has	  a	  preexisting	  objective	  duty	  to	  give	  her	  patient	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C.	  	  We’re	  now	  imagining	  that	  both	  Mary	  and	  the	  patient	  have	  consented	  to	  the	  authority	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  Mary	  treats	  the	  patient.	  	  This	  is	  analogous	  to	  subjects	  promising	  to	  obey	  and	  defer	  to	  the	  government.	  	  Before	  the	  authority	  enters,	  Subject	  Mary	  has	  the	  same	  objective	  reasons	  as	  in	  all	  the	  other	  Mary	  cases.	  	  Upon	  the	  authority’s	  command,	  though,	  the	  reasons	  Mary	  had	  not	  to	  give	  K	  are	  excluded	  qua	  their	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  justificatory	  force.	  	  Without	  the	  consent,	  Mary	  is	  put	  into	  a	  bind	  by	  this	  command	  because	  the	  patient’s	  right	  can’t	  be	  overridden	  merely	  by	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  command.	  	  But	  if	  the	  patient	  has	  waived	  his	  rights	  against	  being	  treated	  as	  the	  authority	  prescribes,	  then	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  authority	  commands	  Mary	  to	  give	  K	  can	  exclude	  the	  justificatory	  force	  of	  the	  reasons	  Mary	  had	  not	  give	  K.	  	  	  	   Notice	  that	  the	  authority	  is	  still	  required	  here.	  	  It’s	  not	  that	  the	  patient	  waives	  his	  right	  against	  being	  killed	  generally.	  	  The	  patient	  waives	  his	  right	  not	  to	  have	  his	  fate	  determined	  by	  the	  authority’s	  judgment,	  but	  up	  until	  that	  point	  Mary	  has	  a	  duty	  not	  to	  give	  K.	  	  When	  the	  authority	  commands	  Mary	  to	  give	  K,	  though,	  that	  duty	  is	  excluded	  and	  no	  longer	  has	  justificatory	  force.	  	  The	  exclusion	  is	  not	  objectionable	  because	  the	  patient	  waived	  his	  right	  and	  that	  explains	  why	  there	  are	  no	  longer	  any	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  reasons	  for	  Mary	  not	  to	  give	  K.	  	  Given	  the	  patient’s	  consent	  to	  the	  authority	  and	  Mary’s	  obedience	  to	  the	  authority,	  she	  doesn’t	  wrong	  her	  patient	  even	  though	  she	  needlessly	  kills	  him.	  	  The	  command	  of	  the	  authority	  explains	  why	  Mary’s	  reasons	  not	  to	  give	  K	  are	  excluded,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  patient’s	  consent	  that	  justifies	  the	  exclusion.	  	   The	  idea	  that	  consent	  grounds	  the	  justificatory	  exclusion	  of	  certain	  reasons	  of	  course	  can’t	  help	  accounts	  of	  traditional	  modern	  political	  authority	  because	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  nonconsensual.	  	  Even	  if	  consent	  can	  cancel	  the	  right-­‐making	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justificatory	  force	  of	  certain	  morally	  weighty	  reasons,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  nonconsensual	  authority	  would	  not	  fall	  to	  Moore’s	  complaint	  that	  those	  reasons	  are	  generally	  not	  subject	  to	  change	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  an	  authority.	  	  Of	  course,	  I	  am	  not	  concerned	  with	  defending	  traditional	  modern	  political	  authority	  but	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  my	  claim	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  traditional	  political	  authority	  is	  not	  conceptually	  incoherent,	  I	  had	  to	  explain	  how	  justificatory	  exclusion	  makes	  sense	  in	  at	  least	  one	  case	  of	  traditional	  authority.	  	  Now	  that	  we	  see	  that	  notion	  of	  consensual	  authority	  depends	  on	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  command	  that	  excludes	  reasons	  and	  what	  justifies	  the	  exclusion	  of	  those	  reasons,	  we	  can	  better	  understand	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	   Epistemic	  reasons,	  evidence,	  justify	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  certain	  beliefs,	  rather	  than	  certain	  acts.	  	  If	  reasons	  are	  excluded	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  their	  justificatory	  force	  no	  longer	  counts,	  then	  when	  evidence	  is	  excluded	  it	  no	  longer	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  certain	  beliefs.	  	  It	  is	  no	  longer	  evidence,	  just	  like	  a	  practical	  reason	  that	  no	  longer	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  act	  has	  lost	  its	  character	  as	  a	  reason.	  	  Recall	  that	  the	  objection	  to	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons	  leveled	  by	  Moore	  was	  a	  straightforwardly	  moral	  one.	  	  Instead	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  conceptual	  objection	  leveled	  at	  the	  other	  two	  interpretations,	  Moore	  objected	  that	  it	  seems	  mysterious	  for	  right-­‐making	  reasons	  to	  lose	  their	  force;	  it	  conflicts	  with	  our	  notion	  of	  morality	  as	  non-­‐arbitrary.	  	  I	  agreed.	  	  	  	   But	  it’s	  not	  mysterious	  for	  objective	  vulnerability-­‐to-­‐punishment-­‐making	  reasons	  to	  lose	  their	  force	  in	  this	  way	  precisely	  because	  objective	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  is	  a	  function	  of	  culpability	  and	  culpability	  is	  a	  function	  of	  evidence.	  	  Evidence,	  as	  I	  have	  been	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stressing,	  is	  not	  veridical	  in	  the	  way	  right-­‐making	  reasons	  are	  veridical.	  	  While	  a	  person’s	  right	  to	  life	  can’t	  change	  at	  another’s	  discretion	  of	  any	  other	  person,	  a	  person’s	  evidence	  can	  change	  at	  another’s	  discretion.	  	  It’s	  not	  necessarily	  morally	  objectionable	  to	  accept	  someone	  else’s	  testimony.	  (Although	  it	  is	  certainly	  more	  difficult	  in	  moral	  contexts.)	  	   This	  is	  essentially	  the	  main	  argument	  I	  have	  been	  making	  throughout	  the	  dissertation.	  	  Morally,	  what	  is	  wrong	  for	  a	  person	  to	  do	  and	  what	  they	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  doing	  are	  different	  notions	  grounded	  in	  different	  reasons.	  	  How	  anyone	  could	  change	  what	  is	  wrong	  for	  another	  person	  to	  do	  is	  mysterious	  and	  does	  not	  accord	  with	  our	  understanding	  of	  morality.	  	  How	  anyone	  could	  change	  what	  another	  person	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  doing,	  however,	  is	  another	  matter	  entirely	  because	  of	  its	  connection	  to	  evidence.	  	  We	  have	  been	  discussing	  reasons	  and	  their	  justificatory	  force	  all	  along.	  	  Justificatory	  force	  is	  just	  another	  way	  of	  talking	  about	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  and	  whether	  reasons	  entail	  duties,	  liberties,	  and	  so	  on.	  	   Excluding	  practical	  reasons	  is	  so	  difficult	  in	  part	  because	  practical	  reasons	  are	  veridical;	  the	  patient’s	  rights	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  our	  discretionary	  control	  and	  he	  has	  them	  regardless	  of	  our	  evidence	  to	  that	  effect.	  	  But	  evidence	  is	  not	  veridical,	  and	  this	  crucial	  difference	  makes	  it	  plausible	  that	  evidence	  can	  be	  excluded	  in	  the	  justificatory	  sense	  even	  when	  practical	  reasons	  cannot.	  	  Here’s	  another	  variation	  on	  the	  Mary	  case	  that	  demonstrates	  the	  claim.	  	  This	  time	  we	  are	  considering	  Android	  Mary.	  	  Android	  Mary	  has	  the	  same	  patient	  in	  the	  same	  predicament.	  	  Notice	  that	  Mary’s	  duty	  to	  cure	  and	  not	  kill	  her	  patient	  are	  entailed	  by	  the	  right-­‐making	  justificatory	  force	  of	  the	  reason	  that	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  patient	  is	  a	  person	  with	  specific	  interests	  and	  rights.	  	  	  	   Now,	  a	  technician	  enters	  the	  room	  and	  tells	  Mary	  that	  her	  patient	  is	  not	  in	  fact	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human,	  but	  a	  very	  cleverly	  constructed	  android.	  	  Let’s	  assume	  that	  androids	  are	  not	  moral	  agents	  or	  moral	  patients,	  but	  simply	  complex	  pieces	  of	  machinery	  no	  different	  in	  kind	  from	  toasters.	  	  The	  technician	  testifies	  to	  the	  patient’s	  android	  nature,	  shows	  Mary	  a	  convincing	  data	  port	  behind	  a	  flap	  in	  the	  back	  of	  the	  patient’s	  skull,	  shows	  Mary	  an	  android’s	  blueprint,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  The	  point	  is	  that	  Mary	  now	  has	  strong	  evidence	  that	  her	  patient	  is	  an	  android,	  not	  a	  person.	  	  This	  is	  evidence	  about	  her	  objective	  reasons,	  for	  her	  duties	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  human	  person	  and	  an	  android	  are	  very	  different.	  	  If	  the	  patient	  is	  an	  android	  and	  not	  a	  person,	  so	  has	  no	  rights,	  Mary	  does	  not	  have	  to	  treat	  him.	  	  	  	   Before	  the	  authority	  entered,	  Mary	  had	  a	  right-­‐making	  reason	  not	  to	  give	  K	  and	  good	  evidence	  that	  she	  ought	  not	  give	  K:	  her	  objective	  duty	  is	  not	  to	  give	  K	  and	  so	  is	  her	  evidential	  duty.	  	  The	  evidence	  given	  by	  the	  technician	  changes	  the	  evidential	  justificatory	  force	  of	  her	  evidence	  that	  she	  ought	  not	  give	  K;	  if	  the	  patient	  really	  is	  an	  android	  as	  the	  evidence	  supports,	  then	  it’s	  not	  the	  case	  that	  Mary	  has	  an	  evidential	  duty	  to	  give	  C.	  	  Before	  her	  evidence	  changed,	  Mary	  would	  have	  been	  culpable	  if	  she	  didn’t	  treat	  the	  patient.	  	  Now	  with	  strong	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  the	  patient	  is	  an	  android,	  she’s	  not	  culpable	  if	  she	  doesn’t	  treat	  him.	  	  Here	  we	  have	  a	  case	  where	  evidential	  justificatory	  force	  is	  decisively	  changed	  and	  so	  what	  Mary	  is	  culpable	  for	  changes,	  without	  changing	  the	  right-­‐making	  justificatory	  force	  of	  any	  reasons.	  	  The	  right-­‐making	  force	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  patient’s	  true	  nature;	  if	  he’s	  human	  after	  all	  and	  the	  technician	  was	  mistaken,	  Mary	  still	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  treat	  him	  even	  though	  she	  blamelessly	  believes	  she	  does	  not.	  	   So	  it	  is	  at	  least	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  that	  evidence	  can	  be	  justifiably	  excluded	  in	  some	  cases	  where	  right-­‐making	  reasons	  cannot	  be.	  	  Moore’s	  moral	  objection	  to	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  of	  exclusion	  only	  holds	  in	  the	  objective	  right-­‐making	  context.	  	  In	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order	  to	  make	  this	  case	  more	  than	  prima	  facie	  plausible,	  though,	  we	  need	  a	  story	  like	  the	  consent	  story	  that	  appealed	  to	  something	  other	  than	  exclusion	  itself	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  exclusion	  is	  justified.	  	  That	  I	  find	  it	  intuitive	  in	  cases	  like	  Android	  Mary’s	  doesn’t	  yet	  show	  this.	  	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  expertise	  and	  exclusion	  and	  show	  that	  exclusion	  is	  justified	  because	  of	  undercutting	  defeat.	  	  
5.	  Expertise	  and	  Exclusion	  Consensual	  traditional	  authority	  is	  a	  coherent	  idea	  because	  consent	  explains	  how	  certain	  reasons	  can	  be	  justifiably	  excluded	  by	  the	  authority’s	  commands:	  the	  subject	  waived	  her	  rights	  against	  certain	  kinds	  of	  treatment,	  so	  canceled	  the	  justificatory	  force	  of	  those	  rights	  and	  opened	  herself	  up	  to	  some	  of	  those	  reasons	  being	  excluded	  by	  the	  authority.	  	  Now	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  something	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	  consent	  and	  canceling	  in	  the	  evidential	  context.	  	  This	  something	  is	  undercutting	  defeat.	  	   Recall	  that	  a	  reason	  is	  undercut	  when	  its	  connection	  to	  what	  it	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  is	  severed.	  In	  chapter	  one	  I	  gave	  the	  example	  where	  you	  find	  out	  that	  are	  in	  fake-­‐barn	  country,	  undercutting	  the	  connection	  between	  your	  visual	  perceptions	  of	  barn-­‐like	  structures	  and	  the	  belief	  that	  barns	  surround	  you.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  you	  are	  in	  fake-­‐barn	  country	  undercuts	  the	  evidentiary	  force	  of	  your	  visual	  perceptions	  because	  it	  provides	  a	  good	  error-­‐theory	  for	  why	  your	  normally	  accurate	  visual	  capacities	  went	  awry	  in	  this	  context.	  	  Once	  you	  know	  that	  you	  are	  in	  fake-­‐barn	  country,	  your	  visual	  experiences	  no	  longer	  count	  as	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  that	  real	  barns	  surround	  you:	  their	  evidential	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justificatory	  force	  counting	  in	  favor	  of	  that	  proposition	  has	  been	  undercut.24	  	  	  	   Undercutting	  is	  based	  in	  considerations	  of	  reliability.	  	  The	  normally	  reliable	  connection	  between	  your	  visual	  capacities	  and	  believing	  what	  they	  appear	  to	  show	  is	  unreliable	  in	  fake-­‐barn	  country,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  evidence	  from	  your	  visual	  capacities	  is	  undercut	  and	  no	  longer	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  that	  you	  are	  surrounded	  by	  barns.	  	  Reliability	  is	  only	  an	  epistemic	  concern,	  though.	  	  If	  you	  happen	  to	  pass	  through	  the	  one	  part	  of	  fake-­‐barn	  country	  that	  is	  filled	  with	  real	  barns,	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  you	  are	  surrounded	  by	  barns.	  	  But	  you	  still	  aren’t	  justified	  in	  believing	  that	  you	  are	  surrounded	  by	  barns	  because	  you	  still	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  your	  visual	  perceptions	  are	  unreliable	  in	  this	  context.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  undercutting	  is	  based	  in	  reliability	  and	  reliability	  is	  an	  epistemic	  concern	  makes	  it	  plausible	  that	  undercutting	  is	  functioning	  in	  the	  case	  of	  evidential	  authority.	  	  This	  is	  made	  even	  more	  plausible	  by	  two	  parallels	  to	  Raz:	  first,	  that	  Raz’s	  favorite	  example	  of	  exclusion	  is	  actually	  a	  case	  of	  undercutting	  and	  second,	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  is	  explicitly	  about	  reliability.	  	   Raz’s	  most	  common	  illustration	  of	  exclusion	  is	  drunkenness.	  The	  thought	  is	  that	  drunkenness	  affects	  your	  judgment,	  and	  knowing	  this,	  you	  should	  not	  act	  on	  your	  judgment.	  	  Drunkenness	  excludes	  the	  reasons	  you	  normally	  have	  to	  act	  on	  your	  judgment.	  Consider	  the	  case	  of	  the	  drunk	  text	  or	  drunk	  dial.	  	  During	  the	  hard,	  cold	  light	  of	  day	  you	  may	  have	  decided	  that	  you’re	  never	  going	  to	  contact	  some	  ex-­‐partner	  of	  yours	  ever	  again.	  	  But	  a	  few	  drinks	  in,	  you’re	  seriously	  considering	  it;	  by	  the	  night’s	  blurry	  end,	  you’re	  punching	  in	  a	  number	  you	  swore	  to	  forget.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  night,	  the	  reasons	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Recall	  form	  above	  that	  reasons	  lose	  their	  justificatory	  force	  very	  particularly.	  Your	  visual	  experiences	  in	  fake	  barn	  country	  still	  have	  evidential	  justificatory	  force	  counting	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  that	  you	  are	  surrounded	  by	  movie	  props	  that	  look	  a	  lot	  like	  barns.	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contact	  your	  ex	  start	  to	  look	  more	  convincing	  and	  the	  reasons	  not	  to	  contact	  look	  like	  they	  matter	  less.	  	  If	  you	  take	  your	  deliberations	  to	  give	  you	  a	  reason	  to	  contact	  your	  ex,	  you’ll	  contradict	  your	  earlier,	  sober	  judgment.	  	  Should	  you?	  	  	   Clearly	  not:	  you’re	  drunk	  and	  drunkenness	  impairs	  your	  judgment.	  	  If	  you	  could	  sober	  up	  for	  a	  second,	  you	  would	  realize	  that	  your	  sober	  self	  made	  a	  good	  decision	  and	  that	  your	  understanding	  of	  the	  reasons	  is	  being	  confused	  by	  your	  drunkenness.	  	  Your	  drunkenness	  excludes	  acting	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  currently	  judge	  contacting	  your	  ex	  would	  be	  a	  good	  idea.	  	  All	  well	  and	  good,	  except	  that	  this	  is	  clearly	  exclusion	  in	  the	  evidential,	  not	  right-­‐making,	  context.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  you	  are	  drunk	  does	  not	  necessarily	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  reaching	  out	  to	  your	  ex	  is	  a	  bad	  idea.	  	  Whether	  that	  is	  a	  bad	  idea	  depends	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  like	  your	  current	  relationship	  with	  your	  ex,	  their	  feelings	  towards	  you,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  These	  facts	  aren’t	  changed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  you’re	  drunk;	  it	  might	  be	  the	  case	  that	  your	  sober	  self	  was	  overly	  cautious	  so	  misjudged	  the	  reasons.	  	  Instead,	  the	  fact	  that	  you’re	  drunk	  is	  good	  evidence	  that	  your	  current	  judgment	  is	  mistaken.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  you’re	  drunk	  doesn’t	  make	  your	  judgment	  mistaken,	  it	  just	  makes	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  it’s	  mistaken.	  	  Drunkenness	  is	  a	  concern	  about	  reliability,	  an	  epistemic	  concern.	  	  	  Given	  that	  Raz	  uses	  drunkenness	  as	  the	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  exclusion,	  then,	  it	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  other	  instances	  of	  undercutting	  based	  in	  epistemic	  reliability	  can	  also	  ground	  exclusionary	  reasons.	  	   Second,	  recall	  Raz’s	  normal	  justification	  thesis:	  	  [T]he	   normal	   way	   to	   establish	   that	   a	   person	   has	   authority	   over	   another	  person	   involves	   showing	   that	   the	   alleged	   subject	   is	   likely	   better	   to	   comply	  with	   reasons	   which	   apply	   to	   him	   (other	   than	   the	   alleged	   authoritative	  directives)	   if	   he	   accepts	   the	   directives	   of	   the	   alleged	   authority	   as	  authoritatively	   binding	   and	   tries	   to	   follow	   them,	   rather	   than	   by	   trying	   to	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follow	  the	  reasons	  which	  apply	  to	  him	  directly.25	  	  Notice	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  authority	  and	  the	  subject	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  exclusion	  is	  the	  difference	  in	  how	  reliable	  their	  judgments	  are.	  	  As	  stressed	  in	  chapter	  one,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  content-­‐independent,	  the	  difference	  must	  not	  be	  about	  whether	  their	  judgments	  are	  correct	  in	  a	  particular	  case.	  	  Instead,	  the	  difference	  is	  about	  whether	  their	  judgments	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  correct	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  i.e.	  a	  difference	  in	  reliability.	  	  If	  I	  know	  someone’s	  judgment	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  correct	  than	  mine,	  that	  gives	  me	  good	  evidence	  that	  she	  is	  actually	  correct	  in	  particular	  cases	  where	  we	  disagree.	  	  But	  it	  doesn’t	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  she’s	  actually	  correct;	  differences	  in	  reliability	  constitute	  straightforwardly	  epistemic	  reasons.	  	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  there	  must	  be	  some	  sense	  in	  which	  epistemic	  concerns	  of	  reliability	  ground	  exclusion.	  	   At	  this	  point,	  it	  may	  seem	  intuitive	  to	  simply	  draw	  the	  connection	  between	  undercutting	  and	  exclusion	  like	  I	  did	  between	  canceling	  and	  exclusion.	  	  When	  a	  reason	  is	  canceled,	  it	  loses	  its	  justificatory	  force	  and	  then	  can	  be	  justifiably	  excluded	  by	  an	  authority’s	  directive.	  	  Similarly,	  goes	  the	  thought,	  when	  a	  reason	  is	  undercut,	  it	  loses	  its	  justificatory	  force	  and	  then	  can	  be	  justifiably	  excluded	  by	  an	  authority’s	  directive.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  crucial	  difference	  between	  canceling	  and	  undercutting.	  	  Canceling	  is	  binary:	  either	  a	  reason	  is	  canceled	  and	  completely	  loses	  its	  justificatory	  force,	  or	  it	  is	  not	  and	  doesn’t	  lose	  any	  of	  its	  justificatory	  force.	  	  Undercutting,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  comes	  in	  degrees.	  	  A	  reason	  can	  be	  undercut	  to	  a	  lesser	  or	  greater	  degree	  and	  thereby	  lose	  its	  justificatory	  force	  to	  a	  lesser	  or	  greater	  degree.	  	  	  	   Interestingly,	  Raz’s	  example	  of	  drunkenness	  illustrates	  this	  point	  perfectly.	  Contrast	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  53.	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two	  cases	  where	  I	  am	  drunk	  and	  my	  inebriation	  gives	  me	  reason	  to	  doubt	  my	  judgment:	  in	  the	  first	  case	  I	  have	  had	  a	  couple	  beers	  and	  am	  buzzed	  while	  in	  the	  second	  I	  am	  extremely	  drunk,	  barely	  able	  to	  stand	  or	  form	  coherent	  sentences.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  I	  know	  my	  judgment	  is	  less	  reliable	  than	  it	  would	  be	  if	  I	  were	  sober,	  but	  clearly	  my	  level	  of	  drunkenness	  is	  relevant	  to	  how	  much	  less	  reliable	  I	  am,	  and	  in	  turn	  this	  is	  relevant	  to	  how	  much	  reason	  I	  have	  to	  ignore	  my	  drunken	  judgments.	  	  Consider:	  if	  I’m	  only	  slightly	  tipsy,	  then	  my	  slight	  impairment	  gives	  me	  some	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  reliability	  of	  my	  judgment,	  but	  my	  tipsiness	  may	  also	  clear	  away	  some	  inhibitions	  and	  allow	  me	  to	  consider	  options	  that	  I	  wouldn’t	  otherwise,	  giving	  me	  some	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  my	  judgment	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  more	  reliable	  when	  tipsy.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  I’m	  extremely	  drunk,	  slurring	  my	  words	  and	  unable	  to	  walk,	  my	  drunkenness	  gives	  me	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  my	  judgment	  is	  completely	  unreliable.	  	  In	  that	  case	  I	  should	  not	  take	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  currently	  judge	  that	  I	  should	  contact	  my	  ex	  as	  any	  sort	  of	  evidence	  that	  I	  should	  contact	  my	  ex.	  	  My	  judgment	  when	  extremely	  drunk	  is	  so	  unreliable	  that	  it	  has	  been	  completely	  undercut.	  	   Undercutting	  comes	  in	  degrees.	  	  Tipsiness	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  low	  end	  of	  the	  scale:	  the	  rational	  response	  is	  to	  lower	  my	  confidence	  in	  my	  judgment	  just	  a	  bit,	  and	  only	  temporarily.	  	  This	  doesn’t	  mean	  I	  should	  never	  act	  on	  my	  judgment	  when	  tipsy,	  just	  that	  I	  am	  less	  confident	  and	  so	  need	  to	  be	  more	  careful,	  perhaps	  confirming	  decisions	  by	  deliberating	  again	  or	  by	  seeking	  advice.	  	  On	  the	  other	  end	  is	  complete	  undercutting.	  	  When	  I	  lose	  confidence	  entirely	  in	  a	  source	  I	  give	  no	  weight	  to	  its	  outputs:	  the	  reasons	  it	  gives	  to	  me	  have	  been	  completely	  undercut	  and	  no	  longer	  have	  justificatory	  force	  for	  me.	  	  	  	   If	  we	  are	  appealing	  to	  undercutting	  as	  a	  parallel	  to	  canceling,	  then,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  we	  have	  to	  consider	  cases	  of	  completely	  undercutting,	  rather	  than	  just	  any	  difference	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in	  reliability	  whatsoever.	  	  Only	  complete	  undercutting	  removes	  justificatory	  force	  like	  canceling.	  	  At	  first	  glance,	  this	  is	  an	  area	  where	  Raz	  has	  gone	  wrong.	  	  	  Many	  have	  objected	  to	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  seems	  rather	  too	  permissive.26	  	  Note	  that	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  contains	  no	  restriction	  on	  how	  much	  more	  reliable	  the	  authority’s	  judgment	  must	  be	  in	  order	  to	  make	  her	  an	  authority.	  	  Any	  difference	  will	  do,	  even	  0.01%,	  but	  this	  tiny	  difference	  in	  reliability	  does	  not	  intuitively	  seem	  to	  justify	  authority.27	  	   One	  implication	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  undercutting	  comes	  in	  degrees	  is	  that	  while	  concerns	  of	  reliability	  always	  give	  undercutting	  reason	  to	  some	  degree,	  they	  do	  not	  always	  give	  completely	  undercutting	  reasons.	  	  A	  small	  decrease	  in	  reliability	  gives	  rise	  to	  only	  slight	  undercutting;	  it	  would	  be	  irrational	  to	  entirely	  discount	  evidence	  that	  you	  suspected	  was	  only	  slightly	  mistaken.	  	  We	  can	  only	  explain	  exclusion	  by	  an	  appeal	  to	  cases	  of	  completely	  undercutting,	  where	  our	  confidence	  is	  totally	  undermined	  by	  unreliability.	  	  But	  this	  is	  what	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  seems	  to	  deny.	  	  The	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  claims	  that	  A	  is	  an	  authority	  over	  B	  whenever	  following	  A’s	  judgment	  would	  make	  B	  more	  likely	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  preexisting	  reasons	  than	  following	  her	  own	  judgment.	  	  Because	  authorities	  necessarily	  give	  exclusionary	  reasons,	  it	  must	  be	  that	  exclusionary	  reasons	  are	  given	  whenever	  there	  is	  any	  difference	  in	  reliability.	  	  The	  reliability	  claim	  is	  captured	  by	  “more	  likely	  to	  conform”,	  and	  contains	  no	  limit	  on	  how	  much	  more	  likely	  is	  required.	  	  But	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  For	  example,	  Moore,	  “Authority,	  Law,	  and	  Razian	  Reasons”;	  Alexander,	  “Law	  and	  Exclusionary	  Reasons”;	  Erman	  Mian,	  “The	  Curious	  Case	  of	  Exclusionary	  Reasons”,	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Jurisprudence	  15	  (2002):	  pp.	  99-­‐124;	  Kenneth	  Himma,	  “Just	  ‘Cause	  You’re	  Smarter	  than	  Me	  Doesn’t	  Give	  You	  a	  Right	  to	  Tell	  Me	  What	  to	  Do:	  Legitimate	  Authority	  and	  the	  Normal	  Justification	  Thesis”,	  Oxford	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  27	  (2007):	  pp.	  121-­‐150;	  Stephen	  Darwall,	  “Authority	  and	  Reasons:	  Exclusionary	  and	  Second-­‐Personal,”	  Ethics	  120	  (2010):	  pp.	  257-­‐278.	  27	  Although	  it	  may	  be	  that	  such	  tiny	  differences	  can	  be	  ignored	  if	  they	  can’t	  be	  discovered	  or	  if	  one	  always	  has	  reasons	  to	  try	  to	  increase	  one’s	  reliability	  that	  tiny	  amount	  (and	  so	  orders	  from	  someone	  who	  was	  only	  slightly	  more	  reliable	  would	  fall	  to	  the	  deference	  condition).	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as	  we	  have	  just	  seen,	  this	  is	  wrong.	  	  Differences	  in	  reliability	  always	  give	  undercutting	  reasons,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  always	  give	  completely	  undercutting	  reasons.	  	  If	  exclusion	  can	  only	  be	  justified	  in	  cases	  of	  canceling	  or	  complete	  undercutting,	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  is	  mistaken	  because	  it	  picks	  out	  many	  cases	  where	  reasons	  are	  only	  partially	  undercut.	  	   If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  we	  should	  modify	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  to	  only	  capture	  cases	  where	  complete	  undercutting	  happens	  rather	  than	  any	  degree	  of	  undercutting.	  	  A	  completely	  undercut	  reason	  entirely	  lacks	  justificatory	  force,	  so	  we	  can	  easily	  explain	  why	  excluding	  completely	  undercut	  reasons	  is	  not	  morally	  objectionable.	  	  Better	  yet,	  it	  looks	  like	  an	  appeal	  to	  expertise	  is	  precisely	  what	  we	  need.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  experts	  and	  laypeople	  is	  a	  categorical	  difference	  in	  reliability.	  	  To	  see	  this,	  we	  need	  to	  know	  the	  nature	  of	  expertise	  more	  precisely.	  	  
6.	  Expertise	  	  When	  we	  say	  a	  person	  is	  an	  expert,	  we	  generally	  mean	  something	  like	  she	  knows	  a	  lot	  about	  a	  particular	  domain.	  	  But	  expertise	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  than	  just	  knowing	  many	  of	  the	  facts	  in	  a	  domain.	  	  The	  layperson	  may	  have	  quite	  a	  stock	  of	  true	  beliefs	  in	  the	  domain;	  for	  example,	  I	  can	  parrot	  a	  lot	  of	  interesting	  facts	  about	  physics	  and	  biochemistry.	  	  But	  for	  the	  layperson	  the	  justification	  for	  these	  beliefs	  is	  indirect,	  most	  often	  based	  in	  trust	  in	  a	  source	  like	  a	  professor	  or	  text.	  	  I	  believe	  Einstein’s	  theory	  of	  relativity	  is	  true,	  but	  were	  I	  to	  go	  read	  the	  relevant	  physics	  papers	  and	  books	  I	  do	  not	  have	  the	  training	  or	  ability	  to	  competently	  assess	  them.	  	  My	  belief	  is	  not	  and,	  given	  my	  current	  limitations,	  could	  not	  be	  directly	  justified.	  	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  it	  would	  be	  odd	  to	  call	  me	  an	  expert	  about	  physics,	  even	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though	  I	  know	  a	  lot,	  much	  more	  than	  the	  average	  layperson.	  	  	  This	  is	  explained	  by	  John	  Hardwig’s	  notion	  of	  an	  expert	  from	  the	  social	  epistemology	  literature.	  Hardwig	  claims	  that	  an	  expert	  is	  someone	  whose	  opinion	  is	  “less	  likely	  to	  be	  mistaken	  and	  likely	  to	  be	  less	  mistaken”	  than	  another	  because	  “sustained,	  prolonged,	  and	  systematic”	  inquiry	  is	  both	  “necessary	  and	  efficacious”	  in	  determining	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  matter.28	  	  This	  definition	  explains	  why	  just	  having	  more	  knowledge	  isn’t	  sufficient	  for	  expertise.	  	  The	  crucial	  component	  is	  the	  inquiry	  because	  it	  establishes	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  knowledgeable	  layperson	  and	  the	  expert.	  	  Because	  of	  her	  inquiry,	  the	  expert	  has	  true	  beliefs	  plus	  much	  more.	  	  As	  Alvin	  Goldman	  puts	  it,	  	  Expertise	  is	  not	  all	  a	  matter	  of	  possessing	  accurate	  information.	  It	  includes	  a	  capacity	  or	  disposition	  to	  deploy	  or	  exploit	  this	  fund	  of	  information	  to	  form	  beliefs	   in	   true	  answers	   to	  new	  questions	   that	  may	  be	  posed	   in	   the	  domain.	  This	  arises	  from	  some	  set	  of	  skills	  or	  techniques	  that	  constitute	  part	  of	  what	  it	   is	   to	   be	   an	   expert.	   An	   expert	   has	   the	   (cognitive)	   know-­‐how,	   when	  presented	  with	  a	  new	  question	  in	  the	  domain,	  to	  go	  to	  the	  right	  sectors	  of	  his	  information-­‐bank	   and	   perform	   appropriate	   operations	   on	   this	   information;	  or	   to	   deploy	   some	   external	   apparatus	   or	   data-­‐banks	   to	   disclose	   relevant	  material.	  So	  expertise	  features	  a	  propensity	  element	  as	  well	  as	  an	  element	  of	  actual	  attainment.29	  	  The	  physicist,	  an	  expert,	  can	  go	  read	  Einstein’s	  papers	  and	  form	  justified	  beliefs	  about	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  arguments	  therein	  and	  the	  conclusions,	  so	  can	  assess	  her	  belief	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  relativity.	  	  This	  allows	  her	  to	  change	  her	  beliefs	  in	  the	  face	  of	  new	  evidence,	  to	  extend	  the	  reasons	  for	  her	  belief	  to	  new	  beliefs,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  The	  layperson	  lacks	  this	  “propensity	  element”	  because	  she	  lacks	  understanding	  of	  the	  justificatory,	  second-­‐order	  claims	  in	  the	  field.	  	  These	  second-­‐order	  claims	  are	  things	  like	  the	  competing	  theories	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Hardwig,	  “Epistemic	  Dependence,”	  p.	  338,	  and	  n.	  2.	  	  	  29	  Goldman,	  “Experts,	  Which	  Ones	  Should	  You	  Trust?,”	  pp.	  91-­‐2.	  Cf.	  Arthur	  Caplan,	  	  “Moral	  Experts	  and	  Moral	  Expertise:	  Does	  Either	  Exist?”,	  in	  If	  I	  Were	  a	  Rich	  Man	  Could	  I	  Buy	  a	  Pancreas?	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  UP,	  1992):	  pp.	  18-­‐39.	  On	  moral	  expertise’s	  propensity	  element	  see	  p.	  34.	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field,	  the	  standards	  for	  good	  evidence,	  the	  appropriate	  methods	  for	  obtaining	  evidence,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  The	  expert’s	  facility	  with	  these	  second-­‐order	  claims,	  and	  her	  practical	  expertise	  at	  accessing	  and	  deploying	  her	  “information-­‐bank”,	  is	  a	  large	  and	  necessary	  part	  of	  what	  distinguishes	  her	  from	  the	  layperson.	  
	   Once	  we	  see	  that	  expertise	  is	  more	  than	  just	  a	  greater	  amount	  of	  true	  knowledge,	  we	  see	  that	  expertise	  grounds	  reliability	  of	  an	  especially	  robust	  kind.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  expert	  has	  what	  I	  will	  call	  trumping	  reliability.	  	  To	  explore	  this	  idea	  it	  is	  useful	  understand	  this	  conflict	  in	  reasons	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  disagreement.	  	  Consider	  a	  case	  where	  the	  expert	  has	  told	  me	  I	  should	  believe	  p	  but	  I	  judge	  that	  I	  should	  believe	  not-­‐p;	  we	  disagree.	  	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  disagreement	  gives	  me	  any	  reason	  to	  discount	  my	  own	  judgment,	  and	  if	  so,	  how	  much.	  	  This	  question	  is	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  answer	  when	  the	  disagreement	  is	  between	  peers.	  	  But	  when	  the	  disagreement	  is	  between	  a	  layperson	  and	  an	  expert,	  the	  answer	  is	  clear.	  	  The	  layperson	  should	  defer	  to	  the	  expert’s	  judgment	  precisely	  because	  the	  expert’s	  judgment	  is	  so	  much	  more	  reliable.	  	  	   As	  Adam	  Elga	  characterizes	  it,	  when	  I	  treat	  someone	  as	  an	  expert	  I	  completely	  defer:	  “conditional	  on	  her	  having	  probability	  x	  in	  any	  [proposition	  within	  her	  domain	  of	  expertise],	  my	  probability	  in	  that	  proposition	  is	  also	  x.”30	  	  So	  if	  the	  physicist	  says	  she’s	  completely	  confident	  that	  tables	  are	  mostly	  empty	  space,	  I	  should	  also	  be	  completely	  confident	  that	  tables	  are	  mostly	  empty	  space.	  	  I	  simply	  match	  her	  judgment	  of	  the	  relevant	  proposition	  because	  she	  has	  trumping	  reliability.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  must	  lower	  my	  probability	  in	  countervailing	  propositions,	  meaning	  that	  the	  reasons	  I	  had	  to	  believe	  those	  propositions	  are	  undercut.	  	  They	  are	  no	  longer	  good	  evidence	  that	  tables	  are	  solid,	  but	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Adam	  Elga,	  “Reflection	  and	  Disagreement”,	  Nous	  41	  (2007):	  p.	  479.	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been	  trumped	  by	  the	  expert’s	  judgment.	  	  As	  Hardwig	  says,	  “The	  rational	  layman	  recognizes	  that	  his	  own	  judgment,	  uninformed	  by	  training	  and	  inquiry	  as	  it	  is,	  is	  rationally	  inferior	  to	  that	  of	  the	  expert	  (and	  the	  community	  of	  experts	  for	  whom	  the	  expert	  usually	  speaks)	  and	  consequently	  can	  always	  be	  rationally	  overruled.”31	  When	  an	  expert	  opinion	  gives	  a	  layperson	  reason	  to	  believe	  p	  and	  she	  also	  has	  reasons	  to	  believe	  not	  p,	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  conflict	  with	  an	  expert	  opinion	  gives	  her	  a	  reason	  to	  lower	  her	  probability	  in	  those	  countervailing	  reasons.	  	  Her	  probability	  in	  the	  proposition	  supported	  by	  the	  expert	  is	  raised	  to	  the	  expert’s	  probability,	  and	  her	  probability	  in	  other	  propositions	  is	  undercut	  so	  that	  they	  are	  at	  least	  lower	  than	  the	  expert-­‐supported	  proposition.	  	  The	  balance	  of	  her	  evidence	  has	  decisively	  changed	  to	  support	  precisely	  what	  the	  expert	  believes.	  	  	  	  Ultimately,	  though,	  we	  are	  not	  concerned	  with	  how	  evidence	  changes	  subjects’	  beliefs	  but	  with	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  change	  in	  evidence	  is	  sufficient	  to	  change	  a	  person’s	  objective	  moral	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  	  The	  appropriate	  epistemic	  response	  to	  changes	  in	  evidence	  depends	  only	  on	  the	  evidence,	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  having	  true	  beliefs.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  whether	  someone	  is	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishing	  for	  acting	  in	  some	  way	  depends	  on	  the	  combination	  of	  two	  factors:	  the	  strength	  of	  her	  evidence	  and	  the	  practical	  context.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  the	  chess	  case.	  	  In	  the	  chess	  case,	  you	  are	  playing	  a	  game	  of	  chess	  against	  some	  opponent	  with	  variable	  stakes.	  	  Let’s	  assume	  that	  you’re	  not	  a	  chess	  expert,	  although	  you’ve	  played	  some	  and	  are	  not	  a	  complete	  novice.	  	  You	  have	  an	  advisor	  on	  speed	  dial	  and	  can	  consult	  her	  as	  much	  as	  you’d	  like	  about	  how	  to	  play	  this	  game.	  	  You’re	  considering	  move	  B(ishop)	  and	  call	  your	  advisor,	  who	  tells	  you	  that	  you	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Hardwig,	  “Epistemic	  Dependence”,	  p.	  342.	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should	  make	  move	  R(ook).	  	  If	  you	  make	  move	  B	  rather	  than	  move	  R,	  may	  you	  be	  punished?	  	  This	  judgment	  depends	  on	  two	  variables:	  the	  advisor	  and	  the	  stakes.	  	  	  In	  half	  the	  cases,	  your	  advisor	  is	  a	  chess	  peer,	  someone	  you	  have	  played	  before	  and	  rightly	  consider	  to	  be	  of	  equal	  chess	  ability.	  	  In	  the	  other	  half,	  your	  advisor	  is	  a	  Grand	  Master.	  	  The	  Grand	  Master	  is	  a	  chess	  expert	  with	  respect	  to	  you,	  so	  her	  judgments	  constitute	  decisive	  evidence	  for	  you	  about	  how	  to	  win	  chess	  matches.	  	  First	  consider	  Fun	  Chess,	  where	  the	  only	  stakes	  are	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  winning.	  	  Whoever	  wins	  the	  chess	  game	  gets	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  winning	  and	  then	  everyone	  goes	  home.	  In	  the	  Fun	  Chess	  example,	  your	  advisor	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  your	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  	  If	  you	  B,	  you	  may	  be	  irrational	  for	  ignoring	  your	  advice.	  	  But	  nothing	  much	  hinges	  on	  your	  decision,	  so	  you	  can’t	  be	  punished	  if	  you	  B.	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  stakes	  are	  so	  low	  that	  punishment	  isn’t	  an	  appropriate	  option	  at	  all.	  Second,	  consider	  Millionaire	  Chess:	  the	  winner	  of	  this	  game	  gets	  a	  million	  dollars.	  	  The	  stakes	  are	  much	  higher	  in	  this	  game,	  which	  might	  make	  it	  seem	  like	  your	  advisor	  becomes	  relevant	  again.	  	  But	  this	  isn’t	  the	  case	  because	  although	  the	  stakes	  are	  high,	  they	  are	  not	  morally	  high;	  that	  is,	  whether	  you	  can	  be	  punished	  generally	  depends	  on	  how	  you	  treat	  others,	  and	  while	  gaining	  a	  million	  dollars	  would	  be	  good	  for	  you,	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  relevant	  to	  how	  you	  treat	  others.	  To	  see	  this,	  contrast	  Millionaire	  Chess	  with	  Hero	  Chess.	  	  In	  Hero	  Chess	  the	  stakes	  are	  much	  different:	  if	  you	  don’t	  win,	  the	  world	  is	  destroyed.	  	  You	  are	  considering	  B	  but	  your	  advisor	  tells	  you	  to	  R.	  	  If	  the	  world	  depends	  on	  your	  chess	  moves,	  may	  you	  be	  punished	  if	  you	  B?	  	  In	  the	  Grand	  Master	  Hero	  Chess	  case,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  answer	  is	  yes.	  Imagine	  that	  the	  world	  was	  watching	  your	  game	  of	  Hero	  Chess.	  	  When	  the	  Grand	  Master	  tells	  you	  to	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R	  and	  but	  you	  decide	  to	  B	  instead,	  do	  all	  the	  people	  whose	  lives	  depend	  on	  your	  moves	  have	  a	  justified	  moral	  complaint	  against	  you?	  Would	  they	  be	  justifiably	  upset	  at	  you	  for	  ignoring	  the	  Grand	  Master?	  Clearly	  yes.	  You	  are	  culpable	  for	  picking	  B	  and	  because	  the	  stakes	  are	  so	  high,	  harsh	  measures	  like	  punishment	  can	  be	  appropriate.	  	  Contrast	  this	  with	  Peer	  Hero	  Chess:	  you	  have	  called	  your	  advisor,	  who	  tells	  you	  that	  you	  should	  R.	  	  Can	  you	  be	  punished	  if	  you	  B?	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  not.	  	  The	  testimony	  of	  a	  peer	  provides	  you	  with	  some	  evidence	  that	  R	  is	  the	  better	  option.	  	  But	  it’s	  not	  decisive	  evidence;	  as	  I	  mentioned,	  how	  you	  should	  respond	  to	  peer	  disagreement	  is	  an	  extremely	  difficult	  question	  in	  epistemology.	  	  Luckily	  we	  don’t	  have	  to	  solve	  this	  issue	  for	  our	  purposes	  here.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  however	  you	  respond,	  whether	  you	  continue	  to	  prefer	  your	  own	  view	  or	  whether	  you	  adjust	  your	  probabilities	  so	  you	  think	  it	  is	  equally	  likely	  that	  you	  should	  B	  or	  R,	  you	  can’t	  be	  punished	  if	  you	  choose	  B.	  	  While	  the	  peer’s	  advice	  gave	  you	  some	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  you	  should	  R,	  those	  reasons	  aren’t	  decisive	  and	  so	  can’t	  ground	  a	  change	  in	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  	  In	  Peer	  Hero	  Chess	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  you	  can	  either	  R	  or	  B	  and	  aren’t	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  either	  choice	  precisely	  because	  your	  evidence	  is	  so	  evenly	  balanced.	  	  	  Whether	  a	  change	  in	  evidence	  changes	  what	  you	  are	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  doing	  depends	  on	  whether	  your	  change	  in	  evidence	  is	  decisive	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  evidence	  pertaining	  to	  some	  morally	  weighty	  decision.	  	  All	  this	  comes	  down	  to,	  though,	  is	  whether	  you	  had	  an	  evidential	  moral	  duty:	  did	  you	  have	  decisive	  evidence	  that	  you	  morally	  ought	  to	  act	  in	  some	  way?	  	  In	  the	  Fun	  Chess	  and	  Millionaire	  Chess	  cases,	  you	  had	  decisive	  evidence	  that	  you	  should	  act	  some	  way	  when	  you	  called	  the	  Grand	  Master,	  but	  you	  were	  under	  no	  moral	  requirement.	  	  Not	  doing	  as	  the	  Grand	  Master	  says	  was	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imprudent,	  maybe,	  but	  not	  morally	  wrong.	  	  In	  the	  Hero	  Case,	  it’s	  clear	  that	  you	  have	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  win	  the	  game.	  	  In	  the	  Grand	  Master	  case	  you	  also	  have	  decisive	  evidence	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  R	  if	  you	  want	  to	  win	  the	  game.	  	  Given	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  moral	  duty,	  if	  you	  B,	  you	  don’t	  do	  your	  evidential	  moral	  duty	  and	  so	  are	  culpable	  and	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment.	  	  In	  the	  Peer	  case,	  though,	  while	  it’s	  still	  clear	  that	  you’re	  under	  a	  moral	  duty,	  your	  evidence	  about	  R	  and	  B	  is	  inconclusive.	  	  You	  have	  no	  evidential	  duty	  and	  aren’t	  culpable	  for	  either	  choice.	  	  	  In	  Grand	  Master	  Hero	  Chess,	  you	  think	  that	  your	  best	  move	  is	  B	  based	  on	  some	  evidence.	  	  The	  Grand	  Master	  then	  tells	  you	  that	  you	  should	  R.	  	  Her	  expert	  testimony	  constitutes	  preemptive,	  content-­‐independent	  evidence	  that	  undercuts	  countervailing	  evidence	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  her	  expertise,	  i.e.	  how	  to	  win	  at	  chess.	  	  Because	  it	  has	  this	  decisive	  effect,	  you	  have	  an	  evidential	  duty	  to	  R.	  	  Given	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  stakes,	  you	  are	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  if	  you	  B.	  	  The	  evidence	  you	  had	  to	  B	  was	  undercut,	  so	  no	  longer	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  that	  you	  should	  B,	  so	  no	  longer	  entails	  that	  you	  are	  not	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  if	  you	  B.	  	  The	  undercutting	  was	  sufficient	  to	  exclude	  your	  evidence	  given	  the	  practical	  context.	  	  	  Here’s	  what	  this	  chapter	  has	  shown.	  	  The	  unique	  and	  characteristic	  effect	  of	  authorities’	  commands	  is	  their	  preemptive	  effect	  on	  subjects’	  balance	  of	  reasons	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  unobjectionably	  exclude	  other	  reasons’	  justificatory	  force.	  	  In	  some	  contexts	  this	  looks	  problematic,	  as	  in	  the	  objective	  duty-­‐making	  context.	  	  Objective	  duty-­‐making	  reasons	  are	  things	  like	  people’s	  rights,	  which	  intuitively	  cannot	  be	  under	  another	  person’s	  discretionary	  control	  without	  the	  right-­‐holder’s	  consent.	  	  In	  other	  contexts,	  though,	  exclusion	  is	  unobjectionable.	  	  This	  is	  true	  of	  the	  context	  we	  are	  concerned	  with,	  namely	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4	  -­‐	  From	  Expertise	  to	  Authority	  	  To	  this	  point	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  expertise	  can	  sometimes	  ground	  the	  sort	  of	  moral	  authority	  that	  changes	  subjects’	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  	  I	  now	  want	  to	  apply	  this	  picture	  of	  expertise	  and	  authority	  to	  the	  modern	  political	  context.	  	  Specifically,	  we	  need	  to	  know	  what	  kind	  of	  expertise	  is	  required	  for	  modern	  political	  authority	  and	  why	  it	  might	  be	  plausible	  that	  modern	  governments	  could	  attain	  such	  expertise.	  	  It	  is	  only	  if	  we	  have	  these	  details	  that	  we	  can	  go	  from	  the	  claim	  that	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  a	  conceptually	  coherent	  position	  to	  limited	  governmentalism,	  the	  claim	  that	  some	  actual	  governments	  have	  genuine	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  Otherwise	  we	  should	  just	  be	  empirical	  philosophical	  anarchists	  about	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority,	  just	  as	  Simmons	  and	  others	  are	  empirical	  philosophical	  anarchists	  about	  traditional	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	   In	  this	  chapter	  I	  argue	  for	  three	  further	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority:	  the	  acceptance	  condition,	  the	  trustworthiness	  condition,	  and	  the	  precedence	  condition.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  chapter,	  we	  will	  have	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  the	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  evidential	  authority:	  1)	  expertise,	  2)	  deference,	  3)	  acceptance,	  4)	  trustworthiness,	  and	  5)	  precedence.	  	  Jointly	  these	  conditions	  are	  sufficient	  for	  genuine	  authority,	  although	  they	  are	  not	  necessary	  at	  least	  because	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  genuine	  authority	  grounded	  in	  consent.	  	  After	  arguing	  for	  the	  latter	  three	  conditions,	  I	  go	  on	  to	  address	  why	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  modern	  governments	  could	  meet	  the	  two	  conditions	  that	  are	  features	  of	  the	  authority,	  the	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness	  conditions,	  which	  modern	  governments	  look	  particularly	  ill-­‐prepared	  to	  meet.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  argue	  that	  some	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actual	  governments	  meet	  these	  conditions	  so	  have	  genuine	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  
1.	  The	  Difference	  Authority	  Makes	  The	  characterization	  I	  gave	  of	  expertise	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  appealing	  to	  Hardwig	  and	  Goldman,	  is	  clearly	  a	  characterization	  of	  epistemic	  authority.	  	  Hardwig	  said	  an	  expert	  is	  someone	  whose	  opinion	  is	  “less	  likely	  to	  be	  mistaken	  and	  likely	  to	  be	  less	  mistaken”	  than	  another	  because	  “sustained,	  prolonged,	  and	  systematic”	  inquiry	  is	  both	  “necessary	  and	  efficacious”	  in	  determining	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  matter.1	  	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  why	  the	  expert’s	  judgment	  is	  so	  reliable	  that	  it	  trumps	  the	  judgments	  of	  the	  layperson	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  her	  expertise.	  	  The	  sustained	  inquiry	  gives	  the	  expert	  a	  bank	  of	  information	  as	  well	  as	  a	  set	  of	  skills	  and	  techniques	  that	  allow	  her	  to	  make	  reliable	  judgments	  across	  a	  range	  of	  questions	  in	  her	  domain,	  what	  Goldman	  called	  the	  “propensity	  element”	  of	  expertise.	  	  But	  if	  our	  concern	  is	  practical	  authority,	  why	  am	  I	  focused	  on	  epistemic	  expertise?	  Shouldn’t	  I	  be	  focusing	  on	  practical	  expertise?	  	   Practical	  authority	  is	  about	  telling	  others	  how	  to	  act.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  intuitive	  to	  think	  that	  practical	  authority	  is	  grounded	  in	  practical	  expertise.	  	  If	  a	  good	  starting	  point	  for	  epistemic	  expertise	  is	  the	  person	  who	  knows	  many	  true	  propositions	  in	  some	  domain,	  a	  good	  starting	  point	  for	  practical	  expertise	  is	  the	  person	  who	  can	  very	  reliably	  successfully	  act	  in	  some	  domain.	  	  The	  expert	  archer,	  for	  example,	  can	  successfully	  hit	  her	  target	  very	  reliably.	  	  The	  practical	  expert	  would	  also	  have	  a	  propensity	  element,	  being	  able	  to	  successfully	  act	  in	  new	  and	  unforeseen	  circumstances.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  John	  Hardwig,	  “Epistemic	  Dependence”,	  p.	  338.	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The	  fact	  that	  someone	  has	  practical	  expertise	  is	  often	  relevant	  for	  decision-­‐making,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  epistemic	  expertise	  or	  authority.	  	  If	  the	  world	  is	  going	  to	  end	  unless	  someone	  hits	  a	  small	  target	  with	  an	  arrow	  then	  we	  should	  choose	  the	  archer.	  	  But	  authority	  is	  not	  about	  performing	  an	  act	  oneself,	  but	  about	  commanding	  others	  to	  act.	  	  And	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  archer	  can	  hit	  the	  target	  better	  than	  I	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  she	  can	  tell	  me	  how	  to	  shoot.	  	  Practical	  expertise	  is	  something	  like	  a	  finely	  honed	  skill,	  but	  practical	  expertise	  in	  a	  domain	  doesn’t	  entail	  epistemic	  expertise	  in	  that	  domain.	  	  The	  archer	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  to	  others	  how	  she	  does	  what	  she	  does,	  but	  this	  doesn’t	  undermine	  her	  practical	  expertise.	  	  Think	  of	  the	  autistic	  mathematical	  savant.	  	  She’s	  a	  practical	  expert	  just	  because	  she	  can	  perform	  so	  well,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  she	  can	  articulate	  what	  she’s	  doing	  and	  thereby	  tell	  others	  how	  to	  perform	  well.	  	  	  	   Even	  if	  I	  know	  how	  to	  do	  something,	  I	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  how	  I	  do	  it	  to	  others.	  	  And	  even	  if	  I	  can	  explain	  how	  I	  do	  something,	  I	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  tell	  others	  how	  to	  do	  it	  successfully	  for	  themselves.	  	  As	  I	  stressed	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  authority	  is	  performative	  so	  requires	  more	  than	  good	  judgment,	  it	  requires	  the	  ability	  to	  transmit	  that	  judgment	  to	  others.	  	  If	  the	  archer	  can	  hit	  the	  target	  every	  time	  but	  can’t	  successfully	  get	  others	  to	  hit	  it	  for	  themselves,	  she	  is	  a	  practical	  expert	  but	  can’t	  be	  a	  practical	  authority.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  practical	  expertise	  and	  practical	  authority	  are	  unrelated.	  	  Any	  actual	  practical	  expert	  is	  likely	  a	  practical	  authority	  about	  some	  aspects	  of	  her	  domain	  of	  expertise	  because	  any	  actual	  practical	  expert	  is	  likely	  a	  person	  who	  can	  successfully	  communicate	  about	  relatively	  uncomplicated	  matters	  with	  others,	  and	  some	  aspects	  of	  her	  domain	  can	  be	  conveyed	  in	  that	  way.	  	  Most	  practical	  authorities	  will	  also	  be	  practical	  experts.	  	  The	  person	  who	  can	  effectively	  direct	  others	  to	  cook	  is	  probably	  a	  good	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cook	  herself.	  	  However	  this	  certainly	  needn’t	  be	  the	  case.	  	  Imagine	  the	  eighty	  year-­‐old	  hitting	  coach.	  	  She	  can	  teach	  others	  how	  to	  hit	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  but	  is	  physically	  incapable	  of	  hitting	  herself.	  	  She	  is	  still	  a	  practical	  authority	  and	  epistemic	  expert	  about	  hitting	  even	  though	  she	  isn’t	  a	  practical	  expert.	  	  You	  appeal	  to	  her	  if	  you	  want	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  hit	  a	  ball	  but	  not	  if	  you	  want	  a	  ball	  hit.	  	  Practical	  expertise	  and	  practical	  authority	  are	  related	  but	  conceptually	  distinct,	  and	  practical	  expertise	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  genuine	  practical	  authority.	  	  (Practical	  expertise	  is	  sometimes	  a	  good	  indicator	  of	  practical	  authority.)	  	  	  	   Epistemic	  expertise	  is	  required	  for	  practical	  authority,	  not	  practical	  expertise.	  	  So	  far,	  though,	  I	  have	  been	  characterizing	  evidential	  authority	  as	  if	  its	  effects	  were	  indistinguishable	  from	  expert	  advice.	  	  That	  is,	  expert	  advice	  also	  changes	  subjects’	  evidence	  decisively;	  that’s	  just	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  an	  epistemic	  expert.	  	  What’s	  different	  about	  evidential	  authority?	  	  First,	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  that	  an	  expert,	  even	  an	  expert	  in	  a	  relevant	  domain,	  could	  not	  meet	  the	  conditions	  on	  authority.	  	  Expertise	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  authority,	  as	  I	  have	  emphasized.	  	  This	  is	  clearest	  when	  we	  focus	  on	  authority’s	  illocutionary	  aspect.	  	   Usually	  when	  we	  engage	  with	  epistemic	  experts,	  we	  are	  asking	  their	  opinion	  about	  some	  proposition	  in	  their	  domain	  of	  expertise.	  	  Recall	  the	  physicist	  example;	  I	  may	  ask	  my	  physicist	  friend	  about	  the	  physical	  makeup	  of	  the	  table,	  and	  she	  replies	  with	  her	  expert	  judgment	  that	  the	  table	  is	  mostly	  empty	  space.	  	  This	  judgment	  is	  usually	  issued	  as	  a	  statement	  of	  fact;	  the	  expert	  makes	  no	  claims	  about	  its	  implications	  for	  action.	  	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  let’s	  compare	  three	  variations	  on	  Grand	  Master	  Hero	  Chess	  and	  see	  if	  there	  are	  any	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differences	  in	  your	  reasons.2	  	   First	  is	  Eavesdropping	  Grand	  Master	  Hero	  Chess.	  	  Recall	  that	  in	  Hero	  Chess	  you	  are	  playing	  with	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  entire	  world	  in	  balance.	  	  Instead	  of	  having	  the	  Grand	  Master	  as	  an	  advisor,	  though,	  in	  the	  Eavesdropping	  case	  the	  Grand	  Master	  is	  simply	  walking	  by	  the	  door	  where	  you	  are	  playing	  Hero	  Chess.	  	  You	  know	  this	  person	  is	  a	  Grand	  Master	  and	  as	  she	  walks	  by	  you	  hear	  her	  make	  a	  chess	  utterance	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  position	  you	  find	  yourself	  on	  the	  chessboard.	  	  This	  gives	  you	  some	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  that	  you	  should	  do	  as	  the	  Grand	  Master	  uttered.	  	   Second	  is	  Hypothetical	  Advice	  Grand	  Master	  Hero	  Chess.	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Grand	  Master	  is	  available	  as	  an	  advisor;	  you	  can	  call	  her	  and	  ask	  how,	  if	  you	  were	  playing	  some	  random	  chess	  game,	  you	  should	  act	  in	  a	  particular	  circumstance.	  	  The	  Grand	  Master	  doesn’t	  know	  the	  stakes	  of	  the	  game,	  just	  that	  you’re	  playing	  chess.	  	  She	  gives	  you	  advice	  about	  how	  to	  move	  and	  this	  gives	  you	  some	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  that	  you	  should	  do	  as	  she	  advised.	  	   Third	  is	  Authority	  Grand	  Master	  Hero	  Chess.	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Grand	  Master	  is	  in	  the	  room	  with	  you	  and	  knows	  the	  stakes.	  	  You	  don’t	  ask	  for	  her	  advice	  but	  she	  commands	  you	  to	  make	  a	  certain	  move.	  	  Since	  she	  is	  an	  epistemic	  expert	  about	  chess,	  this	  command	  gives	  you	  evidence	  that	  you	  should	  make	  that	  move.	  	  (Given	  that	  practical	  reasons	  are	  veridical,	  whether	  you	  should	  actually	  make	  that	  move	  depends	  on	  whether	  that	  move	  will	  actually	  help	  you	  win	  the	  game.)	  	  	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  utterance	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  To	  be	  clear,	  Grand	  Master	  is	  a	  title	  of	  practical	  chess	  experts,	  but	  we	  can	  safely	  assume	  Grand	  Masters	  are	  epistemic	  chess	  experts	  as	  well.	  	  Chess	  is	  a	  practical	  domain	  in	  which	  it	  is	  difficult	  (though	  certainly	  not	  impossible)	  to	  imagine	  a	  practical	  expert	  who	  also	  wouldn’t	  be	  an	  epistemic	  expert.	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reason	  the	  Grand	  Master’s	  judgment	  constitutes	  for	  you.	  	  First,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  Eavesdropping	  case,	  your	  evidence	  is	  weak	  and	  perhaps	  not	  even	  decisive.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  an	  expert	  uttered	  a	  proposition	  with	  content	  in	  the	  field	  of	  her	  expertise	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  utterance	  is	  an	  expert	  judgment.	  	  Just	  before	  passing	  the	  door	  to	  the	  chess	  game,	  for	  example,	  the	  Grand	  Master	  could	  have	  prefaced	  her	  utterance	  with	  “If	  I	  were	  a	  bad	  player…”	  or	  “As	  a	  joke…”.	  	  Because	  you	  are	  eavesdropping,	  you	  can’t	  be	  sure	  whether	  the	  utterance	  is	  intended	  as	  an	  expert	  judgment.	  	  Normally	  we	  use	  contextual	  clues	  to	  set	  circumstances	  where	  it	  is	  understood	  that	  the	  expert	  is	  speaking	  qua	  expert	  and	  in	  the	  eavesdropping	  case	  you	  have	  none	  of	  those	  contextual	  clues.	  	  So	  even	  if	  you	  take	  her	  utterance	  to	  be	  some	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  that	  you	  should	  move	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  it	  isn’t	  decisive	  evidence.	  The	  Hypothetical	  Advice	  and	  Authority	  cases	  are	  much	  closer,	  of	  course.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  it	  is	  understood	  that	  the	  Grand	  Master	  is	  making	  an	  utterance	  qua	  chess	  expert.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  then,	  her	  judgment	  is	  decisive	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  that	  you	  should	  move	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  and	  your	  countervailing	  evidence,	  like	  your	  own	  judgment,	  is	  undercut.	  	  If	  there’s	  no	  difference	  between	  these	  cases,	  it	  looks	  like	  evidential	  authority	  has	  the	  same	  effect	  on	  subjects’	  reasons	  as	  expert	  advice,	  and	  this	  would	  be	  problematic.	  	  Authority	  adds	  something	  extra.	  The	  difference	  that	  matters	  is	  authority’s	  intentional,	  illocutionary	  aspect,	  which	  I	  highlighted	  in	  chapter	  one.	  	  When	  an	  expert	  gives	  you	  advice,	  it	  may	  well	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  decisively	  changing	  your	  balance	  of	  evidence	  and	  undercutting	  countervailing	  evidence.	  	  But	  the	  expert	  needn’t	  intend	  for	  this	  effect	  to	  happen.	  	  As	  an	  advisor,	  she	  intends	  her	  judgment	  to	  be	  a	  weighty	  piece	  of	  advice	  for	  you	  to	  judge,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  for	  you	  to	  judge.	  	  As	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an	  authority,	  she	  must	  intend	  her	  judgment	  to	  not	  only	  be	  weighty	  but	  for	  it	  to	  be	  sufficient	  on	  its	  own,	  regardless	  of	  how	  you	  judge	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  to	  otherwise	  be.	  	  This	  is	  the	  illocutionary	  intent	  that	  Hobbes	  and	  Bentham	  identified.	  	  	  Might	  not	  the	  expert	  intend	  for	  her	  advice	  to	  be	  overriding	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  authority’s	  command?	  	  She	  might,	  but	  then	  she	  has	  to	  express	  that	  intention	  in	  order	  to	  be	  an	  authority.	  	  Recall	  that	  what	  makes	  an	  utterance	  a	  command	  is	  not	  whether	  a	  particular	  imperatival	  locution	  was	  used	  but	  whether	  it	  was	  uttered	  with	  a	  particular	  imperatival	  illocution.	  	  This	  showed	  us	  that	  authority	  must	  be	  intentionally	  claimed;	  an	  authority	  can’t	  accidentally	  command	  and	  thereby	  bind	  subjects.	  	  Subjects	  and	  their	  reasons	  must	  be	  the	  object	  of	  a	  particular	  intention.	  	  If	  an	  expert	  makes	  a	  judgment	  that	  she	  expects	  to	  be	  overriding	  but	  doesn’t	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  overriding,	  it	  is	  rationally	  taken	  by	  the	  subject	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  advice	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  command.	  	  	  To	  see	  why	  this	  matters,	  consider	  that	  in	  some	  circumstances	  it	  would	  be	  appropriate	  for	  the	  Grand	  Master	  to	  make	  different	  judgments	  in	  the	  Hypothetical	  Advice	  and	  Authority	  cases.	  	  The	  reason	  that	  she	  might	  make	  different	  judgments	  is	  that	  recognition	  of	  the	  practical	  context	  changes	  the	  threshold	  for	  decisive	  evidence,	  as	  I	  argued	  in	  the	  last	  chapter.	  	  Imagine	  that	  when	  you	  call	  her	  up	  in	  the	  Hypothetical	  Advice	  case,	  you	  are	  asking	  about	  a	  particular	  arrangement	  of	  play	  that	  makes	  it	  unclear	  what	  the	  best	  move	  is.	  	  The	  Grand	  Master	  weighs	  the	  options	  and	  comes	  to	  a	  0.51	  probability	  that	  you	  should	  make	  move	  R,	  so	  tells	  you	  to	  R.	  	  	  Now	  imagine	  that	  as	  she	  tells	  you	  about	  R,	  you	  mention	  that	  if	  you	  lose	  the	  game,	  the	  world	  will	  be	  destroyed.	  	  This	  changes	  the	  case	  into	  Actual	  Advice	  Grand	  Master	  Hero	  Chess;	  she’s	  no	  longer	  giving	  you	  advice	  about	  a	  hypothetical	  chess	  game	  but	  about	  this	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chess	  game,	  against	  this	  opponent,	  with	  these	  stakes.	  	  When	  you	  are	  simply	  looking	  for	  hypothetical	  chess	  advice,	  she’s	  comfortable	  advising	  you	  to	  R	  at	  a	  probability	  of	  0.51.	  	  But	  now	  that	  she	  knows	  the	  stakes,	  she	  has	  to	  reassess;	  did	  she	  give	  the	  problem	  all	  the	  consideration	  it	  deserves?	  Is	  a	  probability	  of	  0.51	  sufficient	  to	  issue	  a	  judgment	  that	  she	  knows	  will	  decisively	  change	  your	  evidence	  in	  a	  game	  with	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  world	  on	  the	  line?	  Awareness	  of	  the	  practical	  stakes	  changes	  her	  role	  as	  expert	  advisor	  in	  important	  ways.	  	  	  Similarly,	  from	  your	  perspective,	  you	  should	  be	  less	  confident	  in	  her	  advice	  when	  she	  doesn’t	  know	  the	  situation.	  	  You	  justifiably	  worry	  that	  she	  did	  not	  consider	  her	  judgment	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  be	  confident	  enough	  to	  act	  on	  it	  in	  this	  practical	  context.	  	  When	  she	  knows	  the	  context,	  you	  are	  more	  confident	  that	  her	  judgment	  was	  made	  in	  light	  of	  the	  high	  stakes,	  so	  should	  grant	  her	  judgment	  more	  weight.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  it	  may	  be	  true	  that	  you	  are	  confident	  enough	  in	  her	  judgment	  that	  you	  should	  completely	  defer	  to	  it,	  given	  her	  mastery	  and	  your	  relative	  inexperience.	  	  This	  point	  doesn’t	  change	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  judgments	  differ	  in	  how	  they	  impact	  your	  balance	  of	  reasons	  in	  some	  circumstances.	  This	  point	  is	  important	  but	  doesn’t	  yet	  totally	  distinguish	  expert	  advice	  from	  authority.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  Hypothetical	  Advice	  case	  you	  have	  to	  balance	  her	  advice	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  doesn’t	  know	  how	  high	  the	  stakes	  are,	  so	  her	  utterances	  have	  a	  different	  strength	  for	  you	  than	  in	  the	  Actual	  Advice	  case.	  	  But	  now	  we	  want	  to	  know	  whether	  Actual	  Advice	  differs	  from	  Authority	  in	  any	  significant	  respects:	  do	  her	  expert	  utterances,	  in	  full	  knowledge	  of	  the	  practical	  stakes,	  differ	  from	  utterances	  that	  she	  intends	  as	  commands	  to	  bind	  you?	  	  Yes,	  although	  again	  the	  difference	  is	  quite	  subtle.	  When	  issuing	  expert	  advice,	  all	  that	  is	  necessarily	  implied	  is	  that	  the	  advice	  is	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sufficient	  to	  give	  the	  layperson	  decisive	  reason	  to	  believe	  in	  some	  proposition.	  	  Even	  in	  practical	  contexts	  where	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  advice	  has	  specific	  practical	  implications,	  advice	  only	  claims	  to	  change	  subjects’	  epistemic	  standing.	  	  When	  issuing	  a	  command	  with	  imperatival	  illocution,	  I	  claim	  to	  change	  your	  practical	  standing	  as	  well.	  	  (As	  argued	  throughout,	  this	  intent	  need	  not	  be	  to	  change	  what	  your	  duties	  are	  as	  long	  as	  it	  intends	  to	  change	  your	  practical	  standing	  in	  some	  way,	  as	  when	  the	  police	  officer	  intends	  to	  grant	  you	  a	  liberty	  to	  move	  along.)	  	  The	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  “You	  should	  believe	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  φ”	  and	  “φ!”.	  	  	  When	  issuing	  a	  command	  as	  an	  evidential	  authority,	  something	  has	  been	  added	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  judgment	  is	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  believe.	  	  This	  is	  a	  practical	  reason,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  right-­‐making	  sense.	  	  Instead,	  evidential	  authorities	  intend	  to	  give	  subjects	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  accept.	  	  	  Acceptance	  is	  a	  propositional	  attitude	  similar	  to	  pretense	  and	  importantly	  different	  from	  belief.3	  	  Jurors,	  for	  example,	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  accused	  is	  innocent	  even	  if	  they	  believe	  she	  is	  guilty.	  	  They	  can	  perform	  their	  functions	  as	  jurors	  well	  only	  if	  they	  accept	  innocence	  because	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  come	  to	  a	  judgment	  supported	  by	  a	  certain	  restricted	  set	  of	  facts,	  those	  entered	  into	  legal	  evidence.	  	  Their	  belief	  in	  the	  accused’s	  guilt	  may	  be	  justified	  by	  outside	  evidence,	  like	  how	  she	  has	  been	  treated	  in	  the	  media.	  	  Whether	  you	  have	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  accept	  is	  a	  function	  of	  both	  your	  epistemic	  and	  practical	  contexts.	  	  It	  boils	  down	  to	  whether	  you	  have	  sufficient	  practical	  reason	  to	  act	  as	  if	  a	  particular	  proposition	  is	  true.	  	  Jurors	  have	  sufficient	  practical	  reason	  to	  act	  as	  if	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Michael	  Bratman,	  “Practical	  Reasoning	  and	  Acceptance	  in	  a	  Context”,	  Mind	  101	  (1992):	  pp.	  1-­‐16.	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accused	  is	  innocent,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  very	  confident	  she	  is	  guilty,	  because	  only	  if	  they	  act	  as	  if	  the	  accused	  is	  innocent	  can	  they	  secure	  their	  aim	  of	  justly	  evaluating	  the	  accused.	  	  	  This	  illuminates	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  Grand	  Master’s	  utterance	  in	  the	  Actual	  Advice	  and	  Authority	  cases.	  	  In	  Actual	  Advice,	  the	  utterance	  qua	  expert	  advice	  only	  claims	  to	  give	  you	  decisive	  epistemic	  reason.	  	  In	  Authority,	  the	  utterance	  qua	  evidential	  authority	  claims	  to	  give	  you	  decisive	  epistemic	  reason	  and,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  
practical	  context,	  claims	  that	  your	  evidence	  is	  now	  sufficiently	  decisive	  to	  act	  as	  if	  it	  were	  true	  in	  these	  circumstances.	  	  Not	  only	  does	  your	  evidence	  change,	  it	  changes	  to	  the	  point	  that	  you	  should	  accept	  the	  proposition	  your	  evidence	  favors	  given	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  practical	  context.	  Notice	  that	  your	  evidence	  can	  decisively	  change	  such	  that	  you	  shouldn’t	  accept	  anything.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  Grand	  Master	  makes	  her	  utterance	  at	  such	  an	  early	  point	  in	  the	  game	  that	  there	  really	  is	  no	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  about	  which	  move	  would	  be	  best.	  	  You	  might	  think	  there	  is	  good	  evidence	  that	  R	  is	  the	  best	  move	  at	  this	  point	  and	  the	  Grand	  Master’s	  utterance	  could	  decisively	  change	  your	  evidence	  such	  that	  you	  rationally	  must	  believe	  that	  which	  move	  is	  best	  is	  indeterminate	  at	  that	  point.	  	  In	  that	  case	  it	  would	  be	  inappropriate	  for	  the	  Grand	  Master	  to	  issue	  a	  command	  even	  though	  she	  could	  perfectly	  well	  advise	  you	  that	  the	  reasons	  are	  indeterminate.	  	  Even	  though	  your	  evidence	  decisively	  changed	  by	  her	  utterance,	  it	  was	  evidence	  that	  didn’t	  imply	  a	  reason	  to	  accept	  any	  particular	  course	  of	  action:	  it	  didn’t	  entail	  an	  evidential	  duty.	  	  Issuing	  a	  command,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  implies	  not	  only	  that	  your	  evidence	  changes	  but	  that	  you	  have	  reason	  to	  accept	  the	  proposition	  in	  this	  practical	  context.	  	  It	  claims	  awareness	  not	  only	  of	  your	  epistemic	  reasons	  but	  your	  practical	  reasons	  as	  well.	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Recall	  the	  case	  of	  Anecdote	  Mary,	  who	  gave	  her	  patient	  K	  even	  though	  her	  evidence	  that	  K	  would	  cure	  was	  merely	  anecdotal	  and	  so	  very	  weak,	  especially	  given	  that	  she	  had	  a	  pharmaceutical	  guide	  in	  her	  pocket.	  	  When	  Anecdote	  Mary	  gives	  K,	  she	  is	  culpable	  because	  she	  is	  negligent.	  	  Evaluating	  Anecdote	  Mary	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  acceptance	  is	  enlightening.	  	  The	  problem	  wasn’t	  that	  Anecdote	  Mary	  gave	  K;	  so	  did	  Benevolent	  Mary	  and	  Data	  Mary,	  and	  neither	  was	  culpable	  for	  killing	  the	  patient.	  	  The	  problem	  was	  that	  Anecdote	  Mary’s	  evidence	  that	  K	  would	  cure	  was	  clearly	  insufficient	  for	  her	  to	  accept	  that	  K	  would	  cure	  and	  so	  act	  as	  if	  K	  would	  cure.	  	  Given	  the	  morally	  weighty	  practical	  context,	  wherein	  the	  life	  of	  an	  innocent	  patient	  is	  at	  stake,	  her	  evidence	  was	  not	  sufficiently	  strong	  to	  give	  her	  a	  reason	  to	  accept	  that	  K	  would	  cure.	  	  Instead,	  because	  her	  evidence	  was	  merely	  anecdotal,	  she	  had	  reason	  to	  accept	  that	  she	  should	  check	  the	  pharmaceutical	  guide	  first.	  It	  is	  only	  true	  that	  her	  evidence	  was	  insufficient	  in	  this	  particular	  practical	  context;	  if	  we	  change	  the	  particulars	  Anecdote	  Mary’s	  culpability	  changes	  as	  well.	  	  This	  is	  because	  changing	  the	  details	  of	  the	  practical	  context	  changes	  the	  threshold	  at	  which	  her	  evidence	  is	  sufficient	  to	  give	  her	  reason	  to	  accept	  that	  K	  would	  cure.	  	  Consider	  Exigent	  Anecdote	  Mary:	  instead	  of	  a	  dermatological	  problem,	  the	  patient	  will	  die	  if	  he	  doesn’t	  receive	  the	  cure	  within	  ten	  seconds.	  	  Exigent	  Anecdote	  Mary’s	  practical	  context	  is	  very	  different;	  she	  doesn’t	  have	  the	  time	  to	  check	  the	  guide,	  so	  should	  act	  as	  her	  evidence	  currently	  stands.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  weak	  evidence	  is	  still	  a	  problem.	  	  She	  may	  be	  culpable	  because	  she	  is	  a	  doctor	  who	  went	  to	  work	  knowing	  that	  certain	  pharmaceutical	  knowledge	  would	  affect	  the	  lives	  of	  her	  patients	  but	  without	  closely	  examining	  her	  pharmaceutical	  beliefs.	  	  Even	  if	  that’s	  true,	  though,	  she’s	  not	  as	  culpable	  as	  in	  the	  case	  where	  she	  has	  plenty	  of	  time	  to	  check	  her	  evidence	  and	  doesn’t.	  	  When	  she	  has	  to	  act	  in	  the	  moment,	  her	  evidence	  can	  be	  sufficient	  to	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generate	  a	  reason	  to	  accept	  even	  when	  it	  is	  much	  weaker	  than	  it	  would	  have	  to	  be	  in	  other	  contexts.	  Exigent	  Anecdote	  Mary’s	  case	  raises	  a	  concern.	  	  There	  it	  looks	  like	  the	  practical	  context	  is	  so	  demanding	  that	  less	  reliable	  evidence	  can	  still	  meet	  the	  threshold	  for	  culpability.	  	  In	  Hero	  Chess	  it’s	  clear	  that	  disobeying	  the	  Grand	  Master	  is	  culpable	  and	  that	  not	  doing	  as	  your	  peer	  advised	  is	  nonculpable.	  	  But	  cases	  between	  those	  two	  extremes	  are	  less	  clear.	  	  The	  stakes	  are	  so	  high	  that	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  you	  should	  prefer	  any	  increase	  in	  the	  reliability	  of	  your	  chess	  playing,	  whether	  grounded	  in	  expertise	  or	  not.	  	  In	  Proficient	  Hero	  Chess,	  your	  advisor	  is	  another	  friend	  you	  beats	  you	  about	  eighty	  percent	  of	  the	  time.	  	  My	  intuition	  about	  this	  case	  is	  much	  less	  firm,	  but	  it	  still	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  ignoring	  your	  proficient	  friend’s	  advice	  would	  appropriately	  bring	  the	  wrath	  of	  those	  whose	  lives	  depend	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  your	  chess	  game.	  	  You	  would	  be	  culpable	  for	  ignoring	  her	  advice	  because	  she	  is	  an	  expert	  relative	  to	  you,	  even	  though	  she’s	  not	  an	  expert	  more	  broadly	  speaking.	  	  Relative	  expertise	  can	  be	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  culpability	  because	  you	  can	  have	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  accept	  less	  than	  decisive	  evidence	  in	  demanding	  enough	  circumstances.	  	  	  The	  expertise	  condition	  captures	  relative	  expertise	  perfectly	  well	  because	  it	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  difference	  in	  reliability	  between	  two	  individuals.	  	  It	  does	  not	  require	  that	  the	  authority	  be	  expert	  in	  the	  most	  robust	  sense,	  an	  expert	  relative	  to	  all	  of	  humanity,	  or	  something	  of	  the	  sort.	  	  That	  said,	  for	  governments	  to	  achieve	  their	  aims	  they	  must	  have	  authority	  over	  most	  of	  their	  population,	  so	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  more	  robust	  expertise	  is	  required.	  	  I	  discuss	  this	  concern	  more	  in	  chapter	  five.	  	   Returning	  now	  to	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority,	  the	  thought	  we	  have	  been	  exploring	  is	  that	  evidential	  authority	  requires	  expertise.	  	  The	  commands	  of	  an	  evidential	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authority	  are	  distinct	  from	  expert	  judgments	  because	  commands	  add	  a	  practical	  claim,	  namely	  that	  the	  evidence	  is	  sufficient	  to	  constitute	  a	  reason	  to	  accept	  a	  proposition	  in	  a	  particular	  practical	  context.	  	  Call	  this	  the	  acceptance	  condition	  on	  evidential	  authority:	  the	  authority	  must	  not	  only	  claim	  to	  change	  subjects’	  evidence	  via	  her	  expertise	  but	  must	  also	  claim	  to	  give	  them	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  accept	  in	  a	  particular	  practical	  context.	  The	  point	  isn’t	  that	  reasons	  to	  accept	  are	  practical	  reasons	  in	  the	  right-­‐making	  sense.	  	  Instead,	  reasons	  to	  accept	  are	  relevant	  to	  what	  makes	  people	  objectively	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment,	  as	  in	  Anecdote	  Mary’s	  case.	  	  She’s	  culpable	  because	  she	  accepted	  that	  K	  would	  cure	  when	  her	  evidence	  didn’t	  support	  accepting	  that	  proposition,	  while	  Data	  Mary’s	  evidence	  was	  sufficient	  to	  constitute	  a	  reason	  to	  accept	  so	  she	  wasn’t	  culpable.	  	  Similarly,	  Exigent	  Anecdote	  Mary	  was	  not	  (or	  less)	  culpable	  because	  her	  evidence	  was	  sufficient	  to	  constitute	  a	  reason	  to	  accept	  in	  her	  exigent	  practical	  context.	  	   When	  an	  expert	  issues	  a	  practical	  directive,	  it	  claims	  to	  assess	  not	  only	  your	  epistemic	  reasons	  but	  your	  practical	  reasons.	  	  And	  this	  is	  a	  problem,	  for	  epistemic	  experts	  in	  some	  domain	  may	  not	  have	  expertise	  about	  your	  practical	  reasons	  in	  general.	  	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  it’s	  unclear	  how	  they	  can	  be	  practical	  authorities.	  	  I	  take	  up	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
2.	  The	  Precedence	  Condition	  Despite	  adding	  the	  acceptance	  condition	  to	  the	  expertise	  and	  deference	  conditions,	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  reached	  a	  full	  picture.	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  go	  on	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  precedence	  
condition.	  	  The	  precedence	  condition	  addresses	  a	  problem	  for	  evidential	  political	  authority.	  	  Political	  authority	  is	  a	  form	  of	  moral	  authority,	  in	  large	  part	  because	  it	  claims	  that	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disobeying	  the	  law	  makes	  one	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment.	  	  If	  political	  authority	  is	  moral	  authority,	  though,	  it	  appears	  that	  political	  authority	  requires	  moral	  expertise.	  	  This	  would	  be	  an	  extremely	  worrying	  feature	  of	  my	  account.	  	  It	  looks	  implausible	  that,	  of	  all	  the	  agents	  in	  the	  world,	  political	  agents	  could	  plausibly	  claim	  moral	  expertise.	  	  Consider	  Grand	  Master	  Moral	  Maze	  Chess,	  wherein	  the	  Grand	  Master	  fulfills	  the	  expertise	  condition,	  issues	  commands	  so	  fulfills	  the	  acceptance	  condition,	  and	  the	  stakes	  entail	  that	  the	  deference	  condition	  is	  met.	  If	  this	  were	  sufficient	  for	  authority,	  the	  Grand	  Master	  would	  have	  moral	  authority	  over	  you,	  as	  in	  Hero	  Chess.	  	  The	  twist	  is	  the	  Moral	  Maze:	  the	  moral	  stakes	  are	  high	  but	  what	  to	  do	  morally	  is	  very	  unclear.	  	  Winning	  and	  losing	  both	  have	  moral	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  Grand	  Master	  is	  a	  chess	  expert,	  not	  a	  moral	  expert.	  	  She	  can	  help	  you	  with	  chess	  moves,	  but	  she	  doesn’t	  have	  the	  expertise	  to	  make	  her	  way	  through	  the	  moral	  maze	  and	  see	  whether	  you	  need	  to	  win	  this	  game	  or	  whether	  you	  need	  to	  throw	  this	  game.	  	  Although	  her	  judgment	  in	  the	  chess	  domain	  is	  expert,	  trying	  to	  follow	  her	  directives	  doesn’t	  reliably	  lead	  you	  to	  act	  morally	  better	  because	  of	  her	  moral	  ignorance.	  If	  she	  understood	  the	  moral	  reasons	  appropriately,	  trying	  to	  follow	  her	  directives	  would	  lead	  you	  aright	  and	  she	  would	  have	  moral	  authority	  over	  you.	  	   This	  makes	  it	  plausible	  that	  the	  Grand	  Master	  in	  Moral	  Maze	  can’t	  be	  a	  moral	  authority	  precisely	  because	  she’s	  not	  a	  moral	  expert.	  	  If	  she	  were	  a	  moral	  expert	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  a	  chess	  expert,	  she	  would	  know	  under	  what	  circumstances	  she	  has	  decisive	  moral	  reasons	  to	  issue	  you	  directives	  out	  of	  her	  chess	  expertise	  and	  she	  would	  understand	  the	  import	  of	  those	  reasons.	  	  Only	  then	  would	  her	  directives	  morally	  bind	  you,	  but	  she	  requires	  moral	  expertise	  and	  we	  are	  back	  to	  the	  implausible	  claim	  that	  modern	  governments	  must	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have	  moral	  expertise	  in	  order	  to	  have	  genuine	  authority.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  non-­‐moral	  expertise	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  understand	  the	  moral	  situation,	  but	  understanding	  the	  moral	  situation	  is	  what’s	  required	  for	  moral	  authority.	  Another	  way	  to	  put	  this	  worry	  is	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  Grand	  Master	  does	  not	  require	  an	  understanding	  of	  relations	  between	  domains	  of	  reasons,	  only	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  domain	  she	  is	  an	  expert	  with	  respect	  to,	  but	  understanding	  the	  relations	  between	  domains	  is	  precisely	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  actually	  act	  well	  in	  the	  world.	  	  I	  can’t	  act	  only	  on	  my	  chess	  reasons	  and	  leave	  moral	  reasons	  for	  another	  time.	  	  When	  the	  Hypothetical	  Advice	  Grand	  Master	  tells	  me	  her	  judgment,	  she	  is	  making	  that	  judgment	  purely	  on	  chess	  reasons	  and	  not	  in	  the	  context	  of	  my	  moral	  reasons,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  reasons	  she	  gives	  you	  to	  believe	  are	  weaker	  than	  the	  reasons	  given	  by	  the	  Actual	  Advice	  Grand	  Master.	  	   Raz	  expresses	  a	  similar	  concern	  while	  discussing	  John	  and	  Ruth,	  experts	  on	  Chinese	  cooking	  and	  the	  stock	  exchange	  respectively:	  Here	   the	   normal	   justification	   thesis	   establishes	   the	   credentials	   of	   John	   and	  Ruth	   as	   authorities	   in	   their	   fields.	   	   But	   whether	   or	   not	   there	   is	   complete	  justification	   for	   me	   to	   regard	   their	   advice	   or	   instructions	   as	   guides	   to	   my	  conduct	  in	  the	  way	  I	  regard	  a	  binding	  authoritative	  directive	  depends	  on	  my	  other	  goals.	  	  In	  such	  cases	  while	  talking	  of	  a	  person	  as	  being	  an	  authority	  one	  refrains	   from	   talking	   of	   him	   as	   in	   authority	   over	   oneself,	   and	   avoids	  regarding	  his	  advice	  or	  instructions	  as	  binding,	  even	  when,	  given	  one’s	  goals,	  one	   ought	   to	   treat	   it	   in	   exactly	   the	   same	   way	   as	   one	   treats	   a	   binding	  authoritative	  directive.4	  	  John	  and	  Ruth	  are	  experts	  in	  their	  domains,	  but	  they	  aren’t	  experts	  about	  “my	  other	  goals”.	  	  Raz	  seems	  to	  be	  saying	  that	  they	  aren’t	  authorities	  because	  they	  don’t	  know	  about	  the	  other	  domains	  and	  the	  relations	  between	  those	  domains	  and	  their	  domain.	  	  I	  may	  be	  at	  the	  cooking	  class	  because	  I	  am	  collecting	  information	  on	  rival	  businesses	  and	  not	  to	  get	  better	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4Raz,	  MF,	  pp.	  64-­‐5.	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at	  Chinese	  cooking.	  	  If	  I	  have	  to	  make	  a	  worse	  meal	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  more	  information,	  my	  information	  gathering	  reasons	  are	  weightier	  than	  my	  cooking	  reasons,	  so	  John’s	  cooking	  expertise	  can’t	  ground	  authority	  over	  me.	  	   There	  are	  two	  worries	  in	  the	  area.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  authorities	  only	  truly	  bind	  if	  the	  reason	  they	  give	  is	  “complete”,	  i.e.	  all-­‐things-­‐considered.	  	  John	  and	  Ruth	  don’t	  have	  authority	  because,	  while	  their	  commands	  bind	  within	  their	  domain,	  their	  domains	  are	  not	  important	  and	  often	  get	  overridden	  by	  reasons	  from	  other	  domains.	  	  This	  line	  of	  thought	  leads	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  only	  genuine	  authority	  is	  authority	  whose	  commands	  always	  bind	  all-­‐things-­‐considered.	  	  On	  some	  views	  of	  morality,	  moral	  reasons	  are	  lexically	  ordered	  above	  all	  other	  reasons,	  so	  a	  moral	  authority	  would	  have	  genuine	  authority	  of	  this	  sort.	  	  But	  I	  don’t	  think	  this	  is	  Raz’s	  concern.	  As	  I	  explained	  in	  chapter	  one,	  domain-­‐restricted	  authority	  is	  a	  clear	  and	  sensible	  notion.	  	  We	  know	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  bound	  within	  some	  domain,	  to	  get	  conclusive	  reason	  from	  a	  perspective	  without	  getting	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  reason.	  	  	  	   Further,	  this	  line	  of	  thinking	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  reductio	  ad	  absurdum,	  namely	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  can	  only	  be	  global	  moral	  authorities	  and	  advisors.	  	  That	  is,	  there	  is	  nobody	  who	  is	  a	  good	  moral	  advisor	  about	  one	  aspect	  of	  morality	  but	  not	  others.	  	  But	  this	  is	  false.	  	  Some	  people	  know	  more	  about	  racial	  discrimination	  because	  they	  care	  about	  it	  a	  great	  deal,	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  it	  themselves,	  have	  spent	  considerable	  time	  and	  effort	  investigating	  it,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  It	  makes	  sense	  to	  go	  to	  them	  for	  advice	  about	  practical	  questions	  that	  potentially	  involve	  racial	  discrimination,	  but	  for	  exactly	  parallel	  reasons	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  go	  to	  others	  for	  advice	  about	  gender	  discrimination.	  	  If	  we	  push	  the	  idea	  that	  moral	  authorities	  must	  be	  experts	  about	  all	  practical	  requirements	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  deny	  this	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kind	  of	  domain-­‐specific	  moral	  advice.	  	  For	  just	  like	  John	  wouldn’t	  know	  when	  reasons	  from	  the	  cooking	  domain,	  the	  expert	  on	  racial	  discrimination	  wouldn’t	  know	  when	  racial	  discrimination	  reasons	  are	  overridden	  by	  reasons	  from	  other	  moral	  domains,	  as	  when	  claims	  of	  racial	  discrimination	  run	  against	  claims	  of	  distributive	  desert.	  	  She	  would	  then	  give	  advice	  that	  would	  not	  reliably	  lead	  subjects	  to	  significantly	  better	  conformity	  with	  their	  preexisting	  reasons.	  	  Her	  advice	  wouldn’t	  be	  good	  advice	  because	  it	  would	  often	  mislead.	  John	  and	  Ruth	  can	  be	  authorities	  over	  us,	  and	  can	  bind	  us	  with	  their	  commands,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  domains	  are	  restricted	  to	  cooking	  and	  finance	  and	  often	  the	  reasons	  they	  give	  will	  be	  overridden	  by	  reasons	  from	  other	  domains.	  	  Imagine	  I	  am	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  my	  moral	  duty	  is	  to	  φ	  while	  my	  legal	  duty	  is	  to	  ψ,	  and	  assume	  that,	  in	  this	  case	  at	  least,	  the	  moral	  domain	  overrides	  the	  legal	  domain,	  meaning	  that	  all-­‐things-­‐considered,	  I	  have	  decisive	  reason	  to	  φ.	  	  If	  I	  φ,	  I	  act	  rightly	  but	  illegally.	  	  Now	  a	  legal	  authority	  enters	  and	  commands	  me	  to	  not-­‐ψ.	  	  ψ	  and	  not-­‐ψ	  both	  entail	  not-­‐φ,	  so	  I	  still	  act	  wrongly	  if	  I	  act	  legally.	  	  I	  still	  have	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  reason	  to	  φ.	  	  But	  the	  fact	  that	  my	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  moral	  duty	  did	  not	  change	  does	  not	  mean	  the	  authority	  did	  not	  have	  genuine	  legal	  authority	  over	  me.	  	  This	  is	  shown	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  her	  command	  changed	  my	  legal	  standing	  such	  that	  I	  act	  illegally	  if	  I	  ψ,	  whereas	  before	  the	  command	  I	  only	  act	  illegally	  if	  I	  not-­‐ψ.	  	  	  The	  intuition	  that	  she	  lacks	  authority	  over	  me	  is	  understandable,	  because	  she	  didn’t	  change	  what	  I	  should	  do	  all-­‐things-­‐considered.	  	  But	  because	  domain-­‐restricted	  authority	  is	  coherent,	  we	  can	  see	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  this	  intuition.	  	  Her	  legal	  authority	  changed	  my	  legal	  standing,	  but	  that	  change	  didn’t	  matter	  because	  my	  legal	  duties	  are	  overridden	  by	  my	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moral	  duties	  in	  both	  cases.	  	  Had	  the	  legal	  authority	  also	  had	  moral	  authority,	  then	  she	  would	  have	  changed	  my	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  standing.	  	  But	  since	  she	  only	  has	  legal	  authority,	  she	  only	  changes	  my	  legal	  standing.	  	  If	  I	  go	  into	  John’s	  Chinese	  cooking	  class	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  getting	  better	  at	  cooking,	  then	  (ceteris	  paribus)	  John’s	  authority	  binds	  me	  all-­‐things-­‐considered.5	  	  The	  strongest	  reasons	  I	  have	  for	  acting,	  here	  and	  now	  at	  the	  cooking	  class,	  are	  reasons	  from	  within	  John’s	  domain	  of	  expertise.	  	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  John’s	  domain	  takes	  precedence	  for	  me	  in	  this	  practical	  context.	  	  John’s	  commands	  will	  give	  me	  decisive,	  domain-­‐specific	  reason	  to	  act,	  and	  given	  that	  in	  this	  context	  John’s	  domain	  takes	  precedence,	  I	  will	  often	  have	  all-­‐thing-­‐considered	  reason	  to	  do	  as	  John	  says.	  	  This	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  I	  must	  follow	  John’s	  commands	  no	  matter	  what;	  a	  call	  from	  the	  hospital	  that	  my	  partner	  is	  deathly	  ill	  gives	  me	  a	  moral	  reason	  that	  overrides	  any	  cooking	  reasons	  I	  had	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  class,	  including	  any	  reasons	  given	  by	  John’s	  commands.	  This,	  then,	  is	  the	  precedence	  condition:	  if	  A	  has	  expertise	  in	  domain	  D	  and	  B	  does	  not,	  A	  can	  have	  authority	  over	  B	  in	  domain	  E	  only	  if	  D	  takes	  precedence	  in	  E	  (or	  D	  =	  E).	  	  So	  John	  can	  have	  moral	  authority	  over	  me	  because	  he	  has	  cooking	  expertise	  only	  when	  cooking	  is	  the	  morally	  precedent	  domain.	  	  If	  instead	  of	  Hero	  Chess	  I	  am	  engaged	  in	  Hero	  Cooking,	  such	  that	  unless	  I	  cook	  the	  best	  dish	  in	  the	  class	  the	  world	  will	  be	  destroyed,	  John	  has	  moral	  authority	  over	  me	  because	  of	  his	  cooking	  expertise.	  	  John	  can	  also	  have	  cooking	  authority	  over	  me	  when	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  cooking	  is	  the	  most	  precedent	  domain,	  as	  when	  I	  attend	  the	  cooking	  class	  in	  normal	  circumstances.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  domain,	  this	  is	  a	  very	  different	  sort	  of	  authority.	  	  First,	  it	  has	  no	  clear	  moral	  implications;	  disobeying	  doesn’t	  mean	  much,	  although	  perhaps	  John	  appropriately	  gives	  me	  less	  attention	  or	  eventually	  kicks	  me	  out	  of	  the	  class.	  	  Second,	  a	  domain	  like	  cooking	  is	  particularly	  likely	  to	  fail	  the	  deference	  condition	  and	  so	  undermine	  authority.	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But	  perhaps	  Raz’s	  worry	  about	  John	  and	  Ruth	  is	  that	  they	  don’t	  have	  authority	  over	  us	  because	  they	  don’t	  know	  what	  our	  other	  goals	  are.	  	  John	  and	  Ruth	  don’t	  know	  when	  acting	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  expertise	  is	  practically	  required	  for	  me;	  their	  judgments	  are	  more	  like	  the	  Grand	  Master’s	  in	  the	  Moral	  Maze.	  	  One	  way	  out	  of	  this	  problem	  would	  be	  to	  appeal	  to	  moral	  expertise.	  	  If	  John	  were	  a	  moral	  expert	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  a	  cooking	  expert,	  then	  he	  would	  know	  both	  when	  cooking	  takes	  moral	  precedence	  and	  what	  the	  best	  cooking	  reasons	  are.	  	  This	  could	  ground	  moral	  authority	  for	  John,	  but	  this	  again	  leads	  to	  the	  implausible	  position	  that	  modern	  governments	  must	  have	  moral	  expertise.	  	  	  But	  moral	  expertise	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  out	  of	  this	  problem.	  	  People	  can	  know	  that	  a	  particular	  domain	  takes	  moral	  precedence	  without	  being	  moral	  experts.	  	  This	  is	  most	  obviously	  true	  in	  cases	  like	  Authority	  Grand	  Master	  Hero	  Chess.	  	  The	  Grand	  Master	  doesn’t	  need	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  expert	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  that	  losing	  the	  game	  would	  be	  morally	  catastrophic,	  so	  she	  can	  know	  that	  her	  domain	  of	  expertise	  takes	  moral	  precedence	  for	  me.	  	  The	  precedence	  condition	  must	  be	  fulfilled	  for	  genuine	  authority,	  but	  knowledge	  of	  the	  precedence	  condition	  is	  also	  required.	  	  This	  knowledge	  can	  be	  achieved	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  like	  when	  context	  makes	  the	  moral	  demands	  obvious.	  	  Moral	  expertise	  is	  not	  required	  for	  moral	  authority.	  	  	  	  	   There	  is	  considerable	  intuitive	  resistance	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  experts	  on	  non-­‐moral	  domains	  can	  have	  moral	  authority.	  	  I	  just	  explained	  why	  I	  think	  this	  resistance	  is	  mistaken,	  but	  this	  case	  is	  bolstered	  with	  an	  error	  theory	  for	  our	  intuitions	  in	  this	  domain.	  	  First	  note	  that	  almost	  all	  our	  interactions	  with	  experts	  will	  be	  outside	  moral	  contexts,	  and	  so	  almost	  always	  they	  are	  not	  moral	  authorities	  over	  us	  when	  we	  interact	  with	  them.	  	  When	  they	  issue	  judgments	  they	  may	  bind	  us	  with	  epistemic	  authority,	  making	  it	  irrational	  or	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otherwise	  epistemically	  criticizable	  to	  believe	  anything	  other	  than	  what	  they	  say	  in	  their	  domain	  of	  expertise.	  	  Even	  on	  the	  rare	  occasion	  where	  they	  may	  issue	  practical	  directives,	  they	  will	  be	  overridden	  because	  their	  domains	  are	  not	  as	  important	  as	  other	  practical	  domains.	  	  We	  tend	  to	  think	  of	  authority	  in	  its	  most	  extreme	  forms,	  like	  god	  issuing	  moral	  commands	  that	  bind	  all-­‐things-­‐considered,	  meaning	  that	  we	  often	  don’t	  recognize	  when	  we	  are	  bound	  by	  authorities	  whose	  commands	  are	  often,	  even	  regularly	  or	  mostly,	  overridden	  all-­‐things-­‐considered.	  	  	  	   Further,	  sometimes	  we	  are	  morally	  bound	  to	  follow	  expert	  advice	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  being	  commanded	  by	  an	  authority,	  even	  when	  that	  expert	  doesn’t	  have	  authority.	  	  The	  best	  example	  of	  this	  would	  be	  when	  an	  expert	  fulfills	  all	  the	  conditions	  for	  genuine	  authority	  but	  the	  acceptance	  condition.	  	  There	  are	  strong	  moral	  reasons	  for	  you	  to	  maximize,	  fulfilling	  the	  deference	  condition,	  their	  expert	  judgment	  reliably	  leads	  to	  significantly	  better	  conformity,	  fulfilling	  the	  expertise	  condition,	  and	  their	  domain	  takes	  precedence.	  	  You	  would	  act	  culpably	  if	  you	  ignored	  their	  expert	  advice.	  	  But	  they	  can’t	  bind	  you	  morally	  because	  they	  don’t	  intend	  to	  bind	  you	  morally,	  so	  they	  are	  not	  an	  authority	  even	  though	  you	  should	  treat	  their	  advice	  exactly	  as	  you	  would	  treat	  a	  command	  from	  them.	  	  Distinguishing	  authority	  from	  expertise	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  subject	  is	  thus	  often	  a	  very	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  matter.	  The	  pragmatics	  of	  claiming	  authority	  and	  giving	  advice	  in	  the	  cultural	  context	  where	  we	  generally	  pay	  advisors	  also	  complicates	  the	  picture.	  	  Consider	  a	  case	  where	  what	  you	  morally	  ought	  to	  do	  is	  completely	  determined	  by	  financial	  reasons.6	  	  Let’s	  say	  I	  go	  into	  the	  advisor’s	  office	  knowing	  that	  my	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  moral	  duty	  is	  to	  maximize	  my	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  example	  is	  a	  modified	  form	  of	  one	  of	  Darwall’s	  cases	  in	  “Authority	  and	  Reasons:	  Exclusionary	  and	  Second-­‐Personal”.	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financial	  outlook	  this	  year.	  	  The	  advisor	  tells	  me	  “If	  you	  want	  to	  make	  the	  most	  money	  you	  can	  this	  year,	  you	  should	  φ.”	  	  This	  looks	  like	  advice,	  and	  there	  are	  plenty	  of	  reasons	  to	  couch	  her	  judgments	  in	  terms	  of	  advice.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  time	  when	  I	  consult	  a	  financial	  advisor	  she	  isn’t	  an	  authority	  over	  me,	  and	  as	  such,	  and	  given	  her	  position	  as	  a	  paid	  consultant,	  it	  would	  be	  inappropriate	  for	  her	  to	  command	  me.	  	  This	  inappropriateness	  carries	  through	  to	  cases	  where,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  moral	  fact,	  she	  is	  an	  authority	  over	  me.	  	  	  Further,	  the	  conditions	  that	  make	  an	  expert	  an	  authority	  are	  often	  going	  to	  be	  mysterious	  to	  a	  financial	  advisor.	  	  In	  general,	  acting	  in	  the	  real	  world	  is	  a	  complicated	  affair	  that	  implicates	  reasons	  from	  a	  host	  of	  different	  domains,	  so	  having	  one’s	  act	  completely	  determined	  by	  reasons	  from	  a	  single	  domain,	  and	  knowing	  that,	  will	  be	  quite	  rare.	  	  Thus	  a	  policy	  of	  acting	  as	  a	  mere	  advisor	  seems	  a	  good	  one	  for	  a	  financial	  advisor	  to	  take,	  even	  if	  sometimes	  her	  advisees	  are	  bound	  to	  obey	  her	  directives	  and	  she	  could	  have	  authority	  over	  them.	  	  She	  usually	  doesn’t	  have	  the	  time,	  resources,	  or	  need	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  precedence	  condition	  is	  met.	  	  These	  considerations	  show	  why	  advisors	  often	  don’t	  issue	  commands,	  and	  perhaps	  shouldn’t,	  even	  when	  the	  conditions	  are	  such	  that	  they	  are	  genuine	  authorities.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  no	  surprise	  that	  we	  feel	  experts	  aren’t	  authorities;	  in	  the	  rare	  cases	  where	  they	  are	  most	  authoritative,	  they	  still	  have	  good	  reasons	  not	  to	  act	  like	  authorities	  and	  issue	  commands.	  	  	   Experts	  in	  the	  real	  world	  are	  very	  rarely	  moral	  authorities.	  	  This	  may	  have	  already	  been	  clear	  due	  to	  the	  implausible	  nature	  of	  some	  of	  the	  examples	  that	  I’ve	  been	  appealing	  to,	  like	  Hero	  Chess.	  	  Given	  this	  rarity,	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  we	  have	  considerable	  intuitive	  resistance	  to	  expertise	  grounding	  authority.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  given	  that	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  tell	  when	  the	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  authority	  are	  met	  even	  when	  expertise	  is	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clearly	  established:	  whether	  the	  deference	  condition	  is	  met	  depends	  on	  whether	  I	  have	  reasons	  to	  act	  on	  my	  own	  judgment	  for	  it’s	  own	  sake;	  whether	  the	  trustworthiness	  condition	  (below)	  is	  met	  depends	  on	  some	  understanding	  of	  the	  purported	  authority’s	  character	  and	  knowledge;	  whether	  the	  precedence	  condition	  is	  met	  depends	  on	  common	  knowledge	  of	  moral	  reasons.	  	  None	  of	  these	  is	  easy	  for	  philosophers	  to	  determine,	  let	  alone	  the	  average	  layperson.	  But	  this	  shouldn’t	  undermine	  our	  confidence	  in	  the	  claim	  that,	  when	  these	  conditions	  are	  met,	  an	  agent	  has	  genuine	  moral	  authority	  over	  another	  primarily	  due	  to	  her	  expertise.	  	  
3.	  The	  Trustworthiness	  Condition	  The	  precedence	  condition	  addresses	  the	  worry	  that	  moral	  authorities	  must	  have	  moral	  expertise.	  	  But	  it	  might	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  moral	  authorities	  require	  moral	  virtue:	  in	  addition	  to	  knowing	  the	  moral	  context,	  they	  have	  to	  be	  good	  people	  who	  are	  motivated	  to	  act	  morally	  well.	  	  This	  is	  most	  obvious	  in	  cases	  where	  an	  expert	  is	  vicious	  so	  issues	  misleading	  directives.	  	  	  Consider	  Vicious	  Grand	  Master	  Hero	  Chess.	  	  In	  this	  case	  she	  understands	  the	  moral	  reasons	  but	  she	  doesn’t	  want	  you	  to	  win,	  she	  wants	  to	  see	  the	  world	  burn.	  	  So	  although	  the	  chess	  reasons	  indicate	  that	  you	  should	  R,	  she	  directs	  you	  to	  B	  instead.	  	  Are	  you	  bound	  to	  R?	  	   You	  are	  not	  bound	  to	  R	  because	  the	  Vicious	  Grand	  Master	  does	  not	  have	  genuine	  moral	  authority	  over	  you.	  	  The	  problem	  isn’t	  her	  expertise,	  the	  problem	  is	  her	  performance:	  she	  fails	  the	  trustworthiness	  condition	  on	  authority.	  	  The	  trustworthiness	  condition	  arises	  out	  of	  the	  performative	  nature	  of	  authority.	  	  Consider	  again	  the	  expertise	  condition:	  what	  matters	  is	  whether	  the	  subject	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  act	  better	  by	  trying	  to	  act	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on	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  authority.	  	  Directives	  are	  importantly	  different	  than	  judgment.	  	  The	  Vicious	  Grand	  Master	  has	  expert	  judgment	  but	  doesn’t	  issue	  expert	  directives.	  	  Her	  judgment	  is	  a	  function	  of	  her	  internal	  states.	  	  If	  you	  asked	  her	  hypotheticals	  like	  “If	  you	  wanted	  to	  win	  a	  chess	  match	  in	  such	  and	  such	  circumstances,	  how	  would	  you	  move?”,	  she	  can	  give	  you	  extremely	  reliable,	  expert	  answers.	  	  But	  when	  she	  issues	  directives	  to	  you,	  i.e.	  when	  she	  performatively	  attempts	  to	  bind	  you	  with	  an	  utterance,	  trying	  to	  follow	  those	  directives	  will	  not	  lead	  you	  to	  better	  conformity	  with	  your	  preexisting	  reasons	  because	  she	  regularly	  misleads	  you	  out	  of	  her	  viciousness.	  Her	  failing	  is	  a	  failing	  of	  her	  moral	  character;	  she	  recognizes	  all	  the	  reasons	  but	  just	  doesn’t	  care	  that	  issuing	  misleading	  directives	  to	  you	  will	  result	  in	  the	  world	  being	  destroyed.	  	  As	  many	  theorists	  have	  emphasized,	  there	  is	  something	  troubling	  about	  deferring	  to	  either	  an	  authority	  or	  an	  expert.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  when	  we	  defer,	  we	  do	  so	  without	  knowing	  all	  the	  relevant	  reasons.	  	  Consider	  Hardwig’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  layperson	  (A)	  and	  the	  expert	  (B):	  	  So,	   if	   A	   accepts	   p	   on	   B's	   say-­‐so,	   those	   reasons	   (B's	   reasons)	   which	   are	  necessary	  to	  justify	  A's	  belief	  are	  reasons	  which	  A	  does	  not	  have.	  Sometimes	  it	   is	   feasible	   for	  B	   to	   share	  with	  A	   all	   the	   evidence	   necessary	   to	   justify	   the	  claim	   that	   p.	   But	   usually	   not.	   Indeed,	   if	   A	   and	   B	   come	   from	   different	  disciplines	   or	   even	   different	   specialties	  within	   the	   same	   discipline,	   A	   often	  will	  not	  know	  what	  B's	  reasons	  are,	  much	  less	  why	  they	  are	  good	  reasons	  for	  believing	   p.	   //	   Thus,	   the	   blindness	   of	   A's	   knowledge	   that	   p:	   those	   reasons	  which	  are	  necessary	  to	   justify	  p	  (and	  A's	  belief	   that	  p)	  are	  reasons	  which	  A	  does	  not	  have.	  Obviously,	   since	   she	   lacks	  part	   of	   the	   evidence	   that	   justifies	  the	   claim	   that	   p,	   A	   is	   limited	   in	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   she	   can	   effectively	  scrutinize	  or	  challenge	  B's	  claim	  about	  p.7	  	  Note	  that	  the	  layperson’s	  knowledge	  is	  “blind”.	  	  Raz	  says	  similar	  things	  about	  deferring	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Hardwig,	  “The	  Role	  of	  Trust	  in	  Knowledge”,	  p.	  699.	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an	  authority.8	  	  Deference	  seems	  to	  amount	  to	  putting	  blind	  faith	  in	  another	  person.	  Deference	  is	  prima	  facie	  worrying,	  both	  rationally	  and	  morally,	  and	  deference	  to	  mistaken	  commands	  more	  worrying	  still.	  	  Morally,	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  autonomous	  moral	  agent	  traces	  its	  origin	  at	  least	  back	  to	  Kant.	  	  For	  Kant,	  the	  moral	  agent	  must	  be	  autonomous	  or	  self-­‐governed,	  only	  following	  goals	  she	  sets	  for	  herself.	  	  Deference	  to	  others	  seems	  to	  directly	  conflict	  with	  this	  ideal.	  	  Wolff	  complains	  that	  a	  subject	  “by	  refusing	  to	  engage	  in	  moral	  deliberation,	  by	  accepting	  as	  final	  the	  commands	  of	  the	  others…	  forfeits	  his	  autonomy.”9	  	  	  Deference	  is	  rationally	  worrying	  because	  it	  requires	  a	  rational	  agent	  to	  act	  against	  what	  she	  judges	  to	  be	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons.	  	  You	  may	  think	  that	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  favors	  you	  continuing	  along	  your	  way	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  to	  work	  on	  time,	  but	  when	  the	  police	  officer	  issues	  you	  a	  command	  to	  stop,	  she	  purports	  to	  override	  that	  judgment.	  	  You	  are	  now	  required	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  you	  believe	  isn’t	  supported	  by	  the	  reasons.	  	  The	  more	  important	  the	  subject	  matter,	  the	  more	  deference	  looks	  irrational,	  as	  when	  a	  soldier	  is	  commanded	  to	  go	  on	  a	  suicide	  mission	  or	  laws	  command	  citizens	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  grossly	  immoral.	  	  	  	   The	  reason	  that	  deference	  is	  sometimes	  not	  objectionable	  is	  trust.	  	  As	  I	  emphasized	  in	  chapter	  one,	  authority	  is	  importantly	  and	  necessarily	  relational.	  	  Like	  expertise,	  it	  involves	  one	  person	  making	  utterances	  that	  demand	  deference	  from	  another.	  	  So	  we	  should	  expect	  that	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  deference	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  individuals.	  	  Whether	  we	  are	  in	  the	  epistemic	  or	  practical	  context,	  the	  only	  way	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  individuals	  is	  with	  trust.	  	  Deference	  to	  another	  makes	  sense	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Raz,	  AL,	  p.	  24.	  9	  Wolff,	  “The	  Conflict	  Between	  Authority	  and	  Autonomy”,	  p.	  27.	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only	  if	  she	  is	  trustworthy.	  To	  see	  how	  trust	  can	  make	  deference	  prima	  facie	  unproblematic,	  we	  need	  a	  more	  precise	  idea	  of	  trust.	  	  To	  my	  mind	  the	  best	  account	  considers	  trust	  to	  be	  special	  kind	  of	  reliance:	  you	  rely	  on	  the	  goodwill	  and	  competence	  of	  another	  by	  making	  yourself	  vulnerable	  to	  her	  in	  that	  you	  grant	  her	  discretionary	  powers	  over	  some	  interests	  you	  have.10	  	  Trust	  is	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  mere	  reliance,	  which	  is	  simply	  a	  justified	  expectation	  that	  the	  object	  of	  the	  reliance	  will	  predictably	  perform	  some	  function.	  	  Thus	  you	  can	  rely	  on	  a	  sociopath	  to	  always	  act	  in	  their	  self-­‐interest	  and	  you	  can	  rely	  on	  a	  thermostat	  to	  regulate	  the	  temperature.	  	  If	  either	  fails	  to	  act	  in	  the	  expected	  way,	  you	  may	  feel	  disappointment	  or	  confusion,	  but	  you	  do	  not	  feel	  betrayed,	  which	  is	  the	  characteristic	  response	  to	  a	  violation	  of	  trust.	  	  	  Trust	  must	  have	  an	  agent	  as	  its	  object:	  you	  cannot	  trust	  your	  thermostat.11	  	  Intuitively,	  trust	  must	  involve	  more	  than	  a	  simple	  calculation	  of	  likely	  outcomes.	  	  If	  I	  can	  do	  all	  the	  probability	  calculations	  and	  so	  discover	  that	  you	  will	  perform	  as	  expected	  ninety	  percent	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  this	  in	  turn	  justifies	  my	  reliance	  on	  you,	  it	  does	  not	  look	  like	  I	  trust	  you	  at	  all.	  	  Instead,	  I	  merely	  rely	  on	  your	  calculated	  likely	  performance	  and	  the	  more	  robust	  claim	  of	  trust	  seems	  out	  of	  place.	  	  I	  am	  essentially	  treating	  you	  as	  a	  reliably	  performing	  machine.	  	  The	  extra	  element	  that	  trust	  adds,	  and	  the	  extra	  element	  that	  means	  only	  agents	  can	  be	  the	  appropriate	  objects	  of	  trust,	  is	  discretionary	  powers.	  	  When	  I	  trust	  you,	  I	  give	  you	  leeway	  to	  use	  your	  judgment	  to	  advance	  the	  interests	  I	  have	  entrusted	  you	  with	  as	  you	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Annette	  Baier,	  “Trust	  and	  Antitrust”,	  Ethics	  96	  (1986):	  pp.	  231-­‐60.	  	  The	  interests	  you	  entrust	  may	  be	  the	  interests	  of	  something	  else	  you	  have	  interest	  in,	  for	  example	  you	  allow	  the	  babysitter	  discretionary	  powers	  over	  some	  of	  your	  child’s	  welfare	  and	  interests,	  which	  are	  also	  your	  interests.	  11	  In	  terms	  of	  ordinary	  language,	  we	  sometimes	  loosely	  use	  ‘trust’	  to	  mean	  mere	  reliance,	  a	  simple	  expectation	  of	  a	  possible	  outcome.	  	  But	  I	  am	  not	  in	  the	  business	  of	  ordinary	  language	  analysis,	  and	  this	  use	  of	  trust	  seems	  derivative	  of	  the	  more	  central	  notion	  I	  am	  explicating	  which	  requires	  an	  agent	  as	  its	  object.	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see	  fit.	  	  Thus	  my	  trust	  depends	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  your	  will,	  and	  must	  have	  an	  agent	  as	  its	  object.	  	  To	  trust	  you	  is	  to	  treat	  you	  as	  a	  person,	  not	  as	  a	  machine.	  This	  is	  why	  trust	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  goodwill	  of	  the	  trusted;	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  trusted	  has	  discretionary	  powers	  over	  the	  entrusted	  valuables,	  there	  will	  be	  plenty	  of	  opportunities	  for	  her	  to	  intentionally	  and	  subtly	  undermine	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  entrusted	  valuables.	  	  Giving	  her	  this	  opportunity	  is	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  trust	  and	  is	  what	  distinguishes	  trust	  from	  mere	  reliance,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  what	  requires	  depending	  on	  the	  goodwill	  of	  the	  trusted.12	  	  Necessarily	  relying	  on	  the	  goodwill	  and	  judgment	  of	  the	  trusted	  is	  also	  what	  makes	  the	  truster	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  trusted.	  	  On	  this	  understanding,	  in	  order	  to	  trust	  another	  you	  must	  believe	  in	  her	  goodwill	  and	  her	  competence.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  are	  required	  because	  you	  grant	  her	  discretionary	  powers	  over	  the	  interests	  of	  something	  you	  value.	  	  	  An	  illustration	  will	  help	  make	  this	  clear:	  when	  you	  get	  a	  babysitter	  for	  your	  infant,	  you	  trust	  the	  babysitter.	  	  You	  give	  him	  (limited)	  discretionary	  powers	  over	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  your	  child.	  	  If	  he	  is	  disastrously	  incompetent,	  and	  you	  know	  him	  to	  be	  so,	  then	  even	  if	  he	  tries	  his	  best	  to	  protect	  and	  advance	  your	  child’s	  interests,	  he	  is	  going	  to	  fail.	  	  But	  because	  you	  granted	  him	  discretionary	  powers,	  those	  failures	  will	  result	  in	  harm	  to	  your	  child’s	  wellbeing.	  	  Under	  those	  conditions	  he	  is	  untrustworthy	  and	  you	  shouldn’t	  leave	  your	  child	  under	  his	  care.	  	  	  Similarly,	  if	  he	  has	  malicious	  will	  toward	  your	  child,	  then	  he	  can	  use	  his	  discretionary	  powers	  to	  harm	  your	  child.	  	  He	  can	  do	  this	  very	  subtly,	  even	  within	  the	  discretionary	  powers	  you	  grant	  him.	  	  He	  may	  not	  kill	  your	  child,	  or	  take	  her	  to	  a	  smoky	  bar,	  neither	  of	  which	  you	  granted	  him	  power	  to	  do,	  but	  he	  may	  keep	  the	  child	  up	  much	  later	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  This	  answers	  some	  of	  the	  concerns	  about	  Baier’s	  account	  raised	  by	  Karen	  Jones,	  “Trust	  as	  an	  Affective	  Attitude”,	  Ethics	  107	  (1996):	  pp.	  17-­‐8.	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than	  is	  good	  for	  her,	  or	  feed	  her	  food	  that	  isn’t	  the	  best.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  he	  has	  permission	  to	  exercise	  his	  discretion,	  over	  her	  bedtime	  or	  her	  food,	  but	  he	  does	  so	  with	  a	  malicious	  will	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  intended	  not	  to	  bring	  out	  the	  best	  results.13	  	  He	  is	  not	  trustworthy.	  	  So	  in	  order	  to	  justifiably	  defer	  to	  another,	  the	  other	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  trustworthy:	  given	  the	  interests	  and	  discretionary	  powers	  you	  are	  entrusting	  she	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  competent	  and	  have	  sufficient	  goodwill.	  	  Only	  under	  these	  conditions	  will	  the	  trustworthiness	  condition	  be	  met.	  	   The	  problem	  with	  Vicious	  Grand	  Master	  is	  not	  that	  she	  is	  not	  a	  moral	  saint	  but	  that	  she	  is	  untrustworthy.	  	  She’s	  competent	  but	  doesn’t	  have	  goodwill,	  so	  regularly	  issues	  misleading	  commands.	  	  Her	  failure	  is	  not	  of	  her	  expertise	  but	  of	  her	  performance	  and	  her	  relationship	  to	  you.	  	  Note	  that	  individuals	  don’t	  have	  to	  be	  morally	  perfect,	  or	  even	  generally	  virtuous,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  trustworthy.	  	  A	  variety	  of	  mechanisms	  can	  establish	  competence	  and	  goodwill,	  although	  good	  moral	  character	  certainly	  helps	  with	  the	  latter.	  	  The	  important	  point	  is	  that	  experts	  sometimes	  fail	  to	  have	  moral	  authority	  because	  they	  aren’t	  trustworthy,	  but	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  go	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  moral	  authorities	  must	  have	  all	  the	  virtues	  or	  anything	  of	  the	  sort.	  	  
4.	  The	  Expertise	  and	  Trustworthiness	  of	  Political	  Agents	  We	  now	  have	  the	  following	  five	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  authority:	  the	  expertise	  condition,	  the	  deference	  condition,	  the	  acceptance	  condition,	  the	  trustworthiness	  condition,	  and	  the	  precedence	  condition.	  	  Fulfilling	  these	  conditions	  gives	  an	  agent	  genuine	  evidential	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Parents	  who	  leave	  a	  list	  of	  precise	  activities	  and	  times	  for	  the	  babysitter	  trust	  their	  babysitter	  less	  than	  if	  they	  didn’t	  leave	  such	  a	  list:	  they	  are	  granting	  the	  babysitter	  discretion	  over	  fewer	  domains.	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authority	  over	  another,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  the	  only	  way	  to	  attain	  genuine	  authority.14	  	  They	  are	  jointly	  sufficient	  but	  not	  necessary	  because	  other	  routes	  can	  secure	  authority,	  like	  actual	  consent.	  	  	  	   In	  building	  the	  case	  for	  evidential	  governmentalism,	  it	  must	  be	  shown	  that	  at	  least	  one	  modern	  government	  meets	  these	  conditions.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  take	  up	  particular	  cases,	  but	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  want	  to	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  more	  applied	  investigation	  by	  establishing	  the	  prima	  facie	  plausibility	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  modern	  governments	  could	  even	  possibly	  meet	  the	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness	  conditions.	  	  The	  other	  conditions	  are	  either	  easily	  met	  or	  are	  a	  function	  of	  subjects’	  preexisting	  reasons	  and	  so	  not	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  government.	  	  	  The	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness	  conditions	  depend	  on	  characteristics	  of	  the	  purported	  authority	  and	  both	  conditions	  are	  places	  where	  it	  might	  seem	  modern	  governments	  are	  particularly	  apt	  to	  fail.	  	  We	  generally	  see	  modern	  political	  agents	  as	  bureaucrats	  embedded	  in	  massively	  complex,	  inefficient	  institutions.	  	  Our	  paradigmatic	  image	  of	  the	  expert	  is	  the	  brilliant	  individual	  scientist	  while	  the	  paradigmatic	  image	  of	  the	  political	  agent	  is	  either	  the	  overworked,	  apathetic	  bureaucrat	  or	  the	  self-­‐serving,	  hypocritical	  politician.	  This	  characterization	  of	  political	  agents	  generates	  doubts	  about	  whether	  modern	  governments	  can	  meet	  the	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness	  conditions.	  	  	  	   First,	  we	  might	  be	  worried	  that	  political	  agents	  are	  simply	  too	  incompetent	  to	  be	  experts.	  	  We	  could	  spell	  this	  out	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  	  Politicians	  are	  chosen	  for	  their	  looks,	  their	  media	  campaigns,	  their	  ridiculous	  promises,	  but	  certainly	  not	  for	  their	  expertise!	  	  And	  bureaucrats	  are	  the	  paradigm	  of	  incompetence,	  any	  efforts	  stalled	  and	  vitiated	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Just	  like	  Raz’s	  normal	  justification	  thesis,	  which	  is	  “normal”	  because	  it	  is	  the	  usual	  but	  not	  unique	  way	  to	  attain	  genuine	  authority.	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labyrinthine	  institutional	  requirements,	  and	  any	  good	  intentions	  smothered	  and	  dissipated.	  	  To	  answer	  this	  concern	  it	  is	  important	  to	  see	  that	  the	  commands	  of	  modern	  political	  authorities	  are	  generally	  the	  result	  of	  combining	  the	  input	  of	  many	  individuals.	  	  In	  large	  part	  political	  authorities	  can	  be	  competent	  because	  they	  are	  institutional	  authorities	  that	  can	  aggregate	  expertise.	  	  If	  I	  am	  asked	  to	  make	  some	  judgment	  about	  speed	  limits,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  all	  the	  relevant	  underlying	  reasons	  I	  need	  to	  be	  an	  expert	  about,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  metals	  and	  other	  materials	  that	  make	  up	  cars	  and	  their	  response	  to	  stressors,	  the	  biomechanics	  and	  physical	  vulnerabilities	  of	  individuals	  during	  accidents,	  the	  materials	  that	  make	  up	  roads,	  the	  tendencies	  of	  drivers	  at	  various	  speeds,	  the	  type	  and	  frequency	  of	  precipitation	  or	  other	  complicating	  factors,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  To	  do	  this	  responsibly	  requires	  aggregating	  the	  expertise	  of	  many	  different	  fields.	  	  	  No	  individual	  could	  possibly	  be	  sufficiently	  competent	  in	  all	  these	  areas	  on	  her	  own,	  and	  to	  expect	  that	  only	  individuals	  can	  be	  experts	  comes	  from	  an	  overly	  individualistic	  understanding	  of	  our	  epistemic	  practices.	  	  As	  Hardwig	  emphasizes,	  even	  in	  the	  hard	  sciences,	  paragons	  of	  epistemic	  practice,	  it	  is	  groups	  that	  most	  commonly	  reach	  expert	  judgments.15	  	  He	  looks	  at	  a	  published	  paper	  in	  particle	  physics	  that	  included	  nearly	  one	  hundred	  individual	  authors.	  	  No	  single	  author	  had	  the	  expertise	  to	  evaluate	  all	  the	  claims	  in	  the	  paper,	  and	  none	  was	  expected	  to.	  	  Instead,	  they	  aggregated	  their	  expertise	  and	  came	  to	  a	  single	  conclusion.	  	  This	  is	  a	  very	  common	  practice,	  and	  scientific	  progress	  as	  we	  know	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  without	  the	  possibility	  of	  aggregating	  expertise.	  	  Good	  institutional	  structures	  can	  aggregate	  expertise	  and	  thus	  reach	  heights	  of	  competence	  that	  individuals	  cannot.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  John	  Hardwig,	  “Epistemic	  Dependence”,	  pp.	  346ff.	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   This	  is	  why	  we	  needn’t	  expect	  the	  politician	  in	  the	  legislature	  or	  the	  bureaucrat	  manning	  the	  desk	  at	  the	  front	  of	  the	  DMV	  to	  be	  experts.	  	  Governments	  employ	  huge	  numbers	  of	  people,	  including	  people	  with	  expertise,	  like	  scientists.	  	  The	  expertise	  lies	  with	  the	  scientists	  as	  individuals	  but	  is	  aggregated,	  with	  the	  expertise	  of	  others,	  in	  institutional	  structures.	  	  The	  “outputs”	  of	  these	  institutions	  can	  thus	  be	  appropriately	  considered	  expert	  judgments	  even	  though	  the	  leaders	  of	  those	  institutions	  may	  not	  be	  experts	  in	  the	  relevant	  fields	  themselves.	  	   Perhaps,	  though,	  this	  is	  the	  very	  source	  of	  the	  concern.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  physics	  paper,	  all	  the	  participants	  were	  experts	  in	  the	  general	  field.	  	  We	  would	  expect	  some	  of	  them	  to	  be	  able	  to	  aggregate	  the	  expertise	  of	  their	  colleagues,	  even	  if	  they	  didn’t	  know	  quite	  as	  much	  as	  the	  others.	  	  But	  when	  political	  appointees	  or	  elected	  officials	  head	  political	  institutions,	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  able	  to	  successfully	  aggregate	  the	  expert	  judgments;	  that	  is,	  not	  only	  bring	  them	  together	  but	  weigh	  them	  against	  each	  other	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  “retain”	  the	  expertise.	  	  If	  we	  hand	  over	  the	  implementation	  of	  expert	  judgments	  to	  fools,	  we	  will	  get	  foolish	  results.	  	   The	  answer	  to	  this	  problem	  lies	  in	  institutional	  design.	  	  The	  answer	  is	  not	  that	  all	  political	  institutions	  will	  be	  expert,	  even	  when	  they	  employ	  experts.	  	  Bad	  institutions	  will	  undermine	  the	  aggregation	  of	  expertise,	  just	  as	  they	  will	  undermine	  trustworthiness.	  	  The	  aggregation	  of	  the	  physicists’	  expertises	  was	  done	  informally,	  but	  we	  trust	  it	  was	  done	  well	  because	  it	  was	  done	  by	  the	  experts’	  peers	  in	  some	  significant	  sense.	  	  The	  expertise	  of	  the	  aggregator	  seems	  to	  convey	  validity	  on	  the	  aggregation.	  	  If	  the	  aggregation	  of	  expertise	  in	  political	  institutions	  happens	  informally	  like	  this,	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  doubt	  its	  validity.	  	  But	  institutions	  have	  the	  great	  advantage	  of	  being	  able	  to	  set	  explicit	  and	  public	  standards	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of	  aggregation.	  	  	  This	  is	  why	  it	  shouldn’t	  matter	  (up	  to	  a	  point)	  what	  particular	  individual	  holds	  a	  particular	  bureaucratic	  office.	  	  The	  office	  functions	  as	  it	  does	  in	  large	  part	  because	  of	  the	  institutional	  constraints,	  not	  just	  because	  of	  the	  individual	  who	  holds	  it.	  	  We	  shouldn’t	  deny	  the	  importance	  of	  individuals;	  all	  institutional	  rules	  can	  be	  gamed,	  distorted	  and	  repurposed.	  	  The	  institutional	  culture	  still	  matters	  a	  great	  deal.	  	  But	  institutional	  rules	  go	  a	  long	  way	  explaining	  how	  non-­‐experts	  can	  sometimes	  successfully	  aggregate	  expertise,	  and	  so	  how	  institutions	  can	  have	  expertise	  that	  exceeds	  the	  expertise	  of	  any	  individual.	  This	  point	  is	  very	  important.	  	  When	  evaluating	  the	  expertise	  of	  a	  particular	  political	  agent,	  we	  want	  to	  know	  whether	  the	  directives	  are	  expert.	  	  It	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  many	  individuals	  in	  the	  institutional	  structure	  lack	  the	  appropriate	  expertise.	  	  This	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  as	  long	  as	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  political	  agent	  are	  themselves	  expert.	  	  One	  way	  of	  putting	  this	  is	  that	  expertise	  is	  an	  emergent	  property,	  due	  not	  to	  the	  expertise	  of	  a	  particular	  individual	  in	  the	  institution	  but	  due	  to	  the	  combination	  of	  individuals	  and	  institutional	  constraints.	  	  Without	  appropriate	  institutional	  constraints,	  the	  expertise	  of	  the	  individuals	  won’t	  be	  translated	  into	  expert	  directives.	  	  It	  is	  only	  in	  the	  context	  of	  appropriate	  institutional	  constraints	  that	  we	  can	  say	  the	  directives	  of	  a	  modern	  government	  are	  expert.	  	  This	  isn’t	  mysterious,	  and	  my	  claim	  isn’t	  that	  a	  real	  collective	  agent	  with	  expertise	  emerges	  from	  the	  institutional	  structure.	  	  I	  don’t	  think	  this	  claim	  is	  necessarily	  false,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  required	  to	  understand	  how	  expertise	  could	  be	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	  individuals	  working	  within	  a	  particular	  institutional	  structure.16	  	   The	  other	  worry	  is	  about	  trustworthiness.	  	  Just	  as	  we	  might	  expect	  bureaucrats	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  For	  a	  recent	  case	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  “reality”	  of	  collective	  agents,	  see	  Christian	  List	  and	  Philip	  Petit,	  Group	  
Agency:	  The	  Possibility,	  Design,	  and	  Status	  of	  Corporate	  Agents	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  2011).	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politicians	  to	  be	  incompetent,	  we	  might	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  untrustworthy.	  	  If	  political	  agents	  are	  radically	  untrustworthy,	  their	  expertise	  won’t	  matter	  and	  they	  won’t	  be	  authorities.	  	  They	  fail	  the	  trustworthiness	  condition	  and	  so	  lack	  authority	  because	  untrustworthiness	  gives	  subjects	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  reject	  the	  purported	  authority’s	  directives.	  	  Experts	  whose	  expert	  judgments	  are	  rationally	  unavailable	  to	  us	  cannot	  be	  authorities.	  Recall	  the	  account	  of	  trustworthiness	  I	  sketched	  above:	  there	  are	  two	  aspects	  of	  trustworthiness,	  competence	  and	  goodwill.	  	  An	  agent	  is	  trustworthy	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  she	  can	  justifiably	  be	  given	  discretionary	  powers	  over	  valuable	  interests.	  	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  agent	  must	  be	  trustworthy	  depends	  on	  the	  entrusted	  interests;	  the	  more	  valuable	  the	  interests,	  and	  the	  more	  discretionary	  powers	  given	  over	  them,	  the	  more	  trust	  required	  and	  thus	  the	  more	  trustworthiness	  required	  for	  rational	  deference.	  	  Another	  way	  to	  think	  about	  what	  degree	  of	  trustworthiness	  is	  required	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  vulnerability:	  the	  more	  vulnerable	  I	  make	  myself	  to	  you	  by	  trusting	  you,	  the	  more	  trustworthy	  you	  must	  be	  for	  that	  trust	  to	  be	  justified.	  	  How	  vulnerable	  I	  am	  to	  you	  depends	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  interests	  I	  entrust	  to	  you,	  and	  how	  much	  discretionary	  power	  I	  give	  you	  over	  them,	  so	  depends	  on	  the	  same	  considerations.	  	  	  These	  points	  are	  important	  because	  we	  grant	  modern	  political	  authorities	  nearly	  
complete	  discretion	  over	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  interests	  in	  our	  lives,	  like	  our	  collective	  security	  and	  wellbeing.	  As	  the	  twentieth	  century	  demonstrated	  again	  and	  again,	  being	  subject	  to	  untrustworthy	  political	  agents,	  whether	  incompetent	  or	  malicious,	  can	  be	  epically	  disastrous.	  	  It	  appears,	  then,	  that	  political	  authorities	  require	  huge	  amounts	  of	  trust	  from	  their	  subjects,	  but	  that	  this	  degree	  of	  trust	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  political	  authorities	  are	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particularly	  inapt	  to	  attain.	  	  The	  question	  for	  political	  authorities	  is	  how	  they	  can	  establish	  goodwill	  and	  competence	  sufficient	  to	  make	  them	  trustworthy.	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  goodwill,	  competence,	  and	  trust	  is	  a	  complicated	  one.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  complete	  competence	  cannot	  ground	  trust	  if	  it	  is	  matched	  with	  malice.	  	  Similarly,	  complete	  goodwill	  cannot	  ground	  trust	  if	  it	  is	  matched	  with	  complete	  incompetence.	  	  There	  needs	  to	  be	  both	  sufficient	  goodwill	  and	  sufficient	  competence.	  	  But	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  beyond	  the	  extremes,	  there	  are	  some	  tradeoffs	  between	  goodwill	  and	  competence	  that	  make	  sense.	  	  I	  might	  not	  be	  convinced	  my	  brother	  is	  the	  most	  competent	  person	  in	  the	  world,	  but	  I	  know	  he	  loves	  me	  and	  always	  considers	  my	  interests	  in	  his	  decisions;	  he	  has	  goodwill	  towards	  me.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  I	  can	  trust	  him	  just	  as	  much	  as	  I	  trust	  my	  financial	  advisor,	  who	  is	  cold-­‐hearted	  and	  does	  not	  evince	  goodwill	  for	  me,	  yet	  is	  exceptionally	  competent	  in	  her	  domain	  (the	  only	  domain	  in	  which	  I	  trust	  her).	  	  It	  appears	  that	  sometimes	  a	  lack	  in	  competence	  can	  be	  made	  up	  for	  by	  goodwill,	  and	  some	  a	  in	  goodwill	  made	  up	  for	  by	  competence.	  	  	  This	  is	  good	  news	  for	  political	  authorities,	  because	  there	  are	  significant	  limitations	  on	  their	  goodwill.	  	  They	  need	  to	  secure	  a	  sufficient	  level	  of	  goodwill,	  but	  they	  will	  make	  up	  for	  limitations	  on	  goodwill	  with	  competence.	  	  As	  I	  argued	  above,	  the	  institutional	  aggregation	  of	  expertise	  can,	  when	  done	  well,	  result	  in	  judgments	  that	  are	  ultimately	  more	  expert	  than	  the	  judgment	  of	  any	  individual	  would	  be.	  	  If	  we	  can	  establish	  some	  minimal	  level	  of	  goodwill,	  this	  advantage	  in	  competence	  will	  explain	  the	  possibility	  of	  modern	  political	  authorities	  being	  sufficiently	  trustworthy.	  	  Other	  than	  the	  common	  picture	  of	  government	  and	  bureaucracy	  as	  inherently	  untrustworthy,	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  suspect	  that	  there	  is	  a	  limit	  to	  how	  much	  goodwill	  we	  can	  ascribe	  to	  a	  political	  authority.	  	  I	  take	  the	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limit	  case	  of	  goodwill	  to	  be	  something	  like	  the	  brother	  case,	  or	  a	  partner,	  where	  you	  know	  the	  other	  person	  loves	  you.	  	  Not	  only	  do	  they	  take	  your	  interests	  into	  account,	  they	  often	  sacrifice	  their	  own	  interests	  for	  yours.	  	  This	  is	  the	  level	  of	  goodwill	  that	  seems	  required	  to	  justify	  sufficient	  trustworthiness	  to	  grant	  someone,	  like	  a	  partner,	  extensive	  discretionary	  powers	  over	  extremely	  valuable	  interests,	  like	  co-­‐ownership	  of	  a	  house,	  a	  bank	  account,	  or	  raising	  a	  child.	  	  	  This	  kind	  of	  goodwill	  can	  only	  be	  established	  by	  intense	  and	  prolonged	  personal	  relationships;	  the	  problem	  for	  modern	  political	  authorities	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  way	  all	  representatives	  of	  political	  institutions	  could	  have	  this	  kind	  of	  relationship	  with	  all	  those	  subject	  to	  their	  authority.17	  	  As	  noted	  in	  chapter	  two,	  one	  of	  the	  defining	  and	  yet	  problematic	  features	  of	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  their	  scale.	  	  You	  would	  have	  to	  personally	  know	  your	  mailperson,	  your	  state	  representative,	  your	  city	  council	  members,	  your	  senators,	  the	  president,	  and	  many	  thousands	  more	  to	  have	  this	  kind	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  goodwill	  of	  political	  authorities.	  	  In	  turn,	  the	  city	  council	  members	  would	  have	  to	  personally	  know	  you	  and	  every	  other	  citizen	  of	  their	  city,	  the	  senators	  every	  citizen	  of	  their	  state,	  the	  president	  every	  citizen	  of	  their	  country.	  	  Clearly	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  any	  single	  human	  being	  to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  that	  number	  of	  close,	  personal	  relationships.	  	  Modern	  political	  authorities	  cannot	  reach	  anything	  close	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  goodwill.	  	  Not	  only	  can	  we	  not	  have	  close	  personal	  relationships	  with	  our	  political	  authorities,	  but	  due	  to	  the	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  in	  our	  political	  bodies,	  it	  is	  unavoidable	  that	  most	  individuals	  we	  interact	  with	  as	  representatives	  of	  our	  political	  authorities	  will	  be	  complete	  strangers,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Cf.	  Elizabeth	  Anderson,	  The	  Imperative	  of	  Integration	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  UP,	  2010):	  p.	  106.	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and	  the	  goodwill	  we	  attribute	  to	  them	  thus	  very	  limited.18	  	  	  But	  this	  is	  worrying	  because	  as	  mentioned	  we	  grant	  political	  authorities	  extensive	  discretion	  over	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  things	  in	  our	  lives.	  	  	  	   I	  again	  respond	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  institutional	  nature	  of	  modern	  political	  authorities.	  	  When	  I	  meet	  a	  stranger,	  I	  simply	  lack	  experience	  with	  them	  and	  so	  lack	  knowledge	  about	  their	  character	  and	  their	  attitudes	  and	  dispositions	  towards	  me.19	  	  Limited	  interactions	  with	  them	  will	  not	  help	  me	  gain	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  knowledge.	  	  And	  this	  is	  how	  we	  interact	  with	  almost	  all	  political	  authorities,	  and	  their	  delegates:	  when	  I	  go	  to	  the	  DMV,	  the	  bureaucrat	  behind	  the	  desk	  is	  a	  stranger	  to	  me,	  and	  whatever	  limited	  interactions	  I	  have	  with	  her	  will	  not	  give	  me	  reason	  to	  think	  she	  has	  goodwill	  towards	  me	  and	  will	  consider	  my	  interests	  in	  her	  decisions,	  even	  when	  there	  are	  costs	  to	  doing	  so.	  	  But	  when	  she	  is	  acting	  in	  her	  capacity	  as	  a	  bureaucrat,	  she	  is	  embedded	  in	  an	  institutional	  structure.	  	  The	  institutional	  structure	  is	  crucial:	  first,	  it	  can	  force	  her	  to	  consider	  my	  interests	  even	  when	  she	  personally	  would	  not,	  and	  second,	  it	  can	  do	  so	  publicly.	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  institutions	  can	  have	  moral	  characters	  that	  differ	  from	  the	  character	  of	  the	  individuals	  occupying	  institutional	  roles,	  and	  that	  institutional	  moral	  character	  can	  be	  public	  (and	  so	  knowable	  to	  me)	  in	  a	  way	  that	  individual	  moral	  character	  cannot,	  or	  cannot	  easily.	  	  Individual	  moral	  character	  is	  more	  whimsical	  than	  institutional	  moral	  character,	  as	  it	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  This	  is	  perhaps	  one	  reason	  why	  the	  leaders	  whom	  demand	  the	  most	  trust,	  those	  that	  have	  the	  most	  discretion	  over	  the	  most	  powerful	  and	  valuable	  things	  like	  the	  president,	  are	  also	  subject	  to	  the	  most	  personal	  scrutiny.	  	  It	  matters	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  whether	  I	  can	  trust	  the	  president	  than	  whether	  I	  can	  trust	  the	  DMV	  worker.	  	  The	  president	  has	  much	  more	  discretion	  over	  much	  more	  important	  interests.	  19	  Some	  theories	  of	  trust	  and	  testimony	  posit	  that	  there	  is	  a	  baseline	  of	  trust	  we	  automatically	  grant	  to	  strangers.	  	  Even	  if	  true	  this	  issue	  is	  orthogonal	  because	  that	  baseline	  is	  much	  too	  low	  to	  establish	  trust	  about	  the	  sorts	  of	  important	  matters	  we	  are	  concerned	  with.	  	  The	  baseline,	  stranger	  trust	  allows	  us	  to	  trust	  stranger’s	  judgments	  about	  streets	  in	  their	  hometown	  or	  the	  time	  of	  day,	  but	  not	  much	  more.	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change	  more	  discreetly	  and	  without	  apparent	  cause.	  	  I	  do	  not	  have	  direct	  access	  to	  the	  minds	  of	  those	  around	  me,	  and	  so	  may	  justifiably	  be	  worried	  that	  something	  dramatic	  has	  changed	  without	  me	  knowing	  it.	  	  (Think	  of	  courtiers	  living	  in	  fear	  that	  the	  monarch’s	  goodwill	  can	  swing	  in	  an	  instant,	  for	  no	  good	  reason,	  leading	  to	  their	  death.)	  	  Institutions	  more	  easily	  carry	  their	  character	  on	  their	  sleeves,	  with	  explicit	  institutional	  rules	  and	  norms	  constraining	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  individuals	  that	  occupy	  roles	  within	  the	  institution.	  When	  institutional	  power	  is	  exercised	  by	  an	  individual	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  that	  institution,	  I	  do	  not	  need	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  goodwill	  of	  the	  individual.	  	  Instead,	  their	  goodwill	  is	  in	  large	  part	  secured	  by	  the	  institution.	  	  I	  know	  that	  even	  if	  the	  bureaucrat	  in	  front	  of	  me	  is	  a	  vicious,	  selfish	  person	  she	  is	  still	  constrained	  by	  institutional	  checks.	  	  I	  can	  expect	  her	  to	  act	  in	  certain	  acceptable	  ways,	  ways	  that	  include	  my	  interests	  and	  so	  express	  goodwill	  towards	  me,	  because	  I	  know	  about	  these	  external,	  institutionalized	  and	  codified	  checks	  on	  her	  behavior.	  	  The	  institutional	  constraints	  significantly	  bolster	  my	  trust	  in	  her	  compared	  to	  how	  much	  I	  would	  trust	  her	  as	  an	  independent	  individual	  and	  a	  stranger.	  	  Of	  course,	  I	  still	  have	  to	  trust	  her	  personally	  to	  a	  certain	  extent.	  	  Even	  the	  best	  institutional	  constraints	  can	  be	  bypassed	  and	  gamed	  with	  enough	  effort.	  	  But	  I	  do	  not	  have	  to	  trust	  her	  personally	  very	  much,	  and	  much	  less	  than	  if	  she	  was	  simply	  a	  private	  individual	  to	  whom	  I	  was	  considering	  deferring.	  	  Institutions	  can	  make	  up	  the	  lack	  of	  goodwill	  we	  often	  assume	  when	  meeting	  a	  complete	  stranger,	  so	  the	  fact	  that	  political	  authority	  in	  modern	  society	  will	  necessarily	  involve	  trusting	  many	  complete	  strangers	  does	  not	  block	  political	  authorities	  from	  possibly	  being	  trustworthy	  enough	  to	  justify	  deference	  to	  them.	  	   The	  institutional	  nature	  of	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  thus	  of	  central	  importance	  to	  my	  account.	  	  It	  explains	  how	  expertise	  can	  be	  aggregated	  and	  then	  attributed	  to	  the	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decisions	  of	  the	  authorities	  and	  it	  explains	  how	  political	  institutions	  can	  be	  sufficiently	  trustworthy	  to	  rationally	  defer	  to	  them.	  	  Further,	  it	  explains	  why	  their	  expertise	  grants	  them	  the	  power	  to	  command	  across	  so	  many	  domains.	  	  When	  a	  single	  individual	  claims	  to	  know	  everything	  about	  a	  domain,	  that	  is	  when	  we	  are	  confronted	  with	  a	  single	  expert,	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  doubt	  her	  claim	  to	  expertise.	  	  For	  example,	  we	  might	  suspect	  that	  there	  are	  many	  factors	  outside	  her	  ken	  which	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  domain	  but	  which	  she	  could	  not	  have	  possibly	  accounted	  for.	  	  Further,	  any	  worries	  about	  her	  trustworthiness,	  for	  example	  questions	  about	  her	  moral	  character,	  will	  infect	  all	  of	  her	  judgments.	  	  	  Institutions	  avoid	  these	  problems.	  	  The	  idea	  is	  simply	  that	  an	  institution	  regulating,	  for	  example,	  transportation	  need	  not	  have	  an	  individual	  with	  all	  the	  necessary	  skills	  and	  expertise.	  	  Instead,	  it	  employs	  experts	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  fields:	  metallurgy,	  public	  health,	  environmental	  impact,	  etc.	  	  If	  an	  individual	  comes	  to	  me	  claiming	  to	  be	  an	  authority	  about	  all	  things	  transportation,	  I	  have	  very	  good	  reason	  to	  doubt	  her.	  	  There’s	  simply	  too	  much	  to	  know.	  	  But	  an	  institution	  that	  publicly	  employs	  a	  range	  of	  experts	  and	  has	  institutional	  mechanisms	  for	  combining	  those	  various	  expertises	  can	  have	  a	  plausible	  case	  for	  being	  an	  expert	  on	  a	  very	  wide	  range	  of	  issues,	  wide	  enough	  to	  cover	  the	  domain	  of	  transportation,	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  justifiably	  trusted	  as	  an	  authority	  over	  most	  people,	  in	  a	  broad	  and	  important	  domain.	  	  Their	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness	  does	  not	  necessarily	  change	  when	  different	  individuals	  are	  in	  their	  institutional	  roles.	  Individuals	  die,	  retire,	  and	  so	  on,	  but	  the	  institution	  and	  the	  institutional	  features	  that	  ground	  competence	  and	  goodwill	  remain.20	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  This	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  you	  trust	  the	  institution.	  	  Trust,	  as	  noted,	  must	  have	  an	  agent	  as	  its	  object,	  unlike	  mere	  reliance.	  	  There	  are	  two	  salient	  possibilities:	  you	  are	  trusting	  the	  individual	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   Before	  concluding,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  relationship	  between	  markers	  of	  trustworthiness	  and	  other	  discussions	  of	  political	  authority.	  	  Accounts	  of	  political	  authority	  like	  mine	  often	  look	  sterile	  and	  overly	  moralistic.	  	  The	  focus	  is	  on	  conformity	  with	  right	  reasons,	  and	  all	  the	  usual	  values	  people	  appeal	  to	  when	  they	  explain	  their	  allegiance	  to	  political	  authorities	  are	  put	  aside.	  	  Other	  accounts	  of	  political	  authority	  do	  a	  better	  job	  on	  this	  front.	  	  They	  focus	  on	  particularistic	  ties,	  shared	  political	  cultures,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  What	  my	  analysis	  shows	  is	  that	  these	  factors	  do	  not	  directly	  justify	  political	  authority.	  	  But	  the	  standard	  that	  justifies	  political	  authority,	  conformity	  with	  right	  reason,	  cannot	  also	  be	  the	  standard	  of	  the	  decision	  procedure	  subjects	  use	  to	  identify	  and	  follow	  authorities.	  	  This	  is	  because	  laypeople	  lack	  the	  competence	  to	  evaluate	  expert	  judgments	  and	  because	  right	  reason	  is	  not	  identifiable	  qua	  right	  reason.	  	  	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  the	  factors	  people	  should	  use	  to	  measure	  trustworthiness	  will	  often	  be	  those	  factors	  we	  commonly	  call	  upon:	  commitment	  to	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  political	  ideals,	  shared	  culture,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  These	  are	  markers	  of	  trustworthiness	  (some	  better	  than	  others)	  and	  markers	  of	  trustworthiness	  are	  all	  individual	  citizens	  have	  to	  base	  their	  decisions	  on.	  	  So	  it	  is	  often	  valuable	  to	  focus	  on	  developing	  shared	  identities,	  on	  encouraging	  the	  markers	  of	  trustworthiness.	  	  But	  we	  shouldn’t	  mistake	  markers	  of	  trustworthiness	  for	  what	  ultimately	  justifies	  our	  trust	  in	  them,	  namely	  successfully	  helping	  us	  act	  better	  in	  the	  world.	  	   In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  genuine	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority	  requires	  an	  agent	  meet	  three	  further	  conditions,	  the	  acceptance,	  trustworthiness,	  and	  precedence	  conditions.	  	  In	  combination	  with	  the	  expertise	  and	  personal	  conditions	  we	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  representative	  of	  the	  government,	  but	  qua	  institutional	  role,	  or	  more	  controversially	  you	  are	  trusting	  the	  corporate	  agent,	  the	  government,	  that	  is	  constituted	  by	  individuals	  inhabiting	  an	  institutional	  structure.	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jointly	  sufficient	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  I	  also	  made	  the	  case	  that	  institutional	  mechanisms	  make	  it	  prima	  facie	  plausible	  that	  modern	  governments	  could	  attain	  the	  required	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness.	  	  Plausibility,	  though,	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  meet	  the	  philosophical	  anarchists’	  challenge.	  	  In	  the	  next,	  final	  chapter	  I	  argue	  that	  some	  modern	  governments	  actually	  meet	  all	  five	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  modern	  political	  authority	  and	  so	  that	  evidential	  governmentalism	  is	  true.	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5	  –	  Towards	  Evidential	  Governmentalism	  	  We	  have	  the	  full	  theory	  of	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority	  before	  us.	  The	  task	  now	  is	  to	  return	  to	  the	  question	  of	  political	  anarchism,	  and	  specifically	  we	  want	  to	  know	  if	  any	  modern	  governments	  plausibly	  meet	  the	  five	  conditions	  on	  genuine	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority:	  1)	  expertise,	  2)	  deference,	  3)	  acceptance,	  4)	  trustworthiness,	  and	  5)	  precedence.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  evidential	  governmentalism	  is	  established:	  at	  least	  some	  governments	  have	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority	  over	  some	  of	  their	  subjects.	  	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  then	  philosophical	  anarchism	  is	  false.	  	   This	  chapter	  makes	  the	  case	  for	  believing	  that	  some	  Western	  democracies	  have	  genuine	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority	  over	  most	  of	  their	  subjects	  in	  most	  domains.	  	  I	  proceed	  by	  first	  considering	  what	  duty	  evidential	  authorities	  might	  plausibly	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  expert	  about.	  	  If	  we	  can	  find	  such	  a	  duty	  and	  it	  is	  important	  enough,	  the	  deference	  condition	  will	  be	  met.	  	  Further,	  if	  modern	  governments	  can	  plausibly	  attain	  expertise	  about	  this	  sort	  of	  duty,	  the	  expertise	  and	  precedence	  conditions	  will	  be	  met.	  I	  then	  argue	  that	  this	  duty	  covers	  large	  enough	  proportions	  of	  the	  population	  for	  the	  government	  to	  actually	  achieve	  its	  aims.	  	  Finally,	  I	  appeal	  to	  democracy	  to	  further	  bolster	  the	  case	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  government’s	  expertise	  and	  argue	  that	  democratic	  procedures	  are	  an	  invaluable	  component	  in	  meeting	  the	  trustworthiness	  condition	  in	  the	  modern	  world.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  we	  will	  see	  that	  some	  modern	  governments	  have	  political	  authority	  such	  that	  subjects	  are	  objectively	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  disobeying	  the	  law.	  	  
1.	  The	  Natural	  Duty	  of	  Justice	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The	  notion	  of	  evidential	  political	  authority	  depends	  on	  a	  situation	  where	  there	  is	  some	  sufficiently	  important	  moral	  duty	  that	  binds	  subjects	  and	  that	  the	  authority	  has	  relevant	  expertise	  for.	  If	  there’s	  no	  such	  duty,	  then	  the	  precedence	  and	  deference	  conditions	  won’t	  be	  fulfilled	  and	  governments	  can’t	  have	  authority.	  	  This	  is	  why	  the	  Grand	  Master	  has	  moral	  authority	  over	  you	  in	  the	  Hero	  Chess	  case	  but	  not	  in	  the	  Fun	  Chess	  case	  even	  though	  she	  has	  chess	  expertise	  in	  both	  cases.	  	  If	  we’re	  traditionalists	  about	  political	  authority	  the	  duty	  is	  built	  in	  because	  traditional	  authority	  can	  create	  new	  moral	  duties,	  but	  the	  whole	  idea	  of	  evidential	  authority	  is	  that	  it	  cannot.	  	  So	  what	  duties	  are	  there	  to	  be	  expert	  about?	  	   There	  are	  some	  obvious	  ones,	  like	  the	  duty	  not	  to	  murder,	  not	  to	  steal,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  So	  one	  strategy	  to	  establish	  the	  wide-­‐ranging	  authority	  of	  government	  would	  be	  to	  proceed	  in	  a	  piecemeal	  fashion,	  picking	  out	  all	  the	  duties	  of	  this	  sort	  and	  explaining	  why	  the	  government	  has	  expertise	  about	  each	  of	  them.	  	  But	  it’s	  unlikely	  that	  most	  of	  the	  government’s	  activities	  can	  be	  grounded	  in	  such	  obvious	  natural	  duties.	  	  What	  specific	  duties	  are	  we	  fulfilling	  when	  we	  pay	  taxes	  that	  are	  used	  for	  art	  museums,	  highways,	  and	  so	  forth?	  While	  appealing	  to	  natural	  duties	  could	  explain	  how	  mala	  in	  se	  laws	  make	  citizens	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment,	  it	  doesn’t	  look	  like	  this	  strategy	  could	  justify	  mala	  prohibita	  laws	  precisely	  there’s	  no	  preexisting	  moral	  duties	  that	  mala	  prohibita	  laws	  map	  on	  to.	  	  But	  an	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  that	  can	  only	  capture	  mala	  in	  se	  and	  basically	  says	  mala	  
prohibita	  laws	  don’t	  bind	  citizens	  would	  be	  insufficient.	  	  	  Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  find	  a	  conjunction	  of	  piecemeal	  duties	  that	  could	  cover	  all	  government	  activities,	  governmentalists	  have	  appealed	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  wider,	  more	  general	  duties.	  	  These	  include	  the	  duty	  of	  fair	  play,	  Samaritan	  duties,	  associative	  duties,	  and	  others.	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I’ll	  focus	  on	  one	  particularly	  prominent	  case,	  Rawls’	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice,	  which	  finds	  its	  roots	  in	  Kant.1	  	  	  	   Kant	  claims	  that	  all	  people	  have	  a	  natural	  duty	  to	  create	  and	  enter	  just	  political	  institutions.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  respect	  for	  others	  requires	  us	  to	  have	  an	  overarching	  authority	  that	  can	  settle	  disputes,	  without	  which	  we	  subject	  each	  other	  to	  the	  constant	  threat	  of	  unjust	  harm.	  Not	  only	  does	  this	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  require	  setting	  up	  domestic	  institutions,	  it	  also	  requires	  states	  to	  enter	  into	  international	  institutions.	  	  For	  if	  they	  didn’t,	  they	  would	  subject	  their	  neighbors	  to	  the	  unjust	  threat	  of	  harm,	  just	  as	  individuals	  do.	  	  	  In	  this	  same	  vein,	  Rawls	  argues	  for	  a	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice.	  	  Rawls	  doesn’t	  extend	  his	  natural	  duty	  to	  the	  international	  sphere	  as	  Kant	  does,	  but	  at	  the	  domestic	  level	  the	  demands	  are	  similar.	  	  Rawls	  writes,	  [F]irst,	  we	  are	  to	  comply	  with	  and	  to	  do	  our	  share	  in	  just	  institutions	  when	  they	   exist	   and	   apply	   to	   us;	   and	   second,	   we	   are	   to	   assist	   in	   the	  establishment	  of	  just	  arrangements	  when	  they	  do	  not	  exist,	  at	  least	  when	  this	   can	  be	  done	  with	   little	   cost	   to	  ourselves.	   	   It	   follows	   that	   if	   the	  basic	  structure	   of	   society	   is	   just,	   or	   as	   just	   as	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   expect	   in	   the	  circumstances,	  everyone	  has	  a	  natural	  duty	  to	  do	  what	  is	  required	  of	  him.	  Each	   is	   bound	   irrespective	   of	   his	   voluntary	   acts,	   performative	   or	  otherwise.2	  	  So	  citizens	  have	  a	  natural	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  because	  obeying	  the	  law	  is	  how	  we	  discharge	  our	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  in	  a	  just	  society.	  	  The	  natural	  duty	  applies	  to	  us	  regardless	  of	  consent,	  so	  could	  plausibly	  justify	  the	  actions	  of	  modern	  governments.	  The	  main	  question	  is	  how	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  have	  a	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  easily	  translates	  to	  a	  universal	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law.	  	  In	  the	  quote,	  Rawls	  says	  that	  it	  simply	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Raz	  also	  appeals	  to	  Rawls’	  duty	  of	  justice,	  though	  for	  slightly	  different	  reasons.	  	  See	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  66.	  2	  John	  Rawls,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice,	  pp.	  293-­‐4.	  
	   184	  
follows	  that	  “everyone	  has	  a	  natural	  duty	  to	  do	  what	  is	  required	  of	  him”.	  	  The	  “required”	  is	  the	  important	  part.	  	  Rawls	  is	  a	  version	  of	  what	  Simmons	  calls	  a	  “necessity”	  theorist,	  who	  appeals	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  obeying	  the	  law	  toward	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  a	  more	  general	  duty.3	  	  The	  thought	  is	  that	  you	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  because	  if	  you	  didn’t	  obey	  the	  law,	  justice	  couldn’t	  be	  achieved.	  	  Since	  you	  have	  a	  duty	  of	  justice	  that	  can’t	  be	  met	  if	  you	  don’t	  obey	  the	  law,	  you	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law.	  	   The	  problem	  with	  this	  argument,	  as	  Simmons	  points	  out,	  is	  that	  it’s	  simply	  false	  that	  if	  you	  didn’t	  obey	  the	  law,	  justice	  couldn’t	  be	  achieved.4	  	  It’s	  true	  that	  if	  most	  people	  didn’t	  obey	  the	  law	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  justice	  couldn’t	  be	  achieved.	  	  But	  in	  many	  instances	  breaking	  the	  law	  has	  hardly	  any	  effect	  at	  all,	  let	  alone	  a	  catastrophic	  effect.5	  	  When	  you	  speed,	  or	  jaywalk,	  or	  run	  that	  infamous	  desert	  red	  light,	  justice	  can	  still	  be	  achieved.	  	  Justice	  is	  resilient	  and	  doesn’t	  require	  perfect	  conformity	  to	  achieve	  (good	  thing,	  too).	  	  	  	   However,	  if	  we	  look	  at	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  as	  the	  grounds	  of	  evidential	  political	  authority	  rather	  than	  traditional	  political	  authority,	  the	  picture	  is	  much	  different.	  Instead	  of	  arguing	  that	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  grounds	  a	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law,	  we	  want	  to	  establish	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  grounds	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment.	  I’m	  still	  going	  to	  make	  a	  necessity	  argument,	  but	  it’s	  that	  justice	  requires	  equal	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  for	  disobeying	  the	  law	  rather	  than	  requiring	  universal	  obedience	  to	  the	  law.	  	  	   No	  matter	  your	  theory	  of	  justice,	  one	  of	  the	  necessary	  elements	  is	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment.	  Everyone	  agrees	  that	  justice	  requires	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  obedience	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Wellman	  and	  Simmons,	  Is	  There	  a	  Duty	  to	  Obey	  the	  Law?,	  pp.	  127ff.	  4	  Ibid.,	  p.	  167.	  5	  This	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  main	  problem	  with	  one	  of	  Socrates’	  reasons	  for	  not	  fleeing	  Athens	  prior	  to	  his	  death	  in	  Crito.	  	  Crito	  contains	  nascent	  forms	  of	  many	  modern	  accounts	  of	  political	  obligation.	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law,	  just	  not	  universal	  obedience.	  	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  can	  never	  secure	  perfect	  compliance,	  without	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  you	  couldn’t	  get	  the	  significant	  level	  of	  obedience	  required	  for	  justice.	  	  Many	  people	  respond	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  punishment	  in	  the	  law	  rather	  than	  the	  normative	  imperative,	  and	  if	  that	  threat	  were	  removed	  they	  would	  act	  in	  many	  unjust	  ways.	  	  Not	  only	  would	  they	  violate	  others’	  negative	  rights	  more	  often,	  they	  also	  wouldn’t	  contribute	  to	  the	  sorts	  of	  public	  projects	  that	  justice	  requires,	  like	  public	  education.	  	  	  	   A	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  has	  two	  important	  features	  for	  our	  purposes.	  	  First,	  it	  must	  have	  the	  liberty	  to	  punish.	  	  If	  it	  didn’t,	  then	  it	  would	  wrong	  citizens	  every	  time	  it	  punished	  them	  and	  would	  not	  serve	  the	  ends	  of	  justice.	  	  Notice	  that	  the	  liberty	  to	  punish	  correlates	  only	  to	  a	  vulnerability	  on	  the	  part	  of	  subjects,	  not	  a	  duty.	  	  The	  extension	  of	  this	  argument	  to	  a	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  is	  the	  part	  that	  Simmons	  objected	  to.6	  	  The	  state	  is	  at	  liberty	  to	  punish	  people	  for	  not	  meeting	  their	  duties	  of	  justice	  for	  essentially	  the	  same	  reason	  that	  you	  are	  at	  liberty	  to	  break	  into	  someone	  else’s	  cabin	  in	  the	  woods	  in	  order	  to	  survive.	  	  Conditions	  of	  moral	  necessity	  give	  individuals	  the	  permission	  to	  encroach	  on	  others	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  be	  objectionable	  without	  the	  moral	  necessity.	  	  	  Second,	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  must	  exercise	  its	  permission	  to	  punish	  in	  an	  effective	  and	  non-­‐arbitrary	  manner.7	  	  Imagine	  that	  the	  government	  issued	  a	  law	  that	  made	  group	  A	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  φ-­‐ing	  but	  didn’t	  make	  group	  B	  vulnerable	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Although	  Simmons,	  as	  with	  many	  anarchists,	  also	  denies	  that	  the	  government	  is	  required,	  arguing	  that	  private	  institutions	  can	  meet	  any	  demands	  the	  government	  can.	  	  This	  seems	  quite	  implausible	  to	  me,	  but	  I’m	  not	  going	  to	  enter	  that	  debate	  here.	  7	  Why	  not	  think	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  has	  to	  punish	  everyone	  equally,	  rather	  than	  just	  equal	  vulnerability?	  Well,	  like	  obeying	  the	  law,	  equal	  punishment	  is	  not	  required	  for	  the	  system	  to	  meet	  its	  ends.	  	  Equal	  vulnerability	  to	  the	  law	  is	  required	  in	  order	  for	  the	  threat	  of	  punishment	  to	  have	  its	  deterrent	  effects,	  which	  I	  take	  it	  are	  central	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  justified	  punishment.	  	  For	  more	  in	  this	  vein,	  see	  Quinn,	  “The	  Right	  to	  Threaten	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Punish”.	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punishment	  for	  φ-­‐ing.	  	  This	  is	  blatantly	  arbitrary	  and	  prefers	  B	  to	  A	  for	  no	  good	  reason.	  	  Arbitrariness,	  though,	  renders	  a	  system	  of	  punishment	  unfair,	  and	  justice	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  with	  an	  arbitrary	  system	  of	  punishment.	  	  A	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  has	  to	  treat	  each	  individual	  equally,	  which	  is	  one	  reason	  laws	  targeted	  at	  particular	  individuals	  are	  bad	  laws.	  	  It	  also	  has	  to	  apply	  broadly;	  if	  most	  people	  weren’t	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment,	  it	  wouldn’t	  be	  able	  to	  sufficiently	  coordinate	  action	  to	  achieve	  justice.	  	  So	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  not	  only	  depends	  on	  the	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  of	  subjects	  but	  also	  to	  creating	  widespread	  and	  non-­‐arbitrary	  vulnerability.	  Widespread	  and	  non-­‐arbitrary	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment,	  and	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  is	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  justice.	  	  The	  necessity	  argument	  here	  is	  not	  about	  establishing	  a	  duty	  to	  φ	  because	  φ-­‐ing	  is	  necessary.	  	  Instead,	  the	  necessity	  argument	  shows	  why	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  is	  important	  enough	  to	  make	  citizens	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  if	  they	  don’t	  meet	  it	  as	  well	  as	  why	  vulnerability	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  widespread.	  	  Not	  all	  moral	  duties	  are	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  people	  can	  be	  punished	  for	  failing	  to	  meet,	  especially	  punished	  by	  the	  government,	  like	  the	  consent-­‐based	  duty	  not	  to	  cheat	  on	  one’s	  partner.	  	  Once	  we	  see	  that	  justice	  is	  a	  sufficiently	  important	  aim	  and	  that	  widespread,	  non-­‐arbitrary	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  is	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim,	  we	  see	  why	  citizens	  have	  no	  moral	  objection	  to	  being	  made	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  by	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  government.	  This	  also	  means	  that	  governments	  meet	  the	  deference	  condition,	  for	  fulfilling	  the	  duty	  of	  justice	  is	  an	  area	  where	  it	  is	  more	  important	  to	  complete	  the	  task	  than	  to	  make	  the	  decision	  on	  one’s	  own.	  	  The	  duty	  of	  justice	  is	  doing	  the	  same	  work	  in	  establishing	  governments’	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority	  as	  the	  duty	  not	  to	  let	  the	  world	  be	  destroyed	  did	  to	  establish	  the	  Grand	  Master’s	  authority	  over	  you	  in	  Hero	  Chess.	  
	   187	  
One	  of	  Simmons’	  worries	  about	  necessity	  theories	  is	  that	  they	  are	  unclear	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  necessity	  and	  often	  make	  arguments	  that	  elide	  necessity	  and	  helpfulness.	  	  The	  problem	  for	  grounding	  a	  general	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  is	  that	  obeying	  the	  law	  on	  every	  occasion	  is	  merely	  helpful	  and	  not	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  justice.	  	  But	  the	  sense	  of	  necessity	  I	  am	  appealing	  to	  is	  very	  robust.	  	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  one	  of	  the	  constitutive	  elements	  of	  justice	  is	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  and	  that	  one	  of	  the	  constitutive	  elements	  of	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  is	  widespread	  and	  non-­‐arbitrary	  vulnerability	  before	  the	  law.	  	  Thus,	  if	  people	  are	  not	  equally	  vulnerable,	  nonarbitrariness	  is	  entailed,	  and	  neither	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  nor	  justice	  can	  be	  achieved.	  	  The	  necessity	  is	  not	  about	  causal	  contribution	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  a	  particular	  outcome	  but	  about	  what	  constitutes	  the	  outcome.	  	  This	  view	  also	  recognizes	  the	  fact	  that	  obeying	  the	  law	  in	  every	  case	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  justice;	  even	  if	  I’m	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment,	  I	  may	  decide	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  punishment	  is	  worth	  breaking	  the	  law.	  	  What	  would	  undermine	  justice	  is	  if	  I	  wasn’t	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  simply	  because	  I	  decided	  not	  to	  be	  on	  this	  occasion.	  	   Note	  that	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  widespread	  and	  non-­‐arbitrary	  vulnerability	  is	  required,	  this	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  some	  people	  not	  being	  vulnerable	  for	  good	  reasons.	  	  The	  government	  often	  tries	  to	  make	  these	  sorts	  of	  accommodations,	  as	  with	  religious	  exceptions	  to	  government	  restrictions	  on	  peyote.	  	  The	  vulnerability	  that’s	  required	  for	  justice	  is	  equal	  application	  of	  the	  law	  to	  all	  subjects,	  including	  the	  ability	  of	  everyone	  to	  get	  exemptions	  where	  they	  meet	  the	  conditions;	  anyone	  who	  uses	  peyote	  for	  religious	  purposes	  can	  get	  an	  exemption.	  	  This	  kind	  of	  exception	  is	  neither	  arbitrary	  nor	  widespread	  enough	  to	  undermine	  a	  system	  of	  punishment	  being	  effective	  and	  fair,	  and	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  a	  good	  legal	  system.	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   This	  discussion	  of	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  may	  look	  a	  bit	  orthogonal	  to	  my	  concern	  with	  political	  authority.	  	  Simmons	  and	  others	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  citizen	  and	  whether	  she	  has	  a	  general	  obligation	  to	  obey	  the	  law.	  	  Given	  my	  rejection	  of	  traditional	  accounts	  of	  political	  authority,	  I	  have	  to	  agree	  with	  Simmons	  that	  citizens	  don’t	  have	  such	  an	  obligation.8	  	  Instead,	  for	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority,	  I	  was	  trying	  to	  identify	  a	  duty	  that	  could	  plausibly	  be	  thought	  to	  cover	  all	  or	  most	  subjects	  and	  that	  is	  important	  enough	  that	  it	  can	  meet	  the	  precedence	  condition.	  	  The	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  meets	  both	  of	  these	  criteria;	  it	  is	  the	  general	  sort	  of	  duty	  that	  everyone	  has	  and	  it	  is	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  people	  can	  appropriately	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  failing	  to	  meet.	  So	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  can	  ground	  evidential	  authority,	  but	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  whether	  it	  can	  ground	  a	  general	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law.9	  	  	   If	  the	  precedent	  duty	  relevant	  for	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority	  is	  a	  Rawlsian	  duty	  of	  justice,	  then	  it	  follows	  that	  the	  expertise	  required	  to	  meet	  this	  duty	  is	  expertise	  about	  setting	  up,	  maintaining,	  and	  upholding	  just	  institutions,	  particularly	  the	  institutions	  that	  make	  up	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society.	  	  The	  question	  now	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  any	  modern	  governments	  have	  this	  expertise	  with	  respect	  to	  some	  of	  their	  citizens.	  	  And	  I	  think	  it	  is.	  	  In	  the	  last	  chapter	  I	  gave	  some	  schematic	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  governments’	  institutional	  nature	  could	  allow	  them	  to	  achieve	  heights	  of	  expertise	  that	  individuals	  could	  not.	  	  In	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  expertise	  condition,	  though,	  I	  need	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  actual	  governments	  have	  the	  specific	  expertise	  that	  is	  required	  to	  meet	  the	  duty	  of	  justice.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Although	  it’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  my	  account	  doesn’t	  entail	  that	  there’s	  no	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law,	  it	  just	  claims	  that	  no	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  is	  required	  for	  the	  government	  to	  have	  genuine	  authority	  or	  achieve	  justice.	  9	  Cf.	  Wellman,	  “Liberalism,	  Samaritanism,	  and	  Political	  Legitimacy”.	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In	  order	  to	  give	  content	  to	  the	  duty	  of	  justice	  we	  need	  a	  theory	  of	  justice,	  so	  I	  am	  going	  to	  continue	  in	  the	  Rawlsian	  vein	  of	  this	  discussion	  and	  assume	  that	  the	  best	  theory	  of	  justice	  is	  Rawls’	  own	  justice	  as	  fairness.	  	  The	  content	  of	  the	  duty	  of	  justice	  is	  thus	  to	  create,	  support,	  and	  uphold	  institutions	  that	  realize	  Rawls’	  two	  principles	  of	  justice.	  Whether	  you	  agree	  with	  this	  assumption	  isn’t	  particularly	  important,	  as	  the	  argument	  below	  can	  be	  made	  with	  your	  preferred	  theory	  of	  justice,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  although	  applying	  a	  different	  theory	  of	  justice	  may	  result	  in	  different	  evaluations	  of	  actual	  governments.	  	  Given	  that	  you	  are	  reading	  this	  dissertation,	  you	  are	  a	  particularly	  inapt	  example	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  citizen	  that	  governments	  might	  have	  justice	  expertise	  with	  respect	  to.	  	  If	  your	  profession	  is	  the	  study	  of	  justice,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  you	  have	  justice	  expertise,	  and	  likely	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  than	  the	  government.	  	  Below	  I’ll	  introduce	  some	  considerations	  in	  favor	  of	  believing	  that	  even	  those	  with	  justice	  expertise	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  government’s	  authority	  in	  broad	  swaths	  of	  their	  daily	  lives.	  	  But	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  governments	  have	  sufficient	  justice	  expertise	  to	  ground	  authority	  over	  many	  or	  most	  of	  their	  citizens,	  you	  must	  abstract	  from	  your	  own	  case.	  	  The	  number	  of	  individuals	  with	  justice	  expertise	  is	  essentially	  trivial	  considered	  against	  the	  huge	  populations	  of	  modern	  states.	  While	  abstracting	  from	  your	  own	  case	  as	  an	  individual,	  you	  shouldn’t	  also	  abstract	  to	  the	  perspective	  of	  any	  citizen	  in	  any	  state.	  The	  governments	  with	  the	  most	  plausible	  claim	  to	  justice	  expertise	  are	  those	  governments	  that	  are	  closest	  to	  actually	  being	  just.	  	  We	  see	  their	  expertise	  realized	  in	  their	  institutions	  and	  outcomes.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  justice	  as	  fairness,	  the	  best	  case	  for	  justice	  expertise	  is	  for	  Western,	  liberal	  democracies,	  and	  especially	  the	  Scandinavian	  governments.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  is	  not	  even	  a	  prima	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facie	  case	  for	  the	  justice	  expertise	  of	  some	  actual	  regimes,	  of	  which	  North	  Korea	  is	  the	  best,	  most	  horrifying	  current	  example.10	  	  The	  cases	  between	  North	  Korea	  and	  Western	  democracies	  are	  wide-­‐ranging	  and	  more	  difficult.	  	  For	  now,	  I’m	  going	  to	  focus	  on	  Western	  democracies,	  given	  that	  they	  have	  the	  strongest	  claim	  to	  justice	  expertise.	  	  	  In	  particular,	  I’ll	  consider	  the	  case	  of	  the	  American	  government	  for	  three	  reasons.	  	  First,	  I	  am	  most	  familiar	  with	  American	  political	  history	  and	  institutions,	  allowing	  a	  more	  nuanced	  discussion.	  	  Second,	  since	  I	  am	  American,	  whether	  the	  American	  government	  has	  genuine	  authority	  is	  a	  particularly	  relevant	  question.	  Finally,	  if	  I	  can	  build	  a	  plausible	  case	  that	  the	  American	  government	  has	  genuine	  authority,	  I	  will	  have	  also	  made	  the	  case	  for	  much	  of	  Northern	  and	  Western	  Europe,	  as	  those	  governments	  have	  stronger	  claims	  to	  justice	  expertise	  than	  the	  American	  government.	  	  	  Let’s	  start	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  American	  government	  has	  justice	  expertise	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  average	  American	  citizen.	  	  This	  claim	  could	  be	  established	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  	  One	  is	  simply	  to	  appeal	  to	  American	  political	  history.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  justice	  had	  to	  be	  imposed	  on	  American	  society	  from	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  especially	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  because	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  land,	  set	  by	  legislators	  elected	  by	  popular	  vote,	  would	  not	  respect	  those	  elements.	  	  The	  most	  obvious	  example	  is	  racial	  equality	  and	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  individuals	  involved	  in	  that	  movement	  lacked	  justice	  expertise,	  like	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.	  or	  Malcolm	  X	  (or	  whatever	  figure	  you	  prefer),	  nor	  is	  it	  to	  deny	  that	  those	  individuals	  and	  many	  average	  citizens	  played	  a	  large,	  leading,	  important	  role	  in	  changing	  the	  attitudes	  of	  other	  citizens	  and	  the	  government	  itself.	  	  It’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  For	  a	  recent	  United	  Nations	  report	  detailing	  the	  widespread	  human	  rights	  atrocities	  committed	  by	  the	  government	  of	  the	  Democratic	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  and	  its	  leader	  Kim	  Jong-­‐Un,	  see	  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx.	  Accessed	  2/23/14.	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simply	  to	  say	  that	  most	  Americans	  did	  not	  believe	  racial	  equality	  was	  a	  fundamental	  issue	  of	  justice	  (or,	  if	  they	  believed	  it,	  their	  political	  judgments	  did	  not	  cohere	  with	  their	  beliefs).	  	  They	  were	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  if	  they	  disobeyed	  the	  civil	  rights	  laws	  because	  the	  government	  was	  expert	  about	  this	  issue	  and	  they	  were	  not.	  	  We	  see	  the	  same	  top-­‐down	  dynamic	  in	  many	  cases	  of	  basic	  justice,	  as	  even	  today	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  strikes	  down	  laws	  discriminating	  against	  the	  LGBTQ	  members	  of	  our	  community.	  	   We	  can	  also	  see	  the	  non-­‐expertise	  of	  the	  average	  American	  citizen	  by	  looking	  at	  opinion	  polls	  about	  basic	  issues	  of	  justice.	  	  Nearly	  one	  third	  of	  Americans	  support	  making	  Christianity	  the	  national	  religion	  of	  the	  United	  States.11	  	  One	  quarter	  of	  Americans	  believe	  the	  government	  should	  do	  little	  or	  nothing	  about	  rising	  income	  inequality.12	  	  Despite	  rapidly	  changing	  attitudes,	  about	  forty	  percent	  of	  Americans	  still	  believe	  that	  homosexual	  marriages	  should	  not	  be	  recognized	  by	  the	  state.13	  	  We	  could	  go	  on.	  	  These	  are	  basic	  issues	  of	  justice	  from	  the	  Rawlsian	  perspective:	  racial,	  gender,	  and	  sexual-­‐orientation	  equality,	  the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state,	  and	  the	  devastating	  political	  effects	  of	  income	  equality.	  	  Any	  political	  institutions	  that	  do	  not	  address	  these	  issues	  are	  not	  just,	  yet	  significant	  percentages	  of	  Americans	  disagree.	  	  	  Just	  so	  we’re	  clear,	  let’s	  consider	  the	  actual	  numbers	  instead	  of	  percentages.	  	  There	  are	  about	  315	  million	  Americans.	  	  That	  means	  about	  100	  million	  people	  in	  America	  think	  Christianity	  should	  be	  the	  state	  religion,	  about	  75	  million	  think	  the	  government	  should	  do	  little	  or	  nothing	  about	  rising	  income	  inequality,	  and	  about	  125	  million	  think	  homosexuals	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  HuffPo/YouGov	  poll,	  April	  2013,	  http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/toplines_churchstate_0403042013.pdf	  12	  USA	  Today/Pew	  poll,	  January	  2014,	  http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/23/pew-­‐poll-­‐obama-­‐wealth-­‐gap-­‐sotu/4777385/	  13	  Pew	  poll,	  2013,	  http://www.people-­‐press.org/files/legacy-­‐pdf/3-­‐20-­‐13%20Gay%20Marriage%20Release.pdf	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should	  not	  have	  the	  legal	  right	  to	  marry.	  	  If	  they	  are	  so	  mistaken	  about	  such	  basic	  issues	  of	  justice,	  though,	  it’s	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	  they	  misunderstand	  justice	  broadly.	  	  Thus	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	  the	  American	  government,	  even	  with	  its	  widespread	  and	  egregious	  failings	  and	  imperfections,	  has	  expertise	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  justice	  with	  respect	  to	  those	  individuals.	  	  	  Simply	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  most	  obvious	  cases	  of	  citizens’	  opinions	  on	  basic	  issues	  of	  justice,	  we	  have	  made	  a	  plausible	  case	  that	  the	  American	  government	  has	  genuine	  evidential	  authority	  over	  a	  third	  of	  its	  citizens,	  or	  about	  100	  million	  people.	  	  The	  point	  is	  not	  that	  the	  American	  government	  always	  acts	  well,	  or	  even	  mostly	  acts	  well,	  just	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  100	  million	  people	  in	  America	  whom	  understand	  justice	  so	  poorly	  that	  they	  will	  act	  better	  if	  they	  try	  to	  follow	  the	  commands	  of	  the	  American	  government	  than	  if	  they	  tried	  to	  achieve	  justice	  by	  following	  their	  own	  judgment.	  	  This	  is,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  eminently	  plausible,	  as	  it	  should	  be	  to	  anyone	  familiar	  with	  the	  American	  public.	  	  	  Note	  that	  this	  claim	  is	  not	  about	  how	  well	  members	  of	  the	  public	  treat	  others	  interpersonally,	  but	  about	  how	  they	  would	  set	  up	  institutions	  that	  must	  meet	  the	  two	  principles	  of	  justice.	  It’s	  not	  a	  surprise	  that	  the	  average	  person’s	  judgment	  about	  the	  massively	  complex	  question	  of	  how	  to	  set	  up	  the	  institutions	  that	  constitute	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  in	  a	  way	  that	  treats	  all	  fairly	  is	  bad.	  The	  more	  complex	  the	  question,	  the	  more	  we	  should	  expect	  that	  reliably	  good	  judgment	  requires	  intense,	  prolonged	  inquiry	  and	  training	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  grounds	  expertise.	  Political	  questions,	  especially	  questions	  of	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  basic	  structure,	  are	  among	  the	  most	  complex	  questions	  we	  face.	  Establishing	  authority	  over	  100	  million	  people	  is	  no	  small	  achievement	  and	  grounds	  at	  least	  a	  presumption	  in	  favor	  of	  thinking	  that	  the	  American	  government	  could	  have	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sufficiently	  wide-­‐sweeping	  authority	  to	  achieve	  justice.	  	  But	  that	  can’t	  be	  the	  end	  of	  the	  argument.	  	  Given	  that	  I	  have	  now	  grounded	  the	  possibility	  of	  genuine	  modern	  political	  authority	  in	  the	  government’s	  unique	  ability	  to	  help	  us	  meet	  the	  duty	  of	  justice,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  governments	  have	  authority	  over	  a	  significant	  enough	  portion	  of	  their	  population	  to	  achieve	  justice,	  and	  over	  enough	  domains.	  	  I	  don’t	  know	  that	  we	  can	  pin	  down	  a	  certain	  percentage,	  but	  one-­‐third	  is	  not	  enough.	  	  We	  need	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  some	  modern	  governments	  have	  genuine	  authority	  over	  most	  of	  their	  citizens,	  in	  most	  domains,	  over	  most	  of	  their	  lives,	  to	  establish	  that	  they	  have	  sufficient	  authority	  to	  achieve	  justice.	  You	  might	  note	  at	  this	  point	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  American	  government	  has	  justice	  expertise	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  expert	  about	  Rawls’	  justice	  as	  fairness	  is	  quite	  implausible.	  	  That’s	  correct;	  the	  American	  government	  has	  no	  expertise	  about	  Rawls’	  philosophy	  and	  doesn’t	  claim	  to	  be	  constrained	  by	  the	  Rawlsian	  principles	  of	  justice.	  	  This	  isn’t	  a	  problem	  because	  expertise	  does	  not	  require	  perfect,	  or	  even	  objectively	  accurate,	  beliefs.	  	  Consider	  that	  we	  know	  Newtonian	  physics	  to	  be	  false,	  but	  that	  doesn’t	  undermine	  the	  claim	  that	  pre-­‐relativity	  physicists	  were	  physics	  experts.	  	  They	  endorsed	  a	  view	  that	  was	  false	  but	  their	  beliefs	  were	  still	  constrained	  by	  significant	  evidence	  and	  worked	  in	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  test	  cases.	  	  Their	  expertise	  is	  based	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  correctly	  apply	  plausible	  and	  well-­‐supported	  theories	  to	  new	  situations,	  not	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  apply	  the	  correct	  theory.	  	  	  It’s	  likely	  that	  modern	  physicists	  also	  have	  a	  host	  of	  false	  beliefs	  based	  on	  false	  theories	  that,	  although	  accurate	  on	  the	  whole,	  are	  not	  strictly	  true.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  physicists	  find	  evidence	  debunking	  string	  theory,	  some	  physicists’	  beliefs	  will	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  false.	  	  This	  doesn’t	  render	  those	  physicists	  non-­‐expert	  about	  physics.	  	  A	  government	  can	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have	  justice	  expertise	  even	  if	  it	  does	  not	  endorse	  the	  correct	  theory	  of	  justice.	  What	  exactly	  justice	  requires	  and	  whether	  particular	  theories	  of	  justice	  are	  true	  is	  also	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  more	  reasonable	  disagreement	  (even	  among	  experts)	  than	  whether	  relativistic	  physics	  is	  true,	  so	  we	  can’t	  necessarily	  demand	  that	  governments	  endorse	  justice	  as	  fairness	  in	  order	  to	  be	  expert	  in	  the	  way	  we	  would	  demand	  that	  a	  physicist	  reject	  Newtonian	  physics	  in	  favor	  of	  relativistic	  physics	  in	  order	  to	  be	  expert.	  So	  we	  needn’t	  demand	  that	  modern	  governments	  endorse	  justice	  as	  fairness	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  their	  directives	  reasonably	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  justice	  as	  fairness	  and	  whether	  the	  average	  citizen	  would	  better	  fulfill	  her	  duty	  of	  justice	  by	  following	  the	  government’s	  directives	  than	  by	  following	  her	  own	  judgment.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  argument	  in	  chapter	  four	  actually	  showed	  that	  when	  the	  stakes	  are	  high	  enough,	  and	  I	  take	  it	  the	  achievement	  of	  justice	  is	  an	  extremely	  important	  duty,	  non-­‐expert	  yet	  still	  significant	  differences	  in	  reliability	  can	  ground	  authority,	  as	  in	  Proficient	  Hero	  Chess.	  	  The	  authority	  needn’t	  have	  expertise	  in	  the	  most	  robust	  sense	  of	  the	  idea,	  just	  relative	  expertise	  over	  citizens.	  	  Of	  course	  it	  would	  be	  better	  if	  governments	  explicitly	  endorsed	  the	  correct	  theory	  of	  justice	  (whatever	  it	  is),	  as	  that	  would	  make	  them	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  actually	  achieve	  justice.	  	  Not	  making	  that	  endorsement,	  though,	  doesn’t	  doom	  the	  possibility	  of	  having	  genuine	  authority.	  	  	   The	  government’s	  expertise	  also	  explains	  how	  laws	  can	  function	  as	  standing	  orders.	  	  Recall	  that	  in	  chapter	  two	  I	  argued	  that	  one	  of	  the	  defining	  features	  of	  political	  authority	  is	  that	  is	  diachronic	  to	  an	  extreme	  extent,	  claiming	  the	  power	  to	  bind	  citizens	  over	  the	  entire	  course	  of	  their	  lives.	  	  This	  is	  puzzling,	  especially	  if	  we	  are	  focused	  on	  the	  sorts	  of	  examples	  I	  have	  appealed	  to,	  where	  authority	  is	  temporary	  and	  arises	  out	  of	  what	  are	  essentially	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emergency	  situations.	  	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  justice,	  though,	  the	  government	  needs	  diachronic	  authority.	  	  In	  chapter	  three	  I	  characterized	  the	  expert’s	  judgment	  as	  having	  trumping	  reliability;	  in	  addition,	  it	  has	  insurmountable	  reliability.	  	  Insurmountable	  reliability	  explains	  how	  the	  government’s	  authority	  could	  plausibly	  bind	  citizens	  over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  entire	  lives.	  	  A’s	  reliability	  is	  insurmountable	  for	  B	  iff	  it	  is	  rational	  for	  B	  to	  treat	  her	  judgment	  as	  permanently	  less	  reliable	  than	  A’s	  judgment	  because	  it	  necessarily	  is	  less	  reliable	  or	  because	  it	  is	  not	  irrational	  for	  B	  to	  permanently	  forego	  the	  only	  process	  that	  could	  make	  her	  judgment	  as	  or	  more	  reliable	  than	  A’s.	  Let	  me	  explain.	  	   The	  kind	  of	  deliberation	  or	  following	  your	  own	  judgment	  that	  expertise	  rules	  out	  is	  the	  kind	  that	  aims	  to	  come	  to	  a	  conclusion	  in	  better	  conformity	  with	  the	  preexisting	  reasons	  than	  the	  expert’s	  judgment.	  	  If	  such	  a	  conclusion	  were	  reached,	  then	  the	  layperson	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  ignoring	  the	  command	  and	  following	  her	  own	  judgment	  again;	  her	  judgment	  would	  have	  surmounted	  the	  expert.	  	  We	  might	  call	  this,	  somewhat	  awkwardly,	  surmounting	  deliberation.	  Raz	  actually	  hints	  at	  something	  like	  this	  while	  explaining	  why	  exclusion	  does	  not	  cut	  off	  deliberation	  as	  such:	  “There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  prevent	  a	  person	  in	  such	  circumstances	  from	  going	  through	  the	  arguments	  to	  amuse	  himself	  or	  as	  an	  exercise,	  etc.,	  so	  long	  as	  he	  does	  not	  trust	  his	  judgment	  enough	  to	  act	  on	  it.”14	  	  If	  we	  plausibly	  interpret	  trusting	  one’s	  judgment	  as	  a	  claim	  about	  confidence	  in	  the	  reliability	  of	  one’s	  judgment,	  then	  Raz	  is	  ruling	  out	  deliberation	  that	  could	  affect	  confidence	  about	  reliability	  and	  eventually	  justify	  disobedience.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  the	  expert’s	  reliability	  is	  insurmountable	  for	  the	  layperson	  amounts	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  layperson	  has	  no	  hope	  of	  successful	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surmounting	  deliberation,	  and	  thus	  is	  irrational	  if	  she	  engages	  in	  it	  (for	  the	  purpose	  of	  surmounting,	  although	  she	  can	  deliberate	  for	  self-­‐improvement	  or	  other	  reasons).	  	  	  	   So,	  to	  show	  that	  laypeople	  must	  permanently	  submit	  their	  judgment	  to	  an	  expert’s	  we	  must	  show	  the	  layperson	  has	  no	  rational	  hope	  of	  successful	  surmounting	  deliberation.	  	  Recall	  the	  “sustained,	  prolonged,	  and	  systematic”	  inquiry	  that	  characterizes	  expertise.	  	  Consider	  the	  expert	  on	  physics.	  	  It’s	  possible	  for	  me	  to	  understand	  the	  physicist	  and	  her	  reasons	  in	  some	  sense:	  I’m	  a	  reasonably	  intelligent	  person,	  well	  educated,	  using	  the	  same	  language,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  But	  consider	  that	  the	  physicist	  has	  a	  graduate	  degree,	  so	  she	  has	  spent	  years	  of	  her	  life	  gaining	  knowledge	  in	  the	  area,	  thinking	  about	  the	  issues,	  testing	  her	  beliefs,	  discussing	  the	  possibilities	  with	  others	  similarly	  knowledgeable	  and	  passionate,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  From	  my	  current	  knowledge	  and	  skill	  base,	  it	  would	  take	  years	  of	  work	  and	  study	  to	  get	  to	  a	  place	  where	  I	  could	  fully	  understand	  the	  physicist’s	  decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  rationale.	  	  	  We’re	  considering	  whether	  I,	  a	  layperson	  with	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  time,	  effort,	  and	  interest	  to	  deliberate	  about	  the	  issue,	  could	  reasonably	  think	  that	  any	  amount	  of	  deliberation,	  fact-­‐finding,	  and	  so	  on	  could	  improve	  the	  reliability	  of	  my	  judgment	  in	  this	  domain	  to	  the	  point	  of	  the	  expert.	  	  And	  spelling	  it	  out	  this	  closely	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  I	  could	  not.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  would	  take	  a	  major	  life	  disruption,	  e.g.	  getting	  a	  degree	  in	  another	  field,	  for	  me	  to	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  the	  expert	  directly.	  	  This	  is	  not	  a	  realistic	  possibility	  for	  me,	  and	  so	  I	  know	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  realistic	  possibility	  that	  I	  could	  look	  at	  the	  extant	  evidence	  and	  deliberate	  more	  reliably	  than	  the	  expert.	  	  No	  matter	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  I	  spend	  thinking	  about	  it	  or	  amount	  of	  work	  I	  put	  into	  it	  I	  will	  remain	  less	  reliable,	  unless	  I	  am	  willing	  to	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embrace	  the	  major	  life	  disruption.	  	  And	  even	  then	  I	  would	  have	  to	  cede	  my	  judgment	  in	  all	  those	  other	  areas	  I	  can’t	  understand	  without	  more	  major	  life	  disruptions.	  	  	  It	  is	  not	  irrational	  for	  me	  not	  to	  pursue	  expertise	  in	  every	  field	  because	  that	  is	  quite	  literally	  impossible	  for	  a	  human	  with	  limited	  cognitive	  capacities	  and	  a	  limited	  life	  span.	  	  Thus	  when	  a	  layperson	  encounters	  an	  expert,	  she	  is	  rational	  in	  permanently	  deferring	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  expert	  because	  she	  knows	  that	  any	  amount	  of	  deliberation	  (excepting	  major	  life	  disruptions)	  could	  not	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  increase	  her	  reliability	  to	  the	  point	  of	  surmounting	  the	  expert’s	  reliability.	  	  This	  explains	  how	  it’s	  not	  only	  the	  case	  that	  many	  average	  citizens	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  government	  at	  a	  particular	  time,	  but	  also	  how	  they	  are	  subject	  over	  the	  entire	  course	  of	  their	  lives.	  If	  the	  government	  has	  expertise	  about	  meeting	  the	  demands	  of	  justice	  relative	  to	  much	  of	  its	  population,	  we	  can	  also	  explain	  how	  modern	  governments’	  claim	  to	  set	  their	  own	  jurisdictional	  limits	  might	  be	  justified	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  population.	  	  Governments	  don’t	  only	  claim	  to	  bind	  you	  with	  respect	  to	  domains	  and	  acts	  that	  you	  think	  they	  have	  authority	  over.	  	  Governments	  go	  on	  to	  make	  the	  much	  more	  robust	  claim	  that	  they	  decide	  which	  domains	  they	  have	  authority	  in:	  they	  set	  their	  own	  jurisdictional	  limits.15	  	  Laws	  can	  both	  extend	  and	  restrict	  the	  domains	  into	  which	  the	  government	  imposes	  its	  will.	  This	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  meta-­‐authority:	  authority	  not	  only	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  political	  domains	  but	  authority	  to	  determine	  which	  domains	  are	  political.	  	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  what	  looks	  necessary	  to	  justify	  this	  meta-­‐authority	  is	  meta-­‐expertise:	  expertise	  not	  only	  about	  how	  to	  achieve	  justice	  in	  particular	  domains	  but	  expertise	  about	  which	  domains	  are	  the	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appropriate	  concerns	  of	  justice.	  	  Justice	  expertise	  of	  the	  sort	  I	  have	  been	  ascribing	  to	  modern	  governments,	  though,	  is	  precisely	  this	  sort	  of	  meta-­‐expertise.	  	  It’s	  authority	  not	  only	  about	  how	  to	  secure	  the	  safety	  of	  citizens	  but	  the	  authority	  to	  declare	  racial,	  gender,	  or	  sexual-­‐orientation	  equality	  the	  appropriate	  concern	  of	  the	  government.	  	  Given	  the	  examples	  I	  listed	  above,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  this	  is	  the	  sort	  of	  authority	  modern	  governments	  have	  over	  vast	  swaths	  of	  their	  population,	  particularly	  the	  non-­‐experts	  about	  justice.	  Once	  we	  focus	  on	  authority	  that	  can	  set	  its	  own	  jurisdictional	  limits,	  we	  can	  see	  where	  the	  justice	  expertise	  of	  modern	  governments	  actually	  rests.	  	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  politicians	  or	  bureaucrats	  have	  expertise	  about	  jurisdictional	  limits;	  see	  the	  constant	  encroachment,	  or	  attempted	  encroachment,	  of	  laws	  into	  non-­‐political	  domains,	  like	  the	  sexual	  choices	  of	  consenting	  adults.	  	  Passing	  laws	  of	  that	  sort	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  render	  a	  government	  unjust	  precisely	  because	  modern	  governments	  employ	  a	  separation	  of	  powers.	  	  When	  the	  legislature	  passes	  unjust	  laws	  of	  this	  sort	  in	  governments	  with	  a	  plausible	  claim	  to	  justice	  expertise,	  the	  courts	  strike	  them	  down.	  	  	  So	  is	  my	  claim	  that	  judges	  have	  justice	  expertise?	  I	  don’t	  think	  that’s	  terribly	  implausible	  in	  many	  cases,	  especially	  at	  the	  highest	  levels.	  	  But	  I	  also	  don’t	  need	  to	  make	  this	  claim.	  	  Recall	  from	  chapter	  four	  that	  we	  needn’t	  identify	  individuals	  within	  the	  government	  that	  have	  expertise.	  	  Instead,	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  whether	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  government	  are	  expert,	  which	  is	  best	  explained	  by	  appealing	  to	  expertise	  as	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	  individuals	  embedded	  within	  a	  particular	  institutional	  structure.	  More	  important	  than	  individual	  justices’	  expertise,	  then,	  is	  the	  emergent	  expertise	  of	  the	  political	  institution	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  conception	  of	  justice	  that	  judges	  appeal	  to	  when	  striking	  down	  particular	  unjust	  laws	  is	  the	  conception	  of	  justice	  contained	  in	  the	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constitution.	  	  The	  constitution	  of	  a	  state	  describes	  the	  character	  of	  both	  the	  state	  and	  its	  citizens,	  and	  defines	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  two,	  albeit	  in	  quite	  general	  terms.	  	  But	  those	  general	  terms	  pick	  out	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  justice,	  according	  to	  the	  state,	  that	  laws	  cannot	  impede	  upon.	  	  A	  constitution	  imposes	  institutional	  limits	  on	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  government	  and	  a	  good	  constitution	  will	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  reflective	  of	  the	  demands	  of	  justice.	  	  	  For	  example,	  in	  1996	  the	  American	  Congress	  passed	  the	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  (DOMA)	  and	  President	  Clinton	  signed	  it	  into	  law.	  	  DOMA	  forced	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  not	  recognize	  the	  marriages	  of	  homosexual	  couples	  whose	  marriages	  were	  recognized	  in	  their	  individual	  states.	  	  It	  essentially	  rendered	  homosexual	  marriage	  nonexistent	  at	  the	  federal	  level.	  	  In	  2013,	  DOMA	  was	  struck	  down	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  United	  States	  v	  
Windsor:	  “DOMA	  is	  unconstitutional	  as	  a	  deprivation	  of	  the	  equal	  liberty	  of	  persons	  that	  is	  protected	  by	  the	  Fifth	  Amendment.”	  The	  Fifth	  Amendment	  includes	  a	  due-­‐process	  clause	  that	  protects	  citizens	  from	  arbitrary	  discrimination.	  	  	  While	  the	  court	  strikes	  down	  laws	  for	  procedural	  reasons,	  i.e.	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  law	  violates	  the	  constitution	  is	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  strike	  it	  down,	  the	  constitution	  itself	  is	  an	  explicitly	  moral	  document.	  	  In	  the	  modern	  language	  of	  liberalism,	  citizens	  have	  the	  right	  to	  due	  process	  because	  they	  are	  moral	  agents,	  deserving	  of	  equal	  treatment	  before	  the	  law.	  	  If	  the	  constitution	  didn’t	  have	  such	  a	  clause,	  or	  if	  the	  government	  didn’t	  effectively	  enforce	  it,	  then	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  government	  would	  not	  be	  expert	  in	  attaining	  justice.	  	  It	  doesn’t	  matter	  whether	  individuals	  within	  the	  government	  have	  expertise	  about	  due	  process	  (although	  certainly	  some	  do),	  it	  matters	  that	  the	  institutional	  constraints	  produce	  directives	  that	  accord	  with	  due	  process,	  a	  basic	  demand	  of	  justice.	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These	  reflections	  show	  the	  core	  of	  truth	  in	  the	  demand	  that	  citizens	  “trust	  the	  system”.	  	  When	  a	  president	  gets	  elected	  that	  you	  voted	  against	  and	  begins	  to	  implement	  laws	  that	  you	  think	  are	  wrongheaded,	  you	  don’t	  get	  to	  break	  the	  law	  just	  because	  you	  disagree.	  	  Even	  if	  you	  think	  the	  president	  is	  mistaken,	  a	  trustworthy	  system	  will	  constrain	  the	  effects	  of	  her	  mistakes.	  	  Egregious	  enough	  mistakes	  will	  be	  handled	  by	  the	  courts.	  	  Of	  course,	  if	  the	  courts’	  decisions	  also	  break	  from	  justice	  then	  that	  is	  a	  different	  situation.	  	  The	  point	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  institutional	  constraints,	  like	  the	  constitution,	  that	  ground	  a	  large	  part	  of	  our	  trust	  in	  the	  expertise	  and	  goodwill	  of	  government	  directives.	  	  Most	  citizens	  in	  modern	  democracies	  like	  America	  do	  not	  have	  more	  expertise	  about	  justice	  than	  the	  constitution	  itself	  demonstrates	  and	  imposes	  on	  government	  directives	  in	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  system.	  	  
2.	  Particularity	  We	  can	  see	  how	  laws	  might	  apply	  beyond	  non-­‐experts	  and	  so	  broadly	  enough	  to	  be	  sufficient	  for	  the	  achievement	  of	  justice	  by	  answering	  another	  objection.	  	  Simmons’	  second	  objection	  to	  Rawls’	  use	  of	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  is	  that	  Rawls	  is	  unable	  to	  capture	  the	  particularity	  of	  the	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law.	  	  Again,	  this	  is	  important	  for	  Simmons	  in	  large	  part	  because	  of	  his	  focus	  on	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  citizen	  and	  political	  obligation.	  	  Simmons	  rightly	  notes	  that	  we	  often	  think	  of	  political	  obligation,	  patriotism,	  civic-­‐mindedness,	  and	  other	  civic	  virtues	  as	  a	  package,	  and	  he	  wants	  to	  capture	  that	  intuition.	  	   The	  particularity	  objection	  to	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  comes	  down	  to	  this:	  if	  you	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  uphold,	  support,	  and	  create	  just	  institutions,	  this	  should	  apply	  as	  much	  to	  your	  own	  institutions	  as	  any	  just	  institution	  in	  the	  world.	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  though,	  you	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don’t	  have	  a	  particular	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  laws	  of	  your	  own	  state,	  you	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  support	  all	  the	  just	  institutions	  in	  the	  world.	  	  One	  way	  to	  do	  this	  would	  be	  to	  support	  your	  own	  just	  institutions	  but	  that	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way,	  and	  likely	  not	  the	  best	  way.	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  often	  seems	  that	  one	  could	  achieve	  justice	  better	  by	  sending	  one’s	  money	  to	  poverty-­‐stricken	  third	  world	  countries	  and	  contributing	  to	  their	  basic	  infrastructure	  than	  by	  paying	  yet	  another	  tax	  to	  the	  governments	  of	  the	  richest	  countries	  in	  the	  world.	  	  This	  seems	  both	  dissonant	  with	  our	  intuitions	  about	  having	  a	  strong	  moral	  bond	  to	  our	  own	  government	  and	  to	  undermine	  the	  cause	  of	  justice.	  	  After	  all,	  if	  people	  conform	  to	  their	  reasons	  by	  contributing	  to	  foreign	  institutions	  rather	  than	  their	  own,	  so	  many	  would	  break	  the	  law	  that	  the	  domestic	  government	  could	  not	  achieve	  its	  aims.	  	   My	  account	  will	  of	  course	  not	  justify	  particular	  duties	  to	  obey	  the	  laws	  of	  your	  country	  because	  my	  account	  does	  not	  justify	  duties	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  at	  all.	  As	  far	  as	  that	  goes,	  I	  can’t	  answer	  Simmons	  challenge.	  	  But	  my	  account	  can	  explain	  why	  individuals	  are	  often	  subject	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  their	  government	  in	  more	  domains,	  which	  is	  a	  form	  of	  particularity.	  	  I	  admit	  it’s	  not	  a	  very	  robust	  form	  of	  particularity,	  but	  I	  think	  the	  robust	  form	  of	  particularity	  Simmons	  demands	  is	  unreasonable.	  I’ll	  explain	  these	  misgivings	  before	  turning	  to	  the	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  some	  weak	  particularity,	  in	  the	  process	  highlighting	  some	  further	  features	  of	  my	  account.	  	   The	  main	  problem	  I	  have	  with	  Simmons’	  particularity	  requirement	  is	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  current	  world.	  	  As	  Simmons	  admits,	  we	  can	  easily	  imagine	  a	  world	  that	  is	  composed	  of	  nearly	  or	  perfectly	  just	  societies,	  and	  under	  those	  conditions	  it	  is	  clear	  why	  one	  has	  particularly	  strong	  moral	  reasons	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  of	  one’s	  own	  society.	  	  In	  such	  an	  arrangement	  justice	  is	  best	  achieved	  by	  everyone	  doing	  their	  own	  part	  in	  their	  society,	  as	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the	  hypothetical	  assumes	  all	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  is	  also	  doing	  their	  own	  part	  in	  their	  society.	  	  But	  the	  actual	  world	  is	  not	  like	  this;	  many	  of	  the	  societies	  of	  the	  world	  are	  ruled	  in	  manifestly	  unjust	  ways,	  which	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  better	  serving	  justice	  by	  helping	  foreign	  institutions.	  	  Simmons	  complains,	  	  The	   natural	   duty	   to	   promote	   justice	   would	   seem	   then…	   to	   require	   not	  morally	  myopic	  continuing	  support	  exclusively	  for	  our	  domestic	  institutions,	  but	   rather	   that	   our	   low-­‐cost	   assistance	   in	   the	   promotion	   of	   justice	   be	  carefully	   budgeted	   and	   targeted	   so	   as	   to	   be	   most	   effective	   in	   promoting	  justice.16	  	  The	  real	  world	  is	  unjust	  enough	  that	  it	  seems	  clear	  we	  could	  better	  achieve	  justice	  by	  supporting	  justice	  in	  areas	  of	  the	  world	  outside	  Western	  democracies.	  	  This	  is	  true,	  but	  it	  is	  no	  objection.	  	   As	  I	  have	  mentioned	  several	  times,	  I	  am	  a	  cosmopolitan.	  	  Simmons’	  characterization	  of	  our	  current	  practices	  as	  “morally	  myopic”	  is	  exactly	  right	  to	  my	  mind.	  	  A	  similar	  criticism	  to	  Simmons’	  particularity	  objection	  is	  sometimes	  raised	  against	  consequentialism.	  	  Under	  current	  conditions,	  as	  Peter	  Singer	  has	  famously	  argued,	  consequentialism	  requires	  donating	  massive	  percentages	  of	  our	  incomes	  to	  help	  the	  needy	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.17	  	  This	  is	  a	  very	  demanding	  moral	  requirement,	  so	  demanding	  that	  some	  people	  reject	  it	  on	  that	  ground	  alone.	  	  More	  worryingly,	  consequentialism	  in	  these	  circumstances	  is	  so	  demanding	  that	  it	  implies	  that	  we	  often	  have	  to	  sacrifice	  important	  elements	  of	  our	  lives	  for	  the	  betterment	  of	  others,	  perhaps	  including	  friendships	  and	  other	  personal	  relationships.	  	  But	  as	  Elizabeth	  Ashford	  has	  said,	  the	  current	  world	  is	  an	  “emergency	  situation,”	  and	  any	  morality	  worthy	  of	  the	  title	  will	  require	  helping	  those	  in	  grave	  need	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Wellman	  and	  Simmons,	  p.	  165.	  17	  Peter	  Singer,	  “Famine,	  Affluence	  and	  Morality”,	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  1	  (1979):	  pp.	  229-­‐243.	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when	  the	  cost	  to	  ourselves	  is	  minimal.18	  	  It	  would	  be	  problematic	  if	  consequentialism	  could	  not	  capture	  some	  of	  our	  intuitions	  about	  the	  demandingness	  of	  morality	  in	  any	  world.	  	  But	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  can’t	  capture	  our	  intuitions	  in	  this	  world,	  where	  more	  than	  twenty	  thousand	  people	  (mostly	  children)	  die	  every	  day	  due	  to	  preventable,	  poverty-­‐related	  causes,	  is	  not	  a	  problem.	  	  	  	   Similarly,	  it	  would	  be	  problematic	  if	  an	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  could	  not	  explain	  how,	  in	  some	  ideal	  circumstances,	  citizens	  would	  have	  more	  reason	  to	  support	  their	  own	  institutions	  than	  others.	  	  But	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  cannot	  capture	  particularity	  in	  this	  world,	  where	  regimes	  like	  North	  Korea	  and	  Syria	  brutally	  oppress	  their	  own	  populations,	  is	  not	  a	  problem.	  	  In	  these	  conditions,	  only	  supporting	  your	  own	  government,	  or	  even	  supporting	  your	  own	  government	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  is	  like	  watering	  your	  lush	  lawn	  while	  people	  right	  across	  the	  fence	  die	  of	  thirst.	  At	  the	  very	  least	  it	  is	  morally	  myopic;	  plausibly,	  it	  is	  massively	  unjust.	  	  	  	  	   With	  my	  reservations	  duly	  noted,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  some	  considerations	  that	  show	  that	  an	  account	  of	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority	  can	  capture	  some	  of	  the	  intuitions	  behind	  Simmons’	  demand.	  	  First,	  once	  we	  move	  away	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  justifying	  a	  particular	  duty	  of	  obedience,	  the	  task	  becomes	  much	  easier.	  	  For	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  theorists	  have	  appealed	  to	  in	  order	  to	  ground	  particularity	  fail	  to	  support	  a	  particular	  duty	  but	  are	  still	  good	  moral	  reasons	  for	  citizens	  to	  be	  particularly	  concerned	  with	  their	  own	  laws.	  	  If	  the	  intuition	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  capture	  is	  simply	  that	  we	  have	  more	  morally-­‐relevant	  ties	  to	  our	  own	  political	  community	  and	  thus	  have	  some	  moral	  reason	  to	  prefer	  it	  over	  others,	  moral	  reasons	  that	  don’t	  ground	  duties	  will	  still	  be	  important.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Elizabeth	  Ashford,	  “Utilitarianism,	  Integrity,	  and	  Partiality,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  97	  (2000):	  pp.	  421-­‐439.	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For	  example,	  in	  Crito	  the	  Laws	  appeal	  to	  Socrates’	  upbringing	  and	  life	  in	  Athens:	  Socrates	  should	  accept	  his	  punishment	  for	  breaking	  Athens’	  laws	  because	  he	  owes	  Athens	  gratitude	  for	  the	  great	  goods	  of	  life	  it	  has	  enabled	  Socrates	  to	  achieve.	  The	  idea	  that	  gratitude	  could	  ground	  a	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  has	  been	  picked	  up	  in	  modern	  times	  as	  well,	  but	  Simmons	  argues	  that	  an	  appeal	  to	  gratitude	  fails.	  	  Gratitude,	  as	  important	  as	  it	  might	  be,	  can’t	  ground	  a	  duty	  to	  obey	  the	  law.	  	  This	  is	  right,	  but	  my	  point	  is	  that	  gratitude	  can	  still	  give	  subjects’	  good	  moral	  reason	  to	  be	  concerned	  more	  with	  the	  laws	  of	  their	  own	  government	  than	  with	  others’.	  	  This	  is	  a	  weak	  form	  of	  particularity,	  sure,	  but	  it	  goes	  a	  good	  ways	  towards	  explaining	  the	  intuition	  that	  citizens	  are	  more	  strongly	  bound	  to	  their	  own	  governments,	  the	  intuition	  that	  motivates	  the	  particularity	  objection.	  Second,	  I	  break	  with	  Rawls	  by	  maintaining	  that	  states	  have	  a	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  as	  much	  as	  individuals,	  and	  part	  of	  that	  is	  creating,	  supporting,	  and	  upholding	  just	  foreign	  political	  institutions.	  	  In	  this	  sense	  my	  appeal	  to	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  is	  more	  in	  line	  with	  Kant’s	  original,	  quite	  cosmopolitan	  thinking	  than	  with	  Rawls.	  	  Ideally,	  much	  of	  the	  work	  that	  individuals	  would	  be	  required	  to	  do	  to	  support	  foreign	  institutions	  would	  actually	  be	  handled	  by	  their	  domestic	  government.	  	  If	  the	  government	  is	  justified	  because	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  fulfill	  our	  duty	  of	  justice	  and	  our	  duty	  of	  justice	  requires	  supporting	  just	  institutions	  wherever	  they	  are	  found,	  then	  the	  government	  can	  only	  be	  justified	  if	  it	  helps	  us	  support	  just	  institutions	  abroad.	  	  And	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  actual	  modern	  governments	  do	  this.	  	  America	  isn’t	  a	  particularly	  great	  example,	  but	  the	  Scandinavian	  governments	  are	  better.	  	  Part	  of	  their	  legitimacy	  as	  states	  is	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  external	  agents,	  and	  that	  includes	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  meet	  their	  duty	  of	  justice	  in	  creating,	  supporting,	  and	  upholding	  just	  institutions	  beyond	  their	  own.	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I	  believe	  it	  is	  true	  that	  modern	  governments	  must	  use	  a	  much	  higher	  percentage	  of	  their	  resources	  towards	  securing	  justice	  for	  foreigners,	  and	  indeed	  that	  this	  is	  the	  best	  way	  for	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  citizens	  of	  those	  states	  to	  discharge	  their	  duty	  of	  justice.	  	  Realism	  in	  international	  relations	  is	  simply,	  obviously,	  demonstrably	  false.19	  	  A	  good	  modern	  government	  has	  expertise	  about	  how	  to	  best	  use	  its	  resources	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  global	  justice,	  although	  of	  course	  most	  modern	  governments	  aren’t	  good	  in	  this	  sense.	  	  America’s	  foreign	  policy	  is	  characterized	  much	  more	  by	  self-­‐interest	  than	  by	  any	  real	  concern	  for	  justice,	  even	  when	  those	  policies	  are	  “justified”	  in	  the	  language	  of	  assisting	  others	  to	  achieve	  justice.	  	  However,	  our	  concern	  is	  not	  whether	  we	  can	  justify	  the	  status	  quo	  but	  whether	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  in	  some	  circumstance,	  likely	  more	  ideal	  than	  our	  current	  world,	  individuals	  can	  discharge	  their	  duty	  of	  justice	  both	  domestically	  and	  internationally	  by	  following	  the	  directives	  of	  their	  own	  government.	  	  And	  this	  makes	  sense	  if	  governments	  are	  reliably	  assisting	  the	  cause	  of	  justice	  internationally.	  	   That	  said,	  even	  in	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is	  today	  there	  are	  two	  factors	  that	  make	  citizens	  more	  particularly	  bound	  to	  their	  own	  governments	  than	  to	  foreign	  governments,	  in	  terms	  of	  vulnerability	  to	  the	  law.	  	  These	  two	  factors	  are	  characteristics	  of	  justice:	  justice	  is	  
contextual	  and	  indeterminate.	  	  For	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  section	  I’ll	  focus	  on	  the	  contextual	  nature	  of	  justice	  and	  push	  the	  discussion	  of	  indeterminacy	  until	  the	  next	  section	  and	  my	  treatment	  of	  democracy.	  Considering	  these	  factors	  answers	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  Simmons	  frames	  the	  particularity	  objection.	  	  If	  citizens’	  duty	  to	  achieve	  justice	  does	  not	  entail	  they	  have	  a	  particularly	  important	  relationship	  to	  their	  own	  states’	  laws,	  it	  seems	  to	  follow	  that	  citizens	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  For	  the	  classic	  rebuttal,	  see	  Charles	  Beitz,	  Political	  Theory	  and	  International	  Relations	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  UP,	  1979).	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are	  subject	  to	  whatever	  reasonably	  just	  system	  claims	  to	  bind	  them.	  	  But	  this	  seems	  clearly	  mistaken,	  as	  Simmons	  writes:	  For	  nobody,	  I	  assume,	  would	  seriously	  argue	  that	  if	  American	  lawmakers	  did	  in	  fact	  specify	  or	  intend	  that	  French	  citizens	  (in	  France)	  should	  pay	  American	  taxes,	   abide	   by	   American	   federal	   law,	   and	   so	   on,	   that	   the	   French	   would	  thereby	  have	  the	  same	  moral	  duty	  to	  obey	  as	  do	  resident	  American	  citizens.20	  	  So	  we	  need	  some	  reason	  to	  expect	  that	  French	  citizens	  are	  not	  bound	  by	  American	  laws,	  even	  if	  those	  laws	  are	  reasonably	  just	  and	  claim	  to	  bind	  French	  citizens.	  First,	  then,	  justice	  is	  contextual.	  The	  fact	  that	  justice	  is	  contextual	  not	  only	  helps	  explain	  particularity	  but	  shows	  that	  the	  authority	  of	  governments	  will	  often	  bind	  even	  experts	  about	  justice	  in	  their	  daily	  lives.	  	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  it’s	  starting	  to	  look	  like	  some	  modern	  governments	  may	  actually	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  bind	  almost	  all	  their	  citizens	  with	  almost	  all	  laws.	  Justice	  is	  contextual	  in	  that	  what	  is	  required	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  justice	  in	  one	  context	  may	  not	  be	  the	  same	  as	  what	  is	  required	  in	  other	  contexts.	  	  For	  example,	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  aims	  of	  political	  institutions	  is	  to	  secure	  the	  personal	  safety	  of	  subjects.	  	  All	  governments	  must	  do	  so,	  but	  how	  each	  government	  should	  do	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  context.	  	  What	  is	  required	  to	  keep	  citizens	  safe	  in	  the	  Arctic	  is	  much	  different	  than	  what	  is	  required	  to	  keep	  them	  safe	  in	  the	  Amazon.	  	  Even	  if	  I	  am	  an	  expert	  about	  justice	  in	  the	  abstract,	  such	  that	  I	  know	  justice	  requires	  securing	  personal	  safety	  and	  everything	  else,	  I	  need	  to	  know	  a	  lot	  of	  empirical	  facts	  about	  the	  government’s	  actual	  context	  of	  action	  in	  order	  to	  know	  what	  the	  demands	  of	  justice	  require	  in	  this	  case.	  	  But	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  sort	  of	  person	  who	  has	  devoted	  herself	  to	  studying	  theories	  of	  justice	  is	  not	  the	  sort	  of	  person	  who	  has	  studied	  all	  the	  relevant	  empirical	  data.	  	  So	  although	  the	  government	  may	  be	  less	  expert	  about	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Wellman	  and	  Simmons,	  Is	  There	  a	  Duty	  to	  Obey	  the	  Law?,	  p.	  163.	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demands	  of	  justice	  in	  general,	  it	  is	  more	  expert	  about	  the	  demands	  of	  justice	  in	  its	  own	  context.	  The	  government	  has	  the	  relevant	  expertise	  to	  have	  authority	  over	  me.	  	  	  If	  this	  is	  true	  of	  justice	  experts,	  then	  it	  is	  going	  to	  be	  true	  of	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  population.	  	  Even	  those	  people	  that	  have	  expertise	  in	  individual,	  justice-­‐relevant	  domains	  will	  be	  bound	  by	  all	  the	  laws	  in	  domains	  that	  they	  lack	  expertise	  in,	  which	  will	  be	  most	  domains.	  	  This	  is	  why	  we	  should	  think	  it	  plausible	  that	  some	  modern	  governments	  could	  have	  authority	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  binds	  a	  level	  of	  the	  population	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  a	  fair	  and	  effective	  system	  of	  punishment,	  so	  ultimately	  to	  achieve	  justice.	  The	  reason	  French	  citizens	  in	  France	  wouldn’t	  be	  bound	  by	  American	  laws	  that	  claimed	  to	  bind	  them	  is	  that	  American	  laws	  don’t	  have	  authority	  over	  them.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  authority	  is	  due	  to	  the	  American	  government’s	  lack	  of	  contextual	  expertise:	  the	  American	  government	  doesn’t	  know	  enough	  about	  the	  particular	  physical,	  historical,	  and	  cultural	  French	  context	  that	  shapes	  the	  demands	  of	  justice	  in	  France.	  	  Thus,	  directives	  that	  were	  intended	  to	  bind	  French	  citizens	  in	  France	  would	  often	  fail	  to	  help	  French	  citizens	  conform	  better	  to	  their	  duty	  of	  justice,	  especially	  as	  compared	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  following	  the	  directives	  of	  the	  reasonably	  just	  French	  government.	  	  The	  American	  government	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  expertise	  condition	  on	  genuine	  evidential	  authority	  with	  respect	  to	  French	  citizens,	  so	  those	  citizens	  aren’t	  bound	  by	  American	  law	  and	  can’t	  be	  made	  vulnerable	  for	  disobeying	  American	  law.	  	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I’ll	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  American	  government	  doesn’t	  meet	  the	  trustworthiness	  condition	  on	  genuine	  authority	  with	  respect	  to	  French	  citizens.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  reasonably	  just	  French	  state,	  it’s	  more	  plausible	  that	  a	  reasonably	  just	  foreign	  government	  could	  have	  justice	  expertise	  with	  respect	  to	  individuals	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in	  France.	  	  This	  still	  doesn’t	  show	  that	  French	  individuals	  would	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  disobeying	  American	  law;	  for	  one	  thing,	  the	  lack	  of	  contextual	  expertise	  would	  mean	  that	  only	  some	  of	  the	  most	  narrow	  and	  basic	  demands	  of	  justice	  could	  reasonably	  be	  imposed	  on	  foreigners.	  	  Further,	  if	  the	  achievement	  of	  justice	  requires	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment,	  then	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  American	  government	  has	  no	  punishment	  institutions	  in	  France	  would	  mean	  that	  many	  people	  would	  disobey	  American	  directives,	  such	  that	  those	  directives	  do	  not	  help	  even	  those	  who	  obey	  to	  achieve	  justice.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  American	  government	  directs	  French	  citizens	  to	  drive	  on	  the	  left,	  most	  will	  ignore	  that	  and	  continue	  driving	  on	  the	  right	  because	  there’s	  no	  effective	  and	  fair	  American	  system	  of	  punishment	  in	  France.	  	  In	  those	  conditions,	  even	  those	  who	  were	  disposed	  to	  obey	  the	  American	  directive	  shouldn’t;	  the	  fact	  that	  everyone	  else	  is	  driving	  on	  the	  right	  gives	  them	  decisive	  moral	  reason	  to	  also	  drive	  on	  the	  right.	  	  So	  following	  the	  American	  directives	  doesn’t	  help	  French	  citizens	  better	  conform	  to	  their	  preexisting	  reasons.	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  the	  American	  government	  would	  still	  suffer	  from	  a	  severe	  deficit	  of	  trustworthiness,	  as	  I	  explain	  below.	  	   The	  fact	  that	  governments	  have	  contextual	  expertise	  shows	  that	  the	  their	  wide-­‐ranging	  authority	  can	  extend	  even	  to	  experts	  about	  justice	  in	  the	  abstract	  ,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  show	  that	  the	  standing	  of	  justice	  experts	  and	  non-­‐experts	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  law	  is	  identical.	  	  Here	  it	  is	  important	  that,	  following	  Raz,	  my	  approach	  to	  authority	  is	  piecemeal.	  	  The	  grounds	  of	  authority	  are	  whether	  the	  commands	  of	  the	  authority	  will	  help	  a	  particular	  individual	  conform	  better	  to	  her	  preexisting	  reasons	  in	  a	  particular	  domain.	  	  We	  can	  thus	  evaluate	  the	  authority	  of	  governments	  with	  respect	  to	  all	  individuals	  and	  all	  domains;	  you	  may	  be	  bound	  in	  some	  domains	  but	  not	  others,	  while	  I	  am	  bound	  by	  different	  domains	  than	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you,	  and	  a	  third	  person	  is	  not	  bound	  at	  all.	  Actual	  governments	  often	  make	  mistakes	  that	  undermine	  their	  authority	  in	  particular	  domains,	  especially	  with	  respect	  to	  justice	  experts.	  	  	  Consider	  the	  issue	  of	  LGBTQ	  marriage.	  	  This	  is	  a	  basic	  demand	  of	  justice,	  a	  demand	  that	  governments	  must	  meet	  regardless	  of	  their	  context.21	  	  Not	  to	  allow	  LGBTQ	  individuals	  to	  have	  legally	  recognized	  marriages	  constitutes	  arbitrary	  legal	  discrimination	  because	  sexual	  orientation	  is	  a	  morally	  arbitrary	  characteristic.	  	  It	  might	  seem	  that,	  due	  to	  governments’	  contextual	  justice	  expertise,	  I’m	  claiming	  that	  those	  discriminatory	  laws	  bind	  all	  citizens,	  even	  those	  who	  recognize	  the	  arbitrariness.	  	  Because	  of	  my	  piecemeal	  understanding	  of	  authority,	  however,	  that’s	  not	  right.	  	  There	  are	  some	  mistakes	  of	  justice	  that	  the	  government	  can	  make	  that	  would	  not	  undermine	  their	  authority	  precisely	  because	  they	  have	  contextual	  justice	  expertise	  with	  respect	  to	  many	  citizens.	  	  But	  discrimination	  on	  arbitrary	  grounds	  is	  not	  one	  of	  those	  mistakes	  because	  it	  is	  a	  basic	  demand	  of	  justice.	  	  If	  authority	  were	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing,	  then	  mistakes	  about	  basic	  demands	  of	  justice	  might	  mean	  the	  government	  lacks	  authority	  over	  justice	  experts	  in	  all	  domains.	  	  On	  the	  piecemeal	  understanding,	  though,	  we	  can	  claim	  that	  the	  government	  lacks	  authority	  specifically	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  LGBTQ	  treatment.	  For	  example,	  if	  I	  am	  a	  member	  of	  the	  clergy	  in	  a	  state	  where	  such	  marriages	  are	  outlawed	  and	  I	  am	  also	  an	  expert	  on	  the	  demands	  of	  justice,	  I	  am	  not	  objectively	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  if	  I	  marry	  an	  LGBTQ	  couple,	  even	  if	  I	  manage	  to	  trick	  the	  government	  into	  legally	  recognizing	  the	  marriage.	  	  If	  I	  am	  punished	  for	  this,	  I	  have	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Sometimes	  under	  conditions	  of	  extreme	  resource	  scarcity,	  governments	  must	  make	  choices	  between	  which	  aspects	  of	  justice	  to	  meet.	  	  In	  those	  sorts	  of	  contexts	  it’s	  plausible	  to	  me	  that	  some	  deviations	  from	  the	  ideal	  standards	  of	  justice	  don’t	  undermine	  authority.	  	  For	  this	  discussion,	  though,	  I’m	  referring	  primarily	  to	  differences	  in	  geography	  and	  culture,	  rather	  than	  resources,	  as	  modern	  states	  of	  the	  sort	  we’re	  considering	  are	  resource	  rich.	  
	   210	  
justified	  moral	  complaint	  against	  the	  government.	  	  Now,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  real	  world	  goes,	  the	  government	  doesn’t	  recognize	  a	  permission	  for	  me	  to	  avoid	  that	  punishment,	  so	  if	  I	  am	  caught	  I	  will	  likely	  actually	  be	  punished.	  	  But	  because	  of	  the	  basic	  injustice	  and	  resultant	  lack	  of	  authority,	  whatever	  reasons	  I	  have	  not	  to	  break	  this	  law	  are	  merely	  prudential.	  	  In	  other	  domains	  of	  my	  life,	  though,	  I	  still	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  government’s	  directives	  are	  more	  reliable	  than	  mine	  and	  the	  government	  has	  authority	  over	  me.	  	  It	  only	  lacks	  authority	  in	  this	  particular	  domain	  because	  of	  its	  basic	  injustice	  in	  that	  domain.	  There	  are	  even	  more	  nuances	  in	  determining	  whom	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  actual	  laws	  bind.	  	  I’m	  going	  to	  discuss	  one	  more,	  but	  it’s	  important	  to	  note	  that	  on	  my	  theory	  of	  authority,	  evaluating	  whether	  a	  particular	  agent	  is	  bound	  by	  a	  particular	  law	  by	  a	  particular	  government	  is	  never	  going	  to	  be	  easy.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  because	  of	  the	  nuance	  I	  want	  to	  touch	  on,	  namely	  the	  effect	  of	  injustice	  on	  the	  trustworthiness	  condition.	  	  	  A	  basic	  injustice	  such	  as	  arbitrary	  discrimination	  has	  deleterious	  effects	  on	  a	  government’s	  trustworthiness,	  not	  just	  on	  their	  expertise.	  	  If	  the	  government	  can	  discriminate	  against	  one	  group	  arbitrarily,	  there’s	  nothing	  to	  stop	  it	  from	  discriminating	  against	  other	  arbitrarily	  chosen	  groups.	  	  If	  that’s	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  government	  might	  be	  so	  untrustworthy	  that	  it	  loses	  all	  authority.	  	  Now,	  it	  would	  be	  too	  quick	  to	  claim	  that	  any	  arbitrary	  treatment	  renders	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  government’s	  directives	  so	  untrustworthy	  that	  they	  don’t	  bind.	  	  As	  in	  the	  LGBTQ	  case,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  obvious	  that	  the	  government	  is	  arbitrary	  about	  a	  specific	  characteristic	  for	  specific	  reasons	  that	  don’t	  translate	  to	  other	  traits.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  a	  government	  discriminates	  against	  women	  and	  specific	  religions	  and	  homosexuals	  and	  political	  opponents,	  it	  shows	  that	  they	  misunderstand	  the	  basic	  imperative	  of	  government	  to	  treat	  subjects	  equally,	  according	  to	  morally	  non-­‐
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arbitrary	  characteristics.	  	  That	  sort	  of	  government	  is	  so	  untrustworthy	  that	  it	  plausibly	  lacks	  all	  authority.	  	  	  The	  government	  can	  also	  lose	  authority	  over	  specific	  groups	  of	  citizens	  by	  discriminating	  against	  them	  across	  many	  domains,	  such	  that	  members	  of	  that	  group	  are	  not	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  disobeying	  the	  law.	  	  A	  clear	  example	  of	  this	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  the	  black	  underclass.	  	  Many	  members	  of	  the	  underclass	  have	  strong	  evidence	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  goodwill	  of	  both	  the	  federal	  and	  their	  more	  local	  governments,	  evidence	  that	  is	  reinforced	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  	  They	  see	  intimidation	  and	  indifference	  from	  government	  representatives,	  friends	  and	  family	  killed	  by	  endemic	  violence	  the	  government	  fails	  to	  address,	  systematic	  discrimination	  in	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system,	  denial	  of	  economic	  and	  educational	  opportunities,	  and	  so	  forth.22	  	  All	  of	  this	  is	  good	  evidence	  that	  the	  government	  does	  not	  have	  their	  interests	  in	  mind	  when	  making	  laws;	  the	  government	  lacks	  goodwill,	  a	  central	  component	  of	  trustworthiness,	  so	  can’t	  have	  authority	  over	  them.	  	  Especially	  concerning	  is	  the	  systematic	  injustice	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system,	  wherein	  blacks	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  arrested,	  convicted,	  and	  punished	  more	  harshly	  for	  the	  same	  crimes	  as	  whites.23	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  government	  lacks	  authority	  over	  many	  members	  of	  the	  black	  underclass	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  meet	  the	  trustworthiness	  condition	  does	  not	  mean	  those	  members	  are	  never	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment.	  	  It’s	  not	  carte	  blanche.	  	  Instead,	  a	  plausible	  consequence	  of	  this	  claim	  may	  be	  that	  they	  are	  still	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  For	  a	  recent	  philosophical	  treatment	  of	  this	  problem,	  see	  Anderson,	  The	  Imperative	  of	  Integration.	  23	  For	  example,	  see	  Michelle	  Alexander,	  The	  New	  Jim	  Crow:	  Mass	  Incarceration	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Colorblindness	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  The	  New	  Press,	  2010).	  
	   212	  
violating	  mala	  in	  se	  laws	  but	  not	  for	  breaking	  (many)	  mala	  prohibita	  laws.24	  	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  systemic	  racial	  injustice	  of	  American	  criminal	  justice	  institutions,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  actual	  American	  government	  wrongs	  those	  individuals	  when	  it	  punishes	  them	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  committed	  punishable	  violations.	  	  	  My	  point	  is	  that	  failures	  of	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness	  by	  the	  government	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  genuine	  authority	  are	  complicated	  matters,	  particularly	  on	  a	  piecemeal	  approach.	  	  Sometimes	  injustices	  can	  be	  traced	  quite	  particularly	  and	  so	  only	  undermine	  the	  government’s	  authority	  in	  specific,	  narrow	  domains.	  	  But	  sometimes	  injustices	  are	  so	  wide-­‐ranging	  that	  they	  infect	  other	  domains	  and	  nullify	  the	  government’s	  authority	  more	  generally.	  	  	  
	  
3.	  Democracy	  At	  this	  point	  I	  have	  made	  the	  case	  that	  Western	  democracies	  plausibly	  meet	  the	  expertise	  condition,	  due	  to	  their	  institutional	  nature	  and	  contextual	  expertise,	  and	  the	  deference	  condition,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  uniquely	  assist	  in	  meeting	  the	  important	  duty	  of	  justice.	  	  	  The	  acceptance	  condition	  is	  easily	  met,	  requiring	  only	  that	  the	  agent	  intends	  to	  bind	  practically	  as	  the	  law	  clearly	  does,	  and	  the	  precedence	  condition	  is	  met	  because	  the	  governments’	  contextual	  justice	  expertise	  is	  precedent	  for	  citizens	  with	  respect	  to	  meeting	  their	  duty	  of	  justice.	  	  The	  only	  remaining	  condition	  is	  trustworthiness.	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  address	  trustworthiness,	  and	  bolster	  the	  case	  for	  the	  expertise	  of	  modern	  governments,	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Some	  mala	  prohibita	  laws	  change	  empirical	  conditions,	  due	  to	  widespread	  compliance,	  such	  that	  vulnerability	  to	  punishment	  is	  also	  appropriate	  for	  breaking	  those	  laws.	  The	  law	  against	  driving	  on	  the	  left	  in	  America	  comes	  to	  mind.	  Thanks	  to	  Ian	  MacMullen	  for	  pushing	  me	  on	  this.	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addressing	  what	  may	  have	  seemed	  to	  you	  an	  obvious	  hole	  in	  my	  account,	  namely	  the	  place	  of	  democracy.	  A	  central	  tenet	  of	  modern	  commonsense	  political	  philosophy	  is	  that	  democracy	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  on	  political	  authority.	  	  The	  history	  of	  political	  organization	  in	  the	  modern	  consciousness	  is	  the	  move	  away	  from	  anti-­‐democratic,	  tyrannical	  regimes	  to	  governments	  “of	  the	  people,	  for	  the	  people,	  by	  the	  people”.	  	  	  Democracy	  is	  claimed	  to	  be	  the	  key	  to	  international	  peace,	  the	  way	  for	  peoples	  to	  overthrow	  oppressors	  and	  join	  the	  global	  community.	  	  The	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  democracy	  is	  a	  strong	  one.	  	  Buchanan,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that,	  	  [I]f	  we	  take	  the	  equality	  of	  persons	  seriously,	  then	  a	  political	  order	  that	  not	  only	   honors	   the	   commitment	   to	   equal	   regard	   by	   respecting	   all	   citizens’	  human	  rights,	  but	  also	  does	  so	  by	  political	  processes	  that	  themselves	  express	  this	  commitment	  to	  equality	  by	  being	  democratic,	  would	  seem	  to	  provide	  the	  best	   answer	   available	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   reconciling	   political	   power	   and	  equality.25	  	  Taking	  the	  moral	  equality	  of	  persons	  seriously	  is	  a	  necessary	  feature	  of	  any	  plausible	  morality;	  Buchanan	  calls	  equality	  of	  persons	  “the	  most	  fundamental	  moral	  principle	  of	  all”.26	  	  An	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  that	  rejects	  democracy	  disrespects	  people	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  members	  of	  the	  moral	  community.	  Expertise	  and	  democracy,	  however,	  seem	  diametrically	  opposed.	  	  We	  don’t	  appeal	  to	  democracy	  because	  it	  makes	  better	  decisions,	  and	  when	  we	  appeal	  to	  experts	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  precisely	  because	  uninformed	  opinions	  are	  insufficient.	  	  	  	   Four	  qualifications	  will	  help	  us	  see	  the	  force	  of	  this	  concern	  for	  my	  account.	  	  First,	  recall	  again	  that	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  expertise	  as	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	  government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Allen	  Buchanan,	  Justice,	  Legitimacy,	  and	  Self-­‐Determination	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  2004):	  p.	  250.	  26	  Ibid.,	  p.	  253.	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directives	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  institutional	  constraints	  on	  individuals	  in	  institutional	  roles.	  	  If	  my	  account	  claimed	  that	  governments	  have	  authority	  only	  when	  they	  are	  under	  the	  control	  of	  experts,	  it	  would	  be	  decidedly	  undemocratic.	  	  But	  that’s	  not	  what	  my	  account	  claims,	  so	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  democracy	  itself	  is	  one	  of	  the	  institutional	  constraints	  that	  leads	  to	  government	  directives	  having	  emergent	  expertise.	  	  Second,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  ignore	  the	  intrinsic	  value	  of	  democracy	  and	  focus	  on	  its	  instrumental	  value,	  particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  achieving	  justice	  and	  having	  genuine	  evidential	  authority.	  	  It	  may	  well	  be	  the	  case	  that	  respecting	  individuals	  requires	  that	  the	  government	  employ	  democratic	  decision-­‐making	  procedures.	  	  I	  think	  this	  is	  true	  but	  also	  that	  it	  is	  an	  issue	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  rather	  than	  political	  authority.	   It	  makes	  sense	  to	  ignore	  the	  intrinsic	  value	  of	  democracy	  in	  this	  context	  because	  while	  democracy	  may	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  on	  political	  legitimacy,	  nobody	  plausibly	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  a	  sufficient	  condition.	  	  At	  its	  core	  democracy	  is	  a	  procedural	  thesis:	  it	  tells	  us	  that	  we	  should	  use	  a	  democratic	  method	  to	  make	  political	  decisions,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  what	  those	  decisions	  should	  be.27	  	  If	  the	  procedure	  results	  in	  patently	  and	  egregiously	  unjust	  decisions,	  they	  cannot	  bind	  regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  democratically	  produced.	  	  The	  majority	  cannot	  oppress	  minorities	  and	  then	  claim	  the	  oppression	  was	  justified	  because	  it	  was	  done	  with	  laws	  that	  the	  majority	  made.	  	  So	  while	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  democracy	  is	  instrumental	  towards	  achieving	  justice,	  it’s	  not	  the	  case	  that	  instituting	  democratic	  procedures	  simply	  entails	  that	  justice	  is	  achieved.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  I	  am	  not	  denying	  that	  democracy	  includes	  much	  more	  than	  a	  procedural	  thesis,	  as	  emphasized,	  e.g.,	  by	  Anderson,	  The	  Imperative	  of	  Integration,	  ch.5.	  	  But	  the	  procedural	  thesis	  is	  a	  central	  component;	  I	  take	  it	  that	  a	  robustly	  democratic	  culture	  and	  civil	  society	  wouldn’t	  serve	  the	  valuable	  functions	  they	  do	  without	  the	  actual	  procedures	  enabling	  the	  people	  to	  express	  their	  values	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  their	  government.	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   Third,	  it	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  my	  theory	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  intrinsic	  value	  of	  democratic	  procedures	  sometimes	  entails	  that	  less	  just	  democratic	  decisions	  should	  be	  preferred	  to	  more	  just	  non-­‐democratic	  decisions.	  	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  deference	  condition,	  which	  if	  you	  recall	  claims	  that	  A	  cannot	  have	  authority	  over	  B	  if	  B	  has	  decisive	  reason	  to	  make	  the	  decision	  on	  her	  own	  judgment.	  	  The	  example	  I	  gave	  to	  illustrate	  this	  was	  the	  responsibilization	  of	  children:	  even	  though	  parents	  may	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  more	  nutritious	  foods,	  at	  some	  point	  allowing	  children	  to	  make	  their	  own	  decisions	  (for	  example	  what	  to	  eat	  for	  lunch)	  is	  more	  important	  than	  the	  result	  of	  those	  decisions.	  It	  is	  the	  process	  of	  making	  decisions	  for	  oneself	  that	  matters	  here.	  	  The	  parent,	  even	  though	  she	  could	  make	  a	  better	  decision,	  should	  not	  interfere.	  	  Failure	  to	  respect	  these	  sorts	  of	  reasons	  leads	  to	  helicopter	  parenting	  and	  overprotected	  children	  who	  cannot	  act	  well	  in	  the	  world	  on	  their	  own.28	  	  Even	  in	  circumstances	  where	  parents	  have	  expertise	  relative	  to	  their	  child,	  the	  deference	  condition	  would	  not	  be	  met.	  	   The	  same	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  in	  favor	  of	  groups	  of	  people	  making	  their	  own	  decisions	  about	  some	  issues,	  even	  when	  those	  decisions	  might	  be	  worse	  (although	  this	  ignores	  the	  point	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  government	  are	  also	  part	  of	  the	  group).	  	  Just	  like	  there	  are	  reasons	  for	  people	  to	  decide	  for	  themselves	  as	  individuals,	  there	  are	  reasons	  for	  people	  to	  decide	  for	  themselves	  as	  collectives.	  	  As	  Buchanan	  noted,	  these	  are	  weighty	  reasons	  because	  they	  originate	  in	  the	  fundamental	  moral	  equality	  of	  all	  people	  as	  well	  as	  their	  rights	  and	  interests	  in	  joining	  together	  into	  larger	  communities.	  	  The	  reasons	  favor	  a	  particular	  decision-­‐making	  procedure,	  letting	  the	  people	  decide	  collectively,	  over	  others,	  like	  forcing	  people	  to	  defer	  to	  an	  authority.	  On	  the	  plausible	  assumption	  that	  democracy	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See	  Buster	  Bluth.	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quite	  important,	  the	  deference	  condition	  will	  not	  be	  fulfilled	  over	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  questions	  and	  decisions	  should	  be	  left	  up	  to	  the	  people	  rather	  than	  to	  experts.29	  	  Even	  though	  expertise	  grounds	  authority,	  we	  often	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  follow	  democratic	  procedures,	  as	  when	  there	  is	  especially	  important	  reason	  for	  the	  public	  to	  decide	  for	  itself.	  	  	  	   Fourth,	  expertise	  is	  only	  relevant	  where	  the	  relevant	  duties	  are	  determinate.	  	  Consider	  the	  issue	  of	  driving	  on	  one	  side	  of	  the	  road.	  	  There	  is	  a	  determinate	  obligation	  for	  everyone	  to	  drive	  on	  the	  same	  side,	  without	  which	  driving	  would	  be	  incredibly	  risky,	  but	  there	  is	  not	  a	  determinate	  side	  that	  everyone	  must	  drive	  on.	  	  Governments	  can	  choose	  either	  the	  right	  or	  the	  left,	  but	  they	  must	  choose	  one	  over	  the	  other.	  	  Expertise	  is	  relevant	  for	  determining	  that	  some	  side	  has	  to	  be	  chosen	  but	  is	  silent	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  side	  should	  be	  chosen.	  	  Moral	  demands	  are	  often	  indeterminate	  in	  this	  way.	  In	  fact,	  we	  might	  expect	  much	  of	  the	  political	  domain	  to	  be	  indeterminate.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  not	  obvious	  if	  which	  side	  of	  the	  road	  to	  drive	  on	  is	  our	  paradigmatic	  case.	  	  A	  better	  case	  is	  property.	  	  Here	  is	  Anna	  Stilz	  clearly	  and	  concisely	  arguing	  property	  is	  morally	  indeterminate:	  	  The	  basic	  thought	  here	  is	  that	  while	  a	  principle	  of	  equal	  freedom	  provides	  us	  some	   information	   about	   what	   just	   property	   distributions	   look	   like,	   the	  principle’s	   content	   is	   underspecified,	   and	   therefore	   cannot	   be	   directly	  applied.	   	   The	   equal	   freedom	   principle	   suggests	   that	   whatever	   system	   of	  property	  we	  implement,	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  everyone’s	  possession	  of	  a	  zone	  of	  freedom	  that	  is	  guaranteed	  against	  others’	  coercive	  interference.	  	  Nevertheless,	   many	   possible	   systems	   of	   property—collective	   allocation,	  market	   socialism,	   unfettered	   private	   ownership—are	   potentially	   consistent	  with	   that	   sense	   of	   equal	   freedom.	   	   And	   under	   each	   one	   of	   these	   many	  possible	   systems,	   there	   will	   again	   be	   many	   possible	   particular	   rules	  consistent	   with	   everyone’s	   freedom—rules	   about	   the	   precise	   bundle	   of	  claims	  conferred	  by	  ownership,	  about	  how	  exchange	  is	  to	  be	  regulated,	  about	  which	  objects	  belong	  to	  which	  particular	  persons.	  	  And	  finally,	  any	  system	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Note	  that	  “broad”	  is	  a	  relative	  term	  here.	  	  An	  appeal	  to	  democracy	  is	  not	  a	  strong	  enough	  reason	  to	  allow	  the	  violation	  of	  human	  rights,	  for	  example.	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property	  will	  also	  have	  to	  include	  some	  aspects	  that	  are	  wholly	  conventional:	  rules	   about	   what	   precise	   formalities	   are	   required	   to	   conclude	   a	   contract,	  exactly	  how	   long	  a	  statute	  of	   limitations	   to	   institute,	  down,	   indeed,	   to	  what	  side	  of	  the	  road	  to	  drive	  on.30	  	  So	  moral	  reasons,	  for	  example	  given	  by	  a	  principle	  of	  equal	  freedom,	  determine	  that	  some	  systems	  of	  property	  are	  ruled	  out,	  for	  example	  complete	  state	  ownership.	  	  But	  they	  do	  not	  uniquely	  endorse	  one	  system	  over	  the	  others,	  let	  alone	  the	  details	  of	  one	  version	  of	  one	  system	  over	  other	  versions.	  	  	  Expertise	  is	  not	  required	  to	  answer	  these	  questions,	  although	  expertise	  is	  required	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  answers	  fall	  within	  determinate	  bounds.	  	  But	  when	  choosing	  among	  permissible	  options	  to	  give	  specific	  content	  to	  an	  indeterminate	  moral	  demand,	  we	  can’t	  appeal	  to	  better	  and	  worse	  options.	  	  Instead,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  look	  to	  procedural	  reasons;	  we	  should	  choose	  the	  democratically	  authorized	  option.	  	  So	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  suspect	  that	  democratic	  procedures	  should	  be	  instituted	  in	  any	  political	  institution,	  because	  they	  are	  the	  best	  procedure	  for	  choosing	  among	  options	  that	  could	  equally	  well	  meet	  an	  indeterminate	  demand	  of	  justice,	  like	  what	  property	  scheme	  to	  use.	  	  	   With	  these	  qualifications	  in	  mind,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  case	  for	  democracy’s	  immense,	  perhaps	  unique,	  instrumental	  contributions	  to	  both	  trustworthiness	  and	  expertise.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  no	  modern	  government	  can	  possess	  authority	  without	  being	  democratic,	  thus	  affirming	  the	  strong	  pro-­‐democracy	  intuitions	  in	  modern	  commonsense	  political	  thinking.	  	   Recall	  that	  trustworthiness	  is	  composed	  of	  two	  elements,	  competence	  and	  goodwill.	  	  On	  my	  account	  of	  authority,	  competence	  is	  ensured	  if	  the	  government	  meets	  the	  expertise	  condition,	  so	  I’ll	  address	  that	  component	  of	  trustworthiness	  below.	  	  Here	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Anna	  Stilz,	  Liberal	  Loyalty	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  UP,	  2009):	  p.	  40.	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democracy’s	  contribution	  to	  goodwill.	  	  In	  this	  context	  goodwill	  means	  willingness	  to	  take	  account	  of	  and	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  subject.	  	  Democratic	  procedures	  help	  protect	  citizens’	  interests	  by	  giving	  the	  citizens	  a	  voice	  in	  assessing	  whether	  their	  interests	  are	  being	  sufficiently	  protected	  and	  promoted.	  	  If	  a	  president	  keeps	  acting	  against	  the	  (perceived)	  interests	  of	  the	  citizenry,	  they	  will	  hold	  her	  accountable	  by	  electing	  someone	  else,	  someone	  they	  believe	  is	  more	  trustworthy.	  	  Of	  course	  they	  may	  be	  mistaken,	  but	  non-­‐democratic	  governments	  have	  a	  much	  worse	  record	  of	  accountability	  to	  citizens’	  interests.	  	   A	  good	  proxy	  for	  goodwill	  is	  the	  republican	  concern	  with	  non-­‐domination.	  	  A	  dominates	  B	  just	  in	  case	  A	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  arbitrarily	  interfere	  with	  B’s	  interests,	  where	  arbitrariness	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  influence	  or	  control	  B’s	  interests	  have	  on	  A’s	  decision-­‐making.31	  	  Democratic	  procedures	  force	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  people	  into	  the	  decision-­‐making	  of	  governments,	  to	  greater	  and	  lesser	  degrees.	  	  Governments	  must	  be	  trustworthy,	  which	  requires	  goodwill,	  which	  requires	  non-­‐arbitrariness	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  each	  individual.	  	  	  	   In	  previous	  chapters	  I	  said	  nothing	  about	  what	  actual	  characteristics	  a	  government	  must	  have	  to	  achieve	  the	  level	  of	  trustworthiness	  necessary	  to	  ground	  its	  authority.	  	  I	  only	  noted	  that	  it	  is	  very	  difficult,	  given	  how	  vulnerable	  we	  are	  to	  political	  agents.	  	  I	  then	  gave	  some	  arguments	  suggesting	  that,	  quite	  schematically,	  political	  agents	  are	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  their	  institutional	  nature	  to	  achieve	  a	  level	  of	  competence	  and	  goodwill	  that	  would	  be	  otherwise	  impossible.	  	  Here	  I	  can	  add	  a	  substantive	  claim	  to	  this	  argument.	  	  It	  is	  plausible	  to	  me	  that	  without	  being	  democratic,	  no	  modern	  government	  could	  establish	  sufficient	  goodwill	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  trustworthy	  to	  have	  the	  kind	  of	  sweeping	  authority	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Philip	  Pettit,	  Republicanism	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  UP,	  1997).	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governments	  claim.	  	  We	  are	  steeped	  in	  stories	  of	  the	  abuses	  of	  power,	  catastrophic	  history	  lessons	  in	  government	  run	  amok.	  	  There	  is	  a	  reason	  commonsense	  modern	  political	  philosophy	  sees	  democracy	  as	  the	  uniquely	  legitimate	  form	  of	  modern	  political	  organization.	  	  	  	   This	  suggests	  another	  answer	  to	  Simmons’	  objection	  regarding	  American	  and	  French	  law.	  	  Above	  I	  suggested	  that	  French	  citizens	  wouldn’t	  be	  bound	  because	  the	  American	  government	  lacks	  the	  appropriate	  contextual	  expertise.	  	  Because	  the	  American	  government	  is	  also	  not	  democratic	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  French	  citizens,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  trustworthiness.	  	  Without	  institutional	  constraints	  like	  regular	  free	  elections,	  French	  citizens	  have	  no	  reason	  believe	  that	  the	  American	  directives	  are	  being	  guided	  by	  goodwill:	  American	  directives	  aren’t	  being	  constrained	  by	  French	  interests	  and	  so	  dominate	  the	  French.	  Although	  the	  institutional	  nature	  of	  governments	  can	  be	  exploited	  in	  favor	  of	  trustworthiness,	  it	  also	  gives	  us	  reasons	  to	  doubt	  their	  goodwill	  and	  competence.	  	  Institutions	  encourage	  some	  phenomena	  that	  undermine	  trustworthiness,	  for	  example	  the	  diffusion	  of	  responsibility	  that	  occurs	  when	  people	  feel	  their	  part	  in	  a	  collective	  action	  is	  so	  minor,	  or	  so	  controlled	  by	  other	  forces,	  that	  they	  are	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions.	  Feeling	  this	  loss	  of	  responsibility,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  condone	  and	  participate	  in	  collective	  action	  regardless	  of	  whether	  that	  action	  is	  good,	  in	  the	  political	  case	  meaning	  whether	  it	  really	  serves	  the	  public	  interest.	  	  One	  very	  important	  way	  that	  political	  institutions	  can	  be	  trustworthy	  is	  with	  democratic	  procedures	  that	  act	  as	  a	  counterweight	  to	  these	  sorts	  of	  institutional	  problems.	  	  Democratic	  procedures	  are	  the	  best	  check	  on	  the	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political	  agent	  acting	  to	  secure	  ends	  other	  than	  the	  interests	  of	  its	  citizens,	  i.e.	  acting	  arbitrarily.	  	  	  	   So	  democracy	  is	  immensely,	  perhaps	  uniquely,	  valuable	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  secure	  non-­‐arbitrariness	  and	  so	  demonstrate	  to	  citizens	  the	  goodwill	  and	  trustworthiness	  of	  the	  government	  by	  institutionally	  accounting	  for	  and	  protecting	  each	  individual’s	  interests.	  	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  although	  not	  as	  strongly,	  democracy	  contributes	  to	  expertise.	  As	  advocates	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  and	  others	  have	  emphasized,	  democratic	  procedures	  can	  often	  secure	  better	  outcomes.	  	  Institutions	  that	  incorporate	  democratic	  procedures	  will	  sometimes,	  perhaps	  even	  often,	  be	  more	  competent.	  	  	  The	  famous	  case	  is	  the	  UK	  Cumbrian	  sheep	  case.32	  	  After	  the	  nuclear	  disaster	  at	  Chernobyl,	  parts	  of	  the	  UK	  began	  seeing	  radioactive	  rainfall,	  which	  effected	  the	  grass	  and	  ultimately	  the	  sheep	  that	  fed	  on	  the	  grass.	  	  Scientists	  from	  the	  federal	  government	  began	  imposing	  restrictions	  on	  the	  local	  sheep	  farmers	  in	  order	  to	  contain	  the	  radioactive	  consequences.	  	  The	  scientists	  assumed	  that	  their	  expertise	  was	  global	  and	  could	  be	  applied	  equally	  well	  to	  the	  Cumbrian	  sheep	  farmers	  as	  to	  their	  standard	  cases.	  	  Their	  policies	  ultimately	  led	  to	  worse	  outcomes	  precisely	  because	  they	  ignored	  the	  local	  sheep	  farmers	  and	  imposed	  abstract	  standards.	  	  In	  my	  terminology	  from	  above,	  the	  sheep	  farmers	  had	  contextual	  expertise	  relevant	  for	  the	  application	  of	  general	  standards	  that	  the	  scientists	  did	  not	  have.	  	  Had	  the	  government’s	  procedures	  been	  more	  democratically	  informed,	  the	  results	  would	  have	  been	  better.	  Some	  people	  claim	  that	  democracy	  is	  completely	  justified	  on	  epistemic	  grounds,	  but	  I	  don’t	  need	  a	  claim	  nearly	  that	  strong.	  	  The	  point	  is	  simply	  that	  democratic	  procedures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Brian	  Wynne,	  “Sheepfarming	  After	  Chernobyl:	  A	  Case	  Study	  in	  Communicating	  Scientific	  Information”,	  
Environment	  31	  (1989):	  pp.	  10-­‐15.	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sometimes	  lead	  to	  more	  competent	  and	  so	  more	  reliable	  judgments,	  contributing	  to	  the	  government’s	  expertise	  and	  ability	  to	  meet	  the	  modified	  normal	  justification	  thesis.	  	  The	  most	  common	  argument	  in	  support	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  democracies	  make	  governments	  more	  competent	  relies	  on	  the	  Condorcet	  Jury	  Theorem.	  	  But	  there	  are	  limitations	  to	  applying	  this	  theorem,	  and	  good	  reasons	  to	  doubt	  it	  applies	  in	  modern	  democracies.33	  	  	  	   A	  better	  argument	  from	  Elizabeth	  Anderson	  relies	  on	  the	  works	  of	  John	  Dewey.	  	  She	  brings	  out	  three	  epistemic	  aspects	  of	  democracy	  that	  are	  well	  explained	  by	  Dewey’s	  account.34	  	  These	  are	  diversity,	  discussion,	  and	  dynamism.	  	  I	  don’t	  have	  the	  space	  to	  fully	  explain	  the	  argument,	  but	  two	  examples	  can	  illustrate	  the	  basic	  case.	  	  The	  diversity	  claim	  notes	  that	  democracy	  (assuming	  universal	  suffrage)	  brings	  together	  diverse	  groups,	  cutting	  across	  class,	  geographic,	  racial,	  gender,	  ethnic,	  cultural,	  and	  other	  lines.	  	  These	  groups	  are	  also	  epistemically	  diverse,	  and	  epistemic	  diversity	  leads	  to	  better	  outcomes.	  	  The	  sheep	  farmers	  knew	  more	  about	  their	  particular	  context	  than	  the	  government’s	  experts,	  and	  had	  their	  knowledge	  been	  institutionally	  available,	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  government’s	  policies	  would	  have	  been	  better.	  	   Hélène	  Landemore	  also	  appeals	  to	  the	  diversity	  of	  democratic	  procedures	  to	  make	  the	  epistemic	  case	  for	  democracy.35	  Landemore,	  drawing	  on	  studies	  of	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  in	  political	  science,	  argues	  that	  in	  liberal	  conditions	  democracy	  radically	  improves	  the	  outcomes	  of	  government	  decisions	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  extensive	  cognitive	  diversity	  of	  the	  electorate.	  	  She	  argues,	  “under	  the	  right	  conditions	  and	  all	  things	  being	  equal	  otherwise,	  what	  matters	  most	  to	  the	  collective	  intelligence	  of	  a	  problem-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  For	  sample	  critiques,	  see	  Elizabeth	  Anderson,	  “The	  Epistemology	  of	  Democracy”,	  Episteme	  3	  (2006):	  pp.	  8-­‐22	  and	  David	  M.	  Estlund,	  Democratic	  Authority	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  UP,	  2008).	  	  34	  Anderson,	  “The	  Epistemology	  of	  Democracy”.	  	  35	  Hélène	  Landemore,	  Democratic	  Reason	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  UP,	  2013).	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solving	  group	  is	  not	  so	  much	  individual	  ability	  as	  the	  number	  of	  people	  in	  the	  group.”36	  	  The	  argument	  for	  this	  claim	  is	  complex	  and	  I	  certainly	  don’t	  want	  to	  rest	  my	  case	  for	  genuine	  authority	  on	  it.	  	  But	  if	  it	  is	  true,	  it	  makes	  my	  point:	  it’s	  not	  about	  whether	  individual	  experts	  are	  in	  the	  government	  but	  about	  the	  contextual	  knowledge	  of	  millions	  of	  many	  individuals	  under	  good	  institutional	  constraints	  that	  result	  in	  directives	  with	  emergent	  expertise.	  	   Democratic	  procedures	  not	  only	  add	  considerable	  diversity,	  they	  are	  dynamic.	  	  Dynamism	  is	  Anderson’s	  alliterative	  term	  for	  feedback	  and	  change	  mechanisms.	  	  The	  commands	  of	  political	  authorities	  are	  intended	  to	  solve	  practical	  problems	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  individuals.	  	  The	  success	  of	  policies	  is	  best	  evaluated	  by	  the	  people	  whose	  lives	  are	  affected,	  and	  holding	  decision-­‐makers	  accountable	  for	  failed	  policies	  is	  a	  primary	  way	  institutional	  mechanisms	  can	  help	  secure	  better	  outcomes.	  	  Policies	  that	  allow	  for	  external	  evaluation	  and	  change	  will	  be	  better,	  and	  democracy	  helps	  secure	  these	  outcomes.	  	  This	  claim	  is	  about	  more	  than	  voting,	  though,	  for	  other	  components	  of	  a	  democratic	  society,	  like	  a	  free	  press	  and	  active	  dissent,	  contribute	  to	  epistemic	  competence.	  	  Feedback	  mechanisms	  significantly	  contribute	  to	  both	  competence	  and	  goodwill.	  	   The	  point	  is	  simply	  that	  democracy	  can	  increase	  competence,	  and	  so	  make	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  democratic	  governments	  will	  meet	  the	  expertise	  and	  trustworthiness	  conditions	  than	  non-­‐democratic	  governments.	  	  I	  leave	  aside	  the	  many	  interesting	  questions	  remaining,	  such	  as	  how	  much	  competence	  is	  increased,	  under	  what	  conditions	  democracy	  also	  entails	  epistemic	  losses,	  what	  specific	  mechanisms	  increase	  competence,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  These	  would	  be	  more	  relevant	  for	  a	  theory	  that	  claimed	  democracy	  was	  justified	  purely	  on	  epistemic	  grounds,	  but	  that	  is	  not	  my	  claim.	  	  There	  is	  simply	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  democracy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Ibid.,	  p.	  104.	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plays	  a	  significant	  and	  perhaps	  unique	  role	  in	  modern	  governments’	  meeting	  the	  conditions	  for	  genuine	  political	  authority.37	  	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  democratic	  authorization	  procedures	  of	  some	  sort	  will	  be	  a	  necessary	  feature	  of	  any	  genuine	  modern	  political	  authority.	  	  Intuitively	  this	  is	  the	  correct	  result,	  especially	  given	  our	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  the	  modern	  political	  context.	  	  Democracy	  is	  a	  plausible	  condition	  on	  modern	  political	  authority	  because	  it	  is	  the	  primary	  way	  to	  establish	  accountability	  and	  so	  trustworthiness	  with	  respect	  to	  goodwill.	  	  Further,	  access	  to	  the	  diverse	  knowledge	  of	  huge	  populations	  aids	  the	  governments’	  judgments	  by	  increasing	  their	  contextual	  expertise	  and	  ultimately	  helping	  citizens	  better	  conform	  to	  their	  preexisting	  reasons.	  	  Thus,	  as	  Buchanan	  argues,	  where	  we	  have	  the	  resources	  and	  capability	  to	  use	  democratic	  procedures	  we	  should.38	  	  It	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  on	  genuine	  political	  authority	  of	  all	  types,	  but	  given	  our	  modern	  history	  and	  resources,	  it	  will	  be	  required	  of	  most,	  or	  perhaps	  all,	  modern	  political	  authorities.	  	  On	  the	  whole,	  my	  account	  leaves	  ample	  space	  for	  democracy	  and	  for	  the	  expression	  of	  democratic	  values.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  This	  completes	  the	  case	  for	  evidential	  governmentalism.	  	  All	  people	  have	  a	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  to	  create,	  support,	  and	  uphold	  just	  institutions	  that	  meet	  Rawls’	  two	  principles	  of	  justice.	  	  This	  duty	  is	  extremely	  important,	  important	  enough	  that	  people	  can	  be	  permissibly	  punished	  for	  not	  fulfilling	  it.	  	  One	  of	  the	  necessary,	  constitutive	  components	  of	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  There	  is	  a	  nuanced,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  powerful,	  Rousseauean	  argument	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  democracies	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	  formation	  a	  collective	  will,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  with	  a	  collective	  will	  that	  we	  can	  define	  what	  is	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  and	  so	  which	  problems	  ought	  to	  be	  addressed	  by	  political	  authority.	  	  Democracy	  would	  thus	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  on	  competence	  when	  addressing	  collective	  problems.	  	  Unfortunately	  I	  don’t	  have	  the	  space	  to	  address	  that	  argument	  here.	  38	  Buchanan,	  Justice,	  Legitimacy,	  and	  Self-­‐Determination,	  pp.	  249ff.	  
	   224	  
institutions	  is	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment,	  which	  requires	  that	  the	  government	  have	  the	  liberty	  to	  punish	  subjects	  and	  correlatively	  that	  subjects	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment.	  	  In	  order	  to	  make	  subjects	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment,	  the	  government’s	  commands	  must	  change	  subjects’	  subjective	  duties	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  they	  meet	  the	  duty	  of	  justice.	  	  The	  power	  to	  issue	  commands	  that	  changes’	  others	  subjective	  duties	  of	  the	  relevant	  sort	  is	  grounded	  primarily	  in	  expertise.	  	   Some	  modern	  governments,	  particularly	  Western	  democracies,	  have	  expertise	  about	  how	  to	  meet	  the	  duty	  of	  justice,	  as	  we	  see	  in	  how	  close	  their	  institutions	  and	  outcomes	  get	  to	  meeting	  Rawls’	  two	  principles.	  	  Their	  judgments	  have	  the	  emergent	  property	  of	  justice	  expertise	  due	  to	  institutional	  constraints,	  of	  which	  the	  constitution	  is	  one	  particularly	  important	  and	  prominent	  example.	  	  They	  especially	  have	  expertise	  relevant	  to	  their	  average	  citizens,	  who	  are	  often	  benighted	  about	  the	  true	  demands	  of	  justice.	  	  	  Further,	  because	  they	  have	  the	  sort	  of	  contextual	  expertise	  required	  to	  achieve	  justice	  in	  particular	  circumstances,	  they	  have	  justice	  expertise	  over	  most	  of	  their	  population,	  benighted	  or	  otherwise.	  	  Democratic	  institutions	  considerably	  bolster	  this	  contextual	  expertise.	  Modern	  governments	  also	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  trustworthy	  to	  justify	  the	  level	  of	  deference	  they	  require	  in	  the	  very	  important	  domains	  they	  govern.	  	  Again,	  democratic	  procedures	  and	  other	  institutional	  mechanisms	  are	  the	  primary	  reason	  governments	  can	  achieve	  the	  required	  level	  of	  trustworthiness.	  	  	  	   Under	  these	  conditions,	  most	  of	  the	  commands	  of	  some	  modern	  governments	  will	  bind	  most	  of	  their	  subjects	  in	  most	  domains,	  constituting	  preemptive,	  content-­‐independent	  evidential	  reasons	  that	  make	  subjects	  objectively	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  punishment	  for	  disobeying.	  	  This	  allows	  the	  government	  to	  institute	  a	  fair	  system	  of	  punishment	  that,	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because	  vulnerability	  is	  widespread	  enough,	  can	  be	  sufficiently	  effective	  for	  the	  government	  to	  coordinate	  behavior	  and	  achieve	  justice.	  	  Some	  governments	  have	  genuine	  evidential	  modern	  political	  authority	  over	  most	  of	  their	  subjects	  in	  most	  domains.	  	  Evidential	  governmentalism	  is	  true.	  Philosophical	  anarchism	  is	  false.	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Appendix:	  The	  Conceptual	  Coherence	  of	  Exclusionary	  Reasons	  	  	  Many	  theorists	  have	  serious	  doubts	  about	  exclusionary	  reasons:	  “exclusionary	  force	  is	  conceptually	  problematic.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  understand,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  maintain,	  and	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  the	  point	  of	  it.”39	  	  In	  this	  appendix	  I	  address	  the	  concern	  that	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons	  is	  conceptually	  incoherent,	  considering	  arguments	  from	  Christopher	  Essert	  and	  Heidi	  Hurd.40	  	   Essert’s	  concern	  focuses	  on	  the	  reasons	  that	  are	  excluded.	  	  Let’s	  say	  an	  authority	  commands	  me	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym.	  	  I	  have	  preexisting	  reasons	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym,	  like	  the	  benefits	  of	  exercise,	  my	  desire	  to	  stay	  on	  a	  habitual	  gym	  schedule,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  I	  also	  have	  preexisting	  reasons	  not	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym,	  like	  the	  pain	  of	  exercise,	  the	  time	  I	  could	  spend	  doing	  other	  activities,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  The	  authority’s	  command	  excludes	  some	  of	  these	  reasons;	  the	  question	  is	  which.	  	   As	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  in	  earlier	  writing	  Raz	  characterizes	  the	  second-­‐order	  reason	  as	  excluding	  all	  the	  other	  reasons	  from	  the	  subject’s	  practical	  deliberation.	  	  So	  in	  the	  gym	  case	  my	  reasons	  to	  not	  go	  to	  the	  gym,	  like	  the	  pain	  of	  exercise,	  get	  excluded,	  but	  so	  do	  my	  reasons	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym,	  like	  the	  benefits	  of	  exercise.	  	  Call	  this	  the	  broad	  interpretation	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  exclusion.	  	  However,	  more	  recently	  Raz	  has	  modified	  his	  position	  to	  say	  that	  only	  reasons	  counting	  in	  favor	  of	  acting	  in	  a	  manner	  not	  commanded	  are	  excluded.	  	  So	  the	  pain	  of	  exercise	  is	  excluded	  from	  my	  deliberation	  because	  it	  supports	  not	  going	  to	  the	  gym,	  but	  the	  benefits	  of	  exercise	  are	  not	  excluded	  because	  they	  support	  doing	  as	  commanded,	  i.e.	  going	  to	  the	  gym.	  	  This	  is	  the	  narrow	  interpretation.	  	  Essert	  claims	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Emran	  Mian,	  “The	  Curious	  Case	  of	  Exclusionary	  Reasons”,	  p.	  99.	  40	  Christopher	  Essert,	  “A	  Dilemma	  for	  Protected	  Reasons”,	  Law	  and	  Philosophy	  31	  (2012):	  pp.	  49-­‐75;	  Hurd,	  “Challenging	  Authority”.	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that	  exclusionary	  reasons	  are	  incoherent	  on	  either	  interpretation	  and	  so	  presents	  a	  dilemma	  for	  exclusionary	  reasons.	  	   The	  first	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma	  rests	  on	  the	  broad	  interpretation.	  	  The	  problem	  (the	  sharp	  point	  of	  this	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma)	  is	  that	  it	  seems	  perfectly	  acceptable	  to	  do	  as	  commanded	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  as	  I	  have	  been	  stressing.	  	  If	  I	  decide	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym	  because	  I	  want	  to	  get	  healthier,	  and	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  was	  commanded	  to	  go,	  I	  am	  still	  doing	  as	  commanded.	  	  And	  this	  seems	  sufficient	  to	  count	  as	  obedience	  to	  the	  authority.	  	  I	  do	  not	  have	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym	  simply	  because	  I	  was	  commanded	  to,	  but	  this	  is	  what	  is	  required	  if	  all	  my	  reasons	  (other	  than	  the	  command-­‐reason)	  are	  excluded.	  	  	   	  	   The	  second	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma	  rests	  on	  the	  narrow	  interpretation.	  	  Essert	  argues	  that	  the	  problem	  on	  this	  horn	  is	  that	  subjects	  are	  forced	  to	  double-­‐count	  reasons.	  	  Here	  is	  the	  idea:	  when	  reasons	  are	  excluded,	  it	  is	  still	  up	  to	  the	  subject	  to	  go	  through	  her	  deliberation	  and	  act.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  exclusionary	  reasons	  have	  rigged	  the	  game,	  as	  it	  were,	  by	  leaving	  only	  reasons	  counting	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  commanded	  act	  on	  the	  table	  for	  the	  subject	  to	  consider.	  	  In	  the	  gym	  case,	  the	  pain	  of	  exercise	  is	  excluded	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  action,	  but	  the	  benefits	  of	  exercise	  remains.	  	  What	  also	  remains,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  problem,	  is	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  command.	  	  	  	   Recall	  that	  authoritative	  directives	  give	  a	  preemptive	  reason	  with	  two	  parts:	  the	  exclusionary,	  second-­‐order	  reason	  as	  well	  as	  the	  first-­‐order	  reason.	  	  This	  first-­‐order	  reason,	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  authority	  has	  commanded	  the	  subject	  to	  act,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  the	  subject	  may	  consider	  in	  her	  practical	  deliberation.	  	  But	  good	  authorities	  conform	  to	  the	  dependence	  thesis:	  the	  authorities’	  judgments	  are	  based	  on	  and	  take	  account	  of	  the	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preexisting	  reasons	  to	  act.41	  	  In	  the	  gym	  case,	  the	  fact	  that	  exercise	  will	  benefit	  me	  is	  one	  of	  the	  preexisting	  reasons,	  and	  the	  authority	  must	  have	  taken	  that	  fact	  into	  account	  in	  her	  directive	  for	  me	  to	  go	  to	  the	  gym.	  	  If	  the	  subject	  deliberates	  about	  how	  to	  act	  and	  tries	  to	  weigh	  the	  reason	  grounded	  in	  the	  benefits	  of	  going	  to	  the	  gym	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  reason	  grounded	  in	  the	  command,	  she	  will	  double-­‐count	  the	  benefits	  of	  going	  to	  the	  gym.	  	  For	  the	  benefits	  have	  already	  been	  counted	  in	  the	  authority’s	  judgment.	  	   This	  kind	  of	  double-­‐counting	  may	  not	  seem	  pernicious	  because	  it	  is	  just	  extra	  force	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  commanded	  act,	  and	  that’s	  all	  the	  subject	  is	  permitted	  to	  do	  anyway.	  	  But	  this	  ignores	  the	  fact	  that	  authorities	  have	  domain-­‐specific	  jurisdiction,	  and	  only	  reasons	  that	  fall	  within	  her	  jurisdiction	  are	  excluded.	  	  In	  the	  gym	  case,	  perhaps	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdiction	  only	  extends	  to	  my	  physical	  health.	  	  We	  can	  modify	  the	  case	  so	  that	  there	  are	  reasons	  outside	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdiction	  that	  count	  against	  going	  to	  the	  gym;	  perhaps	  my	  sister	  is	  sick	  and	  I	  want	  to	  bring	  her	  some	  soup.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  as	  I	  am	  balancing	  the	  reasons	  for	  and	  against	  going	  to	  the	  gym,	  double-­‐counting	  is	  problematic.	  	  Let’s	  implausibly	  stipulate	  that	  the	  reason	  to	  visit	  my	  sister	  has	  a	  weight	  of	  5,	  the	  reason	  based	  in	  the	  physical	  benefits	  of	  exercise	  a	  2,	  and	  the	  reason	  based	  in	  the	  command	  a	  4.	  	  If	  I	  count	  only	  the	  sister	  and	  command	  reasons,	  then	  I	  visit	  my	  sister	  because	  the	  reason	  of	  weight	  5	  outweighs	  the	  reason	  of	  weight	  4.	  	  But	  if	  I	  double-­‐count	  by	  also	  adding	  in	  the	  exercise	  reason,	  I	  go	  to	  the	  gym	  because	  the	  combined	  reasons	  in	  favor	  of	  going	  to	  the	  gym	  at	  6	  outweigh	  the	  reason	  to	  see	  my	  sister	  at	  5.	  	  This	  case	  is,	  of	  course,	  overly	  stylized	  and	  the	  strengths	  I	  assigned	  may	  seem	  intuitively	  preposterous,	  but	  it	  simply	  serves	  to	  illustrate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  42ff.	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that	  double-­‐counting	  is	  problematic	  primarily	  because	  of	  reasons	  which	  fall	  outside	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdiction.	  	   As	  presented,	  Essert’s	  dilemma	  is	  problematic	  because	  each	  horn	  depends	  on	  a	  different	  interpretation	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons.	  	  The	  first	  only	  works	  against	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  and	  the	  second,	  as	  Essert	  spells	  it	  out,	  assumes	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation.	  	  That	  said,	  I	  think	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  second	  horn	  can	  be	  modified	  so	  it	  works	  against	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  as	  well.	  	  This	  modified	  dilemma	  would	  then	  present	  a	  problem	  for	  Raz,	  but	  not	  for	  me	  because	  I	  reject	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation.	  	  On	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation,	  the	  first	  horn	  is	  not	  a	  worry.	  	   The	  first	  horn	  claimed	  that	  we	  cannot	  accept	  the	  broad	  scope	  of	  exclusion	  because	  to	  do	  so	  commits	  us	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  authorities	  care	  about	  how	  we	  are	  motivated.	  	  If	  I	  am	  commanded	  not	  to	  murder,	  it	  shouldn’t	  matter	  whether	  I	  don’t	  murder	  because	  I	  was	  commanded	  to	  or	  because	  I	  simply	  think	  murdering	  is	  wrong.	  	  But	  if	  the	  scope	  of	  exclusion	  includes	  reasons	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  command,	  like	  the	  fact	  that	  murder	  is	  wrong,	  then	  I	  disobey	  when	  I	  am	  motivated	  not	  to	  murder	  by	  the	  wrongness	  of	  murder,	  and	  this	  seems	  mistaken.	  	  All	  of	  this	  assumes	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  (as	  it	  should,	  since	  that	  is	  the	  interpretation	  Raz	  endorses	  and	  the	  argument	  is	  intended	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  Raz).	  	  If	  we	  switch	  to	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation,	  the	  sharp	  point	  of	  this	  horn	  fades	  away.	  	  If	  the	  justificatory	  force	  of	  all	  the	  reasons	  in	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdiction	  is	  excluded,	  the	  subject	  cannot	  justify	  her	  action	  by	  appeal	  to	  these	  reasons.	  	  But	  what	  she	  can	  be	  actually	  psychologically	  motivated	  by	  is	  left	  untouched	  and	  there	  is	  no	  dissonance	  with	  our	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understanding	  of	  authority.	  	  So	  the	  first	  horn,	  the	  broad	  scope	  of	  exclusion,	  spears	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  but	  not	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation.	  	   On	  the	  second	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma,	  we	  assume	  the	  narrow	  scope	  of	  exclusion	  and	  the	  problem	  is	  double-­‐counting.	  	  If	  the	  fact	  that	  going	  to	  the	  gym	  has	  physical	  benefits	  is	  allowed	  to	  count	  for	  me	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  command,	  then	  when	  I	  weigh	  my	  reasons	  it	  may	  improperly	  tip	  the	  balance	  because	  the	  authority	  already	  took	  account	  of	  its	  force	  when	  coming	  to	  her	  decision.	  	  All	  of	  this	  assumes	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation;	  it	  assumes	  that	  what	  is	  affected	  is	  the	  actual	  force	  of	  the	  reasons	  and	  the	  role	  they	  can	  play	  in	  the	  subject’s	  deliberation,	  not	  what	  the	  subject	  may	  happen	  to	  actually	  be	  motivated	  by.	  	  The	  whole	  metaphor	  of	  double-­‐counting	  is	  a	  metaphor	  of	  weight	  and	  justification,	  not	  motivation.	  	  	  	   But	  unlike	  in	  the	  first	  case,	  switching	  interpretations	  does	  not	  simply	  resolve	  the	  conflict.	  	  If	  we	  assume	  the	  motivational	  interpretation,	  then	  the	  weight	  or	  force	  of	  any	  reason	  is	  not	  excluded,	  only	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  motivated	  by	  that	  reason.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  excluded	  reasons	  to	  disobey	  still	  have	  force.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  double-­‐counting	  thus	  arises	  again,	  although	  in	  slightly	  modified	  form.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  not	  that	  the	  subject	  will	  double-­‐count	  and	  thus	  systematically	  favor	  doing	  as	  commanded.	  	  It’s	  that,	  because	  exclusion	  doesn’t	  affect	  weight	  at	  all,	  the	  effect	  of	  counting	  the	  authority’s	  judgment	  will	  be	  to	  double-­‐count	  all	  the	  preexisting	  reasons,	  both	  pro-­‐	  and	  con-­‐.	  	  This	  will	  give	  those	  reasons	  additional	  and	  inappropriate	  weight	  when	  compared	  against	  reasons	  that	  fall	  outside	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdiction	  and	  so	  undermines	  the	  good	  functioning	  of	  the	  subject’s	  deliberation.	  	  This	  problem	  will	  arise	  for	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  regardless	  of	  the	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scope	  of	  exclusion	  because	  it	  is	  a	  problem	  about	  weights	  and	  on	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  exclusion	  does	  not	  affect	  weight	  at	  all.	  	   So	  if	  we	  follow	  Raz	  and	  accept	  the	  motivational	  interpretation	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons,	  we	  run	  into	  a	  dilemma	  and	  are	  either	  forced	  to	  contradict	  our	  best	  understanding	  of	  authority	  or	  accept	  the	  problem	  of	  double-­‐counting.	  	  I’m	  not	  sure	  if	  double-­‐counting	  is	  very	  problematic,	  but	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  worry	  about	  Raz’s	  response	  here.	  	  If	  we	  accept	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation,	  as	  I’ve	  argued	  we	  should,	  then	  double-­‐counting	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  narrow	  scope	  of	  exclusion	  is	  still	  a	  worry.	  	  But	  the	  first	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma	  is	  no	  longer	  problematic	  because	  on	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  subjects	  can	  be	  motivated	  however	  they	  please,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  do	  as	  commanded.	  	  In	  response	  to	  Essert’s	  argument,	  then,	  we	  should	  endorse	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  and	  the	  broad	  scope	  of	  exclusion.42	  	  	   The	  other	  argument	  that	  claims	  the	  idea	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons	  is	  conceptually	  incoherent	  comes	  from	  Heidi	  Hurd.	  Hurd	  frames	  the	  problem	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  rationality.	  	  The	  service	  conception	  is	  attractive	  in	  large	  part	  because	  it	  shows	  how	  the	  space	  of	  subjects’	  reasons	  is	  affected	  so	  that	  they	  can	  rationally	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  command.	  	  Hurd	  claims	  that	  exclusion	  would	  force	  the	  subject	  to	  act	  irrationally,	  so	  Raz’s	  purported	  solution	  to	  the	  irrationality	  of	  deference	  to	  authorities	  is	  undermined	  and	  his	  account	  of	  authority	  vitiated.	  	  While	  I	  do	  not	  primarily	  think	  of	  Raz’s	  argument	  in	  this	  way,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  see	  why	  Hurd’s	  argument	  fails.	  	   Hurd	  begins	  by	  noting	  that	  Raz	  often	  says	  authorities	  require	  the	  surrender	  of	  personal	  judgment,	  and	  do	  so	  by	  excluding	  some	  reasons	  from	  the	  deliberative	  process.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  This	  seems	  correct	  under	  the	  justificatory	  interpretation	  because	  the	  whole	  idea	  of	  authority	  is	  that	  the	  force	  of	  the	  authority’s	  command	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  force	  of	  the	  underlying	  reasons,	  both	  those	  reasons	  in	  favor	  of	  doing	  as	  she	  commands	  and	  those	  against.	  	  It	  seems	  apt,	  then,	  that	  the	  force	  of	  the	  command	  replaces	  all	  of	  them,	  not	  just	  some.	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But	  excluding	  those	  reasons	  leaves	  the	  subject	  in	  a	  bind	  because	  authority	  must	  be	  evaluated	  by	  the	  subject.	  	  Here’s	  the	  thought:	  a	  purported	  authority	  commands	  me	  to	  take	  some	  act.	  	  If	  it	  is	  the	  command	  of	  a	  genuine	  authority,	  I	  am	  ipso	  facto	  bound	  to	  obey.	  	  In	  order	  to	  know	  if	  the	  authority	  is	  genuine,	  however,	  I	  must	  know	  whether	  it	  fulfills	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis,	  whether	  the	  command	  falls	  within	  the	  authority’s	  jurisdiction,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Investigating	  these	  issues	  requires	  me	  to	  deliberate	  about	  the	  first-­‐order	  reasons.	  	  	  	   Take	  fulfilling	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis:	  before	  I	  can	  rationally	  submit	  to	  a	  purported	  authority,	  I	  need	  to	  know	  whether	  the	  authority’s	  judgment	  will	  help	  me	  better	  conform	  with	  the	  preexisting	  reasons.	  In	  order	  to	  know	  this,	  however,	  I	  need	  to	  examine	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  after	  I	  have	  already	  been	  commanded	  (so	  know	  what	  the	  authority’s	  judgment	  is).	  	  Otherwise	  I	  may	  follow	  a	  command	  that	  doesn’t	  help	  me	  better	  conform.	  	  But	  examining	  the	  balance	  of	  reasons	  is	  precisely	  what	  I	  have	  been	  excluded	  from	  doing.	  	  I	  cannot	  rationally	  submit	  until	  I	  know	  whether	  the	  authority’s	  command	  fulfills	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis,	  but	  I	  cannot	  know	  whether	  the	  authority’s	  command	  fulfills	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  without	  violating	  exclusion,	  so	  I	  cannot	  rationally	  obey	  an	  authority.	  	  Hurd	  pushes	  this	  same	  argument	  against	  knowing	  whether	  the	  authority’s	  command	  falls	  within	  her	  jurisdiction	  and	  whether	  the	  command	  runs	  into	  any	  unstated	  exceptions,	  for	  example	  egregious	  injustices.	  	  On	  several	  fronts,	  then,	  exclusion	  prevents	  subjects	  from	  rationally	  obeying	  the	  commands	  of	  authorities,	  and	  the	  rational	  dilemma	  of	  authority	  still	  holds.	  
	   There	  are	  two	  major	  problems	  with	  this	  argument	  against	  exclusionary	  reasons.	  The	  first	  problem	  is	  that,	  as	  I	  have	  noted,	  Raz	  explicitly	  denies	  that	  exclusion	  has	  anything	  to	  do	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with	  deliberation	  or	  what	  the	  subject	  is	  allowed	  to	  think	  about.	  Hurd	  attempts	  to	  escape	  this	  problem	  in	  a	  footnote:	  While,	   as	   Raz’s	   point	   suggests,	   a	   commander’s	   order	   may	   not,	   from	   the	  commander’s	  point	  of	  view,	  preempt	  a	  subject’s	  own	  deliberation	  concerning	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  order,	  that	  order	  may	  well	  preempt	  such	  deliberation	  from	  the	  recipient’s	  point	  of	  view,	  since	   if	   that	  recipient	   is	  barred	  from	  acting	  on	  the	   results	   of	   her	   deliberations,	   she	   may	   wisely	   find	   it	   either	   pointless	   or	  risky	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  deliberation.43	  	  This	  concern	  seems	  misplaced	  to	  me.	  	  The	  reasons	  not	  to	  deliberate	  that	  the	  recipient	  responds	  to	  are	  purely	  pragmatic.	  	  When	  I	  receive	  a	  piece	  of	  advice,	  there	  is	  no	  exclusionary	  reason	  present.	  	  Still,	  there	  may	  be	  plenty	  of	  pragmatic	  reasons	  for	  me	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  any	  further	  deliberation,	  for	  example	  if	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  pointless.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  I	  can	  have	  these	  same	  reasons	  to	  cut	  off	  deliberation	  in	  either	  the	  advice	  or	  the	  authority	  case	  shows	  that	  “preemption”	  is	  here	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  recipient’s	  context,	  not	  any	  effect	  the	  authority	  had	  on	  her.	  	  The	  preemption	  that	  doesn’t	  happen,	  the	  commander’s	  preemption,	  is	  the	  principled	  kind	  of	  preemption	  that	  we	  should	  worry	  about.	  	  If	  the	  subject	  finds	  some	  pragmatic	  reasons	  to	  deliberate,	  maybe	  she	  just	  finds	  idle	  speculation	  entertaining,	  then	  she	  is	  perfectly	  free	  to	  deliberate.	  	  There’s	  nothing	  preventing	  the	  subject	  from	  deliberating,	  so	  she	  can	  look	  at	  the	  reasons	  and	  assess,	  for	  example,	  whether	  the	  authority	  fulfills	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  if	  she	  likes.	  	   The	  second	  problem	  with	  Hurd’s	  argument	  is	  that	  it	  misinterprets	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  and	  the	  demands	  of	  rationality.	  Consider	  the	  following	  passage:	  If	   it	   is	   rational	   to	  abide	  by	   the	   laws	  enacted	  by	  a	  practical	  authority	  only	   if	  that	   authority	   is	   legitimate	   (premise	   (4")	   above),	   and	   if	   an	   authority	   is	  legitimate	   only	   if	   its	   laws	   better	   cohere	   with	   the	   balance	   of	   content-­‐dependent	  reasons	  for	  action	  than	  do	  the	  judgments	  of	  those	  for	  whom	  it	  is	  an	  authority	  (the	  normal	  justification	  thesis),	  then	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Hurd,	  “Challenging	  Authority,	  p.	  1626,	  n.	  27.	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order	   to	   judge	  whether	   indeed	  an	  authority	   is	  acting	   legitimately	  one	  must	  oneself	  balance	  the	  reasons	  for	  action	  in	  each	  case	  in	  which	  a	  law	  applies	  so	  as	  to	  police	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  claimed	  authority	  to	  order	  action	  in	  conformity	  with	  that	  balance.	  The	  ability	  of	  a	  claimed	  authority	  to	  achieve	  action	  which	  in	   the	   long	   run	   better	   accords	   with	   the	   balance	   of	   reasons	   can	   only	   be	  measured	   if,	  at	  each	  decision,	   one	   judges	   for	  oneself	   the	   reasons	   for	   action,	  and	   compares	   one's	   judgment	  with	   that	   reached	   by	   the	   authority.	  Without	  engaging	   in	   such	   long-­‐term	   comparisons,	   one	  has	  no	  basis	   for	   thinking	   the	  claimed	  authority	  legitimate,	  and	  hence	  no	  rational	  foundation	  for	  abiding	  by	  that	  authority's	  will.	  One	  lacks,	  that	  is,	  any	  foundation	  for	  thinking	  that	  Raz's	  normal	   justification	   thesis	   applies.	   Yet	   since	   the	   attribution	   of	   practical	  authority	   to	   governmental	   institutions	   bars	   one	   from	   engaging	   in	   just	   the	  sort	  of	  comparisons	  that	  practical	  rationality	  depends	  upon,	  that	  attribution	  cannot	  be	  rationally	  defended.44	  	  	  I	  have	  italicized	  the	  problematic	  parts	  of	  this	  argument.	  	  Hurd	  reads	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  as	  addressing	  whether	  obeying	  a	  particular	  command	  will	  help	  the	  subject	  better	  conform	  with	  reason	  on	  that	  occasion.	  	  Here	  is	  Raz’s	  formulation	  of	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis,	  which	  is	  importantly	  different:	  	  [T]he	   normal	   way	   to	   establish	   that	   a	   person	   has	   authority	   over	   another	  person	   involves	   showing	   that	   the	   alleged	   subject	   is	   likely	  better	   to	   comply	  with	   reasons	   which	   apply	   to	   him	   (other	   than	   the	   alleged	   authoritative	  directives)	   if	   he	   accepts	   the	   directives	   of	   the	   alleged	   authority	   as	  authoritatively	   binding	   and	   tries	   to	   follow	   them,	   rather	   than	   by	   trying	   to	  follow	  the	  reasons	  which	  apply	  to	  him	  directly.45	  	  The	  key	  word	  is	  ‘likely’.	  	  To	  know	  that	  an	  agent	  fulfills	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  and	  so	  is	  an	  authority,	  one	  need	  only	  know	  whether	  the	  agent’s	  judgment	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  better	  cohere	  with	  the	  preexisting	  reasons.46	  	  And	  this	  can	  be	  known	  without	  looking	  at	  each	  case,	  and	  indeed	  can	  be	  known	  prior	  to	  knowing	  what	  the	  authority’s	  particular	  judgment	  is	  in	  this	  case.	  	  Once	  I	  have	  a	  sufficiently	  robust	  track	  record	  for	  the	  authority,	  I	  can	  infer	  that	  her	  judgment	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  better	  than	  mine	  and	  rationally	  defer	  my	  judgment	  to	  her.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Hurd,	  “Challenging	  Authority”,	  p.	  1633.	  My	  emphasis.	  45	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  53.	  My	  emphasis.	  46	  Cf.	  Raz,	  MF,	  p.	  47:	  authority	  is	  justified	  “not	  by	  assuming	  that	  they	  always	  succeed	  in	  acting	  in	  the	  ideal	  way,	  but	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  they	  do	  so	  often	  enough	  to	  justify	  their	  power”.	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   This	  is	  true	  of	  all	  sorts	  of	  cases.	  	  I’m	  standing	  outside	  and	  it	  feels	  65°	  to	  me,	  but	  then	  I	  look	  at	  the	  thermometer	  and	  it	  reads	  62°.	  	  I	  defer	  my	  judgment	  about	  temperature	  to	  the	  thermometer	  and	  believe	  it’s	  62°.	  	  Why	  is	  it	  rational	  for	  me	  to	  do	  this?	  	  It’s	  not	  because	  I	  then	  checked	  another	  thermometer	  and	  confirmed	  that	  it	  was	  62°	  or	  anything	  of	  the	  sort.	  	  It’s	  because	  I	  know	  the	  thermometer	  has	  been	  reliable	  in	  the	  past	  and	  I	  have	  good	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  reliability	  will	  continue	  into	  the	  future.	  	  In	  the	  thermometer	  case	  these	  reasons	  have	  to	  do	  with	  its	  physical	  construction	  and	  durability.	  	  These	  reasons	  can	  give	  me	  sufficient	  confidence	  in	  the	  better	  reliability	  of	  the	  thermometer	  for	  me	  to	  rationally	  defer	  my	  judgments	  about	  temperature	  to	  it.	  	  To	  claim	  otherwise	  is	  to	  endorse	  a	  very	  implausible	  view	  of	  the	  rational	  agent	  as	  someone	  who	  always	  needs	  direct	  evidence.	  	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  our	  beliefs	  and	  acts	  would	  be	  irrational.	  	   Hurd	  explicitly	  denies	  that	  I	  can	  make	  inferences	  about	  the	  future	  reliability	  of	  sources,	  but	  her	  reason	  is	  based	  on	  the	  misreading	  of	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis.47	  	  Once	  we	  realize	  that	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis,	  and	  so	  genuine	  authority,	  is	  about	  tendencies	  and	  not	  actual	  conformity	  in	  every	  case,	  the	  rational	  basis	  for	  deference	  is	  much	  easier	  to	  attain.	  	  Indeed,	  an	  account	  of	  authority	  must	  leave	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  mistaken	  (i.e.,	  non-­‐conforming)	  yet	  binding	  commands48	  and	  it	  is	  only	  because	  the	  normal	  justification	  thesis	  is	  about	  tendencies	  and	  not	  instances	  that	  this	  possibility	  is	  open.	  	   If	  Hurd	  were	  correct	  that	  rational	  deference	  requires	  examining	  each	  case	  of	  deference	  one	  by	  one,	  more	  than	  just	  exclusionary	  reasons	  and	  Razian	  practical	  authority	  would	  fall.	  	  So	  would	  epistemic	  authority,	  for	  deference	  to	  epistemic	  authorities	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  deferring	  to	  them	  leads	  to	  better	  conformity	  with	  the	  preexisting	  reasons	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Hurd,	  “Challenging	  Authority”,	  p.	  1635.	  48	  As	  Hurd	  implicitly	  admits,	  ibid.,	  p.	  1636.	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believe.	  	  In	  the	  practical	  authority	  case,	  the	  problem	  for	  deliberation	  was	  that	  exclusion	  purported	  to	  cut	  deliberation	  off.	  	  In	  the	  theoretical	  authority	  case,	  the	  problem	  for	  deliberation	  is	  most	  often	  that	  the	  layperson	  can’t	  do	  it.	  	  The	  expert	  has	  much	  more	  knowledge	  and	  experience,	  and	  assessing	  the	  claims	  of	  an	  expert	  is	  nearly	  always	  impossible	  for	  the	  layperson.	  I	  cannot,	  for	  example,	  reliably	  judge	  whether	  the	  judgments	  of	  a	  physicist	  are	  true	  because	  I	  simply	  don’t	  have	  the	  knowledge	  or	  skill	  to	  assess	  all	  the	  relevant	  facts	  and	  theories	  in	  physics.	  	  If	  a	  barrier	  to	  deliberation	  is	  a	  barrier	  to	  deference,	  then	  deference	  to	  an	  expert	  like	  the	  physicist	  is	  always	  irrational,	  but	  this	  is	  clearly	  not	  the	  case.	  	   Hurd’s	  argument	  is	  correct	  that	  it	  will	  often	  be	  quite	  difficult	  for	  subjects	  to	  determine	  whether	  they	  are	  obligated	  to	  obey	  a	  particular	  command.	  	  They	  need	  to	  know	  that	  the	  authority	  is	  legitimate,	  that	  the	  command	  falls	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  her	  jurisdiction,	  that	  there	  are	  no	  decisive	  reasons	  to	  disobey	  from	  outside	  her	  jurisdiction,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  But	  this	  is	  just	  a	  feature	  of	  living	  and	  acting	  in	  the	  actual,	  messy,	  complicated	  world.	  	  We	  constantly	  have	  conflicting	  demands	  placed	  on	  us,	  reasons	  to	  act	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  incompatible	  ways.	  	  This	  makes	  acting	  well	  difficult,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  general	  feature	  of	  life	  in	  complex	  contexts	  that	  explains	  the	  difficulty,	  not	  any	  particular	  problem	  with	  commanding	  and	  certainly	  not	  any	  problem	  with	  exclusion.	  	  The	  practical	  problems	  Hurd	  highlights	  are	  definitely	  an	  issue,	  but	  as	  Alvin	  Goldman	  has	  argued,	  this	  difficulty	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  many	  indirect	  ways	  laypeople	  have	  to	  identify	  experts.49	  	  While	  a	  difficult	  practical	  task,	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  insurmountable	  and	  in	  fact	  is	  something	  we	  do	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Goldman,	  “Experts:	  Which	  Ones	  Should	  You	  Trust?”.	  
